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PREFACE
TI-US. the third volume of the History of thePeninsular War, covers a longer period than
either of its predecessors, extending over the sixteen
months from vVellington's arrival at nadajoz on his
retreat from Talavera (Sept. 3, 1809) to the deadlock
in ti'Ollt of Sant:3L-em (Dec. 1810), which marked the
end of Massena's offensive campaign in Portugal It
thus embraces the centrnl crisis of the whole war, the
arrival of the French in front of the Lines of Torres
Vedras and their first short retreat, after they had
realized the impossibility of forcing that impregnable
barrier to their advance. The retreat that began at
Sobral on the night of Nov. 14, 1810, was to end
at Toulouse on April U, 1814. The armies of the
Emperor were never ~tble to repeat the experiment of
1810, and to assume a general and vigorous offensive
against Wellington and Portugal. In 1811 they
were on the defensive, despite of certain local nnd
partial attempts to recover their lost initiative.
In 1812 they had to abandon half Spain-Andalnsia.
Estremadura, Asturias, La Mancha, Ilnd much more,
-despite of \i\TeUington's temporary check before
BUl·gos. In 1813 they were swept across the
Pyrenees and the Bidassoa; in. 1814 they were
fighting a losing game in their own land. Rightly
then may Massena's retreat to Santarem be called
the beginning of the end-though it was not for a
full year more that 'i\'ellington's final offensive com-
menced, with the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo on
.Jan. 8, 1812.
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PREFACE
The campaign of Bussaco and Torres Vedras,
therefore, marked the turning-point of the whole
war, and I have endeavoured to set forth its meaning
in full detail, devoting special care to the explanation
of vVellington's triple device for arresting the French
advance-his combination of the system of devasta-
tion, of the raising of the levee en 1Jlasse in Portugal,
Hud of the construction of' great defensive lines in
front of Lisbon. Each of these three measures
would have been incomplete without the other two.
l'ol' the Lines of Torres Vedras might not have
saved POltugal and Europe from the domination of
Napoleon, if the invading army had not been sur·
rounded on all sides by the light screen of irregular
troops, which cut its communications, and prevented
it from foraging {ID' afield. Nor would Masseua have
been turned back, if the land through which he had
advanced had been left un ravaged, and if every large
\rilInge had contained enough food to subsist a brigade
for a day or a battalion for a week.
The preparations, the advance, and the retreat of
Massena cover about half of this volume. The rest
of it is occupied with the operations of the French in
Northern, Eastern, and Southern Spain-operations
which seemed decisive at the moment, but which
turned out to be mere side-issues in the great contest.
For Soult's conquest of Andalusia, and Suchet's
victories in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia only dis-
tracted the imperial genemls from tlleir central tflSk
-the expulsion of Wellington and his army from
the Peninsula. Most readers will, I think, find
a good deal of new intormation in the accounts of
the siege of Gel'ona and the battle of Ocafla. The
credit due to Alvul'ez for the defence of the Cata-
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Ionian city has never been properly set forth before
in any English history, nor have the details of
Al'eizaga's miserable campaign in La Mancha been
fully studied. In particular, the composition and
strength of his anny have never before been
elucidated, and Appendices V, VI of this volume
consist of absolutely unpublished documents.
I have to offer my grateful thanks to those who
have been good enough to assist me in the writing
of this book, by furnishing me with stores of private
papers. or hitherto unknown official reports. Two
of the kind helpers who put me on the track of
new information for the compiling of Volume I I
have passed away while Volume III was in progress.
I bitterly regret the loss of my friends General
Arteche and Colonel F'. A. Whinyates. The former,
with his unrivalled knowledge of the contents of the
historical department of the Madrid'Var Oflice, had
enabled me to discover many a lost document of
importance. The latter had placed at my disposal
his copious store of papers, letters, and diaries
relating to his old corps, the Uoyal Artillery. In
this present section of the history of the war I
am still using much of the material which he
lent me.
Uut new helpers have come to my aid while
this volume was being written. '1'0 three of them
I must express my special gratitude. The first is
Mr. \iV.S.M. D'Urban,ofNewportHouse.nelll' Exeter,
who has furnished me with copies of a collection
of papers of unique interest, the diary and corre-
spondence of his grandfather, Sir llenjamin D'Urban,
who served as the Qunrtermaster~General of the'
. ,
PO;ltuguese army, under :Marshal Beresfo,rd, during
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the two years covered by this section of mi history.
Thanks to the mass of documents furnished by
:1\'11'. D'Urban's kindness, I am now in n position
to follow the details of the organization, movements,
and exploits of the Portuguese army in a way that
had hitherto been impossible to me. Moreover, Sir
llenjamin's day by day criticisms on the strategy
and tactics both of Massena and of Welliu,brton
have the highest interest, as reflecting the opinions
of the more intelligent section of the head-quarters
staff. It is noteworthy to find that, while many of
'iVellington's chief subordinates despaired of the
situation in 1810, there were some who already felt
an enthusiastic confidence in the plans of their
leader, so much so that their criticisms were reserved
for the occasions when, in their opinion, he showed
himself over-cautious, and refused to take full
ndvnutuge of the uncomfortable positions into which
he had lured his enemy.
The second mass of interesting private papers
placed in my hands of late is the personal corre-
spondence of Nicholas Trant and John vVilson, the
two enterprising lea.ders of Portuguese militia forces,
to whom Wellington had entrusted the cutting off
of Massena's communication with Spain, and the
restriction of his raids for sustenance to feed his
army. These letters have been lent me by Com-
mander Rertram Chambers of H.M.S. Resolution, a
collateral relative of' 'Vilson. They fill up a gap in
the military history of 1810, for no one hitherto had
the opportunity of following out in detail the doings
of these two adventurous soldiers and trusty friends,
while they were engaged in the difficult task that
was set them. For a sample of Trant's br.eezy style
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of correspondence. I may refer the reader to pages
399-400 of this volume. Unfortunately, when the
two militia generals were in actual contact, their
correspondence naturally ceased, so that the series
of letters has many lacunae. nut they are never-
theless of the highest value.
Thirdly, I have to thank Sir Henry Le .l\'Iarchant
for a sight of the private papers of his grandfather,
the well-known cavalry hrigadier, General John Gaspar
Le .Marcbant, who fell at Salamanca. He did not
land in the Peninsula till 1811, but during the
preceding year he was receh·-ing many letters of
interest, some from his own contemporaries, officers
of high runk in 'Vellington's army. others from
younger men, who had been his pupils while. he
was in command of the l\filitary College at High
Wycombe. Some of the seniors, and one especially,
were among those downhearted men-of the opposite
type to Benjnmin D'Urbnn-who were consistently
expecting disaster, and looked for n hasty embarkation
llt Lisbon as the natural end of the campaign of 1810.
The younger men took a very different view of
affairs, and invariably sent cheerful accounts of the
doings of the army.
I must mention. once more, kind assistance from
the officials of the Historical sections of the War
~1inistries at Paris and at I\fadrid. 1\1y friend
Commandant llalagny, who gave me so much help
during the compilation of my second volume, has
unfortunately been absent on a military mission to
Brazil during the last three years. But the kind
offices of M. Martinien have continually aided me
in getting access to the particular sections of the
Paris archives with which [ was from time to time
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concerned. I must here take the opportunity of
expressing once more my admiration for his colossal
work, the Lisle des qfficiers hufs et blesses pendant
les Guer1'ts de rEmpire, which, on the nwnberless
occasions when no casualty-return appears in the
Paris archives, enables one to determine what
regiments were present at any action, and in what
proportion they suffered. At :l\1adrid Captain
Emilio Figueras has continued his kind services,
offered during the compilation of my second volume,
and was indefatigable in going through the papers
of 1810 with mc, during my two visits to the Spanish
capital.
Among my English helpers I must cite with
special gratitude four names. The first is that of
Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter College,
Oxford, who has read the proofs of the greater part
of this volume, and given me many valuable correc-
tions and pieces of information, from his wide know-
ledge of British regimental history. The second is
that of Major John H. Leslie, R.A., who has compiled
the Artillery Appendix to this section, corresponding
to that which Colonel ",Vhillyates compiled for the
last. I am also most grateful to him for an early
view of the useful 'Dickson Papers,' which he is
publishing for the Royal Artillery Institution. The
third is that of the Rev. Alexander Craufurd, who
has continued to give me notes on the history of the
Light Division, while it wns commanded by his
grandfather, the famous Robcrt Craufurd. The
fourth is that of Mr. C. E. Doble of the Clarendon
Press, who h::lS again read for errors every page of
a long volume.
Lastly, the indefatigable compiler of the Index
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must receive once more my heartfelt thanks for a
labour of love.
The reader will fiud ~evel'al topographical nores
appended at the end of chapters, the results of my
first and second tours along the borderland of Spain
and Portugal. 'l\vo long visits to the battlefield
of llussaco, and some days spent between the Coa
nnd the Agueda, and behind the Lines of Tones
Vedrns, gave me many new topographical fnets of
imporbU1ce. Drives and walks in the Bad!~joz-EI\'as
country, and about Coimbra, also turned out most
profitable. But my notes on the battlefields of
Fuentes d'Oi'ioro and Albuera can only be utilized
in my next volume, which I trust may not be long
in following its predecessor into print.
The spelling of many of the Spanish, and more
especially the Portuguese, names may appear un-
familiar to some readers. But I believe that COrL'ect-
ness should be studied above all things, even though
the results in cases like nussaco with the double s,
Golegao, or Santa Comba Dao, may produce a
momentary shock to the eye. }:Jortuguese spelling,
both in personal names and in topography, was in
a state of flux in 1810. For example, the General
commanding the Artillery always appears as da Rosa
in the official army lists, yet signed his name da Roz<l;
countless other instnnces could be produced. Where
it was possible I have followed the individual's own
version of his name: he ought to have known best.
There are still, no doubt, errors of spelling surviving:
no mttn is infallible, but I have done my be:)'t to
reduce them to a minimum.
C. OMAN.
OU'{lIlU :
M/lreh 1, 1900.
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L SI'''XISII IXl'"x'rRY 1808
This shows the old uniform of Charles TV, The,Line regiments had white,
the Foreigu and Light regiments blue, coats. Both wore white breeches and
black guitel'S; the plume and fucinlr-l \'(l;Tied in colour for ca.ch regiment.
It 81''':,'1.$11 bl'''''''RY 1810
Under the influcm'C of the immen,>;c quantity of British mllterillls
supplied, the uniform MS eomplc~ly changed since \808, The cut is llSsimi-
lllted to that of the British IInnv-the narl'()w-toppcd shako. and long
trousers have been introduL'Cd. The L'()IIt is dark-blue, the trousel'S grey-
blue. the fudnR's red. Grenadiers have the grenade, light-companie!l the
bugle-horn on their shakos.
ERRATA
Page f.1&~, line 13./QT 3\8 Trod 333
.. :111, .. 20./071811 Twd J810
.. .!13.$, Lord Blayney's force had only a half_battalion. not a ....hole
battalion of the 89th, but contained '" companies of foreign chasseurs,
not mentioned in the tcxt. [See his Memoirs. i. pp, 5-0.1
SECTION XVII
FROM TALAVERA TO OCANA
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY. THE CENTRAL JUNTA. WELLESLEY
AND WELLINGTON
H.K'1'W.l::E~ the 20th of August, 1809, whell Robc.rt Crnufuro's
Light Brigade 1 withdrew from the Bridge of Almataz, to follow
the rest of the British army across the mountains to the neigh-
bourhood of Badajoz, and February ~7, 1810, when part of that
same brigade was engaged in the first skirmish of Barba del
Pllerco, not II shot was fired by any of Wellington'A troops.
'l.'his gap of over six months in his acti"e operations may appeal'
extraordinary, and it was bitterly criticized at the time. Between
August and :March there was hard 6ghting both in the south
of Spain llnd along the nortlHmstern frontier of Portugal;
but -the British army, despite many invitations, took no part
in it. Wellington adhered to his resolve never to commit
himself again to a cumpnigll in company with the Spaniards,
unless he should be placed in a position in which he could
be independent of the freaks of their government and the
perversity of their generals. Two months' experience of the
impracticability of Cuesta, of the deliberate disobedience of
Venegas, of the fl'llitless promises of the cOlllmissary-general
Lozano de 'l'orres, of the insane demands and advice sent
in hy the Central Junta, had convinced him that he dare not
risk his army in a $I..'COnd venture such as that which had led
him to Talavern. If be were made commander-ill-chief by
the Spanish Government, alld granted ll. free hand ill the direction
of the Spanish armies, matters would look different 2. But
1 Not, it must be remembered, to become the LightDi~i.tiQntill '\[ll11lh
1810.
I See Wellington to Canning, Sept. 5,1809, in DispatcMII, I'. 123-4.
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there was at present no chance whatevel' that he would receive
sllch a mark of crmfidence. Only a small millOl"ity of the
leading men at Se,·ille could endure with patience the idea
of a British commander-in-chief. Wellington himself had long
dismissed tile pmjL'Ct-which Frcrc had broached in the sprillg l-
as impracticable.
Meanwhile the French udvance hnd nu suoner ceased-after
the rather objectless combat of Arzobispo-than the Junta
hegsn to press upon the British general schemes for a resump-
tion of the offensive and a seeond march toward Madrid.
The political situatioll, and not any military considerations, was
the originating canse of their untimely activity. They fclt
that their authority was waning, that their popularity had
vllnished. that their critics were didl)' growing morc vellomous,
nnd they saw that success ill the war would be the only possible
\I'ay out of tlleir difficulties. Hence at the very moment when
Wellington was withdrawing his half~starved army from the
Tagus, and impeaching in letters of stinging irony the conduct
of the JWlta's melldaciotls commissaries, he \1'il.S I.>cing prtSSl'd
to resume the offensive. Countless appeals were made to him.
Both fOl'mal and argumentative invitlltions frolll the ministers
at Seville, and private remonstrances by individuals, Spanish
l\ud English, were showered upon him 2. The .Junta e\'en wen1,
so fill' as to offcr him COlllll)~Uld of the Spanish troops ill
Estremadura, though this offer was qualified by their statement
that they ilrtended to rcdut'C those troops to 1:2,000 men, the
larger half of' the army being under orders to march eastward
into Lo. MllllChn Ilnd join the forre of Vencgfls. This proposal
did not in the least meet Wellington's main objection to
resuming active operations; "iz. that he could not trust the
Spanish Government to feed his army, nor the Spanish generals
to CUlT)' out with punctual accuracy any scheme for a joint
campaign which might be laid before him. Hc put the matter
very plainly-' till the evils of which I think that I have reason
to complain arc remedied: till I $L'C magazines established
l See \"01. ii. pp. 465-6.
~ See Di$patcM~, v. 168, for an account of an interview witll the
Marquis of Malaspina and Lord Macdaff, wlLO had come to Badajoz to
make personal representntion, wiJich 'Vellington mnd) resented.
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fm' the supply of lhe ll'00ps, lUul n l't.lglllul" system mloptOO
for keeping them lillL'{l: tilll $CC an army upon whose exeltions
I cau depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry
into execution the operations which have been planned by mutual
agreement, I cannot cntc" upon ally system of L'O-operation \\:ith
the Spanish armies I.' This statement was for publication:
in private correspondence with his brother, the ambassador at
Seville, he added still more cogent rellSons for declining to
take the field with Venegas or Egnia_ He had witnessed with
his OW11 eyes the p..'lnic of Portago's division on the night before
Talavera, • when whole corp.'! threw away their arms and ran
ott' in my presence, while neither attacked nor threatened with
aU..o.ek, but frightened (1 believe) by, their own fire': he had
seen AlbuC}uerque's cilsalry, the day after the combat of Arzo-
bispo, lurking ill every village for twenty miles round, and' had
heard Spanish oflieel'S telling of nineteen or twenty actions
of the same description as that of Arwbispo, an account of
which (1 believe) has ne'-er been published.' The army of
Estremncllll'll c..'ollsisted, he concluded, • of troops by 110 means
to be depended upon'-on every ground, therefore, he ought
to amid' risking the King's army again in such company 2.'
There WM no b"Ctting over this fundamental objection of
\Vellington's, and his brother, therefore, was placed in a "ery
uncomfortable positiOll. During all his negotiations with the
Central J Ullta, Lord Vlcllesley's task indeed was a most in-
vidious one. He had been directed by his government to
profess 1\11 earnest desire to aid the Spllniul'rls in bringing
the war to a successful L'Ollclusion, and to pledge the aid of
Great Britain, yet he was forced to refuse every definite proposal
made to him by the Juntll. On the other Illlnd, there wcrc
clauses in his instructions which pro\'oked the most openly-
displnyed suspicion and resentment, when he touched upon tllem
in his conversations with l\Iartill de Garay and the other Spanish
ministers. Such were the proposal to lllace the whole Spanish
MllIy under a British commander (L c. Wellinb>'ton), the attempt
I Wellington to Wcllesley, Oct. 30 : .DiIt{HlfcJI1!8,1'. 213. For stronger
laugu3.A'e about the rash folly of Spallish generals, see \Velliugton to
BeresforJ, ibid. 1i!l.
~ \Vellingtoll to Wellesley, Aug. 24, from Merillll.
"~
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to open lip the subject. of 0. certain measure of' free tmdc wit.h
Spanish America, and-most of all-the offer to send British
troops to garrison Cadiz, For dc~pite the fiasco of the preceding
winter, the Portland ministry were still harping on this old
string, and allusions to it occur in nearly every dispatch sent
from London to the ambassador at Seville I,
'Vellesley's position was made even more difficult by the fact
that all the Spanish fuctions opposed to the Ccntral Junta tried
to draw him into their schemes, by making lavish professions
of what they were ready to do if onl)' the present govemment
were evicted from office. Of these factions there were mally:
the old' Coullcil of Castile,' which the ,Junta had superseded,
still clung together, making prowls as to the legality of thcir
successor's position, The local assemblies wcre equally jealolls
of the central ttuthorit)" - the Juntas of Estremadura and
Valencia, ill especial~ were always intriguing behind its back,
and the former at least made many tempting proposals both
to ·WeHesley and to Wellington. But the most dangerous
enemies of the existing government were the malcontents close
at its gates-the Andalusian conspirators, led by the mcmbers
of the old Junta of Seville, and hy the intriguers like the Conde
de MOlltijo, the dukes of Jnfantado and OssunR, and Frnncisco
Palafox. The dissatisfaction caused by the incapacity, in~
decision, and-as it WIL~ openly said-the nepotislllllud venality
of the Junta was so general, that a plan was formed in Seville
to seize them, deport them all to the Canaries, and proclaim
a Regency. The troops in the place were tampered with, some
demagogues were ready to raise the mob, and Infantado i, who
was in the thick of the plot, came to Vlellesley one night
to divulge the arrangements for the 'Pronunciamento' and
to bespeak his aid. Mucll as he disliked the Junta and its
methods, the Ambassador scornfully refused to make himself
a member of a conspiracy, and aftcl' warning Infantado of his
intention, went straight to tbe Secretary Garay and ga\'e him
all the information os to the project, though without divulging
I Scc Canning's instruction to ,',rellllShl)' of JllI\C 27, 1809, 011 pages
1aG-91 of Wellesley'll Ditpatcltel ana OorretpqndellCl, Lonu. 1038.
t See Baumgarten, Geschichte Span,ellt, i. 408, and Toreuo, vol. jj. p. 72.
Wellesley Quly calls the Duke r a person' : Di$p(l1ches, p. lOO,
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any names. Some of the plotters fled, others were arrested.
'For the last two days,' writCH'Velleslcy tu his brother, 'I have
been employed in endeavouring to sal'e thc necks of these caitiffs
from the just fury and indignation of the people and soldiery.
and I have succeeded. A regular plot was formed to seize (and
I believe to hang) them all. But I could not suffer such outrages
under my nose, so I interfered and saved the curs from the rope.
They were all gratitude lor an 'WlJ.r (Welle:'llc)' was offered and
refused the Order of the Golden l"leece ne-xt morning], but now
that they think themsel ....es secure they ha....e begun to cheat me
ngain 1,'
:Much as every patriot should deprecate the employment of
coups d'flat while a foreign war is on hand, there was much
to excuse the cOIHluet of the euemies of the Juntn. That body
was llOW more than a year old; it had been from the first
regarded as a. stop-gap, as a provisional government which was
destined to give p]w..'C to something more regular and constitu-
tional whcn occasion should sef\'e. A' Committee of l'ublic
Safety' which fails to preserve the state sLands self-condemned,
and the history of the Central Junta had been one record of
consistent disaster. A body of over thirty persons is too large
for a ministry. too slllall fur 11 representnti\'c !lSSCllIbl.y. Every
intelligent Spaniard, whatever his politics, was desirous of seeing
it give plM.'e to a regular government. The Consermtives nnd
bureaucrats would h!wc been contented if it had appointed
a Regency of foul' or five persons, and then abdicated. The
Liberals demanded that it should summon the national Cortes,
and leave to that hody the creation of an cxecutive. Pamphlets
were showered by dozens from the press-now more or less free,
for the fir:.'! tillle in Spanish history-to advocate one or other
of these courses. The Junta, however, had no intention of' sur~
renderingits power, whatevel'pretence ofdisinterestedness it might
assume and proclaim. Its first attempts to put off' the evil day
when it must yield to public opinion were ingeniously absurd. It
issued, as early as May 22, a proclallllltioll acknowledging the
advisability of summoning a Cortes, and then invited all well-
thinking-Spaniards to send in schemes and suggestions during the
I WeUesley to Wellington, Sept. 19, 1300. Wellingtoll,Suppkmelllary
Diitpatchelf vi. 3i2.
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next two months concerning the best way in which the national
lL-;sembly. could be organized, and the reforms t\lld constitutiollul
impro\'ements which it should take ill hand. These documents
wcre to be rend and pondered over by a Commission, mainly
composed of members of the JUllta, which was to issue a report
in due time, clIlbod>'ing the best of the snggestiollll alld the
results of its own discussion I. This was an admirable devi":e for
wasting time and putting off the n.ssembly of the Cartes. The
Commission finally decided, uu September 19. aftcl' lll(l.ll}' weeks
of session, that a supreme Executive Council of five persons
should be appointed, cllrefully avoiding the lIame of Hegcllcy.
But only existing members of the Central Junta were to be
eligible as Councillors, and the Council was to be changed at
short intervals, till evcry llIC1ubcl' of the Junta had taken 0. turn
in it~. The only laudable clause of this scheme was one
pt'oviding that Spnnish America should be l'Cpl'CSelltcd in the
Junta, and therefore ultimatel..... in thc Executi,'c Council, The
urraugemellt sutisllcd nobody-it merely substituted 11 rapi{ll)'
changing committee of the J'Ullta for the whole of that body
as the sUlwemc ruling powel': and it was deal' that the orders
of the Council would be those of the Junta, though they might
be "oiced by fewer months. The assembly of the Cortes would
be put oft' lId iJ~finitum.
Any effect which the report of the CommiSi>ioll might have
had, wt\s spoilt hy the rn,et that it WIIS followed by It minority
report, or manifesto, drawn up by the :Mfl.l'(luis of La UOlllantl,
who Imd been one of the Collllllissiollcrs. The Jlllrt.u had
called him back from Galicia, and compelled him to surrenclcr
the army that he had re-formed; under the pretext that he
had been co-opted as a member of their own body, A death-
vacancy had been created in the representation of the kingdom
of Valencia: he had been named to fill it., summoned to Seville,
and placed on the constitutional Commission, Dissenting from
every word of the l'Cport of the majority, he published on
October 14 a counter-scheme, in which he declared that the
1 1"01' the text ()f t1lis wordy proclamlltion scc 'Vcllcsloy's Spell/itA
Difpatchel!, PII. 135-!).
! Note the extraordinary similarity of this IllulI to that produced b)' the
Athenian oligarchs ill 4J I 11. c, Had some 011C beeu reading Thucydides ~
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IIcuality, nepotism, and dilatory incapacity of the Junta made
it necessary for Spnin to seek tl IICW cxecutive which should
be wholly independent of that body. Accordingly he suggested
that a Uegency of five members should be constituted, as the
supreme governing body of the realm. No member of the Junta
was to sit therein. It was to be assistcd, for consultnti\'c
purposes, by a body of sLx persons-one of whom was to be
a South Americnn. This second committee, to be calk,(} 'the
l'ermanent Deputation of the Realm,' was to be considered
to repl"esent the Cortes till that assembly should meet. It
WllS not to 111cddIe with excclIti vc matters, hut \I'u.." to dcvote itsclf
to drawing up the details of the constitution of the future
Cortes, and to suggesting practict\l reforms.
So fill' IlS thcdeclurntion in fllvourof aRcgcncywent, lTlostsensiblc
Spaniards liked La Uomana's scheme, and it obtained \'\'elles-
Iey's approval also. Dut the idea of the' Permanent Deputation'
frightened the Liberals, who fcared tlmt its c.xi!>'i;cllcc wOllld hc
made the excuse for putting ofr the sllmmoning of the Cortes
for an illdcfinite time. Moreover it was nnlloul'ed that La
HOlllUlla intended to resign his seat in the Junta, alld to become
a candidate for the position of Senior Uegent, so that his
proposals Illust be intended to benefit himself. The suspicion
that his personal ambitions inspired his patriotic denunciation
of the Junta's misdoings was made the more likely by events
that occurred at tllC same moment in Valcncia. Thcrcthc lending
personage of the moment was the governor, General Jose Caro,
the youngcl' brother of La Romanil, who had complete control
of the local Junta, and exercised what his enemies called EL
tyranny in the province. He and his following were already
011 the worst terms with the Seville Governmcnt, und now
took the opportunity of bnrsting out into open rebellion. They
issued a sounding manifesto against the Supremc:Jullta, declared
their intention of refusing tn obey it an)' longer, and republished
and sent in all directions to the other local Juntas La Romana's
report in favour of n Rebrcncy, of which Cam had struck off
6,000 copies. They threatened to turn back by force General
Castro whom the Supreme Junta had sent to supersede Carol
aud declllrcd their second representative ill that body, the
Condc de Contamina, depoS(.'(} tor <disobedience to the will of
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the people.' It looked as if La U.omana might be intending
to overthrow the centml government by llleans of his brother's
Valcllcian army. Apparently he must be acquitted of this
charge, his fiery and ambitious kinsman having gone far beJond
his intentiOllS.
In the midst of all these intrigues, plots, and manifestos the
Central Junta had only onc hope-to rehabilitate themselves
by means of a great military success. 'Vith ruinous conse~
fjucnces they tried to direct the cOlln;e of the war with political
rather than strategical ends ill view. or the unhappy autumn
campaign which their rasllllCs,'l precipiwted we shall speak in
its proper place; but before narrating the disasters of Ocafia
and Alba de Tonnes, we must turn back for some months to
consider the situation of Eastern Spain, where the continuous
chronicle of events ha.s been conducted 110 furthcr than Blake's
rout at Belchitc ill Junc, IUld St. Cyr'~ victory of Valls in
February 1809. Much had happened in Catalonia find Aragoll
cycn before the day of Talal'cra. Much more WAS to take place
before the ill-judged November campaign of the Junta's armies
in New Castile and Leon had begun.
N.B,-11Iis is a military historr : for the war of pamphlets aud maui-
fcstos, plots amI intrigues, betweeu tllll Seville GoverlJlllcnt autl its
ad,'ersaries, the reader WIIO is anxious to master the disheartening details
mar consult TOI'eno's Tenth Book; Sdiepeler, iii. 400-86; llaumgarteu,
vol. i. chapter viii; Arteche, 1'01. vii. chapter "i, and a1)01'e rill the volume
of the Marquis of Wellesley's Spallish Dispatches (Lolldoll, 1838). There
is a good llmllil'cl)' description of the chief members of the Junta and tllC
ministry, and of the intrigues against them, ill WilIiam Jacob's 7'ruvt18 ill
tfle South o/Spain (Londoll, HIll).
SECTION XVII: CHAPTER II
EVENTS IN EASTERN SPAII'i J>UHlNG THt: SUMMER AND
AUTUMN OF 1800. THE SIEGE OF GERONA llEGUN
I:s- the spring of 1809 the theatres of operations of the two
French army-corps entrusted with the reduction of Aragon uml
of Catalonia were still divided by a broad belt of territory
which was in the hands of the Spaniards, around the fortresses
of Lcridu, Mcquiucllzu, und 'l'ortosa. Only OlWC had COlll-
munication been opened between Suchet and St. Cyr, and then
the force which had crossed frolll Aragon into Catalonia found
itself unable to return. The ollly way of getting a dispatch
from Sar~lY'()ssa to Barcelona was to send it by the circuitous
road through :Fl'llnce. Co-operation between the 3rd and the
7th Corps would have been difficult in any case; but since each
of the two corps-commanders was interested in his own problems
alone, and found them all-absorbing, the war in Catalonia and
the war in Aragon went on during 1809 and the first half of
1810 as separate a(l'airs from the French point of view. It was
otherwise with the Spaniards: Blake had been plaeed in com-
mand of the whole of the Coronilla, the three pro,'inces of
Yalcncia., Aragon, and Catu.lolliu which lllld forllled t.he UUCiClll
kingdom of Ar~<1'Qn I. He had Suchet on his left and St. C~'l'
on his right, was equally interested in the operations of each,
and might, so far as the rules of strategy go, have tumcd his
main force against whichever of the two he might please,
leaving a comparat.ively slllall force to •contain' the other.
Unfortunately he proved unable to make head against either
of his adversaries. 'Ye have already seen how, in the early
sununer. he threw himself upon Suchet, and was bculcll ofI' Ilt
Maria and routed at Belchite. In the later months of the
year it was mainly with St. Cyr that he had to deal. and his
1 Catalonia Imd beel] added to his command after Rcding died of
Wounds rceeil'ed at Ull~ battle of Valls.
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efforts were equully ullsllccessful. It would seem tll!\t he found
it Ycry difficult to concentrate any preponderant portion of his
troops foJ' ll,. blow to either side: vcry few battalions from
Catalonia accompanied his Vitlencians and Aragoncse to Maria;
vcr)' few Valcncians were brought up to aid the Catalans ill
the operutiolls about Gemna. The problems of food and trans-
porl had something to do with this, but the main difficulty was
that the armies of both provinces, 1ll0l'C especially t.he Catululls,
were essentially~local levies, and disliked being drawn far from
their homes. There was always some threatening dauge,' in
their own district which made them loath to leave it unguarded,
while they were taken off on some distant expedition. The
complaints and arguments of the Juntas, the mallifest un-
willingness of the officers and men, fettered the hands at' the
cO~lI11a]]der-in-chicf.whcnevcr hc strove to accomplish tL gCIlCl11.1
concentration. Hence it came to pass that for the most part
St. Cyr was opposed by Odalan troops only, Suchet by Valell-
ciallS and Aragoncse only. during the campaigns of 1809.
The tnsks of the commander of the 3rd Corps in the mouths
that followed his vkiories over Blake were both less intemting
and less impc:wtant than those impoS{.-'d Upoll his cullcngue ill
Catalonia. They were howc\'er laborious enough; after having
dri veil the Spanish regular Ilrmies out of Aragoll, Sllchet had
now to tame the country-side. For even after Belchite he held
little more than the towns of SaragosSll. and Jam, find thl.;
ground all which his camps were pitched from day to day.
When he had concentrated his corps to fight Blake. the rest of
the provillce llll.d slipped Ollt of his hnnds. Its reconquest wa~
It tedious matter, even though he hnd only to contend with
seutt.crcd bands of peusants, stiffcl){,..(I by stn.tgglel's from the arm.)'
that had dispersed after Bclchite. The plain of the Ebl'o,
which forms the central strip of Al"stgOIl, was easily suIxlucd. hut
the mouotains to the north and wuth were wcll fitted to be the
refuge of inslIl'gents. The Arftf,TOllese. along with the Gnlicians,
were the first of the Spaniards to take to systematic guerrilla
warfare. Undislllayed by the fate of make's army, they had
resolved to defend themselvcs to the last. There was more
than OIle focus of I'CSistaIK'C: a colonel Rellovlllcs, who had
been ouc of the defendel'$ of &'U'agossR, and had e~ap~ after
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the capitulation, was at the head of the bands of the north-
western mountains, in the vale of Roncal and on the borders of
NaVtUTC. In the north-eastern region, about the uPlmr water:.;
of' the Cinca and the hills beyond Jaca, two local chiefs named
Pcrena and Sarasa kept the war on foot, getting their stores
and ammunition from the Catalans on the side of Lcrida. In
au entirely distinct part of the province, south of the Ebro, lay
Gayan and VilIacampu., whose centres of activity were Daroca
and Molina, mountain towns from which they were often driven
up into that central ganglion of all the ranges of Spain, the
Sierra de Albaracill, from which descend ill diverging directions
the sources of the Tagus, the Guadalaviar, and the Xucar. Both
G!~yall and VillucRmpn. were officers of the regular ll.rmy, holding
commissions llllder BJake: the band of tlle former had as its
nucleus the regiment of La Princesa, whose extraordinary escape
acro~ northern Spain after the combat of Sanumder has been
told in another place 1.
Sllchet's work, during the later SUlllmer and the autulllll of
1809, was to br~ak up and as far IlJ:I possible to destroy these
bands. His suc<:ess was considerable but not complete: in July
he stormed Gayan's stronghold, the lIloullta,ill sanctuary of
Nucstra Seiiora. del Aguila, captured his magazines, and drove
him lip into the mountains of Molinft. Continuing his l:alll-
paign south of the Ebro, he sent the :l:'ole Chlopiski against
VilIacftmpa, who abandoned Calatayud, Daroca, and the other
hill towns, and retired into the Sierra de Alblll'fieill, where he
took refuge at the relllote convent of El Tremendal, one of the
most out-of-the-way spots in the whole Peninsulll. Here,
Ilc\·ertheless, the piutisan was followed up on Nov. ~3-4 by
a column undel' Colonel Henriot, who manreuned him ont of
his position, surprised him by a night attack, and drovc him
over the Valencian border. The (:oment was blown up, the
deplmuellt \'illUf,f'C of Origuehl SIlchd, mlu t.he French with-
drew 2.
I Sec "o1. ii. 11. 387.
I For an excellent personal diary of all tliese operations see General
Vou Hrandt's Am meillt'lll J..e/KJII, pp. 100--12, He accuses Suchet of
gro:sly exaggeratiug, both in his dispatches nnd Ilis IIIcmoiJ'>:l, the difficulty
a!LI1 impurtam:o uf tllese mouutaill raids (see SlIchet's MemQi,·O', i. liP· 40-
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These operations had been carried out by Musnier's division;
but meanwhile movements of a very similar sort were being
undertaken by another division, that of Lnval, all the other
side of Aragon, along the slopes and gorges of the l'j'Tellees',
In the end of August a column of 3,000 men stunned the
convent of San Juan de la Peoa, close to Jaca, which Sarasa
and Renovales were wont to make their head quarters. It was
lLll ancient building containing the tombs of the early kings
of Aragon, who reigned in the mountains before Saragossa had
been recovered from the :Moor; it had never seen an enemy for
eight hundred years, /lnd was reputed holy and impregnable.
Hence its capture dealt a severe blow to the confidence of the
insurgents. Renovates, however, held out ill the western upland,
continuing to defend himself in the valley of Uoncal, till he was
beset on all sides, for Suchet had obtained leave from Paris to
call up the National Guards of the Aric!o>"e, Basses Pyrenees and.
l-Iaute Garollue, and their bataHkmJ d'etite attacked the in-
surgcllb:l in the rear from across the high 1ll011llh\iIlS, while the
Brd Corps advanced against them from the front. After much
scattered fighting RenovaJes capitulated, 011 condition that he
should be allowed a free departure. He retired to Catalonia
with some of his men: the rest dispersed for the moment, but
only to reassemble a few weeks later, under another and a more
wary and obstinate chief~ the younger Mina, who conmlcn<.'Cd ill
this same autumn lo make the oon:1CJ'l; of Arugon llnd Nll\'arrc
the theatre of' his hazardous exploits. Hut the region was
comparatively quiet in Scptember and October, and Suehet
transferred the activity of' his movable column further to the
eastward, where he drove some parUdaJ out of the valleys of'
the Cinca and ES.'iCl'll, and tried to open up u. new line of
14, for a highly picturesque narrative). The insurgents were still unskilled
ill arms, slLOt very poorly, kellt bad watch, and were given to IJanic.
That there is something ill Brandt's criticism seems to he shown by the
fact that the whole dil'isioll of J\1usnier lost between July 1 and Dec. 31,
1800, onl)' thrlm officers killed and eight wouuded out of 200 prcscut
with the eagles ill six months of incessant raids and skirmishes (see
Martiuien's LiNie del u,fficierll, often fluoted before).
I Suchet's third division, that of Habert, was lying ont in the direction
of tile CinC3. aud tllC Guadalupe, watchiug lest Dlake might muke a new
sall)' from Tortosa or Lcrida.
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communication with France by way of the valley of'Vennsql1e.
This was accomplished, for n moment, by the aid of national
guards from beyond the Pyrenees, who entered the valley from
the north while the troops of Suchet were operating from the
south. But the road remained unsafe, and could only be used
for the passage of very large bodies of troops, so that it was
practically of little importance.
In December Suchet completed the formal conquest of Aragon,
by 1ll0',jllg up the whole of Laval's division into the high-lying
district of Teruel, iu the extreme south-cnst of the province, the
only part of it that had never yet seen the French eagles.
The Junta of Aragon fled from thence over the border of the
kingdom of Valencia, but Villacampa and his bands remained
in the mOlUltains unsubdued, and while they continued to exist
the conquest nf the upland was incomplete. The moment that
its towns ceased to be held by large garrisons, it was clear that
the insurgents would descend to reoccupy them. Nevertheless
Suchet had done much in this year: besides the crushing of
Blake he had accomplished the complete su~jection of the
plains of Central ArilgOll, am] had obtained a grip upon its two
mountain regions. He had fortified Monzon, Froga, Alcaiiiz,
and Cnspe as out.posts against the Catalalls, and, having received
large drafts from France in the autumn, was on the last day of
the year at the hend of a fine corps of 26,000 men, from which
he might hope to produce in the next spring a field army
sufficient for offensive operations against Catalonia or Valencia,
after providing garrisons for his variolls post<; of strength I.
The weak point of his position was that the guerrilleros had
learned cautioll, refused for the future to fight save under the
most favourable conditions, and devoted themselves to the safe
1 The 3nl CollJ!l which hml gone dowll to little O"cr ] 0,000 men in
~lay 18Q!), counted on Jan. 1, IBlO, tlle following force:
Division La,'al 5,348 Garrisons of AlcallizJ Jaca,
"Musnier B,46.') l\[omon, Sa~ossa, Tudela 3,110
"Habert 4,757 <CIm!lSeurs des Montagues'
Cavalry Brigade 2,172 [permanently embodied Py-
Artillery and Ellgineers 920 reneau National Guards] 1,426
'fotal 26,205
Of these 23,074 were elfecth·es present with colours, the remainder were
in hospital or detached.
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and vexatious policy of intercepting communications and cutting
lip small parlicR nnd stragglers. They wel't'.! much harder to
deal with, when once they had learnt that not even in fastnesses
like El Tremendal or San Juall de la Pefia was it wise to offer
the French battle. Unless Sllchct left n garrison ill every
town, nay, in every cOllsiderable village, of the sierms, the
insurgcllts dominated the whole region. If he did take such
measures for holding down the uplnnd, he was forced to im-
mobili7.e a very large proportion of his army. We shall note
that in 1810 he was only able to draw out 12,000 of his 26,000
men for the invasion of "'estern Catalonia.
V\7hilc the commander of the S.rd Corps was making steady
progress with the conquest of Ar~ll"()n, the fortunes of his
colleague of the 7th Corps had been fal' more chequered. Indeed
for the greater part of 1809 St. Cyr was brought to a complete
standstill by the unexpected obstiJlacy of the gallant garrison
of Gerona, who for no lc~ than eight months kept the mail!
body of the army of Catalonia detained in front of their
Imlls.
When last we dealt with the operations in this region we left
St. Cyr vidot"ions at the well-colltested battle of Valls, after
which he advanced into the plain of '1'aITagona, made some
demonstrations against that fortress, but returned after a few
weeks to Barcelona (.March 18) without having made" any serious
attempt to turn his victory to practical account. This retreat
aA:er a brilliant SUCCCi!S muy be compared to Victor's similar
evacuation of Southem Estremadura after l\1edellill, and was
brought about, ill the main, by the iliUllC cause, want of supplies.
For when he had consumed the resources of the newly-subdued
district between ValIs and 'l'arragona, S1. Cyr had no menns
of providing his army with funher subsistence. Barcelona,
his base, could not feed him, for the eity was itself on the
edge of famine: it was still beset to north and west by
the local miqueletes, who had returned to their old haunts
when the main French army had gone off' southward on the
campaign of Valls. It was stringentl)' blockaded on the sea
side by the British Mediterranean fleet, and it could not draw
food from lh'ance by land, because the high-road to Perpignan
pllssed through the fortress of Gerona, wllich was still in
1809] ST. CYR IK CATALONIA 15
Spanish hands. St, C)T himself, it will be remembel'ed, had
only reached llareelona by turning off on to side trackl'l
through the mountain, and winning his way down to the shore
by the hard-fought battle of Cardadeu. Till Gerona should
fall, and the garrison of Barcelona be placed in direct com-
munieutiOIl with France, there was little use in making ambitious
oftensive movements against Tarragona or any other point
in Southern or Central Catalonia.. It was absolutely necessary
to reduce Geronll, lJ,.lld f;() to hring the division left behind under
Reille, in the Ampurdam and on the frontier of Roussilloll,
into free communication with the remainder of the 7th Corps.
From thc moment when St. Cyr PUSSL'll the mountains during
the winter Reille had been fighting out a petty campaign against
the Llorthem Catalalls, whieh had no conne.'don whate\'er with
his superior's opcratiolls at Molins de Rey Ilnd Valls, and had
little definite result of any kind.
No one saw more clearly than Napoleon the need for the
reduction of Gcrona: as early as January he had issued orders
both to St, Cyr and to Rcille to prepare for the enterprise, But
St. Cyr wus now out of tOllch, and Reille W/1.<; far too weak
in the early spring to dream of any such an adventure: he
had been left no more .than seven depleted battalions to maintain
his hold on Northern Catalollia, when St. Cyr took the rest.
of the arIDy across the hills to Barcelona. The Emperor was
not slow to realize that the 7th Corps must be reinforced on
u large scalc. He did so by scndillg thither ill the spring
of 1809 a brigade of Berg troops (four battalions), the regiment
of Wlirzburg (two battalions), und a dh'ision (seven IJattaliolls)
of Wcstphalians: it will be noted that now, as always, he was
most chary of drafting native French troops to Catalonia,
and ulways fed the war in that direction with al1xiliurk'S ill
whose fate he was little interested: the campaign in eastern
Spain was, after all, but 11 side issue in the main struggle 1.
When these reinforcements had arrived Reillc began to collect
material at Bascara on the Fluvia, to which siege-guns labori-
ously drl\,.-rgcd across the Py:rcm.-'CS were added; several t:ompanies
of heavy artillery and sappers were brought up from France.
I Cette portion de l'Espagnc reste, d'ailleurs, iflOIee, et sans influeuce
sur le reste de la Peninsule. Imperial Minute of Dec. 1,1809.
16 EVENTS I~ EASTEH~ SPAIN [J\L"y
St. Cyr meanwhile, four weeks after his retreat from the
plain of Tarragona, mO\'ed on to Vich upon April 18, with
the divisions of Souham, Pino, Lecchi, and Chabot, lea.ving
Duhesme with his original French division, which had held
Barcelona since the outbreak of the war, in charge of his base
of operations. His departure was partly designed to spare
the stores of Barcelona, where the pinch of famine was beginning
to be felt; for he intended to subsist his army on the upland
plain of Vieh, a rich corn-bearing district hitherto untouched
by the war. But a few days after he had marched forth
Barcelona was freed from privation, by thc lucky arrival of
a squa.dron of victuallers from Toulon, cOl1\'oyed by Admiml
Cosmao, which had put to sea in a storm and eluded
the British blockading squadron (April Q1). The position
of Vich, however, had been chosen by St. Cyr not only for
reasons of supply, but because the place was happily situated
for covering the projected siege ofGcrona agaim;t nny interruption
by Blake. If the Spanish commander-in·chief brought up the
wrecks of the old Cntalan Ilrmy from Tarragona, with his
Valencian levies added, he would almost certainly take the
inland rolld by :Manresa. and "ich, since the coast-road was
practically barred to him by the :French occupation of Barcelona.
As a matter of fact the commencement of the leaguer of
Gerona was not vc-xed by any such interruption, for Blake had
his eyes fixed on Saragossa in May and June, and was so far from
dreaming of all assault on St. Cyr, that he drew off part of the
Catalan army for his unhappy invasion of Aragon, which finished
with the disaster of Belchitc. During the early months of this
long siege the only external helpers of the garrison of Geronll.
were the small force of regulars under the Swiss Wimpfen, and
the miqueletcs ofClnros and Huvira frOlll the Ampuroam, Rcille'~
opponents during the spring. At TalTaoll'(lna the Marquis of'
Coupiguy, the senior officer now in Catalonia, had no more than
6,000 men left of lleding's old army, and was helpless to interfere
with St. Cyr who had some ~O,OOO men conccntrated at Vich.
The preparations for the siege therefore went on in the
end of April and the beginning of May without any hindrance,
save from the normal bickcrillgs nf the French outlying detach-
ments with the local samafenes, which never ceased. Around
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Vich matters were particularly livel)'. for the whole population
of the town and the surrounding plains had gone up into
the hilL'i, where they 'wandered miserably for three months,
much hunted by Prench foraging parties, which they OCClISiullully
succeeded ill destro,ying. St. CYl' opened up his communications
with Reille by sending to Ilim Lecchi's Italian division, which
t:t1t its wuy amid COll!imllt skirmishes along the banks of the
'i'er to Gcronn, and met the troops ti'om the Ampurdam under
its walls. Ucille had moved forth from Bascara on :May 4,
and 011 the eighth expelled the Spallish outpusts from nIl the
villages rOllnd the fortress, not without some lively skirmishing.
He had brought up some 10,000 infantry-including his own
uld division alld 1.111 the newly Ilrrivcd Germans-with somc
1,300 artiller)'men aud engineers. Almost at the same moment
arrived dispatches from Paris, announcing that the Emperor,
just before deptuting for the Austriull war, hud superseded
both St. Cyr and Ueillc, being discontented with their handling
of affairs in Catalonia, It is unfol'ttmute that 110 statement
in dctnil of his reasons nppeal's in the Cm'reBpOllda1Jce t, but
it would seem that he thought that the victories ot' Motins
de Reyand Valls should have had greater results, disapproved
of St. Cyr's retreat from in front of Tarrugona, and thought
that Heille had shown great weakness in dealing with the
insurgents of the Ampurdum. He ignored the special diffi-
culties of the war in Catalonia, thinking that the 30,000 men
ot' the 7th Corps ought to have sufficed for its complete
conquest Indeed he showed his conception of the f,reneral sbltc
of affairs by rt."COmmending St. C)'r in MUl'ch to undertake simul-
taneously the sieges of Gerona, Tarragona, und Tortosa 2. The
lengnct' of one, und thut the wlttllcsl, of these pltlce3 WtLS
destined to m:cupy the whole army of Catalonia, when largely
reinforced, for eight llIonths, If it had been cut up according
to the imperial Illundate. it is probable thtlt ut letlSt onc of
its sections would have been destroyed. St. Cyr wrote in his
memoirs that his master WtlS jealous of him, and wished to see
him fail, even at the cost of wrecking the 7th Corps. This is
of course absurd; but there can be no doubt that the Emperor
I There is only a short note in Dispatch no. 16,004. See p. 63 of this vol.
~ Scc St. eyr to BcrthicrJ March <l, 1800, und St. (;yr'silfemQiT8, p.130.
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disliked his lieutenant, all the more because of' the long string
of complaints, and of demands for more men, money, and stores,
which he was now receiving week by WE!€k from Catalonia. He
loved generals who achieved the impossible, and hated grumblers
and frondeurs, a class to which St. Cyr, despite all his talents.
undoubtedly belonged. It is possible that Napoleon's deter-
mination to replace him may haye been fostered by intrigues on
the part of the officer to whom the 7th Corps was now turned
O\'er. Marshal Augereau had served with great credit ill
the old republican campaign in Catalonia during 1793 and
1794, imagined himself to have a profound knowledge of thc
country, and was anxious to try his hand in it. It was many
years since he had been trusted with an independent command;
both ill the \\'UI'S of 1806-7 null in that of 1809 he had been
lost in the ranks of the Grand Anny. His Ilomination to
supersede St. C)T was made early in May, but on his way
to the seat of war he was seized with a fit of the gout, and was
detained ill bed at rerpignan for many WE!€ks. Thus his
predecessor, though apprised of his disgrnee, was obliged to
continue in- command, and to commence the operations of
which the l\Ial'shnl, ru; he well knew, would take all the credit.
At the same moment Ueille was displaced by Veniier, the
general who hud (:onducted the first unlucky siege of Sarngossa
-an experience which seems to have made him vcry cautious
when dealing with Spaniards behind walls.
Lecchi's division fotced its way back to St. Cyr on May 18,
bringing him the intelligence of his sllpersession, but at the
same time apprising him that Augercau would not arrh'c as
yet, and that the duty of commencing the siege of GerOlllt
would still fall to his lot. At thc same time Verdicr sent
letters urging that his 10,000 infantry formed too small a force
to surround such a large fortress, ulId that he llIust ask for
reinforcements from the covering army. 'If they were denied
him, he should refuse to begin the siege, throwing the responsi-
bility for this disobedience of the Emperor's commands on his
superior: he had reported the situation to Paris. St. eyr was
incensed at the tone of this dispatch 1, above all at the fact
I It mar be found printed. in full in the Appendix to the narrative of
the siege of Gerona in Bclmas's Siegu, \'01. ii. pp, 660-1.
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that Verdier was appealing straight to the Emperor, instead of
corresponding through his hierarchical supe~ior, according to
the rules of military etiquette. But he saw that Verdier had
a good case, and he had just learnt that Blake had turned oR'
against Aragon, so that 110 trouble frOll! that quarter need be
feared. Accordingly he, \'ery grudgingl.y, !lent back Lecchi'i.
division to Gerona. It was the worst that he possessed, being
composed of !lO more than four Ncapolitan and three Italian
battalions, with a strength of little over 3/KlO bayonets I. He
added to it a regiment of Italian light horse, several of his OWII
butteries, am} lIeart>' ull the ellgim,'CI'S nnd sappenl of his corl)s,
so that the total reinforcement ~nt to Verdier consisted of
more than 4,000 men.
HIl\'i!lg ret.'Cived these succours, which brought 1I1J his tutu!
force to 14,000 infantry and cavah)', and 2,200 artillerymen,
sappers and engineers, Verdier commenced on May Q4 his
operations against Gcrollu: on that day Lccchi's division took
its post ill the plain of Salt, 011 the west of the town, while the
l"l'ench l1ud "Vestpllltliuu diviiliolls were already close to the
place on its eastern and northern sides. The head quarters and
the French brigades of Joba. and Gllillot lay by SalTia aud
the bridge of Pont.Muym·, WhCl'C the mugaziue!> wcre established,
while the Germans had been !lent up on to the heights east of
the fortre;;s and held the plateaulI; of CampduraJ San M:edir,
and DomellY, The rocky southern sidc of Gcrollll, ill thc
direction ot' the gorge of the Ona, was not yet properly
ill Vestt.-d.
Something has already been said, ill an earlier volume of this
work, c:oncerning the situation ot' Gerona, when its two earlier
sieges by Duhesme were narrated 2. It must suffice to repeat
here thut the town is built 011 the steep down-slope of two lofty
heights, with the river 01180 at its foot: the stream is crossed by
two bridges, hut is fordable everywhere save in times of lOpate,
Heyond it lies the suburb of the Mercadal, surrowlded by
fortifications which form an integral part of the defences of the
I 3,1 Hi lIayollcts ami two squadrons of Halian light hOl'lle by the return
of May 15. 'nlc Neapolitans were bad troops, deserting II'henever it 11'l!8
safe to do so.
~ ~cc \'01. i. 1'1" 317-2D.
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city. The river 'rer, coming from the west, joins the Oilu at
the nOlth side of the l\lercadal and washes the extreme north-
western corner of the walls (If the city proper. The two heights
upon whose lower slopes GcrOlllt is Luilt lire tiCpamk'(l f!'OlIl
each other by a deep ravine, called the Galligall, down which
run an illtcrlllittcllt wutcl'conI'SC and Il road, the only onc by
which approach to the city fi'olll the east i~ possible. The
northern height is crowned by the titrong fort of Monjuich, the
most formidable part of the city defences, with its three out·
lying redoubts called Sail :srarciso, Sail Luis and San Daniel.
The crest of the southern height is CO\'crcU ill U similttr fushioll
by the three forts of the CapuchillS, QU{'''ell l\.UllC, and the
Constable, with the Calvary redoubt lower down the slope
above the Gnlligan, facing San Daniel 011 the other side of
the ravine. Two other slllall fortificatiol1~ the redoubts of
the' Chapter' and the' Cit),,' cover the pnth which lCttds down
from the forts to Gel'Ollu. Xcither the Monjuich UOl' the
CllpllChill heights arc i~o]utcd hill~; c[lch is t.he eud of a ~pur
running down from the higher lllounto.ius. But while the
southern sUlllmit rises high tdJOI'c thc hilly rcuch which joills it.
to the mountain of Nuestra Senora de los Angeles, the llorthem
summit (where lies Monjuich) is ut the cnd of a platetlu extend-
ing ftl.r to the north. The Capuchill heights, therefore, can only
be attucked uphill, while Mcv1juich can be assailed from ground
of a level little inferior to itself. But except on this point both
heights arc \'cr)' strong, their slopes being in lllaIl)' places
absolutel), Prccillitous, especially towards the GuUigtlll, und
everywhere steep. Ne\'erthcless there are winding paths leading
up both, fmlll Sarria ll.ud POJlt-l\Iayor ill the CIlse of Monjuich,
from Casa de Sclva alld other villages towards the cast and the
sea ill the cnsc of the Ctlpuchill heights. All the gl'OUlJ(! is
bare rock, with no superincUlubent soiL
All the fortifications wel'e somcwhat antiquated ill type,
nothing ha\'ing been done to modernize the defences since the
war of the Spanish Succession 1. l"erdinand VI and Charles III
had neglected Gerona in favour of the lIew fortrcss of Fib"1lCl'US,
nearer to the frontier, 011 which large SUI11S hRd been expended
, For 11 g<lod historir,1Io1 stmly of the f011ificatioJlB of GcroDa aud their
hi~tor}', sce VacRoi j \'01. iiL pp. 246-06,
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-for the benefit of the Fl'cll<:h who ~iz(!(l it by treachery ill
1808, and were now using it tL9 their hase of operations. The
actual wall of enccinte of the city was mediaeval-a plain
rampart twenty-five feet high, too narrow for artillery and set
thickly with small towers; only at its two ends, on the Olia
and the Ter, two bastions (caned those of Ll\ Merced and
Santn ~'fnl'ill) had been inserted, and pl"Operly firmed. This
weaknc8S of the walls went for little so long a.q Monjuich, the
Capuehins, and the other forts held firm, since the enemy could
ollly approach the town-cnceinte at itl> two ends, where the
bastions lay. E'flr morc dangerous 'I'M the feebleness of the
l\Iermdal, whose rampart,; formed the southern section of
the exteriOI' defenccs of the plaec. Its Cit·CHit had fi\·c plain
bastions, but no demi·hmes or other outer defences, no covered
WiLy nor L'Otlllterscarp: it.'! profile, only some eightLoell or twenty
feet high, witS visible, across the Aat ground which surrounds it,
from the foot to the summit of the wall, for want of ditch or
gll\cis. The grollnd leading up to it WIlS ffl.vonmble for siege
approaches, since the soil was soft and easy to dig, and was
seamed with hollow ro..'t.ds and stone walls, giving much cover to
an ussuiluut. Aware of the defects df the fortifications of the
:\fercadal, the Spaniards had prepared a line of defence behind
it, along the further bank of the Oiia. The)' had made the
rh'er-front of the city proper defensible to a certain extent, by
building up the doors and windows of all the houses which abut
upon the wder, mining the two bridges, nlll! fixing a stockade
and entanglements in the bed of the Ona, along the consider-
able space, where it is fordable in dry weather 1. They had
indccd repairt.-d. the whole circuit of the defcuces ~il\<.'C Du-
he-mc's sieges of' 1808, having cleared ant the ditches of
Monjuich and of the basti01l8 of La. l\ferced and Santa Maria,
walled up many posterns, n.nd repuircd with new and solid
1 This last was done by public subscription, when the engineers pointed
out the uanger of the city being stormed across the ril·er-bed. See
ArteclH~J vii. ]51. .Belmas and Vllcrmi do not seem to ha,'c known of
this fact, as each of them makes the remark that if the :\Iercadalllad been
taken, 0. suuden rush might IHl.I'C taken the aSSllilalll:ll acro8S the shallow
river and into the old toWII. It may be remarked that there had once
becu a river-wall, but that Illost of it had been allowed to fall h,to decay
when the i\Jen.."t.llal was taken into tile city defence.~.
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mMOllry all the parts of the walls that had been dilapidated at
the moment of the first siege. They had also pulled down
many isolated house; outside the walls, and demolished the
nearer half of the suburban village of Pcclrct, which liel (most
inconveniently for the defence) along the bank of the Ter
between the water and the dopes of Monjuich,
All these precautions must be put to the credit of the
governor, Mariano Alvarez de Castro, a man to be mentioned
with nIl honour and respect, and probably the best soldier that
Spain produced during the whole Peninsular '''al'. He was
a veteran of the Rc\'olutiollal'Y und Portuguese wars, and had
a good reputation, but no special credit for military science,down
to the moment when he was put to the test. I-le had been the
officer in charge of the CWltle of Barcelona on the occasion when
it was seized 1?y Duhesme in March 1808: his spirit had been
deeply wounded by that vile piecc of treachery, and he had at
once adhered to the national cause. Since then he had been
serving in thc Ampurdlllll ~lJ'fiillst Reille, till the momcnt when
he was appointed governor of Gerona. Alvarez is described by
tho!;C wl10 served under him as a severe, tnciturn man of
a puritan cast of mind. 'I should call him,' wrote one of his
brigadiers, 'sm officer without the tl'ue military talents, but
with an extreme 'confidence in Providence-almost, one might
say, a believer in miracles. His soul was great, capable of every
sacrifice, full of admirable constancy; but I must confess that
his heroism always seemed to me that of a Christian martyr
rather than of fl, professional soldier 1.' General Fonrnas, who
wrote this somewhat depreciatory sketch of his chief, was one of
those who signed the capitulation while Alm.I'el waR monnill/.{
l1Q quiero rendinne on his sick-bed, so that his judgement is
hardl), to be taken as unprejudiced; but his words point the
impression which the governor left on his subordinates, The
details ot' his defence sufficiently show that he was a skilful and
resourceful fiS well as an obstinate gcnemJ. His minute Cfirc to
utilize every possible means of defence prove that he was no
mere waiter on mirncles. That he was a vcry dcvout prnclising
Catholic is evident from some of his doings; at the opening of
the siege a great religions ceremony was held, at which the locnl
1 l\lanuscript lloteil of General Fourna8J quoted by Artedle, di, 4oB.
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pntron saint, Narcissus, was r}et;lared captain of the city and
presented with a. gold-hilted sword. The levy en fflQ8SC of the
citizens was called' the Crusade,' and their badge was the red
cross. The ideas of religion and patriotism were so closely
intertwined that to the lay companies of this force were after-
wards added two clerical companies, onc composed of monks
and friars, the other of secular priests: about 200 of these
ecclesiastics were under arms 1. Evcn the womcn were orgnni7.ed
in squads for the transport of wounded, the care of the hospitals,
and the carrying of provisions to the soldiery on the walls:
about 300 served, under the command of Donnn Lucia Fitzgerald
and Donna Mana Angela Bibern, wives of two officers of the
regiment of Ultonia. Five of tllis 'company of St. Barbam'
were killed and eleven wounded during the siege.
The garrison at the moment of Verdier's first attack consisted
of about 5,100 men, not including the irregulars of the Crusade.
There were scven battalions of the old army, belonging to thc
regiments of Ultonia 2, BorboD, and Voluntarios de Barcelona,
with three battalions of miqueletes, two local corps, 1st and
2nd of Gcrona, and thc 1st of Vich. Of cavalry there was
a single squadron, newly levied, the 'escuadron de San Narciso.'
Of artillery there were but ~78 men, a wholly insufficient
number: the officers of tlmt arm were given 510 more tu train,
partly miqueletes of the 2nd Gerona battalion, partly sailors
having some small experience of gunnery. It was difficult to
make proper use of the great store of cannon in the fortress,
when more than half the troops allotted to them had never
before seen, much less served, a heavy gun of positiOll. '1'0 the
above 5,700 men of all arms mllst be added about 1,100
irregulars of the' Crusade '-se"en lay and two clerical COlll4
panies of fusiliers and two more of artificers. But these were
1 The bishop gave bis sanction to tbe formation of this strange corps ;
!lee his proclamation in Aneehc's Appendix vii. p. 639, dated June 9.
t Ultonia, the regiment of Ulster, still contained many officers of the old
Jacobite strain, as may be seeu by consulting the list of killed and
wounded, where sucII names as O'Donnell, l\fllclIrthy, Nash, Fit2gerald,
Pierson, Coleby, Candy, occur: but it had just been raised from 200 to
800 bayonets by filling tho depleted cud7'/! with CatAlan recruits, and all
the junior lieutenants, newly appointed, were Catalans also. So there
was little Irish about it save the naDles of some of its senior officeN'o
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set to guard almost unapproadmblc parts of the wall, or held in
reserve: most of the stress fell upon the organized troops. The
defence was altogether conducted on ;;cientific principles, and
had nothing in common with that of Saragossa. Here the
irregulars formed only a small fraction of the garrison 1, llnd were
never hurled in senseless fur)' against the French batteries. but
used carefully and cautiously as an auxiliary force, capable of
setting free sOllle part of the trained men for service Oil the
more important points of the enceinte 2.
For the first two mouths of the siege Alvare1: received no
help whatever from without: in May the central government of
Catalonia bad been left in a perfectly paralysed condition, when
BInkc wcnt off himself and took with him the best of the
regular troops, in order to engage ill the campaign ot' Alcani7.
and l\farin. Coupigny, the interim cOlmmmder at Tarrngona,
had only 6,000 organized men, and he and the Catalan pl'O\·incilll
junta were during tlUlt month mueh engrossed with an enter-
prise which distracted them from the needs of GcrollR. A wide-
spread conspiracy had been fOM1led within the walls of Barcelona,
with the ObjL'Ct of rising tlgl~inst the garrison ill St. Cyr's
absence. A secret committee of priests, merchants, and retired
officers had collected an the arms in the city, smuggk-d in mUll)'
muskets from without, and enlisted several thousand persons in
a grund design for un outbreak and a sort of' Sicilian Vespers'
fixed-after two postponements-for the 11th of May. They
opened communication with Coupign)' and with the captains of
thtl Bt'itish fligutc"! blockailing the port. The one was to
bring his troops to tile gates, the others to deli\'er an attack on
I For the details of the eomllosition of the Gerolla garrison, ll(,'C
Appendix no. 1.
2 1 knoll' llot \l'llY Napier, contrasting Gerona. with Snmgossa. (H. 251),
says that at tIle former place the I'egular garrison was 3,000, tile arme,l
Jllultitude' less thall 6,000.' When it is remembered th:lt its total popula-
was 14,000 souls-of whom some tied to places of safety before the siege
heg'Jn-alld that it batt already raised two hattaliollS of miqueletes with
1,360 bayonets out of its able-bodied nmle in]l3bitants, it is difficult 10 see
how more than 0,000 armed irregulars are to be prooured, for in a popula-
tion of 14,000 souls tllere Cllllllot be Jllore than some 3,000 men between
eighteen and forty.five. As a matter offact (see documents in Artecllt~,vii.
ApIKmdix 6), the (Cru;;ade' was about 1,100 strong fit most,
r
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the port, upon thc appointed night. No Spaniard bctraycd the
plot, though 6,000 citizens are said to have been in the secret,
but it WllS frustrnted by two foreigners. Conscious that the
town could not be freed if the citadcl of l\fonjnich was retained
by the French, the conspirators sounded two Italian officers
named Captain Dottori, fort adjutant of l\Ionjuich, and
Captain Pl'Ovnna, who wns known to be discontented and
thought to be corruptible. They oflered them nn immense
bribe-I,OOO,OOO dollars, it is said-to bctrl1y the postern of
Monjuich to the troops of Coupigny, who were to be ready in
the diteh at midnight. But they had mistaken their men: the
officers conferred with Duhesmc, and consented to /lct as ageutlf
provocatcu./'s: the)' pretended to join the conspiracy, were intro-
duced to and had interviews with the chiefs, and informed the
go\'CI'nor. On the lllOl'lling before the appointed dllte mall)' of
the leaders were arrested. Duhesme placed guards in e\'ery
street, and proclaimed that he knew all. The citb:ens remained
quiet ill theil' dcspuil', the chief,; who had not bccll seil'.ed fled,
and the troops on the Llobregat retired to Tarragona. Duhesme
hanged his captives, two priests named Gallifa and P on, a young
merchant JlllmOO l\{ns.'lUllll, NavlllTo fln old soldier', lllld fOlll'
others. 'They went to the gallows,' says Vacani, an eye·
witness, 'with pride, convinced everyone of them that they
Illld done the duty of good citir.ens in behalf of king, country,
and religioJl I,'
Engrossed in this plot, the official chiefs of Catalonia half
fOl'got Gel'Ollll, Ilnd did nothing to help Alvllrer. till long after
the siege had begun. The only assistance that he received
from without was that the tniqlleletes and somatene3 of the
Ampurdalll and the mountain region above Hostalrich were
always skirmishing with Veroiel"s outposts, and once or twice
cut oft' his conyo)'s of munitions on their way from l"igueras to
the front.
The French engineers were somewhat at variance as to the
right way to deal with Gerol1a. There were two obvious
alternatives. An attack on the weak front of the Mercadal
was certain to sncceed: the ground befOl'C the walls was suitable
for trenches, and the fortifications wcrc trifling, But when
I Vucaui, iii, 211.
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a lodgement had been made in this quarter of the town it would
be necessary to work forward, among the nnrrow lanes and
barricades, to the Ona, and then to cross that river in order to
continue similar operations through the streets of Gerona.
Even when the city had been subdued, the garrison might still
hold out in the formidable works on the Monjuich and
Capuchin heights. The reduction of the Mcrcadal and the
city, moreover, would have to be carried out under a continuous
plunging fire fmm the forts above, which overlooked the whole
place. This danger was especially insisted upon by some of the
engineer officers, who declared that it would be impossible for
the troops to work their way forward over ground so exposed.
As a matter of fact it was proved, after the siege was o\'cr and
the forts had been examined by the captors, that this fear had
been c-"{aggeratcd; the angle of fire was such that large sections
of the town were in no way commanded from the heights, and
the streets could not have been scnl'chcd in the fashion that was
imagined. But this, obvious in December, could not have been
known in May t. The second nltemative WllS to commence the
attack on Gerona not from the easiest but from the most
difficult side, by battering the lofty fort of :Monjuich from the
high plateau beside it. The defences here were very formidable:
the ground was bare exposed rock: but if Monjuieh were oncc
captured it was calculated that the town must surrender, as it
was L'Ompletely overlooked by the fort, and had no further
prote<..tion M\'e its antiquated mediaeval wall. The deduction
that it would be cheaper in the end to begin with the difficult
task of taking Monjuich, rather than the easier operations
against the Mercadal, seemed plausible: its fault was that it
presupposed that Alvnrez and his garrison would behave
according to the accepted rules of siegecraft, and yield when
their situation bee:.-ame llOpclcss. But in dealing with Spanish
garrisons the rules of military logic did not ahva}'s act. Alvarez
essayed the impossible, and held out behind his defective
defences for four months after ]\'lonjuich fell. The loss of men
and time that he thereby inflicted on the French was certainly
no less than that which would have been suffered if the besiegers
had begun with the Mercadal, and worked upwards by incessant
1 See Belmas, iii. 6IG.
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street fighting towards the torts 011 the height. But it is hard
to say that Verdier erred: he did not kllOw his adversary, and
he did know, from his experiences at Saragossa, what street
fighting meant. /
It may be added that Verdier's views were accepted by the
engineer-general, Sanson, who had been specially sent from
France by the Emperor, to give his opinion on the best mode of
procedure. The document which Verdict, Sanson, and Taviel
(the commanding artillery officer of the 7th Corps) sent to llaris,
to justify their choice of the upper point of attack, lays stress
mainly on the impossibility of advancing from the Mercadal
nnder the fire of the upper forts 1. But there were other reasons
for selecting MOlljuich as the point of attack. It lay fal' nearer
to the road to France and the central siege-depots beside
5arria and the Pont Mayor. The approaches would be over highly
defensible groum} where, if a disa."tcl' occurred, the defeated
assailant could easily recover himself and oppose a strong front
to the enemy. l'he shortness of the front was suitable for an
ann)' of the modemte strength of 14,000 men, which had to
deal with a fortress whose perimeter, allowing for outlying forts
and inaccessible precipices, was some six miles. Moreover, the
ground in front of the 1\fercadal had the serious inconvenience
of being liable to inundation; slimmer spates on tbe 1'er and
Ona are rare, hut occur from time to time; and there was the
bare chance that when the trenche.<l had heen opened all might
be swept away by the rivel'S 2, /
Verdier's opinion was arn\'ed at after mature reflection: the
French had appcnn..>d in front uf Gerolln on May 8: the out·
lying villages on the east had been occupied between the
twelfth and eighteenth: Lecchi's Italians had closed the
westem exits by occupying tllc plain of Salt on the twenty-
fourth: the inner posts of observation of the Spaniards had
been clear~ off when, 011 May 80, the Italians seized the
suburban village of Santa Eu/:,rcnia, and on June 1 the Germans
took possession of the mountain of Nuestra 5cl10ra de los
Angeles. But it was only on June 6 that the besiegers broke
ground, and commenced their trenches and batteries 011 the
I See their letter in Appendix V to Behnas's account ofthe 8ie~,
t Note, ibid., ii. p. 502.
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plateau of Monjuich. It Wllr> lIc<:cssm'y to make n beginning
by subduing the outer defences of' the fort, the towers 01'
redoubts of San Luis, Situ ~al'ciso, tuld San D!micl: two
batteries of 24-pounders were constructed against them, while
a third batter)' of mortars on the' Grccn MOllnd 'by the Cusa dell
Uoea on the west bank of the Ter, WM to play upon the north
end of the town: Verdicr hoped that the hombardment would
break the spirit of the citizens-little knowing the ob!>tinate
people with whom he had to deal. Five thomand bombs
thrown into the place in .'une and July produced no effect
whateycr. More batteries on the height,; were thrown up upon
the 13th and 15th of ,June, while on the former day. to distract
the attention of the Spaniards, Lccchi's diYision, in the plain
below, was or-dered to opeu Il flll~e lltt/l(:k UpOll the Mcrcndal.
This had gocxl effect as l\ diversion, :-ince Alvarez had expected
tUl USMUlt, ill this qunrtcr, /1,lId the long 1iue of trenchL"; tlll~)\\'ll
up by the ItAlians in front of Santa Ellgenia attracted much 01'
his attent.ion, Three (lays of battering greatly damaged SUlI
Luis and San Nar-eiso, which were no more than round towers
of masonry with ditches cut ill the rock, (lIld only two or three
guns apiece, The French also took possession on the night of
the fourtl..>tmth and fifteenth of the remains 'of the half-destroyed
suburb of Pedret, between Monjuich and the '1'e1', as if about to
establish themselves in a position from which they could attack the
low~lyillg north gate of the town and the bastion of Santa Marill.
Hitherto the defence had seemed a little passh'e, but at dRWIl
on the morning of the seventeenth Alvn.re;" dc1ivert.'<1 the first of
the many furious sallies which he made against the siege 1ine.~,
A hnttnlioll of Ultonin rush(.-xl suddcnly dOWllhill out nf Mon-
juich and drove the I"rench, who were taken completely by
:mrprii>e, out of the ruins of Pe<lret. Aided by Il. s1l11l.llcl'
detachment, including the artificers of the Cn/sade, who came
out of the StwtA Maria b1fltc, they de<>troYL-d all the works nlld
lodgements ot' the besiegers in the suburb, and held it till thc,r
were drivcn ont by two French und one 'V'Ciltphalitul b/lttalion
sent up from Verdier's reserves, The Spaniards were forced
back into the town, but retired in good OrdCI", contcntL't.1 to
have undone three days of the besiegers' labour. They had lost
155 men, the French 128, in t.his shatp skirlllish.
1809] THE ATTACK ON 1\10NJUICH
Two days later the towers of San Luis and San Narciso,
which Imd been I"educcll to shapeless beups of stone, were
carried by assault, with a loss to the }~rellch of only 18 men;
but Rn attempt to carry San Daniel by the same rush wus
beaten off~ this redoubt being still ill a tenable state. Its
gorge, however, was completely commanded from the ruins of
San Luis, nud access to or exit from it was rendered so dangerous
that AlI'arez withdrew its garrisulI (Ill the Ilcxt Ilight. The
possession of these three outworks brought the French close up
to MOlljuich, which they (.'ould now attack from ground which
\\'US fuvoumblc in every rc:;pc'Ct, suye that it WIts blu"C rock
lacking soil. It was impossible to cxcuxatc in it, unO. all
advances had to be made by building trenches (if the word is
not It misnomer ill this case) of sandbags and loose stoncs 011
the surface of the ground. The inen working at the cnd of the
sap were therefore completely exposed, and the work could
only procC(.>tl ut n grent expensc of life. Neverthelcss the
preparations ad"t\llced rapidly, and on the night of July 2 an
enormous battery of sandbags (ealled the Bauerie Imperiale) was
thrown lip at a distanl.'e of only four hundred yards from
Monjuich. Next lllorning it opened on the fort with twenty
16- and 24-pOllndcl"i;, tlnd soon established CL superiority over
the fire of the defence. Several Spanish pieces were dismounted,
others had to be tclllOyed because it was too deadly to serve
thcm, But II stcndy fire 'I'LL':! returned against the besiegen;
from the COllstable and Cal,'ar)' forts, on the other side of the
Galligan rtlvine, Nevertheless Monjuieh began to crumble,
null it looked ns jf the cud of the siege werc tllready uppruuching.
On July g there was a breach thirty-fi,'e feet bruad ill the
fort's north-eastern bastion, and the Spanish flag which f10llted
over it WM thrown d01l'1l into the ditch by a chance shot.
A young officer Damed Montorro climbed down, brought it up,
and nu.iled it to u. lIew flagstaff under the fire of twenty gUllS.
Meanwhile long stretches of the parapet of Monjuich were
ruined, the ditch was half-filled with debris, and the garrison
could only protect themselves by hlL~ty erections of gllbions and
sandbags, placed where the crest of the masonry had stood.
Dy this time St, Cyr and the covering anny had abandoned
the po~ition ill the plain of Vich which thc)' luul so lOllg
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occupied. The general had, as it seems, convinced himself at
last that Blake, who was still engaged in his unlucky Aragoncse
campaign, was not likely to appear. He therefore moved nearer
to Geronu, in order to repress the efforts of the locu.l aoma.tenea,
who were giving much trouble to Verdier's communications.
On June 20 he established his hend quarters at Caldas de
Malavel~ some nine miles to the south-east ot' Gerona. That
same evening one of his Italian brigades intercepted and cap-
tured a convoy of 1,200 oxen which the Governor of Hostalrich
was trying to introduce into the beleaguered city along one of
the mountnin-puths which lead to the Capllchill heights from
the coast. St. Cyr strung out his 14,000 men in a line from
San Feliu de Guixols 011 the sea. to the upper '1'er, ill II semi·
circle which covered all the approaches to Gerona saving
those from the Ampurdam. He visited Vcrdier's camp, in-
spected the siege operations, and expressed his opinion that an
attack on the Mercadal front would have bccn preferable to
that which had been actually chosen. But he washed his lumds
of all responsibility, told Verdier that, since he had chosen to
correspond directly with Paris, he must take all the praise or
blame resulting frolll his choi~ and refused to countermand
or to altcr any of his subordinate's dispositions. On July 2
howcver he sent, with some lack of' logic, a sumlllons of his
own to Alvarez, inviting him to surrender Oil acCOWlt of' the
desperate state of his defences: this he did without informing
Verdier of his movc. The Go\'eruor returned all indignant
lIegativ~ and Verdier wrote in great wrath to complain that if
thc siege was his affilir, lIS he hud just becn told, it was
monstrous that his commander should correspond with the
garrison without his knowledge I. The two gcnerals were left
on even worse terms than before. St. Cyr, ho""cver, gave real
assistance to the siege operations at this timc by storming, on
July 5, the little fortified harbour-town of' Palumos, which lies
on the point of the sea-coast ncarest to GcroIlU, and had bL'e1l
hitherto used by the miqueletes as a base from which they
communicated by night with the fortress, and ut the samc timc
I See St, eyr to Alvarez and Verdier to the Minister of War at Paris,
nos. 9 and] I of BelOlas'S Appendices in llis second volullIe, pp. 077
and 678.
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kept in touch with TarragOlUl. and the English ships of the
blockading squadron.
On the night of the 4th and 5th of July the defences of
Monjuich appeared ill such a ruinuus condition that Com-
mandant .Fleury, the engineer officer in charge of the advanced
parallel, took the extraordinary and unjustifiable step of assault-
ing them nt 10 1'. M. with the troops-two companies 0111y-
which lay under his orders, tmsting that the whole of the
guards of the trenches would follow if he made a lodgement.
This presumptuous attack, Illude contmry to all the rules of
military subordination, was beaten ofI' with a loss of forty mcu.
Its failure made Verdier determine to give the fort three days
more of contiuuous bombardment, before attempting to storm
it: the old batteries continued their fire, a new one was added
to ellfilnde the north-western bastioll, and cover was contri\'ed
at 5e\'eral points to shelter the troops which were to deliver the
assault, till the aetllll.l moment of the storm arrived I. Dut
three hundrcd yards of exposed grollnd still separated the frout
trenches fi-oUl the breach-a distance far too great according to
the rules of sie&recraft. The Spaniards meanwhile, finding it
-impossible under such a fire to block the breach, which was now
broad enough for fifty men abreast 2, threw up two walls of
gabious ou each side of it, sank a ditch filled with chevaux-de-
frise in fl-ont of it, and loopholed some interior buildings of the
fort. which bore upon its reverse side.
Monjuich, however, looked in a miserAble state when, just
before sunrise on July 7, Verdier launched his colulIlns of
assault upon it. He hud colleetL.J for' the pw·po:;c the grenadier
and voltigeur companies of each of the twenty }~rench, German,
and Italian battalions of the besieging army, about 2,500 men
ill n11 3. They wcre di\'idcd into two colullllls, the larger of
1 NlIopier sa)'s (ii. 2.'iO) tl\llt 'tile breaching tire ceased for four days
before the IlSSIlUlt; aud that this cau~d the failure. TIle statement is ill
direct contradiction of Vacani (iii. 277) who states that Verdier 011 the
contrary' proscgui per tre giorlli if vivo flloco della sua artilleriu,' aud of
Belmas (iL 630) who makes the same statement.
, See Aharez's letter ill Behuas's Appcndix, 110. I(i, where he says that
the breacll had this breadth since July 3.
~ This seems a low estimate of Belmas, as the compagl/iu d'~Iit~ formed
a thin! of cach battalion.
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which WCllt straight at the breach, while the smaller, which
was furnished with ladders, was directed to escalade the left fl\ee
of the demi·lune which co,'cr$ the llorthern front of Monjuich.
The troops pu:;.-;etl with lIo.great los:> o,'c1' the open space which
di"ided them from the work, as its gUllS had all been silenced,
and the fire fWIll the more distulIt forts wm; incfli..'Ctivc ill the
dusk. Hut when they got within close musketry range they
begu.n to fall fast; the head of the main column, which W::l.O;;
composed of sOllle sapper companies und the Italian Vclitcs of
the Guard, got tip on to the face of the breach, but could never
break in. Every officer or man who reached the cutting and
its chcvQux-dc-frisc was shot down; the cOIl(:cntric fire of the
defellders so swept thc opening that nothing could li\'c there.
Meanwhile the rear of the colullIn was brought to a stand,
partly ill, partly ontside, thc ditch. The Spaniards kept playing
upon it with musketry il.lld two or thn.'C small ~- and 4-poullders,
which had been kcpt uuder cover and rcscrvt..J for that purposc,
firing canister into it at a distance of' twenty or thirty yards.
Flesh and blood could not bear lhis fot" long, unu the whole
mass broke and went to the rear. Verdier, who had cOllle out
to the BIIUC1"ie Impl:riale to view the assault, had the mcn
rallied and sent forward a second time: the head of the column
again reached the breach, alld again withcred awny: the sup-
porting mass gave way at once, and fell back much more rapidly
than on the fih;t assault. Yet the General, most unwisely,
insisted on a third attack, which, made feebly and without
conviction, by men who knew that they were beaten, only served
to increase the casualty list. Mennwhile the escalade of the
demi-Iunc by the smaller column had been repelled with CIDiC:
the assailant:> barely succeeded in crossing the ditch und plant-
ing a few ladders Ilgainst the scarp: no one sunived who tried
to mount them, and the troops drew off.
This bloody repulse cost the 1i'rench 1,079 casualties, including
seventy-se\'en officers killed or wounded - much more than
a third of the troops engaged. It is clear, therefore, that it
was not courage wbich had becn lacking: nor could it be said
that the enemy's artiller)' fire had not been subdued, llor that
the breach was insufficient, nOlO that the 300 yards of open
groulld crossed by the column had been a fatal obstacle:.
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indeed, they had been passed with little loss. Tbe mistake of
Verdier had been that he ntl:ucked before the garrison was
dcmoralized~the same error made by the English at Badnjoz
in 1811 and at San Sebastian in 1813. A brond breach by
itself does not neecssnrily make a place untenable, if the spirit
of the defenders is high, llnd if they are })I'epal'ed with all the
resources of the militarj' art for resisting the stormers, as were
the Geronese on July 7-8. The garrison lost, it may be
remarked, only 123 men, out of a strength of 78'1 present in
the fort that morning. The casualty list, however, was some-
what increased by the accidental explosion, apparently by
a careless gunnel', of the magazine of the tower of San Juall,
alongside of the Galligau, which was destroyed with its little
garrison of twenty-five men.
The repulse of the assault of Monjuich thoroughly demomlized
the besieging army: the l"CSistmwc of the Sp!ll1iard~ Imd lx.'CTI
so· fierce, the loss they had inflicted so heavy, that VCI'(lier's
motley collection of French, German, Lombard, and Neapolitan
regiments lost heart and confidence. Their low spirits were
made manifest by the simulumeotls outbreak of desettion and
disease, the two incvitable marks of a decaying morale. All
through the second half of July and August the hospitals
grc\\' gradually fuller, not only from sunstroke cases (which were
fl'CqUCllt on the hurc, hot, rocky ground of the heights), but
from dysentcry and malaria. The banks of the Ter always
possessed a reputation for epidemics-twice in earlier centuries
a French army had perished before the walls of Gerolla by
plagues, which the citizcns piously attributcd to their patron,
San Narciso. It was mainly because he realized the depression
of his troops that Verdier refmined from any more assaults,
llml went on from July 9 to Ailgust 4 huttering Monjuich
incessantly, while he cautiously pushed forward his trenches, till
they actually reached the ditch of the demi·lune which co\'ers
the northern fl"Ollt of the fort. The garrison was absolutely
overwhelmed by the incessant bombardment, which destroyed
every piece of upstanding masonry, and prevented them from
rebuilding anything that was demolished. Thcy were forced to
lurk in the casemates, and to burrow for shelter ill the debris
which filled the interior of the work. Tbree large breaches had
O.....lI:. II' n
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been made at various points, yet Verdicr would never risk
another assault, till on August 4 his approaches actually
crowned the lip of the ditch of the demi-lune, and his sappers
had blown in its cQunterscarp. The ruined little outwork was
then stormed with a loss of only forty men. This put the
French in the possession of good CQ\'cr only a few yards from
the mllill body of the fort. Proceeding with the Silmc caution
ail before, they made their advances against MOlljuich b)'
mining: on the night of the 8th-9th August no less than
twentj'-three mines under the glacis of the fort were e.xploded
simultaneously. This left a gaping void in front of the original
breach of July 7, and filled up the ditch with debris for mallY
)'ards Oil either side: part of the interior of the fait 'I'M clearly
visible from the besiegers' trenches,
Only one resource for saving l\Ionjuich remained to Alvarcz
-a sortie for the expulsion of the enemy from their advanced
works. It was executed with great courage at midday on
August 9, while at the same time separate demonstrations to
distract the enemy were made at two other points. The column
from MOlljuich had considerable success; it stormed two
advanced butteries, spiked their guns, and set fil'C to their
gabions; the French lI'ere cleared out of mally of their trenches,
but made head behind one orthe rear batteries, where they were
joined by their reserves, who finally thrust back the sallying
force into the fort. The damage done, though considerable,
(:ould be repaired in a 'day. Verdier gave orders for the storm
of the dilapidated fort on the night of August 11, aud
borrowed a regiment from St. Cyr's covering army to lead the
assault, being still ver.v'doubtful of the temper of his aII'll
troops. But at six 011 the preceding afternoon an explosion
was heard in MOlljuich, and gl'Cat part of its buttered walls
flew up into the air. Thc Spaniards had quietly evacuated it
a few minutes before, after preparing mines for its demolitiOIl.
The French, when they entered, found nothing but a shapeless
mass of stOlles and eighteen disabled cannon. The garrison
had lost, in the sixty-five days of its defence, 96!l men killed
and wounded; the besiegers had, first and last, suftered some-
thing like three times this loss.
'Vhile the bombardment of MOlljuich was going all, the
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Spanish generals outside the fortress had at last begull to make
serious efforts for its assistance. Not only had the 80lludelles
redoubled their activit.y agllillst Verdier's convoys, Imf! several
times succeeded in destroying them or turning them back, but
Coupigny had at 1aflt begun to mm"c, for he saw that since
make's rout at Delchite on Jllne 18 he, and he alone, possessed
all organized body of troops on this side of Spain, small though
it was. Unable to face St. Cyr in the field, he tried at least to
throw succours into Gerollll by the lIlountain paths from the
south, if he could do no Inore. The first attempt was disastrous;
three battalions started from Hostalrich under nil English
adl'enturer, Ralph .Marshall, whom AlvAI'ez had suggested for
the command of this expedition. They emded the first line of
the covering army. but at Castellar, on July ID, ran into the
very centre of Pino's division, which had concentrated from all
sides for their destruction. Marshall escaped into Geronll with
no more than twelve men: 40 officers IInd 878 rank IInd file
IlIid down their arms; the rest of the COhllllll, some 600 or 700
mell, evaded surrcnder by dispersion.1
Equully disastrous, though on n sllIaller scale, li'us ullother
attempt madc ou August 4 by n purty of 300 llIiqueleh:s to
cllter GerOJln: they elUdL>d St. Cyr, but Oll urrivillg at the entry
of the GaIligan, close under the forts, made the unfortunate
mistake of entering the convent of San Daniel, which the
garrison had been compelled to evacuate a few days before. It
was now in the French lines, and the entalans were all taken
prisoners. It was not till August 17, six days after the fall of
Monjuich. that Alvarez obtained his first feeble reinforcement:
the miquelete battalion of Cervera, with a draft for that of
Vich already in the garrison, altogether 800 bayonets, got into
the city on the west side. by eluding Lecchi's Italians in the
plain and fording the Ter. They were much needed, for Alvarez
I St. eyr, Va.cani, alld Belrnas all say that Marshall escaped by hoisting
the white flag, and taking to the MUll while termll of capitulation were
being arranged. Coupigny on the other haud (see his letter in Belrnas's
Ap~lldix 110, 18) says that l\1arshaU behaved adrnirablr, but was llot
seconded by bis men, who flinched and abandoned him. Hicb, the officer
who failed to guide the column aright, was not, as Napier supposed
(H. 236), an Englishman, but a Vatalall, all is shown br his Ubristiaullarne
Naroiso. Rie or Rich i.s a common lIame ill Catalonia.
D2
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was complainillg 10 the Catalan Junta that he had now only
1,500 able-bodied men left. of his original 5,000 I,
Verdicr had written to his master, after the capture of lI-'1on-
juich, to announce that Gerontl must infallibly surrender within
eight or ten days 2, now that it had nothing but an antiquated
mediaeval wall to oppose to his caunon. So far, however, was
he from being tl. trlle prophet that, llS n matter of fnct, the
second and longer episode of the siege, which was 10 be pro·
tracted fur into the winter, had only just begull.
1 This must have been Rn exaggeratioll, as 2,()()() men under arms of
tllC old garrisoll sunived to surrender ill December. Sec Alvare£s lllUer,
on p. G86 of Relmas's Appendix.
t See Verdicr's letter of August 12, in Belmas's Appelldix no. 11, p. 700.
SECTION XVII: CHAPTER III
THI:: FALL OF GERONA. AUGIJST-D.Ec..~mHm, 180'J
'V"V-K lHonjuich had been cvacuatCl:J, the position of Gerolla
was t1ndouhhxlly perilous: of the two mountain snmmit'! which
commanrl the city one was now entirely in the hands of the
French; for not only the great fort it,self but ;;e\'eral of the
smaller works above the ravine of the Galligan-such as the
fortified convent of San Daniel and the ruined tower of
San Juan-had been lost. 'The front exposed to attack now
consisted of the northern section of the old city wall, from the
bastion of Santa ::'I'laria at the water's edge, to the tower of
La GironeUa, which forms the north-eastern angle of the
place, and lies further up the slope of the Capuchin heights
than any other portion of the enceinte. The space between
these two points was simply covered by 11 mediaeval wall set
with small round towers: neither the towers nor the curtain
between them had been built to hold artillery. Indeed the
only spots on this front where guns had been placed were
(1) the comparatively modern bastion of Santa Maria, (2) a
work erected under and about the Gironella, and called the
, nedoubt of the Germans,' and (3, 4) two parts of the wnll
called the platforms I of San POOro and San Cristobal, which
had been widened till they could carry a few heavy guns. On
the rest of the enceinte, owing to its narrowness, nothing but
wall-pieces and two-pounders could be mounted. The parts
of the curtain most exposed to attack were the seetions named
Santa Lucia, San Pedro, San Cl"istobal, and Las Sarracinas,
from churches or quarters which lay close behind them. With
nothing but an antiquated wall, seven to nine feet thick, thil·ty
feet high, and destitute of a ditch, it seemed that this side of
Geronl.\ was doomed to destruction within a fcw da)·s.
But there were points in the position which rendered the
1 Some caU tlll1nl bastions, but they are too slllall to deserve that Ilame.
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attack more difficult than might haye been expected. The
first was that any approaches directed against this front would
be exposed to a flanking fire from the forts on the Capuchin
heights, especially from the Cah'ary and Chapter redoubts.
The second was that the greater part of the wcak sections
of the wall were within a re-entering angle; for the tower of
Santa Lucia and the' Redoubt of the Germans' by the Gironella
project, and the curtains betwcen them are in a receding sweep
of the enceinte. Attacks on thclIe ill-fortified sections would
be outRanked and enfiladed by the two stronger works. The
only exposed part of the ctll'tain was that called Santa Lucia,
T1111ning from the tower of that name nown to the bastion ofSanta
Maria. Lastly, the parollcls which the :Frellch might COllstrm:t
from their base on Monjuich would have to be built on a down
:slope, ovC!r1ookcd b.y loftier ground, and when they rC!achC!d the
foot ~f thC! walls they would be in a sort of gullC!)' or bottom,
into which the defenders of the city could look down from
above. The only point from which the north end of GC!rona
could be approached from flat ground and without disadvantages
of slope, is the short front of less than ilOO yards breadth
between the foot of l\Ionjuich and the bank of the Ter. Here,
in the ruins of the ~uburb of Pedret, there was plenty of cover,
n l;oi1 ellSY to work, nlld nlevel terrain as far as thc foot of the
Santa l\faria bastion. The engineers of the besiC!ging army
selected three SC!etions of wall as thdr objectivC!. The first ww;
the 'Redoubt of the Germaus' nnd the tower of La Gironella,
thC! highest and most <':olllnmuding works ill tllis part of the
enceinte: once established in these, they could overlook and
dominate the whole city. The other points of attack were
chosen for the opposite reason-because they were intrinsically
weak in themselves, not because they were important or
dominating parts of the defences. The curtain of Santa. Ludo.
in particular seemed to imite attack, as being in 11. salient
nnglC!, unprotected by flanking fire, and destitnte of any
artillery of its own.
VC!rdicr, therefore, on the a<.hice of his engineers, set to work
to attack these points of tlw enceinte between La GironelIa and
Santa l\furia. New batteries erected nmid the ruins of Monjuich
were Ic"eIled against them, in additioll to such of the older
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batteries as could still be utilized. On the front by PeJret
also, where nothing had hitherto been done, works were
prepared for guns to be directed again:<;t Santa Maria and
Santa Lllcia. Meanwhile u. p<'rpetual bombardment with shell
WB,& kept up, against the whole quarter of the town that lay
behind the selected points of atWck. Morrol'$ were always
playing, not only frolll t.he Monjuich heights but from two
bnttcries erected on the SQ-cnJ]ed 'Grccn :\10Ilnd' in the plain
beyond the river Ter. Their eff'ect was terrible: almost ellery
house in the northem quarter of Geronn WM llnroofed or
destroyed: the population had to take refuge in cellars, where,
after a few days, they began to die fa.~t- all the more so that food
was just beginning to rUll short 11$ August advanced. From the
14th to the 30th of that month Verdier's attack was de"cloping
itself: by its last day four breaches had been established: one,
about forty feet broad, in the curtain of St. Lucia, two close
together in the works at La Gironella I, the fourth and smallest
in the platform of San Cristohal. But the approaches were
still far from the foot of the wall, thc fire of the outlying
Spanish works, especially the Calvary fort, was unsubdued, and
though the guns along the attacked front had all becn silenced,
the French artillery had paid dearly both in li"es and in
material for the advantage they had gained. Moreover sickness
was making dreadful ravages in the ranks of the besieging
army. The malarious pestilence Oil which the Spaniards had
l'elied had appeared, after a sudJen and heavy rainfall had
raised the Tcr and Olla beyond Lheir lnmks, LUld inundated
the whole plain of Salt. By malaria, dysentery and sunstroke
Verdier had lost 5,000 men, in aildition to his casualties in the
siege. Many of them were convalescents in the hospitals of
Perpigmm and Figueras, bllt it was hard to get them back to
the front; the aomalelles made the roads impassable for small
detachments, and the officers on the line of comlllllnication,
being very short of men, were given to detaining drafts that
reached them 011 their wa.y to Gel'Ona.~. Hence Verdier, including
• llelmas, for convenience' sake, distinguislles these two breaches by
calling the northern one the bre."\ch in the Barracks, tlle soutllern the
b~ach in the Latrines of the (German Redoubt.'
t Between Gerotla and Perpignan, for the defence of communications
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his artillerymen and sappers, had less than 10,000 men left
for the siege, and these much discouraged by its interminable
length, short of officers, and sickly. This was lIot enough tu
guard a pcripllcry of six miles, and messengers were continually
slipping in or out of Gcrona, between the widel)' :;cattcrcd
camps of the French.
On August 31 a new phase of the siege began. III response
to the constant appeals of Alvuret to the Catalan Junta, and
the consequent complaints of the Junta alike to the Captain-
General Blakc, and to the central government at Seville, some-
thing was at last about to be done to relieve Gerona. The
supreme Central Junta, in reply to a formal representation of
the Catalan8 dated AIlbl'\lst 16 \ had sent make 6,000,000 reals
in cosh, and SI. peremptory order to march 011 Gerona whatever
the state of his nrmy might be, nuthorizing him to call out all
the 301Iwt€/IC8 of the province in his aid. The geneml, who
had ilt last returned to Ttlrragona, oheyed, though entirely
lacking eonfidencc in his mcans of success; and 011 the thirty-
first his advance guard was skirmishing with St. eyr's covering
army on the heights to the south of the Ter.
lllake's army, it will be remembered, had been completely
routed at llelchite by Suchet 011 June 18. The wrecks of his
Aragonese dh'ision had gradually rallied at Tortosn, those of
his Valenci{\1l divisions at ::\forella: but even b)' the end of .July
he had only 1\ few thousand men collected, and he had lost
every gun of his artillery. }o'or Illlllly we<:ks he could do nothing
but press the Juuta of Vlllenci!~ to fill thc depleted milks of his
regimcnts with recruits, to reconstitute his train, and to pro\'iJe
him with new call1lon. Al'agon had bcen lost-nothing could
be drawn from thence: Catalonia, distracted by Suchet's
demonstration on its western flank, did not do as much as
might have been expected in its own defence. The Junta
was inclined to favOllr the em}Jloyment of micllw!eles and
llnd the gnrrisollillg of Figuerns, tJlero were at this time the Vnlais
battalion, OIlC battalion of thll Confederation of the !thine (Waldook-
HCIIss-Schwllr1.burg), ono battalion c.'leh of tile Freuch 7th alld 113th-llot
more t11.1.11 2,300 IJ,'l)'oncts in all. Sce Returns of tlJe Army of SIJain for
Scllt. Hi,1809. .
I For tllis correspondence sec lhe Appendices nos. 16 and 2'J-5 ill
1101. ji of &11113.5.
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,wmafelles, and to undervalue the troops of the line; it forgot
that the irregulars, though the)' did admirable work in
harassing the enemy, could not be relied upon to operate in
large masses or strike a decisive blow. Still, the regiments
at Tllrragona, Lerida, and elsewhere had been somewhat
recruited before August was out.
Blake's field army was composed of some 14,000 men; there
were {h'e Vl\lencian regiments-those which had been least
mishandled in the campaign of Aragon-with the relics of
six of the battalions which Ret.lillg had brought from Granada
in 1808 1, lwo of Lu",uu's old Amgonese corps, and five or six
of the regimenLs which hud formed the originul garrisoll of
Catalonia. The bl\tLuJiolls were very weak-it look twenty-
rOlll' of them to lIlukc up 13,000 infantry; of cavul!'y there
were ollly four squadrons, of mtillery only two blltteriL'S.
Those of the rank and file who were not raw recruits were
t.he vanquished of lHolins de Rey and Vall~ or of 1\lurin. /ll1d
1lelchite. They had no great confidence in Bl/lke, and he had
still less in them. Despite the ordel'8 received from Seville,
which bru:l.e him risk all for the relief of Gerona, he was
determined not to fight another pitched battle. The memories
of Belchite were too recent to be forgotten. Though much
obloquy has been poured upon his head for this resolve, he
was probably wise in his decision. St. Cyr had still some
1~,000 men in his covering army, who had taken no share in the
siege; their mOl'ale was intact, and they had felt little fatigue
or privation. They could be, and were in fact, reinforced by
4,000 men from Verdicr's force when the stress came. Blake,
therefore, was, so far as regular troops weut, outnumbered by
the l?rel1ch, especially in ca\'alry and altillery. He could not
trust in time of battle the miqueletes, of whom some 4,000
or 5,000 from the Ampurdam and Central Catalonia. ClIme to
join him. He thought that it might be possible to elude or
1 See tile {morning state' given in Artec1le, vii. pp. 565-0. 111e
Valcncian regiments were Savoya, OrihueJa, Voluntarios de Valencia,
an(1 AlmanUl, with about 5,000 bayollets. Of Hedillg's old troop!! from
Ule south there were Almeria, HaUl, Santa Fe, 1st of Granada (othenvise
called Jliberia), and two battn,lions of I'rol'illeial Grcundicrs, sOlllctlling
ov()r 3,000 mcn. '1116 rest were mainly C:.talans.
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outflank St. Cyr, to lure him to divide his forcC$ illto scattcred
bodies by threatening many points at once, or, on the other
hand, to induce him to concentrate 011 one short frout, and so to
leave some of the exits of Gerona open. But a battle with the
united French army he would not risk under any conditions.
St. Cyr, however, was too wary for his opponent: he wanted
to fight at all costs, and he was prepared to risk a disturbance
of the siege operations, if he could catch Blake in the open and
bring him to action. The moment that pressure on his out-
posts, by regular troops coming from the south, was reported,
he drew together Souham's and Pino's divisions on the short
line between San Dallllny on the right and Cusa de Selva on
the left, across thc high road from Barcelona. At the same
time he sent stringent onlcrs to Vcrdier to abandon the UII-
important sections of his line of investment, and to come to
reinforce the field army at the hend of his French division,
which still counted 4,000 bayonets. Verdier accordingly
. marched to join his chief, leaving Lecchi's Italians-now little
more than ~,OOO strong-to watch the west side of Gerona, and
handing over the charge of the works on )1olljuich, the new
approaches, and the park at Pont Mayor, to the \Vestphalians.
He abandoned all the outlying posts on the heights, even the
convent of San Daniel, the village of ClIllIpduru, und the peak
of Nuestru Seiiom de loo Angeles. Only 4,600 infantry and
2,000 gunners and sappers IVcre left facing thc garrison: but
Alvarez was too weak to drive off even such a slUall force.
On September 1 Blake ostentatiously displayed the hcads of
his columns in front of St. Cyr's position; but while the .French
general was eagerly awaiting his attack, and preparing his
counter-stroke, the Spaniard's game was being played out in
another quarter. '''hile Hodra and Claros with their miquc-
Ides made noisy demonstration from the north against the
1Vcstphalians, and thl'Clltellcd the park and thc calllp at Sarria,
Blake had detached onc of his divisions, that of Garcia Conde,
some 4,000 strong, far to the left beyond St. Cyr's flank: tbis
corps had with it a convoy of more than a thousand mules
laden with provisions, and a herd of cattle. It completely
escaped the notice of' the French, and marching from Amer at
break of day came down into the plain of' Salt at noon, far in
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the rear of St. eyr's army. Garcin Condc had the depleted
Italian di\,jsion of the siege corps in front of him: onc of the
brigadiers, the Pole Milosewib.., was in command that dny.
Lecchi being in hospital. This small force. which vainly
believed itself coyered from attack by St. Cyr's corps, had
kept no look-out to the rear, being wholly intent on watching
the garrison. It was surprised by the Spanish column, cut into
two halves, Rnd routed. Garda Conde entered the Mercadal
in triumph with his convoy, and St. Cyr first learnt what had
o(.'{'urrcd when he saw the broken remnants of the Italians
ponring into the rear of his own line at Fomells.
That night Gerona wag free of enemies on its southern and
eastern sides, and Alvarez communicated freely with Rovira's
llJ1d Claros's irregulars, who had forced in the "Vestphalian
division and compelled it to conccntrate in MOlljuich and the
camp by the brreat park near Surria. The garrison reoccupied
the ruincU convent of Sun Daniel by the Ga1ligan, and placed
a strong party in the hermitage on the peak of Nuestra Sci\OI'U
de los Angeles. It also destroyed all the advanced trenches
all the slopes of IHonjuich. On the next morning, however,
it began to appreciate the fact that the siege had not been
l'lliilC<1. St. eyr sent back VeN1ier's division to rejoin thc
'Yestphalialls, and with them the wrecks of Lecchi's routed
battalions. He added to the force nnder Velxlier half Pino',.,
Italian division-six fresh battalions. ""Vith these reinfOloce-
ments the old siege-lines conld be reoccupied, and the Spaniarrls
were forced back from the points outside the walls which they
had reoccupied on the night of September 1.
By sending away such a large proportion of the 16,000 men
that he had concentrated for battle on the pre\·ious day, St. Cyl'
let'\; himself only some 10,000 men for a general .action with
lllake, if the latter should resolve to fight. Hut the Spanish
general, being without Garcia Conde's division, had also no
more than 10,000 men in line. Not only did he refuse to
adyance, but when St. Cyr, determined to fight at all costs,
marched against him with off'ensiye intentions, he hastily
retreated as far as Hostalrich, two marches to the rear. There
he broke up his army, which had exhausted all its provisions.
St. Cyr did the same aud for the same reasons; his mcn had to
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disperse ill order to live. He says in his memoirs that if Blake
had shown a bold front llgninst him, Elnd forced him to keep
the covering army concentrated for two more days, the siege
would have had to be raised. For the covering army had
advanced against the Spaniards on September fl with only two
days' rations, it had e.xhausted it.'! stores, and eaten up the
countr)'-side. On the fourth it would hu\'c had to retire, or to
break up into small fmctiom, leaving the siege-corps un-
protected. St. C)'r doubted whether theretrcn.t would havecea.;e<'
before l?igucras was reached. But it is morc probable that
he would have merely fttllen back to join VC1'tlicr, and to li\'c
for some days 011 the depots of Pont Mayor und Sarria. He
could have offered battle again under the walls of Gcrona, with
all his forces united. Blake might ha\'e got into close t09ch
with ....\lvarel'.. and ha.vc thrown what convoys he pleased into
the town; hut as long as St. Cyr and Verdier with 22,000 mcn
lay opposite him, he could not hu\'e risked any more. The
situation, in short, would have been that which o<.:cnrroo in
February ]811 nnder the walls of lladajo?., when Mortier faced
:'Ilcndizahal, and would probably have ended in the same
fashion, by the French attacking and driving off' the relieving
army. Blake, then, may be blamed somewhat for his excessive
caution in gi\'ing way so rapidly before St. Cyr's advance: but
if we remember the quality of his troops and the inevitable
result of a battle, it is hard to cellsure him overmuch.
l\Ie..'tllwhile Garcia Conde, whose movcmcnts wcre most happy
and adroit, rcinfOl'ccd thc garrison of Gerona up to its original
strength of 5,000 bayonets, by making over to Alvarcz four
whole battalions and some picked companies from other corps,
and prepared to lea\'e the town with the rest of his division and
thc vast drove of mules, whose burden had been discharged into
the magazines. If he had dedicated his whole force to strength.
ening the gal'rison, thc additional troops would ha\'e eaten up
ill a few days all UlC provisions thut the convoy had brought in l •
1 '1lle reinforcemenls left behiml by Garcill Conde consisted of two
battalions of Baza (one of lteding's old Grana.dan regiments), \I'itll 1,368
bayonets, two Clltalan I tercios,' 1st and 2nd of Talam, with 716 b.,}'oncts,
and select companies of 1st of Granada (Iliberia), 2nd of Vich, aud Volun-
t.a.rios de Tarragolla.-in all apparently about 2,707 men,
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At:eordingly he started off' at two n.lll. on September 4 with
some 1,~OOmen, by the upland path that leads past the hermitage
of Los Angeles; St. Cyr had just plal.w l)ino's troops from the
covering anny to guard the heights to the south-east of Gerona,
but Garcia Condc, warned by the peasant'> of their exact position,
slipped between the posts and got off' to Hostall'ich with a loss
of no more than fifty mell I,
Before he could consider his position safe, Verdicl' had to
complete the lines of investment: this he did on September 5
by dl'iving olT the intermediate posts which AlviLl'cZ had thrown
out from the Capuchin heights, to Ilnk the town with the
gal'rison ill the hermitage of Nucstru Sciiorn de 10s Angeles.
IHazzuchclli's brigade stormed the hermitage itself Oil the
following day, with a loss of about eighty men, llnd l1lus;w.croo
the greater part of the garrison. Oil that same day, however,
the French suffered a small disaster in another purt of the
environs, General Joba, who had been sent with three bat~
talions to clear the road to Figueras from the bands of Clams
and llovira, was beaten and slain at San Gregorio by those chiefs.
But the miqueletes afterwards retired to the lllollllt:lins, and the
road became intermittently passable, at least for large bodies
of men,
It was not till September 11, however, that Verdier reOOI11-
'I1Le table 011 p. 315 of Arteche's 1'01. vii seems to err in crediting tILe
Cerl'era 'tercio' to Garcia: this had 1..'Ollle ill on Aug. 1i, as described 011
1). 35. 011 the otlier hand tlle company of Volulltarios de Tarragolla
should be credited to him.
I St. err tells a story to the effect tllat he had placed l\lazzuchelli's
brigadc of I'ino's division ill ambush behind the hill of I'alau to intercept
Garcill Comic, and that the SI)llllillrds lI'ould have marched right illto the
trail on SejJt. 3, if the Tlalhms ]Im} not hoon ~l,1Lpio.l e1JOugh to SlIllliU
the rl!uei/ at dawn, and so WlUlL tile enemy of tlJeir existelJ~. But lhe
Spallish accounts of .Minali and Claros are quite different (see Arteche,
vii. 377) ; they are 'to the effect I1lat Garcia Conde Imd intellded to start at
dUfk on the third, but, hearillg firiug 011 tlle side of 1'a13u, deferred his
exit and took another road. If he WlIS starting at 7 or 8 o'clock at night
on the tiJirll, he cannot have been wllJ'lled by the monling bugles LIt
4 o'clock ou the !lrevious morniug. SOIl St. Cyr, p. 234, and Napicr,
ii. 24.5, for tILe Prench story, wllich the latter takes Ol'er whole from 111e
former. Delmas and Vacsni do not give the tale, tllOUgiJ they llave
a full Ilarratiou of the escape of Garcia COilde.
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lIIcllccd the actual siege, and bade his batteries open once Illore
upon Gcrona. The eleven days of respite sillce Blake inter-
rupted the bombardment on September 1 had been invaluable
to the garrison, who had cleared away the debris from the
foot of the breaches, replaced the damaged artillery on the
front of attack, and thrown up interior defences behind the
shattered parts of the wall. They had aho destroyed all the
advanced trenches of the besiegers, which had to be reconstructed
at much cost 01' life. In four days Verdier had recovered most
of the lost ground, when he was surprised by a vigorous sally
from the gate of San Pcdro; the garrison, dashing out at
three r,M., stormed the three ucarcst breaching batteries, spiked
their guus, and filled in all the trenches which wcre advallcing
towards the foot of the walls. Four days' work was thus undone
in an hour, and it was only on September 19 that Verdier had
reconstructed his works, and pushed forward so far towards his
objective that he considered an assault possible. He then
begged St. Cyr to lend him a brigade of fresh troops, pleading
that the siege-corps was IlOW so weak in numbers, and so
demoralized by its losses, that he did not consider that the men
would do thcmsclves justicc at a storm. Thc losses of o(Jicers
hud been fearful: one battalion was commanded bya lieutenant,
another had been reduced to fifty men; desertion was rampant
It among several of the foreign corps. Of 14<,000 infantry I of the
French, ·Westphaliau, and Italian divisions less than 6,000 now
remained. So far as mere siegecraft went, as he explained to
St. Cyr, 'the affair might be considered at an cnd. We have
made foUl' large practicable bL'Citchcs, each of them sufficient to
reduce the toWll. But the troops cannot be trusted.' St. Cyr
refu~d to lend a mall for the assault, writing with polite irony
that' every general has his own task: yours is to take Geroma
with the resources placed at your disposal by the government
for that object, and the officers named by the government to
conduct the siege.' 2 He added that he considered, from its pust
1 Vel'tlicr did uot exaggernte: Bee 'o\l'Ileudh: 110. 2 at end of Ulis
volulIle, sllowiug that !lis threo dil'isiollS 11Ild lost H,161 men Ollt of 14,044
by Septem1.oer Hi.
2 See the acrid correspolldeuce between St. eyr and Verdier ill Appen-
dices !lOll. 37-8, 4Q--{l of Belmas, vol. ii.
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conduct, that the morale of the siege-corps was rather good
than bad. He should not, therefore, allow the covering army to
join the assault; but he would lend the whole of Pillo's di\'ision
to take charge of Monjuieh and the eumps, during the storm,
Ilnd would make fl. demonstration against the Mercadal, to
distract the enemy from the breaches. With this Verdier had
to be content, and, after making two final protests, concentrated
all his brigades save those of the \Vestphalian dhision, and
composed with them four columns, amounting to some 3,000
men, directing one against each of the four breaches. That sent
against the platform of San Cristobal was a mere demonstration
of 150 men, but the other three were heav)' masses: the Italians
went against Santa Lucia, the Frendl brigndc against the
southern breach in the 'Rl'l:loubt of the Germans,' the Berg
troops against the northenl one. A separate demonstration
'I'M made against the Call'll.ry fort, whose Ilnsubrlued fire still
flanked the breaches, in the hope that its defenders might be
prevented from interfering in the main struggle.
Almrez, who had noted the French columns marching fmm
all qnarters to take shelter, before the assault, in the trenches
on the slopes of Monjuich and in front of Pedret, had fair
warning of what was coming, and had done his best to provide
against the danger. The less important parts of the enceinte
had been put in charge of the citizens of the' Crusade,' and the
picked companies of e\'ery regiment llad been told off to the
breaches. The Englishman, Ralph Marshall, was in charge
of the curtain of Santa Lucia, 'VilIiam Nash, the Spanish-Irish
colonel of Ultonia, commanded at the two breaches under
La Gironella : Brigadier Fournas., the second-ill-command of the
gnrrison, had general supervision of the defences; he had
previously taken charge ofMonjuich during the great assault ill
August. Everything had been dOlle to prepare a secolld line
of resistance behind the breaches; barricades had been erected,
houses loopholcd,and u. great many marksmen disposed 011 roofs
und church towers, which looked down 011 the rear-side of the
gaps in the wall.
At four o'clock in the anernoon of September 19 the three
columns destined for the northern breaches descended from
Monjnich on the side of San Daniel, cros...oo till" GalUgan, lwd
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plunged into the hollow at the foot of the •Redoubt of the
Germans.' At the same moment the fourth column started
from the ruins of the tower of San Juan to attack the curtn.ill
of' Santa Lucia, The diversion against the Calvary fort was
made at the same moment, and beaten off' in a f'ew minutes, so
that the fire of this work was not neutralized during the assault
nccordiug to Verdier's cxpedatioll. The main assault, never-
theless, was delivered with great energy, despite the flanking
fire. At the two poinb! of attack uuder La Gironella the
stormers twice 11'011, crossed. and descended from the breach,
forcing their way into the ruined barracks behind. But they
were mown down by the terrible musketry fire fi'om the houses,
find finally expelled with the bayonet. At the Santa Lllcia
curtain thc Italians scaled the breach, bllt were bl'ought up by
a perpendicular drop of twelvc fcet behind it-the foot of the
wall in this quarter chancing to be much higher than the level
of the street below, They held the el'cst of the breach for
some time, but were finally worsted in a long and furious
exchange of fire with the Spaniards on the roofs and churches
before them, and recoiled. The few sllrviving oflicers rallied the
stol'mers, and brought them up for a second aSSll.ult, but at the
cnd of two hours of hard fighting all were CQllstraiuoo to rctire
to their trenches. They had lost 6~4 killed and wounded,
including three colonels (the only thrt.'C surviving in the whole
of Verdier's corps) and thirty other officers. The Spanish loss
had been ~51, among them Colonell\farshal1, who was mortally
wounded at his post on the Santa. Lucia front,
Verdier accused his troops of cowardicel which seems to ha,,·e
been unjust. St. Cyr wrote to the Minister of 'Var to expn..'Ss
his opinion tha.t his subordinate was making an excuse to cover
his own error, in judging that a town Illust fall merely because
there were large breaches in its walls. I • The columns stopped
for ninety minutes on the breaches under as heavy a fire as has
ever been seen. There ,,;as some disOluer at the end, but that
is not astonishiJlg in view of the heavy loss suffered before thc
l , 11 panlit 'Iue 1'011 n cmploy~ 18 resBQUfCC, malheufcuscmclIt trOll usitCe
ell pareil ens, de dire que les troupes n'ollt lllL'! fait Icur devoir, co IllIi
prouuit ue jusWs r~clanmtiolls tic Icur {lllrt.' (8t. err tu the Milli.~tcrJ
Sept. 24, 1I«)lJ.)
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retreat. I do not think that picked grenadiers would have
done any better, and 1 am cOlwinced that the assault failed
because the obstacles to surmount were too great.' The fact
was that the Spaniards hud fought with such admirable obstin-
acy. and had so welllwronged their inner defences, that it did not
suffice that the breaches should have been perfectly practicable.
At the northern assault the stormers actually penetrated into
the buildiugs behind the gaps in the ruined wall, but could not
get further forward. I In short, the history of the siege ofGerona
gives a clear corroboration of the old military axiom that 110
town should ever surrender merely because it has been breached,
and justifies Napoleon's order that every governor who capitu·
latOO without having stood at least one assault should be sent
before a court martial. It refutes the excuse::; of the too
numerous commanders who havesurrendel'ed merely because there
was a practicable breach in their walls, like Imaz at Dadajoz ill
1811. If all Spunish generals had beellll.S wary and us resolute
I\S l\InriaDo All-are;:, the Peninsular War 1V0uld have taken some
unexpected turns. The moral of the ddcm.:cs of Tal'ifa, BUI'go~,
and San Sebastian will be fOllnd to be the same us that of the
defence of Gerona,
The effect of the repulse of September 19 on the besieging
army was appalling. Verdier, after w,·it.ing three venomous
letters to the Emperor, the YVar Minister, and Marshal Augereau,
in which he accused St. Cyr of ha"ing deliberately sacrificed the
bl"(}()(j of the service to his personal resentments, declared himself
invalided. He then went off to Perpignan, though permission
to depart was expressly denied him by his superior: his divi·
siona! generals, Lecchi and Moria, had already preceded him to
France. Disgust at the failure of the storm had the same effect
on the rank and file; 1,200 men went to the hospital in the
I Tho IlOt \1111latuT;\l suggestiou that tllC German ami Itnlirm trooJls may
have failed to display such desperate courage as the nath'6 French in the
assault seems to be refuted by their losses, which were hardly smaller in
proportion. Of 1,4.30 natil'e French of the 7th and SGth Line and 32nd
Uger, 328 Ivere put out of action; of 1,400 .Herg, Wiirl.burK, andltalian
troop!!, 21)6. The difference ill the {lcrccntllge is lI() small that it is dUl.r
that there was no great difftlrence in conduct.
2 See especially Verdier to Augereau, no. 63, and to the Minister, no. 61,
of Belmas's App6udices.
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fortnight that followed the assault, till by October 1 the three
divisions of the siege-corps numbered little morc than 4,000
bayonel..-just enough to hold Monjuich alld the camps by the
great depots at Pont Mayor and Sarria. The store of ammuni·
tion in the park had been tlSl'd up for the tremendollS bombsu"tl.
ment ponred upon the breaches from the 15th to the 17th of
September. A new supply was wanted from Pcrpignan, yet no
troops could be detached to bring it forward, for the miquclctcs
were again active, and 011 September 13 had captured or destroyed
near &scara a convoy guarded by so mallY as 500 men.
St. Cyr, left in sole charge of the siege by Venlier's departure,
came to the conclusion that it WIl." useless to proceed with the
attack by means of trenches, batteries, and asSAults, and frankly
stated that he should starve the town out, bllt waste no further
li\·cs on active opemtions, He drew in the covering corpl;
closer to Gcrona, so that it could take a practical part in thc
investment, put the wrecks of Lecchi's troops-of whom less
than 1,000 survived-into Pino's division, and sent the French
brigade of Verdier's old division to guard the line bctW(.-e1l
llascara and the }<'rontier, Thus the distinction between the
siege~corps and the covering troops ceased to exist, and St. Cyr
lay with some 16,000 mcn in a loose eh,de round Gerona, hltcnt
not on prosecuting admncc.~ against the walls, but only 011
prevcnting the introduction of further succours. He was aware
that acute privations were already being suffered by the
Spaniards: Garcia CondC's convoy had brought ill not much
more than eight days' pro,;sions for the 5,000 men of the rein~
forced garrison and the 10,000 inhabitants who still survived.
There was a considerable amonnt of flour still left in store,
but little else; meat, salt and fresh, was all gone 5&\'C horseflesh,
for Aharez had just begun to butcher his draught horses and
those of his single squadron of cavalry, Thcre was some small
store of chocolate, tobacco, and coffcc, but wine und aguurdicnte
had run out, so had salt, oil, rice, and-what was most scrious
with autumn and winter approaching-wood and charcoal. All
the timbers of the houses destroyed by the bombardment had
been promptly used up, cither for fortification or for cooking 1,
I The "ery illteresting list or the prices of commoditics at the commence-
ment and the end of the siege, drawn IIp by Dr. Iluiz, one of the Gerona
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Medical stores were wholly unobtainable -' the chief hospital
had been burnt early ill the sich"C, and the sick and wounded,
laid in vaults or caSCllllltcs for safety, died off like flies in the
underground nil'. The sl,.'(!ds of pcsLilcJl(:c were spread by the
Ilumber of deltd bodies of men and animals which were I)'iug
where they could not be reached. under the ruins of fallen houses.
The spirit alike of garrison and lmops still mu IJigh; the
repulse of the grent assault of September 19, and the cessntioll
of the bombal'(lmCl1t fi)t' many days after had encouraged them.
But they were beginning to murmur more and more bitterly
against Blake -' there was a genem1, if erroneous, opinion that
he ought to have risked a battle, instead of merely throwing
in provisions, on September 1. Alvarez himself shared this
view, and wrote in vigorous terms to the .JIlUta. of Catalonia,
to ask if his garrison was to perish slowly by famine.
Blake responded by a second eflort, less happily planned tllan
that of September 1. He called together his scattered divisions,
now about 12,000 strong, and secretly concentrated them at
La BispaJ, between Gerona and the sea. He had again got
together some 1.~OO mules laden with foodstuffs, and a large
drove of sheep and oxen. Henry O'Donllell, all officer of the
Ultonia regiment, who had been sent out by Alvare1., marched
at the head of the convoy with ~,OOO picked men; a dil'isioll
of 4,000 men under Geneml Wimpfen followed close behind to
cover its rear. Blake, with the rcst, rcllmincd at La Bispal: he
committed the egregious fault of omitting to threaten other
diarists, may be round 01\ 1). 579 or Arteclw's \'01. ,·ii. Note \.he following
-the Teal (20 to the dollar) = 2!d. :-
Reo{/J. Reaa.
!nJulle. InSepl. III Julle. !Il&pt.
Wheat flour, the qr.. BO 112 Wood, the arroba (32
Barleymeal, the qr. 30 6(; lb.)...
Oatmeal, the qr.. 48 HO Clum:ool, ditto.
Coffee, the lb... 8 24 Tobacco, the lb.
Olocnlatc, thelb.. IG G4 A. [llwl . . .
Oil, the measure 2~ 24 Rice, \he lb.
Salt fish, the lb.. 21' 32 Fresh flsb horn the
Cheese, the lb. 4, 40 'fer, the lb... 4 36
'111Us while flour and Illeal had not dllubled ill value, coffee had gone up
threefold, chocolate and tobacco rourrold, cheese alld fuel tenfold, and the
other commodities far more.
•
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parls of the line of investment, so as to dmw off St. CF's
attention from the crucial poitl~. He trusted to secrecy llnd
sudden action, having su{.'C€(,xled in concentrating his anny
without being discovered by the French, who thought him still
far awa,\' be)'ond Hostalrich. Thus it came to pass that though
O'Donnell struck sharply in, defeated an Italian regiment near
Castellar, am!. another three miles further on, and reached tlle
Constable fort with the head of the convoy, yet the rest of
Pino's division tlllU pnrt of Souham's L'Ollccntratcd upon his
flank and rear, because they were not drawn off hy alarms in
other quarters. They broke in between O'Dollncll and his
supports, captured all the convoy save liO mules, and destroyed
the leading regiment ot' "\Vimpfen's colmnn, ~hootillg also,
IIccOl-ding to the Spanish reports, man)' scores of the unarmed
peasants who were driving the beasts of burden 1. About 700
of "Vimpfen's mell were taken prisoners, about 1,300 killed or
wounded, for little quarter was given. The remnant recoiled
npon Blake, who fell back to Hostalrich next da)" September ~7,
wit.hollt offering to fight. The amount of food which reached
the garrison wns trilling, llnd Alvarez declared thnt he had 110
need for the additional mouths of O'Donnell's four bttltn1ions,
alld refused to admit them into the city. The)' lay cllcompcd
under the Capuchin fort for some days, waiting for an oppor-
tunity to escape.
After having thus wrecked Blake's second attempt to succour
Gerona, and driven him from the neighbourhood, St. Cyr betook
himself to llerpignan, in order, as he explained to the Minister
or'Var 2, to hurry up provisions to the army at the front, and
to compel the oflkcrs at the base to send forward some 3,000
or 4,000 cOllvalescents fit to march, whose services had been per-
sistently denied him 3. Arrived there he heard that Augereau,
whose gOllt had long disappeared, was perfectly fit to take the
field, and could have done so long before if he had not pre-
ferred to shift Oil to other shoulders the responsibility for the
siege of Gcrolla. He was, on October 1, at the baths of MoHtg,
I destroying the germs of his malady' as he gravely wrote to
I See Toreno, ii, and Arteehe, vii. 412.
~ See St. eyr to the Minister, Belmas, ii, Appendix no. 67.
, Augereau to the :\Iinistcr, ibid., Od. 8.
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Pal'is,-amusing himself, as St. Cyl' maintain8 in his memoirl';.
Convinced that the siege had still a long time to run, and
eager to do an ill turn to the officer who had intrigued to get
his place, S1. Cyr played on the Marshal precisely the same
trick that Verdier had played on himself a fortnight befme. He
announced that he was indisposed, wrote to congratulate
Augereau on his convale8(.-encc, and to resign the command to
his hands, and departed to his home, without waiting for an
answer, or obtaining leave from Paris-a daring act, as Napoleon
was enraged, and might have treated him hardly. He \I'M
indeed put under arrest for a short time.
From the first to the eleventh of October Souham remained
in char!,1'C of the army, but on the twelfth Augereau appeared
and took command, bringing with him the mass of convalescents
who had been lingering at Perpignan. Among them WO-" Verdiel',
whose health became nU that could be desired when St. Cyr
had disappeared. The night following the Marshal's anivo.l
wus disturbed by all exciting incident. Hellry O"Donl1ell from
his refuge on the Cupuchin heights, had been watching for
it fortnight for a good chance of escape. Thcre was a dense
fog on the night of the 12th-13th: taking advantage of it
O'Dollllell cume dowll with his brignde, made a circuit round
the town, crossed the OrUI. alld struck stmight nway into the
plo.in of' Salt, which, being the most open and exposed, \I'M o.lso
the least guarded section of the French lines of investment.
He bl'oke through the chain of vedettes almost withont firing,
und came rushing before dawn into Souham's head-quarters camp
on the heights of Agunvh·a. The battalion sleeping there was
scattered, and the general forced to fly in his shirt. O'Dollncll
swept ofi' his riding-horses and baggage, as also some prisoners,
and was out of reach ill half 1111 hour, before the rallying
fractions of the French division came up to the rescue of their
chief. By six o'clock the escaping colullIn WtlS in safety ill the
mountains by Sunta ColOlllll, where it joineo the llIiquclete.~ of
Milnns. FOl" this daring exploit O'Donnell was llmdc It major-
!,'Cueral by the Supreme Junw. His dcpal·ture was a great
relief to Alvarcz, who had to husband e\"ery mouthful of food,
and had ah'Cady put both the garrison and the townsfolk OIl
half-rations of flour and horseflesh.
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Augcreau was in every way inferior as an officer to St. Cyr.
An old soldier of fortune risen from the ranks, he had little
education or military science; his olle vj("tue was headlong
courage on the battlefield, yet when placed in supreme command
he often hesitated, and showed hopeless indecision. He had
been lucky elloll~h to earn a great reputation as Napoleon's
second-in-commllnd in the old campaigns of Italy in ]796-7.
Since then he had nuu:lc his forluuc by Occoming olle of the
Emperor's most zealous tools and flatterers. He was rcckollcd
!\ blind and n..'Cklcss Boullpartist, read>, to risk tlllythiug fol'
his master, bllt spoilt his reputation for sincerity by deserting
him at the first opportunity in 1814. He was inclined to a
harsh interpretation of the laws of war, and elljoyed a doubtful
reputation for financial integrity. Yet he was prone to
ridiculous self-laudatory proclamations and manifestos, written
in a bombastic strain which he vainly imagined to resemble
his master's thundel'S of the Bllllet-ilM. Scraps of his address
to the citizens of Geron/l. may serre to display his fatuity-
'Unhappy inhabiwnls~wl"elched victims immolated to the
caprice and madncss of ambitious men greedy for your hlood-
retul"ll to yom sen~cs, opcn your eyes, consider the ill;, whieh
surround you! With what tram~uillit.r do your leaders look
upon the groves crammed with your corpses! Are you llOt
horror-struck at these cannibals, whose mirth bursts out in the
midst of the human hecatomb, and who yet dare to lift their
gory hands in prayer towards the throne of' a God of Peace?
They call themselves the apostles of Jesus Christ! Tremble,
cruel and infamous men! The God who judges thc actions
of mOl'tals is slow to condemn, but his \'cngcallce is terrible....
I WUI'll )"OU for the last time, inhabitants of Gerona, reflect
while you slilllllay! If you fOl't"C me to throw aside my usual
mildness, your ruin is inevitablc. I shall be the fil'St to groan
at it, but the laws of war impose on me the dire necessity....
1 am severe but just. Unhappy Gerona! if thy defenders persist
in their obstinacy, thou shalt perish ill blood and flame.
(Signed) AUGEREAU.'
Stuff of this sort was 1I0t likely to h(lvc mueh cllhct on fUllutic~
like AJvarez and his' Crusaders.' If it is so wrong to cause the
deaths of men-they had ollly to answer-'Vhy has Bonaparte
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sent his legions into Spain? On the Marshal's line of argument,
that it is wrong to resist overwhelming force, it is apparently
a sin before God for any mall to attempt to defend his house
and family against any bandit. There is much odious and
hypocritical nonsense in somc of Napoleon's bulletins, where
he grows tender 011 the miseries of the people he has conquCl'L.J,
but nothing to approach the llltlllllderillgs of his copyist.
AUg'Cl'eIUl found the nnny about Gel'ona showing not more
than l::l,OOO bayonets fit for the field-gunners and sappers
excluded. The men were sick of the siege, and it woulrl seem
that the l\fal'shal was forced, after inspecting the regiment.s
and conferring with the generals, to acquiesce in St. Cyr's
decision that ally further assaults would probabl)' lead to more
repulses. He gave out that he was resolved to change the
system on which the operations had hitherto been conducted,
but the change amounted to nothing morc than that he ordered
a slow but steady oombardment to be kept up, and occasionally
\'exL'(I the Spanial'lls by uemollstl"ations against the lIlore exposed
points of the wall. It doe:> 1I0t appeal" that either of these
cxpedients had the least erred in shaking the momle of the
garrison, It is hue that during October and November the
hearts of the Gerone8C were (.'Ommencing to grow sick, but this
was solei)' the result of starvation and dwindling numbers.
As to the bombardment, they wcre IlOW hardened to any amount
of dropping fire: 011 Octobe. 28 they celebrated the feast of
San Narciso, their pahOll, by a procession all round the town,
which was under fire for the whole time of its progress, and
paid no attention to the casualties which it cost them.
Meanwhilc, whcn the secol1d half of October had begun,
Blake made the third and IMt of his attempts to throwsuc(,'Oul"S
into Gerolla, It was e\'en more feebly can'ied out than that
of September flG, for the army emplo)'ed was less IIUllIcrous.
Blake's force hud 1I0t rcceived any reinfol"Cement to make up
fOl· thc mCll lost in thc last affair, a fact that seems surprising,
silJ(:e Valencia ought now to have bccl1 able to send him the
I'culUinder of the regiments which had been reorganized since
the disuslers of June. But it would seem that Jose CarOl who
was ill command in that pro\'ince, and the local Junta, made
excuses for rctt\illing liS mall)' men as possible, and cared little
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for the danger of Gcrona, so IOllg as the war was kept far from
their own frontier. It was, at all)' rate, with no more than
10,000 or Ifl,OOO men, the remains of his original force, that
Blnke once mOl'C came forward on October 18, and threatened
the blockading army by demonstrations both from the side of
La Bispal and that of Santa Coloma. He had again collected
a considerable amount of food at Hostalrich, hut had not )'et
formed a convoy: apparently he wn.~ waiting to discover the
weakest point ill the J?rench lines before risking his mules and
his stOl"eS, both of which \I'ere b)' llQW ver)' hard to procure.
There followed a fm'blight of confuscd skirmishing, without
any battle, though Augereau tried with all his might to force
all a general engagement. Onc of his Italian brigades was
roughly handled near La Bi31ml on the twenty-first, and another
repulsed Ileal' Santa Column on the twenty-sixth, but 011 each
occasion, when the French reinfOl'Cements came up, Blake gfn"e
back and refused to fight. On November 1 the whole of
Souharn's division marched on Santa Colomn, and forced Loygoni
and Henr)' O'Donnell to evacuate it and retire to the mountains.
Souham reported that he had illflict.ed Cl loss of 2,000 men on
the Spaniards, at the cost of' eleven killed amI forty~three
woullded on his own side! The real CflSualty list of the two
Spunish divisions seems to have been somewhat O"er 100 men l.
Nothing decish'c had taken place up to Novcmber 7, when
AUl,>'ercau conceived the idea that he might make an end of
Blake'sfruitless but vexatious demonstrations, by dealing a sudden
blow at his magazines in Hostalrich. If these were destroyed
it would cost the Spaniards much time to collect another store
of provisions fOl' Gerona. Accordingly Pino marched with three
hrigades to storm the town, which was protected only by a dilapi-
dated mediaeval wall unfurnished with guns, though the castle
which dominated it WflS a place of considerable strength, and
proof against a coup de main. Only one of Blake's di \,j"ions, tllllt
of Cuadrado, less than 2,000 strong, was ill thi!J quartet', and
Au&rereau found employment for the others by sending some
of Souham's troops against them, The expedition succeeded;
while MazZt\chelli's brigade occupied the attention of Cundrado,
I See Souham's dispatch, 8triring to make tile combat into a very big
business, in Helmas, ii, Appendix no. 72, and cf. Arlecbe, vii. pp. 430-].
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the rest of the Italians stormed Hostalrich, which was defended
only by its own inhabitants and the small garrison of the castle.
The Spaniards were driven up into that stronghold after a lively
fight, and all the magazines fell into Pino's hands and were
burnt. At u cost of only thirt)'·five killed nnd sixty-four
wounded the food, which lllake had collected with so much
difficulty, was destroyed 1. Thereupon the Spanish general hJ1lVC
up tile !lttcmpt to succour Gcronu, Illld withdrew to the plain
of Vich, to recommence the Sisyphcan w.sk of f,"Cltiug together
onc more CQll\"Oy. It was not desthled to be of allY use to
Al"n1"Cz find his gallallt ~ll'rison, for by the time that it WIlS
collected the siege had nrrived at its final stage.
The Geroncse were now reaching the cnd of their strength:
for the nrst time since the investment began in May some of' the
defenders began to show signs of' slackening. The heavy rains
of October and the commencement of the cold season were
reducing alike troops and inhabitants to a desperate condition.
They had long used up all theil' fuel, and found the chill of
winter intolerable in their cellars and casemates. Alvarez,
though reduced to a state of ph)'sical prostration by dysentery
and fever, was still steadfast in heart. But there was discontent
brewing among some of his subordinates: it is notable, as showing
the spirit of the time, thllt the malcontents were foulIll Illllong
the professional soldiers, not alllong thl! citizens. Early in
No\'cmber sc\'eral officers were found holding secret cOllfcrclIcc:;,
and drawing np illl address to the local Junta, sctting forth the
desperate state of the city und the necessity for deposing the
governor, who was represcnted !tS incapacitated for command by
reason of his illness: it was apparently hinted that he was going
mad, or was intermittently delirious 2. Some of the wild sayings
attributed to Alvarez during the later days of the siege might
be quoted as 11 support for their representations. '1'0 It captain
who asked to what point he was expected to retire, if he were
driven froUl his post, it is said thut hc llnswcrlod, 'lo the
cemetery.' '1'0 another officer, the first who dured to say thut
I See l'illO'S nnd Allgcreau's dislmtchcs ill Belmas's AplJoendices, IIOS.
i3 and 74.
2 Alvare,,'s letter to BIake of Nov. :) prillk.,j ill Art«he's Aplletlflix,
110. 18 ofllis 1'01. vii, gives tlliB account of tlle first Jisco\'ery of plots.
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capitulation was incvitnble because of the exhanstion of the
magazines, he replied, "Vhen the last food is gone we will slurt
eating the cowards, and we will begin with you.' Though t\\\'fll'e
that their conspiracies were known, the mak'Ontcnts did not
desist from their efforts, and Alvarez made preparations for
seizing and shooting the chiefs. Buton the night of November 19
eight of them, illclm!ing three lieutenant-colonels I, wlll'lled by
a traitor of their upprouchillg fute, fled to Allgcl'cnu's camp.
Their arrival was the most encouraging event for the :Frcnch
that had oecuned since the commencement of the siege. The)'
spoke freely of the exhaustion of the garrison, and said that
Alvarez was mad and moribund.
It was apparently this information concenling the desperate
state of the garrison which induced Augereau to recommence
ucti'lc siege operations. He ordered up amlllunition from Pc\'-
pignan to fill the empty magazines, alld 'when it arrived began
to baUel' a new breach in the curtain of Santa Lucia. 011
December ~ Pi no's Italians stormed the suburb of La Marina,
outside the southern end of the town, a quarter hitherto unas·
snile<l, llnd made n. lodgement therein, as it' to open 0. new point
of attack. But this was only done to distn\ct the enemy fmlll
the real design of the Marshal, which was nothing less thall to
cut off the forts on the Capuchin heights from Gerollll. by seizing
the redoubts, those of the 'Chapter' and the 'City,' which
covered the steep upward path from the walls to the group of
works on the hill-top. At midnight on December 6 the voltigeur
and grenadier companies of Pino's division climbed the rough
southern face of the Capuchin heights, and surprised and escaladed
the' nedoubt of the City,' putting the gnrdson to the sword,
Next moruing the batteries of the forts ll.OOVC and the city belo\\'
opened a furious fire upon the lost redoubt, and Alvarcz dircctLxl
his last sail)., scnding out cvcry man that he could collect tu
reeover the work. This led to a long and bloody fight on thc
slopes, which ended illost disastrously for the garrison. Not oul),
was thc sortie repulsed, but in the confusion the French calTie<!
the"Calvary and Chll.pter redoubts, the other works which guarded
the access from Gerona to the upper forts. On the afte1110011
I Of wllOm two, str-.nlKe1r eltOugh, llad been specially mentioned for
eourage ut the September assault.
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of DCL'embcr 7 the communication with them was completely
cut off~ and as their garrisons possessed no SCptlfute 1llU/:,"l.lzines,
and lmd bL'ClI \Vout to receive their daily dole from the city. it
WM dear that they mllst be shu"\"ed out. They had only food
for fOl"ty-eight hours III the moment 1•
The excitement of the sally had drained away the governor's
last strength; he took to hi" bed that evening, WM in delirium
next day, and on the morning of' the ninth re<:ei\·ed the last
sacraments of the Church, the doctors having declared that his
hours were numbered. His last conscious act was to protest
against any proposal to surrender, before he handed over the
command to the senior officer present, General Juliano llolivar.
Had Alvarez retained his senses, it is certain that an attempt
would have been made to hold the town, even when the starving
garrisons of the forts should have surrendered. But the moment
that his stern hand was removed, bis SUCL-essor, Bolil'al', called
together a council of war, to which the members of the Junta,
110 less than the officers t:ollllllandillg corps, were invited. They
voted that further resistance 'I'M illl!lOSsible, and scnt out
Brigadier-Gencral Fonrnas, the man who had so well defended
Monjuich, to obtain terms from Augereal1. On the morning
of the tenth the Marshal received him, and dictated a simple
sun-ender, without any of the favourable conditions which
Fourllas at first demanded. His only concession was that he
om:red to exchanl:,l'E: the garrison for an equal number of the
unhappy prisoners from Dupont's army, now lying in misery on
the pontoons at Cadil'') if the Supreme Junta concurred. But
the bargaiu was never ratified, as the authorities at Se\·ille were
obdurate.
On the morning of December 11 the survivors of the garrison
marched out, and laid down their arms on the glacis of the
Mercadal. Only 3,000 men Cal11e forth; these looked like
living spectres, so pale, weak, and tattered that' the besiegers;
as eye-witnesses observed, 'felt ashamed to have been held at bay
so long by dying men.' There were 1.~OO more lying in the
1 Kapier (H. 249) Iia)'s tllat the sortie was so far successful t113t the
GerOllese opened the W3)' for tlle garrison of the Constable fort to escape
into tlLe cit)'. Blit I call find no authority for this in either the rrencll or
the Spallish Ilarr.ltives, see especially Vacani.
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hospitals. The rest of the 9,000 who had defended the place
from May, or had entered with Garcia Cancle in September,
were dead. A detailed inspection of figures shows that of the
5.723 men of Alvarez's original l'ommand only 2,008 survived,
while of the 3,648 who had COllle later there were still 2,Q40
left: Le. two-thirds of the old garrisull und one-third of the
succours hud perished. The mortality by famine and disease
far cxcc{.>dcd that by the sword: 800 men had died in the hospi-
tals in October, and 1,300 ill Kovember. from mere exhaustion.
The town was in a dreadful stale: about 6,000 of the 14,000
inhabitants had perished, including nearly all the very young
and the ycry old. l~,OOO bombs and 8,000 shells had been
thrown into the unhappy city: it presented a melancholy vista
of houses rooHess, or with one or two of the side~walls knocked
in, of stn.'ets blocked by the fallen masonry of churches or
towers, under whieh half-decayed corpses were partially buried.
The open spaces were strewll with broken Uluskets, bloody rtlb'S,
wheels of disabled gu"S and carts, fragments of shells, and the
bones of horses and mules IVhose flesh had been eaten. The
stench was so dreadful that Augereau had to keep his troops
out of the place, lest infection should be bred among them. In
the magazines nothing was found sa"e a little unground corn;
all the other provisions had been exhausted. There were also
168 cannon, mostly disabled; about 10,000 lb. of powder, and
tl million Illusket cartridges. The military chest handed over
contained 562 rcals-about 6l. sterling.
Augereau behaved very hal'Shly to the brarrison: many feeble
or diseased men were made to march to Pel'pignan and perished
by the way. The priests and monks of the' Crusade' were
informed that they were combatants, and sent oft' with the
soldiery. But the fate of the gallant GovernOl' provokes especial
illdignution. Alvarez did not die of his fe\'er: whell he was
somewhllt recovered he was fOl'wl\rded to Perpignall, and fmll1
thence to Narbonne, where he was kept for some time and
seemed convalescent. Orders then came from Paris that he
was to be sent back to Spain-apparently to be tried asa traitor,
for it was alleged that in the spring of 1808 he had accepted
the provisional government installed by Murat. He was
separated from his aide*de-camp and servants, and passed on
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from dungeon to dungeon till he rcac:hed Figueras. The day
!Utcr his urrivul ut that pln.(,'C he was found deud, 011 a burro\\'-
the only 1)(.'(1 grnlltcd him-in the dirty cellar where he had been
placed. It is probable that he perished from natuml cuuscs,
'but mallY Spaniards belie\'ed that he hud been murdered 1,
Great as the losses of the garrison of Gerona had been, they
were far exceeded, both positively and proportionately, by those
of the besieging army. The .French official retums show that
on June 15 the three divisions charged with the attack, those
of Verdier, Morio, and Lecchi, had 14,456 bayonets, and the
two divisions of the covering army, those of Souham and l)ino,
15,73!:! : there were 9l,6S1 artillerymen and engineers over llIld
above these figures. On December 31, twenty days after the
surrender, and when the regiments had been joined by most of
their convalescents, the three siege-divisions counted 6,343 men,
the covering divisions 11,666, and the artillery and engineers,
2,390.
~his shows a loss of over 13,000 men; but on examination
the deficit is seen to Le even larger, for two new battalions from
France hud just joined Verdier's di vision in December, und their
1,000 bayonets should be deducted from his total. It would
seem, then, that the capture of Geroml. cost the 7th Corps about
14,000 men, AA well as a. whole campaigning season, from April
to December. The att/lCk on Catalonia had been brought to
a complete standstill, and when Geroml. fell the French ?"cupied
nothing but the ruined city, the fortresses of H.osas and
l"igueras hard by the frontier, and the isolated Barcelona, where
Duhesme, with the 6,000 men of his division, had been lying
quiescent all the summer and autumn. Such a force was too
weak to make detachments to aid St. Cyr or Augereau, since
4,000 men at least were needed for the garrison of the citadel
and the outlying forts, and it would have been hopeless for the
small remainder to take the field. Duhesme only conducted
I For details of this disgraceful eruelty, see Arteche's 'Elogio' on
Alvarez in the proceedings of the Madrid .1eademy. The Emperor
Napoleon himself must bear tile responsibility,:IS it \I'M by orders from
Paris that Aharw, w"... sent back from ,"'ranee to Figueras. .4.1'IJ3,reuUy
he was to be tried at Barcelona, and perhaps executeU. luere is uo
allusion to the matter in the GQrre~prJl!dullce de NapolirJl!.
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one short incursion to Villafruncu during the siege of Gerontl.
In thc last months of the year Barcelona was again in a state
of partial starvation: the food brought in by Cosmao's convoy
in the spring had been exhausted, while a second provision-fleet
from Touloll, escorted by five men-of-war, had been completely
destroyed in October. Admiral Martin surprised. it off Cape!
Creus, drove ashore and burnt two line·of·baUle ships and
1\ frigate, and captured most of the convoy. The rest took
refuge in the harbour of Uosas, where Captain Halliwell attaekerl
them with the boats of the squadron alld burnt them aliI.
W'hile Gerolla was enduring its last month of starvation,
those whose care it should have been to SUCCOUl' the place at all
costs were indulging in a fruitless exchange of recriminations,
and making preparations when it was all too late. Hlake, aftcr
retiring to Vich on No\'ember 10, informed the ,JuntA of Cata-
lonia that he WM helpless, unless more men could be found, and
t1mt thc)' must find them. \\'hy he did 1I0t rather insist that
the Valcncian reservcs should be brought up, and risk stripping
'l'arl'agona and Lerida of their regular garrisons, it is hard to
say. This at uny ratc would have been in his power. The
Catalall Junta. replied by summoning a congress at l\fanresa 011
NOI'ember 20, to which representatives of e\'ery district of the
principality were invited. The congress voted that a levy
en lIlasse ot' all the able-bodied men from seventeen to forty·five
years of age should he called out 2, and anthorized a loan of
10,000,000 rcnls for equipping them. They also wrote to
Seville, not for the first time, to demand rcinfon.:emellts from
the Central Junta.. But the battle of Ocaiia had just been
fought and lost, and Andalusia could not have spared. 11 mall,
even if there had been time to transport troops to Tarragona.
All that the Catalans received was honorary votes of approval
for the gallant beh[lvioUl' of the Geronese. The levy en lIli13se
was actually begun, but there was an insuperable difficulty ill
collecting and equipping the men in winter time, when days
were short and roads were bad. The weeks passed by, and
Gerona fell long before enough men had been got together to
I For details, see JameE;'s NIIVlll Hi8lory, v. pp. 142-5.
21116 Proclamation of I\'ov. 29 orllering this Iev}', written in a very
magniloquent style, IIlay be found in BeImas, APPClldix no. 81.
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induce Blake to try a new offensive movement. ""hy was the
congress not ealled in September rather than in No~·ember?
Blake had always declared that he was too weak to risk a battle
with the French for the raising of the siege, but till the lust
moment the Catuluns contcnLcd thcmschel with urglling with
him, nnd writing remonst.rances to the Central Junta, instead
of lending him the !lid of theh· last levies.
Oue or two points connected with this famons siege require
a word of comment. It is quite clear that St. Cyr during its
early stages did not try his honest best to help Verdict.. During
June llud July his covering army was doing no good whatever
at Vich: he pretended that he had placed it there in order to
wa.nl off possible attacks by Blake. But it was matter of public
knowledge that BJakc was far away ill Aragon, engaged in his
unhappy ClUllptlign against Suchel;, Ilnd t1mt Coupigny, left ut
'rlll·ragono. wit.h a few thousand men, wa.~ not 0. seriOIlS dangcr.
St. Cyr could have spared Il whole division more for t.he siege
operations, without risking anything. If he had done so, Gerona
could have been approached on two sides instead of one, the
l\1ercadal front might have been attacked, and the loose blockade,
which was all that Verdier could keep up, for want of more men,
might have ~n made effective. But St. Cyr all through his
military career earned a reputation for callous selfishness and
habitual leaving of his colleagues in the lurch. On this occasion
he was bitterly offended with Verdier, for giving himself the airs
of an equal, and corresponding directly with the Emperor.
Thcre can be no douht that he took a malicious pleasurc in
seeing his failures. It is hardly disguised in his clC\·CI· aud
pluusiblc Jourllal des Op:-,ratilJ1~ de tArmee de Cata[fJl:,""le en
1808-1809 I.
1 :t\":Jlmleon's commCll!.iJ on tho 01)Crations of his gencrals arc always
illterestillg, lhouglL sometilllell fOLlnded on imperfcct information, or
vitiated by predislmsitions. Of St. Crr's campaign he writes [Disl).
IlO. IG,004] to Clarke, his Minister of "rar :
t Il Caut me Caire un rapport serieux Sur la carnpagnc du general
Gouvion Saint-Cyr en Catalogne: (I) Sur les raOOns qui l'ont porW
a eVllcuer cette pro\·ince, lorsque Saragosse etait prise et sa jonetioll
faite avcc le marechal i\lorticr. (2) Sur cc Ilu'i1 s'ost laisse nttaqucr
par leg FAflagnols, et ne Ics a jarnais att."1ques, et sur 00 quc, aprcs Ic~
avoir toujours battus par la \'aleur des troulJe6, il u'a jamais lJrofiW de 11l
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VenEer, on the other hand, seems to have felt all through that
he was being asked to perform a task almost impossible, when
he was set to lake Gero118 with his own 14,000 men, unaided by
the covering army. His only receipt for success was to try to
hurry on the malter by deli\'ering desperate blows. Both the
asAAult on l\1onjuich on July 8 and that on the dty on Septem-
ber 19 were premature; there was some excuse for the former:
Verdier had not yet realized how well Alvarez could fight. But
the second seems unpardonable, after the warning re(:eh'cd at
~1onjllich. If the general, 85 he dedured before delivering his
assault, mistrusted his own troops, he had no right to order
a storm at all, considering his experience of the Wily in which
the Spalliards had behaved in July. He acted on the fallacious
theory that a practicable breach implies a town that can be
taken, which is far from being the case if the garrison are both
desperate and ingenious in defenrling themseh'es, The only way
to deal with such a resolute and CRpllble adversary was to
proceed by the slow and regular methods of sicgecraft, to sap
right up lo UiC ditch before deliveriug an tlssault, and balter
everything to pieces before risking a man. This was how
:Monjuich was actually taken, after the storm had failed.
Having neither established himself close under the walls, nor
subdued the flanking fires from the Cfllvary and Chapter
l'edoubts, nor ascertained how far the Spaniards had prepared
iuner defences for themselves, he had no right to attack at all.
As to Blakc, e\'en after making all possible allowances for
the fact that he could not trust his troops~the half-rallied
wrecks of l\Iaria and Belchitc~for a battle in the field, he IllUst.
yet be pronounced guilty of feebleness and want of ingenuity.
If he could never bring up enough regulars to give him a chance
of facing St. Cyf, the fault was largely his own: a more forcible
\'ictoire. (3) Sur cc qu'i1 I1,Imr cet esprit d'egoismc (llli lui est particulicr,
comlJromis le si~ge de Gcrone: sur ce qu'iln':l jamais aecouru 8uflisammcnt
l'armce I1SSiCgClllltC, I'lL ll\l cOlltrairc attirlle a lui, ct a Jaisse rnvitailler In
villc. (4) Sur 00 flu'i1 a quitt.C I'o.rmee sans IlermiAAiol1J sous le \'niu
I,retc:de de mnla.lie,'
TIle first IJOint seems unjust to St. eyr. From his position ill front of
Tarragowl, after Valls, lIe had no real c1mnce of comhining his operations
with tlle army of Aragon. But tIle ot1ler three charges seem well
fOllmll'tl. •
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general would have insisted that the Valcllcian reser\'CS should
march t, and would have stripped Lerida nlld Tarrngona of men:
it could safely have ~n donc, for neither SlIchct nor Duhesmc
WM showing any signs of threatening those point!;. He might
ha\'c insisted that the C.'lWan Junta should call out the full
levy of aomafenes in September instead of in November. He
might also have made a better use of the irregulars already
in the field, the bands of Rovira. l\1ilalls, and Claros. These
miqueletes did admil'able service all through the siege, by
harassing Verdicr's rear and culling off' his convoys, but they
were not employed (as they ~hould have been) in combinution
with the regulars, but nllowed, a<; a rnle. to go off' on excllrsions
of their OWI1, which hu(l 110 relation to the main objects of
Blake's strategy. The only occn!:ion 011 which proper use was
made of them Wfl.'l when, on September 1, they were !'et to
threaten Verdier's linesl while Garcia. Conde's GOl1voy was
approaching GerOlla. It may be pleaded in the Spanj~b
general's defence that it was difficult to exact obedience from
the chiefs: there was a distinct coolness between the regulars
and the irregulars, which sometimes led to actual quarrels and
Gonflids when they met. But hcre again the reply is that
more forcible ctLpLtin-genemls were able to cOlltrol the lIlique-
Ides, and if Blnkc failed to do so. it WM only olle more sign of
his inadequacy. It is impO!;siblc lo avoid the conclusion t111\l;
he mismanaged matters, and that if in his second and third
attempts to relieve Gerona he h'ad repeated the tactics of hifi
first, he would ha"c had a far better chance of SllCCess. On
September 1 only did he make any scientific attempt to distract
the enemy's attention and forces, and on that occasion he was
successful. Summing things up, it may be said that he was
not wrong to refuse battle with the troops that he had actually
brought up to Gerona: they would undoubtedly have been
I The Valencilln troops at Maria were eleven battaliOllil, viz, &woia.
(three), 1st and 3rd CaZlldoree de Valencia (two), America (two), Volun-
tsrios de Valencia (one), 1st of Valencia (three), Of these only Savoia
(now two hatts. only) and Volunt.1.rios de Valencia tumed up for the
relief of Gerona. Along with them came two fresh regiments, 2nd
C~ores of Oribuela., and Almanza, wllich had not ~n at i\faria, But
these were l\Iurcian, not Valenciau, troops.
0 ...."'. '11 t'
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routed if he had risked a general engiloo-ement. His fault was
that he dic1not bring up larger forces, when it WM in his power
to do so, by the exercise of compulsion 01' the Catalan and
Valencian ,Juntas. But these bodies must shlll'e lllake's respon-
sibilities: they undoubtedly behaved in Cl slack and selfish
fashion, and let Gerona perish, though it was keeping the war
from their doors for n IOllg eight months.
All the more eredit is due to Almrez, considcring the way
in which he was Icft ullsuceourcd, and fed with vain promises.
A less constant soul would havc abandoned the defence long
before: the last two months of resistance were his sole work:
if he had fallen sick in October instead of December, his
subordinates would have yielded long before. But it is 110t
merely for heroic obstinacy that he must be praised. Every
detail of the defence shows that he was a most ingenious and
provident general; nothing was left undone to make the work
of the besiegers hard. Moreover, as Napier has observed, it is
not the least of his titles to merit that he preserved a strict
discipline, Clnd exacted the possible maximum of work from
soldier am] civilian alike, withont the use of any of those whole-
sale executions which disgraced the defence of Saragossa. His
words were sometimcs truculent, but his acts were just and
moderate. He never {''OlIlltenunc:.'ed moJ>..law, U$ did Plllufox,
yet he was far better obeyed by the citizens, and got as good
service from them as did the Aragonese commander. He
showed that good organitation is not incompatible with patriotic
enthusiasm, and is far more effective in the hour of danger
than reckless courage and blind self-sacritir.e.
SECTION XVII: CHAPTER IV
THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1800: TAMAMES, OCA~A,
AND ALBA DE TORMES
As carly as August 30, when Wdlington had not fully com-
pleted his retreat from Almaraz and Jaraicejo to Budajol. and
Mcrida, the ccntral Junta hurl already begun to pester him
and his brotber, the Ambassador at Seville, with plans for n
resumption of the o/li;!l1sive in the mIle)' of the TllgllS. On that
day Martin de Gamy. the Secretary of State, wrote to reprcscnt
to Wellesley that he had goarl reason to h<!licvc that the troops
of Victor, Mortier, Ilnd Soult were making a general movement
to the rear, and that the moment had arrived when the allied
armies in Estremadlll'fL and La :Mancha should' move forward
with the greatest activity, either to observe more closely the
mo\'cments of the enemy. or to attack him when circumstances
Illay rendel' it expedient 1.' The French movement of retreat
was wholly imaginary, and it is tlstonishillg that the Spanish
Governlllent should IHI.\·c been so mad tlS to helic\'c it possihle
that 'theil' retrograde movement may have O1'igillfltc!t1 in
accounts received from the NOl'th, which compel the ellemy
either to I'etil'e into the intel'ior of l~rnllce, or to take up It
position nearer to the J)yrenees.' On It groundless rumour,
of the highest intrinsic improbability, they were ready to hurl
the newly-rallied troops of Eguia and Venegas upon the French,
and to imite Wellin6P!on to join in the advance. Irresponsible
frivolity could go no further, But the Junta, as has been
already said, were eager for a military success, which should
cause their unpopularity to be forgotten, and were ready to
seize on any excuse for ordering their troops forward. This
particular rumour died awa}'-the French were still in force
all the Tagus, and, as a matter of fact, the only movement
northwards on thcir part had been the return of Ncy's corps
Dc Gamy to Wcllcslcy ill IVcJ/uWy md/m/cM', 11. 92.
d
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tu SnlumunCil. But though the truth wus soon disrovcI"C(l, the
Junta only began to look out fol' new excuses for recommcncing
activc operations.
\Vcllington, when these schemes were laid before him,
reiterated his rcfusal to join in any offensivc campaign, pointed
out that the allied forces were not strollg enough to embark
on any ~uch ha7.amous undertaking, and bluntly expressed his
opinion that 'he was much afraid, from what he had seen of
the proceedings of the Central Junta, that in the distribution
of their forces- they do not consider military defence and military
operations so much as political intrigue, and the attainment
of petty politicAl object,;,' He then proceerled to make an
e~imll.te of the Frcnch armiC!>, to show their 1lI1melical1'llperiority
to the nllie"l; in this he very much under-estimated the encmy\>
resources, calclllathlg the whole force of the eight corps in Spnin
at 125,000 mcn, exclusive of sick IUld garrisolls not available
for acti\·e servk'C. As a matter of fact there were 180,000 men,
llot IfZ5,OOO, with the Eagles at that momcnt, nfter all u(.'(luctiolls
had been made, 00 that his reasoning wus far more cof:,"ent than
he supposed '. But this only makes more culpable the obstinate
determination of the Junta to resumc operations with the much
inferior force which they had at their disposal.
Undismayed by their first repulse, the Spanish ministers were
soon making new representations to Wellesley and "Vellington,
in orner to induce them to eommit t.he English army to a
forward policy. The)' sent in repeated schemes for supplying
Wellington with food and transport on a lavish flCale 2; but he
merely expressed his doubts ns to whether orders tha.t looked
admirable on paper would ever be carried ont in pmctic..'C. He
consented fol' the prescnt to remain at Badajoz. as long as he
could subsist his army ill its environs, but warned the Junta
that it Wf\.S more probable that he would retire within the
Portuguese border, for reasons of suppl>', than that he would
join in another campaign on the Tagus.
Despite of all, the government at Seville went on with its
plans (or a general advance, even after they recognized that
lVellington was not to be moved. A grand plan of operations
1 Wellington to Wellesley, from Merida., Sept. 1, 1800.
1 See the details in Wellesley to Canning, Sept. 2, 1809.
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was gradually devised by the \"'nr·Minister Cornel and his
adviscrs. Stated shortly it was as follows. The army in La
Manchu, which VCDcgllS hau rallied after the disustcr of .Almo~
uucid, WllS to be raised lo a strength of over 50,000 men by
the drafting into it of a full two-thirds of Cuesta's old army
of Estremadura. On September 21 Eguia marched eastwards
up the Guadiana, with thrICe divisions of inftUltry and twelve or
thirteen regiments of cavalry, to join Venegas J. The remaining
force, amounting to tll'O divisions of infantry and Ji.!,500 cavalry,
was left in Eslremadura under the Duke of Albuquerquc, the
offieer to whom the government was obliged to assign this
IUllly,!x.'<:ausc the Junta of Badajoz pressed for his appointment
IUld would 1101 hear of "'tly other cOlllmtUldcr. He 11'8.:; COII-
sidcred all Allglophil, tllld t~ friend uf some of the Andalusitlll
malcontents, so t.he force left with him WM cut down to the
llI11lll11UlIl, All the o1cl regulm' regiments were withdrawlI from
him, save one single battalion, and he was left with nothing
Stlve the newly-raised volunteer units, some of which ha.d
behaved so badly at Talavera 2. His cavalry was soon after
reduced by the order to send a brigade 10 join the Arm)' of the
North, so that he was finally left with only five regiments of'
that ann or about 1,500 sabres. Of his infantry. about l~,OOO
strong, over 4,000 were absorbed by the garrison of Badajoz,
so that he had only 8,000 lllen available for service in the
lield,
Eguia, on the other hand, carried with him to La Mancha
some ~5,OOO men, the picked corps of the Estremadurall army;
tllId, as the remains of Venegas's divisions rallied and recruitetl
aftcr Allllonucid, amounted tu rather more thun t1mt number,
the united force exceeded 50,000 sabres and bayonets, With
this army the Junta intended to make a dil'CCt:Jtwke at Madrid,
while Albulluerque Wt\l:l dirccted lo show himself 011 the Tagus,
ill front of Almaruz uncI 'l'tdavcm. wilh the object of deto.iuillg
I His llead quarlers moved from Truxillo Oil tile serellteelllh, were at
La Serella on the twenty-lirst, and joined the anllY of UI :\Jancha about
Odober 1.
~ See the list of Albuquerque's army ill Appendix no. 2. 11lere llad
beeu twenty-one regular battalions ill Cuesta's arm)' in June. Twenty of
these marclled off with .Eg}lia, leal·jug only olle (4th WallOOIl Guards) with
Albuqucrque.
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at least one of the French corps in that direction. It was
hoped, even yet, that Wellington might be induced to join
in this demonsh'atioll. If once the redcoats reappeared at the
front, neither Soult 1101' MorHer could be moved to oppuse the
army of La l\:Iancha. Meanwhile Ney and the French corps
in Leon and Old Castille were to be (1 istracted by the use
of a new force from the north, whose composition must be
explained. The .Junta held that the last campaign had failed
only because the allies had possessed no force ready to df',tain
Soult alld Ne)'. If they had 1I0t appeared at Plascncia, Wel-
lingtoll, Cuesta, and Venegas would have been able to drive
King Joseph Qut of his capital. Two months later the whole
position was changed. in their estimation, by the fact that Spain
once more possessed [L large' Army of the Left,' which would
be able to occupy Ilt least two French corps. while the rest of
the allies marched agllin 011 Madrid. That such a force cxi1:ltcd
did indeed modify the aspect of affairs. La Romana had
been moved to Seville to become a member of the Junta, but
his successor, the Duke Del Parque, was collecting a host very
formidable as far as numbers went. The old army of Galicia
had been reformed into four divisions under Martin de la Cilfrera,
Losada, 1\'[ahy, and the Condc de Beh·eder-the !:,I'Cuernl whose
llame was so unfortunately connected with the ill-fought combat
of Gamonal. These fout' dh'isions now comprised 27,000 men,
of whom more than half were newly-raised Galician recruits,
whom La nomana had embodied in the depleted cadres of his
original battalions, after Ney and Soult had evacuated the
province in .Tuly. A few of the ancient regiments that had
made the campaign of Espinosa hud died out completely-their
smalll'emnants having been drafted into other corps I, On the
other hand there were a few new regiments of Galician volunteers
-but La nOtllana had set his face against the creation of such
units, wisely preferring to place his lleW levies in Ule ranks of
the old battalions of the regular army~. In the main, there-
I 'l'be only regiments of lllnke's original IIrmy thllt seem to be com-
pletely dcad in October 180'J lire 211d of Catalonia, Naples, l'ontc,·edra,
Compostella. Naples had been drafted into Iter early ill 1800. Of tile
others I can find no details.
t The new Galician regiments which appear in the autumn of lOO'!! are
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fore, the llew 'Arm)' of the Left' represented, as- far as !lames
alld caclreiJ went, Blakc'g originul 'Army of Galicin 1.' It had
the same rnrdinal fault as that arlll)'. in that it had practically
no cavalry whntercr: the single dragoon regiment that Dlake
had owned (La Reina) having been almost completely destroyed
iu 1808 2• Each didsion had a battery; the guns, of which
La Romana's army had been almost destitute in the spring,
had been supplied from England, and landed at Corunna during
the summer. .
But the Galicinn divisions, though the most numerous, were
not the only units which were told ofl'to the new' Army of the
Left: Asturias had been free of invaders since Ne)' and Bonnet
retired from its borders in June 1809. The Centml Junta
ordered Bo.llaslcl'os to join the main aJ'my with the few regular
troops in the principality, and ten battalions of the local
volunteers, a force of o\·er 9,000 men. The Astllrian Junta,
always very selfish and particularist in its aims, made some
protests but obeyed. ~ille of its less efficient regiments were
left behind to watch Bonnet.
Finally the Duke Del Parque himself had been collecting
fresh levies about Ciudad Rodrigo, while the plains of Leon lay
abandolJ(..'<1 by the French during the absence of Ney's corps
in the valley of thc Tagl1s. Including the garrison of Rodrigo
he had 9,000 II1CI1, nll ill new unibi suvc onc old line battalion
und onc old militia regimcnt s. Deducting thc 8,500 men which
held the fortress, there were sevcn oottalions-nenrly 6,000
bayonets-and u squadron or two of horse llvuiluble for the
strengthening of the field army. These were llUW told off as
the' 5th Division of the Army of the Left'; that of Ballasteros
wns numbered the 3rd Division.
The Gll.lician, Asturian, and Leonese divisions had between
them less than 500 horsemen. To make lip for this destitution
the Centrul Junta. directed the Duke of Albllquerqllc to send off'
to Cilldad Rodrigo, via the Portugucse frontier, a brigade of his
Monforte de Lcmos, VohmturiOll de ll~ j\J lIcrte, lA Uuion, Lo\"er,~, Mllceda,
l\Iora.zzo.
• For the full muster-roll of Del Parque's army in October, see
Appemlix 110. 4.
• Some small fraction of it reappeared in the campaign of 1809.
lOne battalion of :'olajorca, and the i\lilitia battalion of Se~via,
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cavalry. Acconlillgly the Priuccof AnglulIllumrclu:."<lnorlh with
three regiments I, onI}' ],000 sabres in all, and joined Del Parque
Oil September 9!5. Thus at the end of that month the' Army
of the Left' numbered nea.-ly 50,000 men-all infantry save
1,500 horse and 1,200 gunners. But they were scattered nil
over Korth-Western Spain, from Odedo to Astorga, and from
Astorga to Ciudad ll.odrigo, and had to be cOlleenlrated before
~hey could act. Nor was the concentration devoid of danger,
fol' the French might fall upon the Astlll'ians or the Leones(:
before they had joined the G!tlicillll main lxxly. As u mutter
of fact the 50,000 never took the field in one mass, for Del
Parque left a division under :.\1ah)' to protect Galicia, Rnd,
when these regiments Rnd the garrison of Rodrigo were deducted,
he had but 40,000 in all, including sick and mell on detach-
ment. This, nevertheless, constituted a formidable force-if' it
had been in existence in July, Soult and Ney could never have
marched against Wellington with their whole strength, and
the Talavera campaign might have had anothCl' end. But
the troops were of varying quuJity-the Leoncse division wu:;
absolutely raw: the Galicians had far too many recruits with
only two months' training in their milks, the Eslremaduran
cavalry had a bad record of disasters. A general of genius might
have accomplished something with the Army of the Left-but
Del Parque, though more cautious than many of his compeers,
WIUi no bTCllIlIS.
The Junta had a deeply-rooted notion that if sufficient pres-
sure were applied to Wellesley and 'Vellington, they would
permit Beresford's Portuguese army, now some ~O/)()() strong,
to join Del Parque for the ad\'ance into the plains of Leon.
They had mistaken their men: Wellington returned as peremp-
tory it refusal to their reqnest for the aid of the Portuguese
troops. as to their dellltllld that his 011'11 British llrlllY should
advance with Albuquerquc to the 'l'agus 2•
Nothing could be more hazardous than the plan finally
formulated at the Seville War Office for the simultancous advanee
I Borhllll, SugllllW, ami Grlllllu]erl);! de Llerclla, 1,0,'>3 SllOrc.~ ill October.
1'lleile regimcllt3 Ilnd newly rejoined tlte Estremaduran llrmy from tile
rear.
t ~e \\'cllillgton tu Welle~II'}', frum B..u.Iajcy.oI, Oct. 30, l11oo.
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of the armies of La Mmu;hn, the North, and Estremadurtl.
Even if it had been energ<!tically supported by Wellillgton and
lleresford, it would have been rash; converging operations
by several armies starting from distant bases against all enelll)'
concentrated in their midst are proverbially disastrous. In
this particular plan three forces-numbering ill all about 110,000
men, and starting from points so far apart as Ciudad Rodrigo,
'l'ruxillo, and the Passes by La Carolina, were to fall upon some
120,000 men, placed in a comparatively compact body in thei,'
cClltre. A sillgle mistake ill the timing of operations, the
chance that OIlC Spanish arlll)' might outmil.rch another, or thnt
onc of the lImlc might filii to detain 1I1l)' hostile force ill it.-,
front (us hail hnppcnoo with Venegas during thc Tu.lavcnl
Campaign) was bound to Le ruinous. The French ho.d it in
their power to deal with theil' enemies in detnil, if the loo..,t
Inischance should occur: and with Spanish generals and Spanish
armies it was almost certain that some error would be made.
Meanwhile the Junta made their last preparation for the
grand stroke, by deposing Venegas from the command of the
united anny in La Mancha. EJ:,'Uia held the interim command
for a few days, but was to be replaced by Areizaga, an elderly
general who had never commanded more than a single division,
null hud to his crl..-uit oul)' eoul'Ilbl'C shown in 11 suoorcliuate
position at thc battle of Alcailiz. He was summoned fl'om
Lcridu., and came hastily to take up his dlilrgc.
The solc t\dVllntage which the Spaniards POSSl>sscJ ill October
1809 was that their ClIClIl}' did Hot e..xpt..'Ct to bc llllllckL'tl. A
month after Talavcl'Il lllllttel'S had Ilpplu,(!lltly settled dowll for
the whole flutllmn, as far as the Frellc:h generals could calculate.
With the knowledge that the Austrian War was over, and that
nnlimited reinfort.:emenLs l'Ould now be poured into Spain b)'
his bl'Other, King .roseph was content to wait. He had refused
to allow Soult to make his favourite move of invading POl'tug!l.1
in the end of August, hecause he wished the Emperor to take
up the responsibility of settling the next plan of campaign, and
of determining the numbel' of new troops that would he required
to earI')' it out. The F'rellch corps, therefore, were in a semi-
circle ronnel Madrid: Soult and Mortier in the central Taglls
Valley at Plasellcia and Talavera, Victor in La Mancha, with
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Sebastiani sllpporling him at Toledo and Artll1jllC7., Ney at
Salamanca, Dcs~olles and the Royal Guard as n. central rescn'c
in the capital. This was a purely defensive position, and
Joseph intended to retain it, till the masses of troops from
German)" with the Emperor himself perchance at their head,
should come up to his aid. It does not seem to ha\'c entered
into his head that the ellemy would again take the offensive,
after the fiasco of the Tn.lavern campaign, and Ule bloody lesson
of Almonacid.
In September and the early days of October the French
hardly moved at all. Ne)' left his corps at Salamanca, and
wellt on a short leave to Paris on September ~5, so little was
any danger expected in the plains of Leoll. The charge of the
6th corps was handed over to l\1archand, his senior divisional
gencral. Thcre was Ull cvcn more importunt change of (:Olll-
llIalld pendillg- Jourdan had been soliciting permission to retul1l
to France ever since July. He had been on excellent tenns
with King Joseph, but found it hard to exact obedience from
the lllarsh!lls~indeedhe was generally engaged in a controvers)'
either with Victor or with Soult. The Emperor was not
inclined to allow him to quit Spain, but Jourdo.n kept sending
ill applications to be superseded, backct.l by mediclll ccrtificates
as to his dangerous statc of health. Finally he was granted
leave to retul'll, by a letter which reached him on October 9l5,
just as the new campaign was beginning to develop into an
acute phase. But he gladly handed over his duties to Soult,
who thus became' major-genmnl ' or chief of the Staff' to King
Joscph, and dcpnrlcd without lingcring or rcluetllllCC for France,
glad to be quit of a most invidious office I.
Before Jourdan's departure there had been some small move-
ments of the li'rench troops: hearing vague rumours of the
passage eastward of Eguia's anny, King Joseph ordered n
corresponding shift of his own troops towards that quarter.
Soult llnd the 2nd Corps were ordered from Plasencia to Oropesa
and Talavera. there relieving Mortier and the 5th Corps, who
were to push up the Tagus toward Toledo. This would enable
Victor to call up Sebastiani's cavalry and two of his infantry
divisions fmm Toledo into La MBllcha. Having thus got
, For Jourdall's personal views, see Ilia MimQire8, et!. Grouchy, p. 282.
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together some 25,000 Illell, Victol" l\d\'HIlCOO to DaiOlicl, tUld
pressed in the admnced posts of t.he main Spanish army 011
October ]5. Eguia, who was still in tempOl'ury commalld,
since Arei7.aga had not yet arrived, made 110 attempt to stand,
but retired into the passes of' the Sierra Morena. This apparent
timidity of the enemy convinced the Marshal that nothing
dangerous was all hand in this quarter. He drew back his army
into cantonments, in a semicircle from Toledo to 'l'arancon,
leaving the cavalr), of i\tilhaud and Paris out in his front.
Nothing more happened in La 3fancha for a fortnight: but
on the other wing, in the kingdom of Lcon, matters came to
a head sooner. About the .middle of September the bulk of
the Guliciwl army, the divisions of I.oslula, BclH...u.er and La
Carrera, had moved down the Portuguese frontier via Alcanizus,
ulld joined Del Pan/lIc tlt Ciuuml Roorigo. Oil the twenty-fifth
of thc samc month thc Prince of AngloJlll, with the cavalry
brigade frOIll Estl"cumdura, also came in to unite himself to
the Army of the Left. Del Pm·yue had thus 25,000 infantry
and 1,500 horse cOllcenlratoo. He hud still to be joill(.J. by
Bullastel'OS and the Asturiuns, wllo had to pick their WIlY with
ctmtion through the plnills of L..'OIl. Mah)' Itnu the 4th division
of the GalicilUls hml !Jccn lcft ill the Pll..'$SCS above Astorgll, to
cover the high-rond into Galicia. He had a vanguard in
Astol'ga, under Santocildes, and the town, whose walls had
been repaired by the order of La ll.omana, was now cupable
of Illllkillg SOIllC defence.
Facing Del Parque and his lieutenant__ there were two distinct
forces. The 6th Corps. now under Mnrcband, was concelJtrated
at Salamanca. Having received few or no drafts since it." return
from GaliciA. it was m.ther weak- its twenty-one battalions and
four Cll.valry regiments only counted at the end of' Septemher
some 13,000 bayonets and l,jWO sabres 1 eft'ecti;·e-the sick
being numerous. In the north of' I..eon and in: Old Castile
Kellel'llllUlIl was in charge, with an independent force of 110 great
strength: his own division of' dragoons, nearly 3,000 sabres,
was its only formidable unit. The infantry was composed of
three Swiss battalions, and foul' or fi\'e French battalions,
which had been left in garrisons in Old Castile when the
I See tile table gil'ell by Sprlingliu 011 p. 300 of his Memoiret.
76 THE AUTUMN CAMI1AIGN 01" 1809 [Oul',18
regiments to which they belonged \rent southward in thc pre·
<.-cding winter '. The whole did not umount to more than
3,500 bayonets. The dragoons were ycry serviceable in the
vast plains of Lean, but it was with difficulty, and only by
cutting down garrisons to a dangerous extent, that Kellermanll
could assemble a weak infantry brigade of ~,OOO men to back
the horsemen.
It was nevcrtheless on Kellermanll's side, and by the initiatil'e
of the French, that the first clash took place in north-westem
Spain. Hearing vague repOlts of the movement of the Galician
divisions towards Ciudad Rodrigo, Kellermrum sent General
Curric, with two regiments of dragoons nnd l,~OO infantry, tu
occupy Astorgu, bcillg iguorant !lppareutly that it WM no\\'
garrisoned and more or less fortified. Carri6 found the plu<.'(!
oecupied, made a weak attack upon it on October 9, and was
beaten off. He was able to report to his chief that the
Spaniards (i. e. Mahy's division) were in some force in the passes
beyond.
At much the same moment that this fact was ascertained Del
1'arqlle began to move: he had heen lying since September 24
at Fllente Guinnldo in the highland above Ciudad Uodrigo.
On October 5 he made all admllce a~ fill' as Tamnmes, on the
hy-wlld froUl Rodrigo to Salulllt\llCa which skirts the Illouutains,
wisely avoiding the high-road ill the more level ground by SUll
::\lat,tiu del Rio and CUlitrejon. He had with him his three
Galician divisions and his 1,500 horse, but he had not brought
forward his raw Leonesc division under Castrofuerte, which still
lay by Rodrigo. On hearing of the duke's ad\'llIlCe Marchand
sent out reconnaissances, and having dis<.'Overed the position of
the Spaniards, resolved at once to attll.Ck them. On October 17
he started ont from SalamanCi!, taking with him his whole corps,
except the two battalions of the 50th regiment, which were left,
to garrison the town.
011 the afternooll of the next day Marchand came in sight
of the enemy, who was drawn up ready to receive him on the
heights above Tamamcs, The French general had with him
I Apparently Kellermann had at this moment a battalion each of tlle
2nd, 3rd, and 4th Swiss, a battalion of the Carde de Paris, one eaell of
tile 12th Uger and 32nd Line, and one or two of the 122nd.
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nineteen battalions, some 12,000 bayonets- hi:; 1,200 horse, and
fourteen gUllS. Del Parquc had 20,000 Galiciull infantry,
AnglonR':; cavalry, and eightccn gun:;: his positioll was so
:;trong, and his superiority in infantry so marked, that he was
probably justified in ri~king a. battle on thc defensive.
Tumumes, Illl unwulled village of moderate sii"A!, lies at the
foot of ft range of swelling hills. Its strategicn.1 imporhmce
lies in the fact that it is the meeting-plnce of the two coulIL.·y
roads from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca via Matilla, Il.l1d from
Ciudad Rodrigo to Bejar and the Pass of Dmlos via Nu"n.
Uedonda. l 11aced there, Del Parque's anny threntened Sala-
rnallCa, alld had a choice of lines of retreat, the roads to Rodrigo
and to the passes into Estremadura being both open. Hut
retreat was not the duke's intention. He had drawn IIp his
army on the heights above 'l'amames, occupying the village
below with a battalion or two. Oil the right, where the hillside
WllS steeper, he had placed Losada and the 2nd Division: Oil
the left, where the ridge sinks down gently into the plain, was
Martiu de la Canera with the Vanguard Division. The Conde
de Beh·eder's di\'ision-the third-formed the reserve, and was
drawn IIp on the re\·erse slope, behind La Carrem. The llrince
of AllglOlla's C3\·aJry brigade was out on the extreme left, partly
hidden by woods, in the low ground beyond the flank of the
Vunguard.
Mllrchulld, arriving 011 the ground in the afternoon ufl:er
u nmrch of fourteen miles from Matilla, was overjoyed to sce the
enemy oflcring buttle, Ilnd tlttllckcd without u moment's hej;ita-
tiou. His arrangements much resembled those of Victor Ilt
UclC!>-though his luck was to be "cry different. It was clear
thftt the Spanish left \VIIS the wellk point, and thnt the heights
conld he turned Rnd ascended 011 that side with ease. Accordingly
i'I'laueune's brigade (six battalions in all) 1 and the light cavah·y,
strengthened by one regiment of dragoons, were ordered to
march off to the right, to form in a line perpendicular to that
ofDellJ arque, and break down his flank. 'Vhenthis movement
was well developed, Marcognet's brigade (six battalions) 2 was
16th Uger (two batts.), 6{lth Line (three batts.), and one battalion of
voltigeu78 1'~UIll·8•
• 39th aud 76th of the Line.
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lo attack the Spanish centre, to the east of the village of
Tamames, while the 25th Uger (two battalions) IV/\S to
contain the hostile right by a demonstration against the high
Ilnd difficult ground in that direction. Marchand kept in
reserve. behind his centre, the lnth and 59th of the Line (six
battalions) and his remaining regiment of dragoons: The "ice
of this formation was that the striking force-Maucune's
column~wM too weak: it would have been wise to have
.«trengthened it at the expense of the centre, and to ha"e
lllade a mere demonstration again~t the heights above the
village of Tamame::;, il.S well as on the extl-eme French left.
Maucunc accomplished his Rank mlll"ch undisturbc<l, deployed
in front of La Can-cra's left and advalIced. against it. The
Spanish general threw back his wing to protect himself, and
ordered his cavalry to threaten the Rank of the advancing
force. But he was ncarly swept away: when the skirmishing
lines were in contact, the l?reneh brigadier ordered his cavalry
to charge the centre of the Spanish division: striking in
diagonally, Lorcet's HUflsars and Chasseurs broke La Carrera's
line, and roptured the i>ix gllllS of his divisional artillery.
Almost o.t the Mmc momcnt Allglolln's rovalry rome in upon
Maucune's Rank; but being opposed by two bl\ttalions of the
69th in S(luure, they I'C<.oci\'ed but onc fire and Red hastily to the
rear. l\faucune then resumed his march up the hill, covering
his Rank with his horsemen, and pushing La Carrem's broken
Hne before him. But at the hcad of the slope he met Belveder's
reserve, which let the broJ.:en troops pass through their intervals,
and took up the fight steadily enough. The French were now
opposed by triple 1l11lllbeNl, and the combat came to a standstill :
MllllCunc's offensive powcr was exhausted, and he could 110
longer use his cavalry on the steep ground which he had
reached.
Meanwhile, Oil Sl?cing their right brigade opening the combat
with such success, the two other French columns went forward,
:Marcogllct against the Spanish centre, Anselmeof the 25th lAger
against the extreme right. But the gronnd was here much
steeper: Losada's Galician division stood its ground very
steadily, and 3'1arcognet's two regiments made all involuntary
halt three-quarters of the wAy up the heights, under the full
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fire of tile two Spanish butteries there placed and the long line
of infantry. The uffiecni mudc several desperate attempts to
induce the columns to resume their adl'llllcc, but to no effect.
They fell in great numbers, and at last the regiments recoiled
and desccnded the hill in disorder. Losadn's battalions pursued
them to the foot of the slope, and the Spanish light troops in
the village snJlied ouL upon their flank, and completed their
rout. l\Iarcognct's brigade poured dowll iuto the ph\ill as
a disordered mass of fugitives, and were only stayed when
:\fnrchulld brought up the ~1th and 59th lo their reseue.
Del Pm"que wisely halted the pursuing force before it came
into contact with the French rcsCl'\'CS, and took up again his
post on the heights.
l\lcanwhile the ~5th :Ugcr, 011 the extreme French right, had
not pressed its attack home, and retrcuk.-d when the central
advance was repulsed. Maueuuc, too, seeing the rout to his
left, withdrew from t.he heights wHler cover of his cavuh'y,
carrying ofi' only onc of t.he Spanish guns t1mt. he had takell
early in the fight., and leaving in return a disabk-d piece of his
own 011 the hill,
The battle was fairly lost, and Marchand rct.irL-d, uuder cov,,:r
of his ca"alry along the Salamanca road. The ellemy made no
serious attempt to pursue him in the plain, where his horsemen
would have been able to act with aJxantage. The French had
lost ],300 or 1,400 men, including ]8 officers killL-d, and a
f,reneral (Lorcet) and 54 officers wOWlded 1. Marcognet's brigade
supplied the greater part of the casualties; the 76th lost its
eagle, seven officers killed and fifteen wounded: the 39th
almost as many. The caval!')' and 3fallcllue's brigade suffered
little. The vcry moderate Spanish loss was 7lS killed and
wounded, mostly ill La Carrern's division.
This was the first general action since Baylen in whieh the
Spaniards gained a complete victory. They had a superiority
of about seven to four in numbers, and a good position. never-
theless the troops were so raw, and the pa!>t record of the Army
I J\.Iarehand in his dispatch says 1,300 men ill all were lost, and a gun;
lLC makes no mention of the cngle. His aide-de-camp, SprUnglin, who hllS
a good nceollnt of the battle in his Mcmaire~ (JIV. 370-1), gives the total of
1,500. 1l1ll S}'alliartls exaggerate,] the loss to 3,000.
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of the Left wm; 80 di~hel\rtel1il1g, that the ,'ictory reflects COll-
f:idemble credit 011 the Glllieial1s. The 6th Corps W/lS reckoned
the best of uU the French ullil.<; in Spain, being entirely com-
posed of old regiments from the army of Germnll)'. It is !Jot
too much to &1), that Ney\ absence was responsible for the
defeat of his men. Marchalld attacked at three points, anll
WitS weak at each. The Marshal would certainly havc massed
a whole division against the Spanish left, and would not ha\'e
been stopped by the stout resistance made by Belvedcr's reservc,
A demonstration by a few battalions would have' contained'
Losada.'s troops on the left, where the ground \Vas too llnfavour-
ahJe for a. serious attack I.
On the 19th of October the beaten army l'cn.ched Salamll.llca
by a forced lllarch. Marchand fenred that the enemy would now
mUnmU\TC eithcr by Lcdcsma, so Wj to cut him off from
KellermuIIll and the troops in the north, or by Alba de Tonnes,
so as to intercept his communication with Madrid. In either
case he would have to retreat, for there WM no good defensj,'e
ground on the Tormes to resist an army coming from the west.
As a matter of fact Del Parque moved by Ledesma, for two
reasons: the first was that he wished to avoid the plains, fearing
that Kellel'manll might have joined the 6th Corps with his
cavalry division. The second was thllt, by moving in this
direction, he hoped to make his jum.:tioll with BallllSteros, who
had started from the Asturias to join him, and had been
reported to haye moved from Astorga to Mirallda del Duero,
and to be feeling his way SQuth-eastward. The juncture took
place: the Astllriall di\'i~ion, after an unsuccessful a.ttempt to
cut oft' the garrison of Zamorn on the sevcnteenth, hnd marched
to Ledesmu, and met thc main army there. Del Parque had
now 28,000 men, and though still very weak in cavalry, thought
himself strong enough to march on Salamanca. He reached it
oti October 25 and found it eHlCllated, Marchalld, learning
that Kellermann was too fal' off to help him, and knowing
that no reinforremellts from 1\Iadrid could reach him for many
I 'La perte de cette alfaire fut entikrement due a la faute que fit le
General Marchand de multiplier ses attaques, et de ll'engager par petits
paquels. Tout le monde !e melait de donner son avis, et on remarquait
I'absence de M. le :'oIarechal; says Sprunglin in p. 371 of his Mimoircg.
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days, had evacuated the town on the previous evening. He
retired towa~ Toro, thus throwing up his commullicatioll$
with Madrid ill order to make sure of joining Kellermanu.
This seems doubtful policy, for that general could only aid him
with 4,000 or 5,000 men, and their joint force would be under
20,000 strong. On the other hand, b~' retiring Oil PCllal'll.llda
or Medina de Cnmpo, and so approaching the King's army. he
could have counted on picking up much larbrcr reinforcements,
and 011 resuming the stmggle with a good prospect of
success.
As a matter of fact Jourdan, on hearing of the disaster of
Tcunames, had dispatched, to aid the 6th Corps, Godinol's
brigade of Dessolles' di\'isioll, some 3,500 bayonets, from Madrid,
nnd Heudelet's division of the 2nd Corps, about 4,000 strong,
from Oropesa, as well as 0. couple of regiment!'. of cavalry.
He made the.~c detachments without scruple, because there
was ns yet no sign of Ally activity on the part of the Spanish
armies of La 1fancha and Estremadura. A week later he
would have found it much more hll7,nrdous to weaken his front
in the valley of the Tagus. These were the last orders issued
by Jom'dan, who resigued his post 011 October 31, while Soult
on NO"cmber 5 arrived at ::\1adrid and l'eplaced him as chief
of' the staff' to King Joseph.
Del Parque, not unnatumlly elated by his victory, now
nourished ambitious ideas of clearing the whole of Lean and
Old Castile of the enemy, being aware that the armies of
La Mancha and Estremadura ought llOW to he on the move,
and that full occupation would be found ere long for the
French corps in the valley of the Tagus. I-le Ol'dered up his
5th Division, the raw Leonese battalions of Castrofuerte, from
Ciudad Uodrigo, and made vehement appeals to the Portuguese
Govcl'Ilment to lend him the whole of Beresforo's army for
a great advance up the Douro. The Regency, though much
pressed by the Spanish ambassador at Lisbon, gave a blank
refusal, following \"'ellington's advice to have nothing to do
with offensive operations in Spanish company'. But part of
I Del Parque's demauds had begun as early as the end of September,scc
Wellington to Castlereagh, Badajoz, Sept. 2(J, Di8p(ltc1lu, \'. 2QO-l,alld cf.
Wellingtoll to Forjaz, Oct. 15, ibid. 223.
0 ....". III G
82 'l'HE AUTUl\1~ CAMPAlGN OF 1809 lNov.S
Beresford's troops were ordered up to the frontier, not so much
to lend it mOI1\l support to Del Parque's advance I l\S to be
ready to defend their own borders in the event of his defeat.
Showing more prudence than Wellington had expected, Del
!larque did not push forward from Salamanca, when he became
certain that he would ha\'e to depend on his own forces alone.
Even after the arriml of his reserveR from Rodrigo he remained
quiet, only pURhing ont reconnaissances to discover which WRy
the enemy had gone. He hacl, in fact, carried ont his part
in the Central Junw.'s plan of Cllmpaign, by calling the attention
of the French to the north, und distracting troops thither from
the King's ttl'lny. It wu:; now the t.ime for Albuquerqne and
Areizagn to take lip the game, and relieve him. .Marehulld
meanwhile had retired across the Douro, and taken lip nil
extended line behind it from Zamora to Tordcsillas-a front
of o\'er forty miles-which it would have been impossible to hold
with his 13,000 men against a heavy attack delivered at one
point. But he was hardly ill position when Kellermalln arrived,
took over the command, and changed the whole plan of cam-
paign (November 1). He had left two battalions to guard
Benevente, two to hold Valladolid, and had only brought up
his 8,000 dragoons and 1,500 infantry. Seeing that it was
absolutely necessary to re<..'Ovel· the line of communication with
Madrid, lie ordered the 6th Corps to leave Zalllora und Toro,
mass at Tordesillas, and then cross the Douro to Medina del
Campo. the jlUlction point of the roads from Madrid, Segovia,
Valladolid, and Toro. To this same place he brought up his
own small force, and baving received Godinot's brigade frOlll
Madrid, had thirty·four battalions and eighteen squadrons
concentrated-about ~3.000 men. Though not yet joined by
the other troops from the wuth-Heudelet's di\,jsion-he now
marched straight upon Salamanca in two COllllllllS, Olle by
Callwlapioora, the other by Fuente Sauco, intending to offer
battle to Del Parque.
But the duke, much to the surprise of everyone, utterly
refused to fight, holding the plain too dangerous for an army
so weak in cavalry as his own, and over.estimating the enemy's
, Wellington to Heresford, NOI·. 16, 1809.
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forcc at 36,000 men I. Hc retired from Salmmmca, after having
JIt~ld it less thall 1\ fortnight, ou NovcmbClo 5, llnd took 1I0t. t.he
l"Olld lo Ciudad Rodrigo hut that to Bejar and the Pass of
lliuios, us if he were about to pass the mountains into Estremu.-
dunl~. This '.I'm; illl excellent move: the French <-,ouId not
pursue him ill force without evacuating Old ensiile and Leoll,
which it would htl.\'c been impossible for them to contemplate.
For when Kellermunn had concentrated his troops to strike at
SnllllllllllCll, there was nothing left behind him in the vast
upland !>aye 11, buttnlioll or two I\t Denevente, Valladolid, nnd
Durgos. l\lahy. from Galiein. and the Astudans might have
OVCITllll the whole region ullopposed. As it WIlS, the whole
of the provinces behind the Douro showed signs of bUl'sting out
iuto insurrection, Jlllian SanChe7., the Empecinado, and other
guerrillero chiefs, whose names were soon to be fiunou~ raiHed
large bands during the absence of the normal garrisons, and
swcpt thc counlry-sidc, cltpluring COll\'0ys and cutting the lines
of eomlllllllicu.tioll betwccn Vittoria, Burgas, and Valladolid,
Podier came dowll with !l. flying colullln from the Asturia~
llssuulted Palcllcia, and threatened Burgoo, The French
govcrnors on cve"y side kept reporting their pcl'iloll~ positioll,
whcn they could get U lllcssngc through to Madrid 3,
Realizing thut he must cover his I'MI', or the whole of Old
Castile would be lost to the illsUl'gcnts, KcllemJalln, after
o<:cupying Salamunca 011 November 6, left the 6th Corps und
Godillot's brigadc distributed between Ledcsma, SaIUlIlllllCll, and
Alba de Tonnes, wutchillg Del Purque, und returned ill 11Ilste
with his own twops to the Douro, He comUlcllct.oU to semI out
flying colullllls frolll VllUauolid to deal with tilC guer"mews, but
did not work too fllt' uficld, h.-st he lllight be called buck by
0. new forwurd movemcnt 011 the purt of the Army of the Lcfl~
nut in a few du}s he had to rL'eust all his illTungcmcnb:, for-11.-;
,
1 He sent this estinlatc to ·Wellington, see the latter to Beregford,
Hadajo:.;, l\'ov, 16,
~ The Jllutll afterwards contemplated bringing him down to join
AIIJUtjucrquc, "ill Plascncin, which W;Lg fn.'C of Freud, truolJ>i, since Soult
had moved tu Oropes:" But llli~ does 110t secm to l!ave been tl,ougl,t
of so early as No\', 5,
" See Soult to Clarke, from Madrid, NOI', 0, for these movements,
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Del Panlue had calculated-the cumpaign in La Maneha hau
just opened, and the position of the Fl'ench in Leon and Old
Castile was profoundly affccted by the new de"clopments.
In the south, as we ha\'e already explained, the Junta
designed Albuquerque's army of Estremadura to be a mere
demonstrating force, while Areizaga's 55,000 men were to strike
the real blow. The Estremadllran troops, ns was proper, mo\'ed
early to draw the attention of the enemy. Albuquerque's first
division under Bassecourt- 6,000 infantry and 600 horse-was on
the Tagus from Almaraz to MC'lA de lOOr: his second division
under St. Juan and the rest of his cavalry-some 4,000 in all-
were moving up from 'l'ruxillo. Bassecourt began by sending a
small force of all arms across the rirer at Almaraz, to drh'e in
Soult's outposts and spread reports abroad in all directions that
he was acting a!i the vanguard to ,"Vellington's arm)', which was
marching up from Badajoz, Unfort.unately the full e/lect that
he desired was not pl'odllced, because desertel'S iJlformed SOlllt
that the BI·itish Army was still quiescent on the Gnadiana1•
Thc French madc no movement, and left the 2nd Corps alone
to watrh Albuql1crqlle.
Meanwhile Areizaga, within a few da),s of assuming the
COliltlllllld of the IIrmy of Ln Mancha, commencl.>tl his forward
movement, On .Kovembcr S, having eonl.'Cntratcd his eight
divisions of infantry and his 5,700 horse at Santa Cruz de
Mudela., at the foot of the passes, he g[we the order to advance
into the plains. The head quarters followcd the high·road,
with the train and three divisions: the rest, to avoid encum-
bering the chau3gee, marched by parallel side-roads, but were
never more than ten miles from their Commander-in-chief: at
any 1'nte Areizagn avoided the sin 01' dispersion. His army
was the best which had been seen nnder the Spanish ballners
sincc 'l'udela. The men had nIl heen furnished with new
clothes and equipmcnt since Augu~t, mainly from English
stores lnnded at Cudiz. There were sixty gUllS, and such
ll. body of cavah'y as had never yet been collectl.>tl during the
1 Soult to Clarke, from Madrid, NOI'. 6. llle deserters were a body of
twenty-one men oftlie Walloon Guards, who had enlisted from Dupont's
prisoners in order to get a chance of escaping: they reachelt OrOpeSlL OIl
Oct. 25.
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war. The \'alue of the troops Wa!; \'ery unequal; if there were
many old battalions of the regular army, there were also many
lIew units composed of hulf-truinoo AndalusiUll le\·ics. The
cavalry included the old runaways of Mcdellin, and many other
regiments of doubtful \·ulue. The morale was 011 the whole
not satisfadory. 'I wish I had anything agreeable to com-
municate to you from this army' wrote Colonel Roche, a British
officer attached to Arei,mga's staff; to Wellington. • The corps
which belonged to the original army of La MUllcha are eel'-
lainl), in every respect superior to those from Estremadura,
and fi:Olll e\'erything that I can learn none of those abuses
which were to be lamented in the army of Estremadura existed
here-or, at least, in a much less degree. But nothing can
exceed the general discontent, dissatisfaction, and demoralit'Ation
of the mass of the people and of the army. How can anybody
who has the faculty of reason separate the inefficiency, intrigue,
bad organization, and consequent disasters of the army from
the source of all those evils in the Junta? There is not
a man of the least reflection who, as things now stand, has a
hope of success; and this is the more melancholy, because the
mass of the people are just as inveterate in their resentment and
abhorrence of the French as at the first hour of the revolutionI:
The fact seems to ha\'e been that the superior officers doubh.>d
the wisdom of taking the offensive according to the Junta's
orders, and had no confidence in Areizaga, who was only known
as a fighting general, and had no reputation for skill. The
mnk and file, as Arteehe remarks, were disposed to do their
duty, but had no confidence in their luck 2. Their govenlment
and not their generals must take the major part of the blame
for the disaster that followed.
Areizaga was well aware that his best chance was to strike
with extreme boldness and vigour, and to dash into the midst
of the French before they could concentrate. Hence his march
was at first conducted with great rapidity and decision; between
the Srd and the 8th of November he made nearly fifteen miles
a day, though the roads were somewhat broken tip by the autumn
1 lloehe to Wellingtoll, from Santa Cr\l7; de la i\ludela, Welling/un
S«pplemclltary DiwJXltchclI, vi. 394. Cf. also the same to tlle same, vi. "1'.1,.
• IJiJltona de la GWl/'ra de la [Ildepelldencia, vii. 283.
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rains. 011 the eighth he reached La Guardia, eight), miles
fmm his starting-point, and his advanced cavalry nllder GClleral
FI"Circ had its first skirmish with a brigade of 1\filhalld's
dragoons at Costa de Madera, near Dos Bun'ios, The Spanish
horse deploycd in such numbers that the French were com-
pelled to move oft' in haste and with some loss, though they
h8.l.1 beaten off' with ease the first two or three regiments which
had gone forward against them,
The Spanish ad\'anee had been so rapid and so unexpected
that Soult and King Joseph had been taken completely by
surprise. On November 6 the Marshal had reported to !'aris
that 'the troops on the Tagus and in La Mancha are up to the
present unmolested, and as, from all I can learn, there is no
prospect of the enemy making any offellsh'e movement on that
side, I intend to form from them a strong flying column to
hnnt the brigands in the direction ot'1l1lrgOg 1,' Only four days
later he had to announce that an army of at least 40,000 men
W/IS close in front of ArtllljUCb, and not 1ll0l'C thlln thirty-five
miles from Madrid, and that he Wfig hlll'l'ying together troops
frOIll all quartcrs to make head against t1l1~Ill, At the moment
indeed, there WIIS nothing diret:tly between Areizaga's vanguard
at La Gllardia and the Spanish capital, save the Polish division
of the 4th Corps stationed at Aranjuez, and Milhaud's five
regiments of dragoons at Ocaiia. ]f the Spaniard had pushed
on for three days more at his starting pace, he might have
crossed the Tagns, flnd have forced King Joseph to fight, close
in front of'Madrid, with an imperfectly assembled arm)', On the
ninth Illld tenth J...eval's Germans were in march from Toledo to
Aralljuez to join Sebnstiani's Poles: l\1ortier's first di\'ision \\'/L<;
hurrying from Talaveru to Toledo, and his second division WllS
making ready to foUow, The ~nd Corps, despite Albuquerquc's
demonstration in front of Almaraz, was preparing to quit
Oropesa., in order to replace Mortier's lllen at Talavera. Victor,
in the meanwhile, with the First Corps, was lying in front of
Tolerlo at Ajofrin, with his cavalry at Mora and Yebelles: he
repnrted that no hostile force had come his wa)'. lmt that he
had ascertained that a huge army had marched past his front
along the great dWIl.$,tee fl'om l\fadl'idejO$ to Al'Illljuczo He was
I SQult w Clarke, Madrid, NOlO, 0.
1809] AllgIZAGA BEFORE A]IANJl'EZ 87
in a position to attack it in renr and flank, if there was a suffi~
dent force gathered in its front to justify him in closing '.
But on reaching La Guardia, Areizaga seemed suddenly to
realize the dan!.rers of his movement. No doubt it was the
news that Victor was almost in his rear that paralysed him, but
he hultL'd on the ninth, when a bold advancc would certainly
have cllt\blcd him to seize Aruujue7" b,}' evicting the ~l1Jall
force under ~1il1l1lud and Scbasliulli. For three faW da~'s,
the 9th, 10th, mul 11th of NO\'cmbcr, the Spllllish muill body
remained halted in a mlViS at La Guardiu, as if for the special
purpose of allowing the enemy to com:entru.te. all the eleventh
Areiulga at last began to mO\'e again: he Bellt forward the
whole of hill cavalry, supported by 7.ayns and hill Vanguard
division, to press back the force in his front. They found
Milhnnd's five regiment<; of dragoons ranged in line of battle
before the smAll town of Ocafin, and snpported by Sebastiani's
Polii'h infantry. Freire advlt.ncecl, using his triple superiority
of' numbers to ttlrn both flAnks of the French cam1r),; Milhaud,
after some part.ial charges, retired behind the Po1e:-, who formed
a line of six battalion squares, The Spanish horse made a
half-hearted attempt to attack them, but were repelled by their
rolling" fire before they came to close qllartet;;., and drew back.
It was no\\' four o'clock in the afternoon, and the Spanish
iJlfantry was only just beginning to come up. Zayas and
Freire agreed that it was too late to begin a second attack, and
put oir fighting till the ne.xt morning. But during the night
the French evacuated Ocafia and retired to Aranjuez, wisely
judging that it would be insane to wait for ,the arrival of the
Spanish main body. They had lost about fifty men, }~reire's
cavalry just over two hundred.
Next day [November 1!tJ, Areizaga brought lip the whole of
his army to Ocafia, and his cavalry reconlloitred up to the gates
of Aranjuez and the bridge of l'uente La Reyna. Sebastiani
made ready to defend thelll, and having been joined by the
German division from Toledo, wrote to Soult to say that he
would resist to the last extremity, in order to gain time for
the arrival of 'Victor's corps and the other troops which were
1 Soult lo Clarkc, Matlritl, Nov. 10,
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marching up from the west and north I, The attack which he
expected was never delivered. Arei1:agn., nervous about the
presence of the 1st Corps on his flank, had resolved to shift his
army eastward to get further away from it. Abnndoning his
line of COlllllHlllicatioll by Lt Gllardin and :Hndridejos, he
marched his whole forec by cl'Oss-l'oads parnllcl to the Tagns lip
to Lt Znl"/..a, !lud seized the fords of Villamunrique, twenty-five
miles above Amnjllcz, 011 the l\fadrid-.Aloocctc road. If Victor,
as he supposed, had been mnnreuvring on his flank, this move-
mcut would have cut him off from his base in Andalusia, and
have left him only the mountains of l\1urcia as a line of retreat
But, as a matter of fact, the 1st Corps was no longer at Ajofrin
or Mora, but had been called behind the Tagus, so that his
retreat was safer than he supposed.
Soult and King Joseph, meanwhile, had been completing their
concentration. They had written to Kellermalln, ordering him
to send back to IHadrid without dela), the brigade of D£!ssolles'
division under Godinot which had been lent him, and to spare
them us well one infuntry brigade of the 6th Corps. These
troops wcre too fur off to be lwailable at once; but of the
telllt\illder of their lIuit..'l the Royal Guard tlnd Spanish battalions
of King Joseph, with Dessolles' remaining brigade, were moved
out to SUppOl·t Sebastiani. Victor had been brought back across
the'l'llgus, and was also marching on Aranjllez. Mortier's corps
was concentrated at Toledo, while the 2nd Corps was in motion
from Oropcsa to Talavera, having disco,'ered no signs of a serious
ad,'ance on the part of AlhuC"Juerque. The care of Madrid was
handed over to the incomplete French division of the 4th Corps 2,
somc of whose battalions were dispersed at Guadulajara, Alcula,
Scgovia, and other /:,11l.rrisolls. Paris's light cavalry of the same
corps was also at this moment wutching the roads to the east of
Madrid.
On the twelfth Areizaga threw Lacy's division across the
Tagus, and laid down two pontoon bridges near Villamanrique,
so AS to be able to bring over his whole army in the shortest
possible time. But the thirteenth, fourteenth, find fifteenth
I Sel.mstiani to Soult, night of the twelfth-thirteenth, from Aranjucz.
2 It had still 110 dil'isiolll'll general, and was officially known by the
IJallll.! of ' Sebastillui'e division '-regiments 28th, 321ld, 58th, 76th.
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were days of storm, the river rose high, and the artillery and
truin st.uck fast on the vile cross-rontls from Oeuiln over which
they were being brought. 111 consequence less than half the
Spanish army was north of the Tagus all November 15, though
the advance cavalry pushed on to the line of the Tajuna, and
skirmished with raris's chasseurs about Argallda. Tt seemed
nevertheless that Arci1.aga was oommittec:l to an advance upon
Madrid by the high-road. from Albaecte, wherefore Soult blew
up the bridges of Aranjuez and Puente la Reynn, and ordered
Victor to march from ArB.lljuez Oil Arganua with the 1st Corps,
nenrly 20,000 men, purposing to join him with the Killg's
reserves and to offer battle Oil the Tnjuna, while Mortier tlnd
Sebastiuni's Poles and Germans should fall upon the enemy's
flank. But this plun was foiled by tl Ilew llIove upon ArcizagtJ,'s
part; he now commenced a retreat us objcetless as his late
advunce. Just ns Victor':> cavah'Y came in toudl with his front,
he withdrew his whole army ncro:;s the Tagus, dcstroyLxl his
bridges, !mu retired to La ZarLa 011 the seventeenth, evidently
with thc intention of recovcring his old line of COUllllunication
with Andalusia, via Ocai'la and IHadridejos.
The lIloment that this new dcparture becume evident, 80ult
reversed the marching orders of ull his columns save Victor's, amI
bade them return hastily to ArlLnjucz, where the bridge was re-
paired in haste, and to cross the Tagw; there, with the inteution
of intercepting Areizaga's liue of retreut and forcing a battle
on him near Ocaiia. Victor, however, had brut so far to the cu~t
that it would Imve wasted time to bring him back to AranjuC'i.,
wherefore he was directed to cross the river at Villamanrique and
follow Imrd in Areizaga's rear.
On the morning of the eighteenth Milhaud's und Paris's
camlry, riding at the head of the Freneh army, erossed the Tagus
at Aralljuez, and pressing forward met, between Ontib'o}1l tUld
OCUlltt, :Frcire's horsemcn moving at the heud of Areh·.ngu's
colullln, which all this day was strung out betwcen La ZarUl
and Koblejas., marching hastily westward towards the high·
road. The collision of Milhaud and Freire brought about
the largest. cavulry fight which took place during the whole
Peninsular War. For Milhaud and Paris had eight regiments,
nCfll·l.y 8,000 mell, while U)l'CC of Fl'eirc's four divisiolls were
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present, to the number of over 4,000 sabres. all neither side
wu..~ any illfantry in hl\l1d.
Scbastillni, who had comc up with the light cavalry of his
corp:>, was ettger for a fight, and engaged ut once. Charging
t.he Spanish front line wit.h Paris's light horse, he broke it with
eilS(!: but Freire came on with his reserves, forming the gceldcr
part of them into a solid columll-all odd formation for cavalry.
Into this mnss Milbaud charged with four regiments of dmgoons.
The heaviness of their formation did not suffice to enable the
Spaniards to stand. They broke when attacked, and went to
the rear in disorder, leaving behind them eighty prisoners and
:some hundreds of killed and wounded, The French lost only
a few scores, but among them was Paris, the not unworthy
successor of the adventurous Lasalle in command of the light
cavalry division attached to the 4th Corps.
Movillg forward in Pllrsllitof the routed squadrons, Sebastiani
approached Ocana, but halted on discovering that there was
already Spanish infantr)' in the toWll. The head of Arei7.uga's
long column had reached it, while the cavalry combat was in
progress: the rest was visible slowl), moving up by cross-roads
frOIll the cast. Soult was at once apprist.u that the enemy's
army WM close in hi~ front-so close that it could not get away
without fighting, for its train and rearguard were still far
behind, and would be cut oH' if the main body moved Oil
without making a stand.
Arei7J'lga, though he had shown slIch timidit)' when faced by
Sebastia.ni's 9,000 men at Aranjne~, and by Victor's ~O,OOO on
the Tajuna, now ofl-'ered bnttle to the much 11101"C formidable
force which Soult was bringing up. He wns indeed compelled
to fight, rmrtly becausc his men wcre too wenry to move forward
that night, partly because he wished to give time for his train to
arrh-e and get on to the Cha1WfS~e.
On the morning of the nineteenth his army was discovered
drawn lip in two lines 011 each side of the town of Ocaiia. There
were still some 46,000 infantry and 5,500 ca'valry lmder arms
despite of the losses of the late wcek 1• The oncoming French arm)'
, Col!J.orlle, ill a letter dated December 6, says' wc had 40,100 infantry
,and nearly 6,000 C3valrr dra.wn out, in II very ood position.' He was
present 1111 through the campaign, but wrote no full report,
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W&l smaller; though it. 1l1lIslcl1..'(1 5,000 horse it hud only !t7,OOO
loot-the GcrnlUlIs und PolL>!; of ScbustilUli, MorliCl' with nearly
the whole of tile 5th Corp". it brigade of Dessolles' division, the
Killg\ guards, and t.he cavalry of l\filhnud, Paris, and Ueaure-
gard I, Victor was too far off to be available; having found the
flooded Tagus hard to cross, he was on this day barely in touch
with the extreme rearguard of Areizaga's army which was
c!>Corting the train. Being nearly twenty miles from Ocaiiu, he
cOllld uot hope to arrive ill time for the general action, if it was
lo be dclivcrt.'<1 next murn. If Arcizagu stood firm for another
day, Vicw.. would be pI'0lsillg him frolil the flunk and reur while
the maiu army Wtl>; ill his front; but it WJlB highly plubnblc
that Arei1.nga would not stand, but wonld retreat at night; nil
his previ011s conduct argued a great disinclination to risk a
battle. Wherefore Soult and the King. after a short discussion~,
agreed to attack at once, despite their great mnnerical in-
feriority. In the open plain of lA ~lallcha a difference of
16,000 or 17,000 infantry was not enough to outweigh the
superior quality and training of the .French army,
There is, so to speak. no position whatever at Ocmia: the
little unwalled town lies ill a level upland, where the ouly
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I Vi~. Mortier'slnfantrr Dil'isions(Girard and GlI2an),
tll'ClItr-two !.mUs. [UlIC regiment deducted] ubOllt J2,000 mell
8l:Laslialli's Polish Dil'isiollluul Gerrn'l1l Dil'isioll
(under '~'erM amI Le\-'al),
Iter's Brigade of Dessolles' Dh'ifiiou of the
Central HeseTl"e
The King's Ueserves, I'iz, four guanl battalions
and three othel'll
MilIlaud's Dr.lgOOIlS, fh'e regilnents
Paris's Light Cavalry, attachcd to 4th COfJ.IS,
thrcc regimcnts
Be.1.ureg-.lTIl's Cill'alry of tl11~ Stll CoTJI8, four
,regiments
'nle King's Cavalry, onc regiment of the
Guards, one of Chasseul'll
Artillery, Sappers, &c..
" 700"
" 1,500"
Total about 33,500 mell
! Joseph declared that he urged instant altao::k when Soult advised
"'aUing for Victor, See hi!! lelter ill "01. \'ii of DUca!lSe's Life ff1ld
Carre8p<nldellce ~r Joscph Napoleon.
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natural feature is a ravine which passes in front of the place;
it i:; sufficiently dt.'€p and broad at its western end lo t.1)nstitutc
a military obstacle, but east of the town gradually grows
slighter and becomes a mere dip in the ground. Areizl\ga had
chosen this ravine to indicate the line of his left and centre;
but on his right, where it had become so shallow as to afford
no cover, he extended his troops across and beyond it, The
town was barricaded and occupied, to form a central support to
the line, There were oliw-grO\'es in the rear of Ocmia which
might have served to hide It reserve, or to mark It position for
11. mlly in case a retreat should become necessary. But Areizaga
had made no preparation of this sort. His trains, with it 511mB
escort, had not arrived even on the morning uf the ninetccnth,
but were l,till belated on the cross-roads from Noblejns and
La ZarYA\.
The order of the Spanish army in line of battle is difficult
to reconstruct, for Areizaga uses very ,'ague language in the
dispatch in which he explained his defeat, and the other docu-
ments available, though they give detailed accounts of some of
the corps, say little or nothing of others. It seems, howe,'er,
t.hat Za)'n8, with the vanguard division, formed the extreme
left, bchilld the deepest. part of the ravine, with 11 cavalry
brigade undcr Ri\'lli; on its fhUlk and rear. Hc htlcl thc town
of OCafitl 011 his right. Thcn followed ill the line, going from
left to right, the di,"isiolls of Vigodet, Giron, Castejon, and
I..acy. Those of Copons, JacolIH:i, and Zerain appear to have
formed a second line in support of the other four I. Vigodet's
left was in the town of Ocafia and strongly posted, but the
other flank, where Lacy lay, wns absolutely in the ail', with no
natural feature to cover it. FOI' this reason Areizaga placed
I '11lis order scems tlle only one consistent lI'itll tho sole ~clJtcllce ill
Areiza,,<ra's disl'atell tu tile ,JUlltll ill whieh hl;\ cXl,lnius his bal-tlc-lIrrl~Y:
< Inmooiatamcnte forme I)M ml mismo la primer.1 liuea en direccion de
Ocaffa, colocalldo por la iZlluierdll. la di"ision de Vigodet, defcndidll. por la
frente de la gran 7..anja, Y 1'01' Sll dcrechll. las dil'isiollCi! de Girou, <':astcjoll
r Lacy: la de Copons formaba martillo, junta. Ii ]llS ta]Jias de la villa,
illmcdiata Ii la de Giron, y las demos III secullda linea. 1I distancia
competente }laTa protegeI' {I la primera.' The llnnamed divisions which
must hal'C Illill beyond CoPOIIS in the right of the second line are Jllcomc
lUld 7..crll.in.
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beyond it Freire, with the whole of the cavalry except the
brigade on the extreme left under Uivas. Unfortunately the
Spanish horse, much shaken by the combat of the preceding
day, was a weak protection for the flank, despite its formidable
numbers. The sixty gW1S of the artillery were drawn out in
the intcr\'1l1~ of the infantry divitiiollJ:i of the fjr:;t und second
line.
Solllt'g plan of attack was 800n formed. The ravine made
the Spanish left-beyond Ocaiia-inaccessible, but also prevented
it from taking any oflensi\'c action. The Marshal therefore
resolved to ignore it completely, and to concentrate all his
efforts against the hostile centre and right, in the open ground.
The scheme adopted was a simple OIlC: Sebastiani's Polish and
Germtlll divisions were to attack the Spanish right wing, and
when they were !Lt close quarkrs with the enemy the Illain umss
of the French cavlllry was to fall upon Fl'eirc's horse, drive it
out of the field, and attack all the flunk the dh'isions already
engaged with the infantry. For this purpolle Milhand's,
Paris's, and Deauregnrd's regiments, more than 3,500 sabres,
were massed behind the Poles and Germans. For a time their
march would be masked by oliye-groves and undulatiolls of the
ground, 80 that they might come in quite suddenly upon the
enemy. Mortier with his first dh'ision-that of Girurd-and
a regiment of Gazan's, followed ill the rear of the Polish and
German infantry, to support their frontal attack. Dessolles,
with his own brigade and Guzun's remaining one, took post
opposite Ocafia. ready to fall upon the Spanish centre, when the
attack to his left should have begun to make way. He had in
his front the massed artillery of the 4th and 5th Corps, thirty
guns under Scnarmont, which took ground on a low knoll above
the great ra\'ine, from which they could both play upon the
town of Ocafia and also enfilade purt of the Spllnish line to
it.'! immediatc right-Vigodet's division and half of Giron's.
Finally the King, with his gunn:l.s und other troops, horse !lIld
foot, were placed to the right rear of Dessolles, to act n.s Il. gcncral
reservc, or to lnOI'C against Zayas if he should attempt to cross
the ravine nnd turn t.he French right..
The plan, despite of some checks !Lt. the commem.'cment,
worked in a satisfactory fllShion. The German and Polish
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divisions of 1£\'al and WerIe attacked Lacy's and Castejoll's
divisions, which gave back some little way, in order to align
t1.1cmselves with Vigodct who WAS sheltered by the slight eastem
end of the ro.,'ine. The enemy followed and brought up six guns
to the point to play upon the lIew position which the SpRniards
had taken up. Thc forward movelllcnt was eontilluillg, when
suddenly to the surprise of the Frcneh. Laey's, Castcjon's, amI
Giron's men, lcaving their places in the line, made a furious
eounter-charge upon the Poles and Germans, drove them baek for
some distance, and threw them into disorder. This movement wa~
no result ofAreizaga's generalship: he had betaken himself to the
summit ofthe ehureh-tower of Ocai'ia, an inconvenient place from
which to issue orders, and practically left his subordinates to fight
their Qwn battle. Mortier WM torced to bring forwarq Gimrd's
division to snpport his broken first line. It wns hotly engaged
with Lacy and Gb'OIl, when suddenl.y it felt the Spaniards
slacken in their fire, waver, und break. This wus the result of
the intervcntion of u new fort.'C in the field. The great mass of
French sqUtldrons., which had been sent undel' Sebastiani to turn
the Spanish right, had now come into action. Arriving close to
Freire's cavalry before it was discovered, it fell on that untrust-
worthy corps, and scattered it to the winds in a few minutes.
Then, while three or four regiments followed the routed horse-
men, the rest turned inwards upon the hostile intantry. 'fhe
flanks of the first and second lines of Areizaga's right were
charged ~imultaneously. IInd hardly a regiment had time to get
into squarc. Brigade after brigade was rolled up and dispersed
or captured; the mass of fugiti\'cs, running in upon the troops
that were frontally enga/:,red with Girard, wrecked them eOlu-
pletely. Of the five divisions of the Spanish left, it. eertaill
number of steady regiments got away, by closing their ranks and
pushing ahead through the confusion, firing on friend and foe
alike when they were hustled. But Illany corps were annihilated,
and others captured wholesale. 'fhe last seems to have been the
fate of nearly the whole of Jacomc's division of the second line,
as hardly a single unit from it is reported ID rallied Il mouth
later, and the French accounts speak of n whole column of
6.000 lllell which laid down its arms ill a maSS before the light
cavalry of the 4th Corps. Just as the Spanish right broke up,
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Dessolles with his two brigades, followed by the King's reserve,
crossed the ravine and attacked the town of Ocai'ia, and the two
divisions-Vigodet and Capons-which lay in first and second
line immediately to the ea~t of it. These retired, and got away
in better order than their comrades to the right. Of all the
Spanish army ouly Ztlytl.:l's vanguard divisioll, 011 the extreme
left., 1I0W rCllluilH..'<l intact. Arciznga hu.d !;Cut it lUl order to
cros.<; the ravine and attack the French right, when he :;(LW hi"
army beginniug to break up. Then, Il. few minutes hlte!', he
sent another order bidding it close to the right and cover the
retl-eat. Afler this the Commander-in-Chief descended from
his tower, mounted his horse, and fled., Zayas carried out the
second order, moved to the right, and fouud himself encom-
passed by masses of fugitives from Giron's, Cast~ion's,and Lacy's
broken divisions, mixed with l~rel1ch ca\·alry. He su~tained,
with great credit to himself and his troops, a rearguard action
f\; for some miles, till near the "illaf,"C of Dos Barrios, where his
line was broken and his men at last mixed with the rest of the
fugitives I.
The whole rouh.'<1 lllultitude now streamL-d wildly over the
plaill, with the French clwalry in hot pur:mit. 'l'hoLUW.llds of
prisoners were takell,IUld the ehase only elldL'<1 with lIightfnll.
The fugiti \'cs hcndcd stmight for the Sicrra MOI'Cllll, Illld rCllchcd
it with 1.\ rapidity even greater than thnt which they ha.d used
in their ontward march n fortnight befMe. Victor's camlry
arrh·ed in time to take lip the plll'slIit ne."t morning: they
had on their way to the lidO. captured the whole of' the trains
of the Spanish army, on the road from Koblejas to Octtiill.
The losses of Areizaga's army were appalling; about 4,000 killed
and wounded and 14,000 prisoners. Thirty flags and fifly ont
of the sixty guns had been captured. When the wrecks of the
army had been rallied in the passes, three weeks after the battle,
only some 21,000 illfantry~ and 3,000 horse were reported as
1 The only detailed nceounts of the Spanish movements that ( huve
discovered are the divisional reports of Lacy Rnd Zayas, both in the
Foreign Office ardlivcs at tlle Record Offil;e. Arci1JlgtL'S Ilill(13tch is so
vague as to he nearly useless.
2 Viz. Za)'as, Vigodet, aml Castejon, about 4,0Ct0 men eacll, CO(JOll!l
3,0Ct0, Giroll 2,600, remains of tlle oUler three divisions about 3,000. From
the returns ill the Madrid \Var Office.
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present. The divisions of Lacy, Jacome, and Zel'llin had
practically disappeared, and the others hud lost from a third to
a half of their numbers. The condition of the cavalry Wll.$
peculiarly di~gra{.'Cful ; us it had nevcr stood to fight., its losses
represent not prisoners, for the most part, but mere runaways
who never returned to their standnrds. The French had lost
ubout 90 officers amI 1,900 men. neurly ull ill the divisions of
Lcml. WerIc. and Girard 1• The cavah'y, which had delivered
the great strokc und WOll the battle. suffered \'CI)' little.
MOI-tier had been slightly wounded. Lcvul and Giranl scvcrdy.
Even allowing for tile fuct that Arcizl\ga had been the victim
of the Junta's inSCllsate resoke to make un offellsil'c movement
on Madrid, it is impossible to speak with paticnce of his general-
ship. F'ot' 11 combination of rashncss ulld vl\cillll.tion it ex{.'Cls
that of allY other Spanish general during the whole war. His
only chance wus to cateh tile enemy beforc they could COll-
centrate: he succeedc<.l in doing this by his rapid march from
the passes to La Guardia. Then he wuill:d three days in
deplorable indecision, though thcre were only 10,000 men
between him and :\1adrid. ~e..xt he resumed his advance, but
by the circuitous route of Villamanrique, by taking which he
lost three days more. Then he halted again, the moment that
he found Victor with 20,000 men in his front, though he
might still have fought at great advantage. Lastly he retreated,
yet so slowly and ullskilfully that he was finally brought to
action at OcaJia by the 34,000 men of Mortier and Sebastiani.
He was sent out to win a battle, since Madlid could not be
delivered without onc, and knew that he mnst fight sooner or
later, but threw away his favourable opportunities, and then
accepted an action when all the eharll..'es were against him. For
he must have knowll by this time the misernble quality of his
cavalry, yet gave battlc in a mst plain, where everything
depended on the mounted arm. In the actual moment of
conflict he seems to have remained ill a hypnotized condition on
his church-tower, issuillg hardly an order, and allowing the
fight to go as it pleased. Yet he was, by all accounts, possessed
I i\Iartinien's lists of officen killed and \vOUlldcd show tllat the Genuall
division lost 19 officers, the I'olish division 23, Giraro's division 28-
in all 70 out of the total of 94 officers hit ill the whole anuy.
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of personal courage, as he had proved at Alcm1iz and elsewhere.
Apparently responsibility reduced him to a conditiOll of nlcil-
lating idiocy. Perhaps the most surprising fact of the whole
business is that the Junta rdailloo him in commllnd after his
fiasco, thanked him for his services, and sent him all honorary
present-as it had done to Cucsta after Mcdellin wit.h some-
what better excuse. He was its own man, and it did not
throw hi.m over, even when he had proved his perfect incom-
petence.
To complete the narrativc of the deplorable antnmn eampaign
of 1809, it only remains to tell of the doings of Albuquerque
and Del Parque. '1'he former played his part with reasonablc
success; he wa'! ordered to distract the attention of the ellemy
from the army of La Mancha, and did what he could. Having
got some 10,000 men concentrated at Almaraz, he sent oue
column oYer the Tagus to demonstrate against the 2nd Corps
from beyond the river, and with another threatened the bridge
of Talavera from the near side. But Hel1delet, now in command
of the 2nd Corps, soon found that there was no reality in his
demonstration, and that he was not supported by the English,
though he had given Ollt that 'Vellingtolt was close in his rear.
After skirmi~hillg around Taluvera from the 17th to the 221ld
of N?vcmber, the Duke hastily recrossoo the river on hearing the.
news of Denfia, and resumed his old positions.
Del Pa.rqlle's eampa.ign wns more vigorous and more llufor-
Lunale. 'While he Jay in the passes above. Bejar Il.nd Baliog, he
got early news of the withdrawal of Godiuot's and l\farcognet's
troops toward Madrid, when Soult summoned them off' to
reinforce the main army. He reasoned that since he had now
only the 6th Corps, shorn of one of its brigades, in his front,
he might repeat the success of Tamames, for Marchand was
weaker than he had been in Odober, while he himself was far
stronger. Accordingly he disregarded all orrler from the Junta
to extend his operations southward, and to join Albuquerque in
the valley of the 'l'agus. Instead, he marched once more upon
Salamanca on Noyember 18, the day before the disaster of
Oeana. He drove in an outlying brigade of Marchand's
force from Alba de Tonnes, and pressed it vigorously back
towards the main body. Conscious that with his ]0,000 men
OllUl(. 111 H
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he could not hope to face 30,000, Marche.ud promptly evacuated
Salamanca on December 19, and retired, just as he had done in
October, behind the Douro, concentrating his whole corps at
Toro. He sent urgent demands for help both to Ke1lermann
at Valladolid, and to Soult at Madrid. Dj' the time that they
arrived Arciznga. had been dealt with, and the army in New
Castile could spare us mauy reillfon.'Clllcnts us were required.
Marcognet's bri/:,"8dc, the one which had Uccn borrowed from
the (lth Corps, was first sent back from Scgovin, the point
which it had reached in its southward march, and Gaul.ll's
divisioll of the 5th Corps was ordered by Soult to follow.
Meanwhile Del Parque, still ignorant of the disaster in the
south, had occupied Salamanca on November 20, and on the
following day moved out towards Cantalapiedra and Medina del
Campo, with the object of throwing himself between Marchand
and Kellennann and the capital. This was an excellent movc,
and, but for what had happened at OcaUll, might hose hwi
considerable results, since the Army of the Left ought to hAvc
made an cnd of the small French force in Old Castile.
Kellermann, however, hud Sl.>C1l the danger of Marchnnd's
retreat to Toro, and had directed him to close in towards the
east, and to occupy Medina del Campo, as the strategical point
that must ~be held in order to maintain touch with Ma9.rid.
Thus it chanced that on Novcmber !t3 Labassee's brigade and
four regiments of cavalry, coming from Torclesillas, reached
Medina del Campo just as l\'1arcognet's brigade, returning from
Segovia, came into the town from the other side. They had
hardly met when the approach of Del Pllrquc's army along the
Salamanca. road was reported. 'l'he two French brigadiers
thought for a moment of fighting, and the cavalry was ordered to
press baek the Spanish advanced guard. They drove off with ease
Anglona's horsemen, who rode at the head of the long column,
but were repulsed by llallasteros's infantry. whieh formed square
in good style, and drove them off' with a rolling fire of musketry.
Socing that the whole Spanish army was coming up, Marcognet
and Labassee then evacuated Medina del Campo, and retired- to
Valdestillas. ·With one push more the Spaniards could have
cut the line between Valladolid and Madrid.
On November ~4 the whole 6th Corps and Kellermann's
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dragoons, with a battalion or two from the garrisons of Old
Castile, were concentrated at Pllcnlc de Ducro. with their van
nt Valdestillas. If attacked, they must have gOlle behind the
Dollro and flbl\ndolH~dall tonch with Maddd; for there were not
more than ]6,000 mell ill line, and they were forced to take the
defensive. But, to their surprise, Del ParljUe made 110 advance.
He had heard OIl that morning of the disaster of Ocmla, and
guessed that reinforcements for Kellermann must already be all
the march. Wherefore he resolved to regain the mountains
without delay. and to gi\'c up Salamanca and his other con·
quests. With this prudent resol\'c he broke up from Medina del
Campo. and marched hastily away in retreat, making, not for
Salamanca, which was too much in the plains to please him,
but for Alba de Torlllc~. He had gaincd a day's start by hi~
prompt action, but on the twenty-sixth Kellel"lllann set off in
pursuit, leaving orders for the troops lhat were e."(peet.ed fl"Olll
Madrid to follow him.
On the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh the French cavalry
failed e"en to get in touch with DellJarque's rearguard, and found
nothing but a few stragglers on the road. But on the afternoon
of the twenty-eighth the leading squadrons reported that they had
come upon the whole Spanish army encamped in a mass w"Ound
the town of Alba de 'rormes. The duke had flattered himself
that he had shaken off his pursuers, !\ll{l W!l.S surprised in It
most unfortunate position. Two of his di,'isiolls (Dn1lasteros and
C!\strofuerte) were beyond the Tormcs, preparing to bivouac
011 the upland above it. The other three were qUll.l:tered in
and about the town, while the cavalry was wl\tching the road,
but had fallen in so close to the main body that its yedettes
gave very short notice of the approach of the enemy. Keller-
mann was riding with the leading brigade of his cavalry-
Lorcet's chasseurs and hussars; the sb: regiments of dragoons
were close behind him, so that he had over 3,000 sabres in
hand; but the infantry was ten miles to the rear. If he waitetl
for it, Del Parque would have time to cross the rivcr and take
up a defensive position behind it. The French general, there-
fore, resolved to risk a most hai'.ardous experiment, an attack
with unsupported cavalry upon a force of all arms, in t.he hope
of g~t,ltjllilJg it till the infantry should come up. The Spaniards
.2
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were gC!Wng into line of bat.tle in It hllrry, Losruln's division
on the right, Beh'ec:ler's and La Cnrm1'a's on the lefl:., the Cfiva]ry
-·1,200 sabres at most-in thC!ir fro.llt. The divisions beyond the
river were only beginning to v.sselllble, uno' woulo. tukc some
time to recross the narrow bridge: but ]8,000 men were on the
right bank prepared to fight.
Without a moment's delay Kellermann ordered Loreet's
brigade to charge the Spanish right find ccntre: it was followed
by the six regiments of dragoons in three successive lines, and
the whole mass ~me down like a whirlwind upon Del Parque's
front, scattering his cfi\'alry to the winds, and breaking the
whole of LOSIl.ol\'s and the right of Belveder's divisions, A
battery of artillcl·y. and nearly 2,000 prisoners were taken.
The wrecks of the broken divisions fell back into Alba de
Tonnes, and jammed the bride,re, thus preventing the divisions
on the further side from rccrossing it. Kellermallll then rnllied
his squadrons, fllld led them against La Carrcra's division and
the remaining battalions of that of Beh,eder. These troops,
formed in brigade·squares upon a rising ground. held out
gallantl)' and repulsed the charge. But they ",ere cut off' from
the bridge, which they could only reach by a dangerous flank
movement over rough gl'Ound. Dy continnally threatening to
repeat his attacks, Kellermann kept them from moving off~ till,
two houts and a half after the action had begun, the French
infautry and guns commenced to come up. La Carmm saw
that it would be fatal to await them, and bade his division
retreat and reach the bridge as best it could. This was
naturally done in disorder, and with some loss; but it was
already growing dusk, and the bulk of the Spanish left got
1l\\'fI.Y·
';Vhile the Spaniards wcm defiling over the bridge,1\Ial'chand's
leading brigade attacked Alba, out of which it drove some
tallied troops of Losada's division, who held the town to cover
La Carrera's retreat. This was done with ease, for Del Parque
had not brought over hill two intact divisions, preferring to use
them as a second line behind which the others could retire.
Alba was stormed, and two guns, which hud been plncC(l behind
a barricadc at ill; main exit, were taken by the Frcnch.
Here .the fighting stopped: the Spaniards had lost five flags,
lROO] DEL PARQUE'S RETREAT 101
Ilille guns, most of lheir baggage, and about 3,000 killed or
t.akell-llo very rUi1l011S deductions from au arlllY of 32,000 mCII.
The !"rcnch casualties were less than 300 in all 1. Dd ral'que was
determined not to fight again llext morning, and bade his army
make off under cover of the night. The disorder that followed
was frightful: the three divisions that had been ill the baWe
dispersed, and went off in all directions, some towards Ciudad
Uodl'igo, others towards Tamames, others by the hill-road that
leads towards 'fala and the Pass of Bui'ios. Many of the raw
Lcollesc troops, though they had not been ellgugcd, also left
their colours in the, dark 2. It WM a full mouth befol'e Del
Pal't]lle could collect his whole Ul'lll)', which, when it hud bcc.1I
reorganized, 'I'M found to number 26,000 meu, despite ull ib
misfortuncs. n would seem, thcrefore, that beside the losses ill
the battle some 3,000 men must have gone ofi-' to their homes.
The duke fixed his hCitd qnarters at San Martin de Tl'ebejOS in
the Siel'l'a de Gata, and dispersed his infantry in cantonments
about liejar, I"uenteguinaldo, and Miranda de Cnstanar. Having
only the rnined region around Coria and Plasencia, and the small
district about Ciudad Rodrigo, to feed them, these troops
suffered dreadful pri~-atiolls during the winter, living on half-
rations eked out with edible llCOl'lIS. Dy the middle of Janual"j-
they had lost 9,000 men from fever, dysentery, and starvation.
lJC'lpite all this, it is fair to say that Del IJal'que's campaign
contrMts most favourably with that at' Areizaga. I-le showed
a laudable prudence when he twice evacuated Salamanca rather
than fight a battle in the plain. His victor)' of 'l'amames was
most creditable, showing that .when prudently conducted, and
rall&ted ill a well-chosen hill-position, his m-my could give a
good i\CCOWlt of itself. But for the disustcl' of Alba de Tormes
his record might Ue (:ousidered e...'(eclIcnt_ There, it is true, he
committed II grave mistakc, by separating his army into two
halves by the rivcr whcll his cnemy was ill pursuit. But in hb
I AI"rtillicll's lists sllow 4 officers kilk~llInd 14 wounded_
~ 'Olere is a IOllg l"elXJrt by Del Partlue ill the Ikcoru Office, ill ",hidl
Ilc states tllat thc paniu was causc{l by a stray l~'lTty of Ilis own TOuted
cavalry uashillg iu among the rearguard in the dark, anu crying that the
French were pursuing tllem. He afterwarus court-martialled aud shot
some cavalrymeu for cowardice,
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defence it may be urged that his cavalry ought to have had
vcdcHes Qut for ten or fifteen miles to the rear, and to have
gi"clI him long warning of the approach of the French. And
when the enemy's horse did make its sudden appearance, it was
contrary to the laws of probability that it would attack at once,
without waiting for it:> infantry allll gUlls. KcllcrnlUllll's head-
long charge was lL violation of all rules, a stroke of inspiration
which could not have been foreseen. If the Spanish cavulry
had been of allY use whatever, and jf Losnda's division had only
known how to form square in a hurry, it ollght to have been
beaten off. Dut the resisting·power of a Spanish army was
always n doubtful quantity. Kellermantl resolved to take the
risk of atl:acking, and was l'cwarded by a victory on which he
was not entitled to reckon. He would probably have justified
his i.adics by ul'ging that failul'e could ha\'e no severe penult)"
for the Spaniards could not pursue him if he were repulsed,
while success would bring splendid results. This was true:
and if his infantry had been five miles 'more to the front, he
might have captured the whole of La Carrera's dh'isioll.
SECTION XVIII
THE CONQUEST OF ANDALUSIA
CHAPTER I
THE CONSEQUENCES OF OeAN-A. DECEMBER 1809-
JANUARY lInQ
THE news of the disaster of Ocafia gave a death· blow to the
Central Junta. Its attempt to win back its lost credit by an
offensive campaign against Madrid having ended in such a
lamentable Cushion, there was nothing left for it but to
acquiesce in its own superscssiou by the oft.discussed Ilutional
Cortes. But that assembly wus Ilot to meet till March J, 1810
-t\ date still four months in the futuI'C,-alld even its fOfm and
constitution had not yet been settled. For it would have been
absurd to have called it together in the ancient and unrepre-
sentative shape,-a legacy from the time of Charles V,-in which
it had been wont to meet under the Bourbon kings. Many
regions had few or 110 members; decayed mediaeval towns of
Old Castile had more deputies than the most populous pro-
vinces, Moreover, it had yet to be settled how that larger half
of the realm which was now occupied by the ]i'rench was to elect
its representatives. The commission was still sitting to deter-
mine these vital points, and in this moment of dismay the day of
the assembly of the Cortes seemed very far distant, The :French
might be following hard on the heels of Areizaga's broken host,
and might enter Seville, long before it had been decided what
sort of a Cartes was to take over the power fl'om the hands
of the discredited Central Junta.
That most unhappy government, therefore, had to face bot.h
an acute constitutional crisis and an acute military crisis, Some-
thing had to be done without delay to satisfy public opinion
concerning the convocation of the Cortes, or the revolution
which had been checked by 'Vellesley's aid in September would
certainly burst forth again, But even more pressing was the
necessity for rallying and reinforcing the army which had been
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crushed at Ocaiia, before the French should resume their
adwl.Ilce. The actual administrative power was for the moment
in the hand of the first of those temporary executil'c commit·
tees to which the Junta had agreed to rlelegnte its authority by
the decree of September 19. This body, composed of six
members, nmong whom La Rom/luft was numbered, had come
into office 011 November 1. The rest of the JUlltn were only too
eager to throw on their comrudcs the weight of the responsi.
bility which should have fallen upon them all. The executive
committee was accused on all sides of slow and feeble action.
It published, as soon as possible, the details concerning the con-
stitution of the forthcoming Cortes, which (in pursuance of the
recommendation of the commission of inquiry) was to consist of
two classes of members, elected representative.~ who were to be
allotted in due proportion to all the provinces of the realm, and
'pri\'i1egiados' or chosen individuals from the nobility and the
higher clergy. The American colonies were to be givcnlllembers
no less thun the mother l;ountry, but their numbers were to be
snmU. Such an arrangemcnt seemed to foreshadow a double-
chambered legislature, resembling that of Great Britain, and
British precedents had no doubt been running in the minds of
the framers of the constitution. But-as "'I..' shall see-the
Cartes, wben it actually met, took no such shape. The mandate
for the eledion of the assembly was duly published; and so far
public opinion was to a certain extent satisfied, for it was clear
that the Central Junta was at last about to abdicate. But
though the majority of the Spanish people were contented to
wnit, provided that the executi,·c committee should show signs of
rising to the occasion, uud doing its best as 8n interim govern-
ment, there were some politicians who saw in the crisis only an
opportunity for pushing their private ambitions. Those veteran
intriguers, the Conde de Montijo and l?rancisco Palafox, undis-
mayed bythe failure of theSeptemberplot, began to make arrange-
ments with the Seville demagogues for a fresh attempt at acoujJ
iN/at. Their plots seem to ha.ve distrach.-cl Romana Ilnd his
colleagues from their obvioHs military duties-the conspirator
at home is always the enemy who looms most large before the
.eyes of a weak government. But after some search both were
discovered, arrested and imprisoned.
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Meanwhile the executh'c committee, with the Junta's
approval, issued a long series of edicts concenling the re-
organization of the arm)', and the defence of Andalusia from
the French attack, which might at any moment begin. 'lnc
• Army of the Centre,' of which Areizaga was still, strange to
say, left in commanu, Will; to be raised to 100,000 men by u
strenuous conscription. The press was to be all-embracing,
man'ied men, novices ill monasteries, pcrsons ·in minor orders,
ollly sons of widows, all thc cltls:;cs hitherto exempt, were to be
subject to it. To provide funds the clergy were ordered to send
in to the mint all church plate save ::;uch as wns strictl), necessary
for the celebration of thc sacraments, alld all privutc citizcns
wcrc biddcn to contribute OllC half of their tablc-silvcr. III
ordcr to provide teams fol' thc artillery-which had lost Ilcttrly
all its horses and gUlls at Ocmlo.-n sb·iet rcquisition for draught
animals was begun all ovel' Andalusia. Engincers werc sent out
to fortify all the passe<> of the Sierra Morena, with permission
to exact forced labour from the peasantry of the hill cowltry.
Three members of the JUllto.-Rabe, Riquelme and Cumpo
Sagrado-were sent t.o Arei7.a.ga's head quarters a.t La Carolina
as 'field deputies,' to stir up or support the energy of the
commander-in-chief. This was a device borrowed from the
practice of the French ltevolution, and had no better efl:ect than
might have been expected. As ill 1793, the' Hepresentativeson
Mission' were either useless or positively harmful. They either
wished to thrust amateurish plans of their own upon the milital'Y
men, or at least distracted them by constant inquisitorial
supef\'ision.
On the whole the effect of this volley of violent decrees was
small. \Vith six months to carry them out they might, no
doubt, have produced great results. But within nine weeks
after the disaster of Ocalln the French had commenced their
attack, and in that spat."C of time little had been accomplished.
The money was beginning to come in, the reeruits were being
collected, but had not been armed or clothed. still less drilled.
Of the fortifications in the passes many had been sketched out,
but only a few had begun to take tangible shape. To man
them there was still only the wrecks of Areizago.'s old army,
which had hardly begun to receive its drafts of conscripts. Its
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whole force at the New Year did not exceed 30,000 men, and
these were distributed m'er a front of more than 150 miles, for not
only the main group of passes in front of La Carolina had to be
watched, but also the enstern ingress into Andalusia by Bllcr,u and
UOcdu, and the western de(jJcs from Almooen Rud Benulrozur,
which lead directly down on to CordO\'R. The whole country-
side WIiS in a state of desperate turmoil uud excitement, yet very
little in the way of practical defence had been completed by the
middle of January.
Meanwhile} in accordance with the ridiculous constitution of
the 'executive committee,' half of its members went out of
office at the New Year, and were succeeded by other individuals
of the Junla. Among those superseded was La U.omulla, who
wns now directed to go off to Valencia IlS captain-general. The
Junta seems to have considered that he would be less dangerous
in company with his brother Jose CarD in that province, than
when posted at the seat of government, with his brother to back
him by threats of Valeneian military interference. Yet La
llomana did not depart.., and was still lingering at Seville when
the Frcnch crossed the Sicrru Morena.
There was a larger military problem before the JUlltaand the
new 'e.'"ccutive committee' than the mere defence of Andalusia.
Thc whole arrangement of the national armics had to bc re-cast
in consequence of the black day of Deans. Thc corps of Del
Pnrque and Albuquerque, 1\5 well as all the smaller outlying
bodies of troops, had to receive llew orders. Above all it was
Ilccessary to discover what wcre the plans of 'Vellingtou, for
the prescnt position of the British army at Badajoz was thc
most important factor ill the whole situation. As long as it
remained there, in support of the small forcc under Albuquerquc
which was guarding the passages of the 'l'agus at Almaraz and
An.obispo, the western section of the front of Andalusia was
secure, The defence of the eastCl'n section, too, was in no small
dcgree helped by the filet that Wellington's solid troops were ill
a position to march up the Guadiana, and to threaten the flank
of any French army which might intend to attack the Despeil.a-
Perms, or any other of thc passes which lead from La Mancha
down to the Andalusian plains.
It was a terribly disquieting fact for the Junta that, c\"cn
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before Ocllfin Illld bccll fought nlltI lost, \Vcllingtoll hud begUll
to annOlll1t.:c his intent.ion of leaving Thulnjo;;; and rct.iriug withill
the boundaries of Portngal. He Imd paid fL flying visit lo
SC\'ille on the 2nd-4th 1 of' November, just as Arei7~1.ga·8
unhappy advance into La Mallcha was ~mmencing. The
project had been concealed from him 2, and when he learnt of it
he had expressed his entire disapprobation of it, and had refused
to gh'c any promiiSC to support the Spanish armies in their
offensi\"c movements. For this reason he had been bitterly
provoked when Areh·..aga and Albuquerque both wrote him, a
little later, to say that they had been promised the assistancc
of his Itrmy by the Juntas. Hc had consistently prophesied ill
of the adventure, amI had recorded his opinion that both Del
Parque aud Areimga would probably lose their armies. In a
dispatch of November 20, six days before the news of OcaJ1a
rcachcu. him, he Imd annoullccd his definite illtcntiOll of lellying
Badajoz with the main body of his army, and transferring him-
self to the north of the Tagus, where, by posting himself in the
Portuguese provill<:e of ReiI'a, he would eovCl" the high-roads
to Lisbon from Old Castile. This decision was founded on his
bclicfthat whcn the Freudl had made an cnd of Arcizaga [uld Del
PaNlue-a contingency which he regarde<11lS almost certain f_
they would strike at Lisbon and not at Sc,·illc, Hc hud l:,"Ood
reasons for holding this ,·icw; it was exactly consonant with
1 lIe then pushed Oil to Calliz, where lle was on the Oth-7tll, spent a
night at Seville again 011 the Otll-1Oth, all\I was back at ll.1dajoz on tile
11th of Noyember. At Cadiz he parted \\ith his brother, who was just
emb..nking for England, to take up his pln.ce iu the new Ministry.
'I As late as Oct. 28 lIe had writWlI to Colollcl Iloche, the Hritisll officer
attached to tile staff of thc Army of the Cclltrc, to heg Ilirn to press 011 the
IJcwlr-arrived Areizaga thc necessity of adopting a defensi'-e poslure, lIml
risking nothing. .From tIle wording of the letter it is clear that no hint of
the orders sent to Areizaga from Seville had reached Badajoz. Wellington
Di8patChel, \". 24.IH), see also the disll3tch to Ca8tlereagh 011 11. 267.
8 Sce Wellingtou to Roche, aud to H. Frere, lladajlYt, No\.. 19. .Dig-
patcMI/, \', 292-3 aud 204..
j 'Kothing call save them save a victory by Arcizaga, alld the IlOsscssion
of :'IIadrid, u'kich IInl the mm/t f1ll1JTt)/)fI/de rif COOl/tl/• ..• If Del PanjllO alld
Albuquerqlle are destroyed, lI,hich il/ 1/(j{. ul/likely, imlt'i-'fl pretty l-ertllifl •••
we mllRt makc our arrangements for tllll defence of Portllg-al.' 'Velling-
ton to Beresford, Nov. 20, IBQl).
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Napoleon's own plan, which was only abandoned by reason of
King Joseph's pleadings with his brother. For, from the l"rench
standpoint, it was far more profitable to conquer Port~ooal and
to expel the British army from the Peninsula, than to o\'erl'utl
Andalusia. 'Wellington and his troops formed the one solid
llucleus of resistance which stillremainerl; it WAS clear that the
dispersion of the misel'l1ble wrecks of Arehagtl.'s host would
present 110 difficult)'. And llot only was it addsnble, from the
Emperor's point of \'iew, to destm)' the most formidnble hostile
force still slU'viving, Lut the bulunec of strategical t\dVulltngc
was all ill favour of subduillg Portugal, before Andalusia should
Le invaUL..(\. For !lorhlhral fhmks the attack 011 southern Spain,
and a brood army based upon it could check the advance Oil
ScvilIe and Cadiz by demonstrations aimed at Valladolid 01'
Madrid, which might wreck or delay the conquest of Andalusia.
It Illay be objected that Andalusia also flanks the attack Oil
Portugal; but the objection had no validity since the day of
Ocaiia, as the Junta had now no longer any striking force in
hand. It would be many months before Arei7.aga's host WI\.S
in 11 proper condition for undertaking even cautious defensive
operations. A French at.tack Oll Portugal, therefore, would
Le pruet.icnlly unlIlolested by exteruul interference.
At the present moment the strength of the French troops ill
Spain was not sufficient. to provide two armies for offensive
purposes, the one destined to march on Seville, the other on
Lisbon. The numbers at the front had not appreciably
increased since thc autumn, though already the reinforcements
which the Emperor hurl set upon the march, after concluding his
peace with Austria, had begun to appear at Bayonne, and to
cross the BidtlSliou. But in December and Januury thc rouds
wel"C bad, the days short, and provisions hard to procure.
Hence Wellington reckoned that, till the spring should urt'i"e,
t.he allies would have to face no more than the forces which
were already opposed to them. 'When, however, the campaign-
ing season should have come rOlUld, and the reinforcements from
Germany should have been incorporated with the old Army
of Spt\iu, hc thought that Portugal would Le thc enemy's
main objective. It was therefore his intention to withdraw his
army, or at least the greater part of it, from Spanish Estrema-
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dura, and to arrange it so as to cO\'er LisbOll, c"en though by
making this movement he was weakening the left flank of the
defence of Andalusia. If he had to choose betwccn the
interests of Portugal und those of Spain, he was prepared to
sacrifice the Iz\ttcr. His reasons were simple: (1) he considered
POl'tngal mOl'c importnnt in the grand strategy of the defence
of the Peninsnla tlum Andalmia; (2) he regarded it as more
defensible, and he had alrendy-n.'l we shall presently soo-
sketched out and commenced the construction of his great
lines of Torl'~ Vedras, in which his trust as a final impregnable
stronghold Wll,.'l nll'cady fixed; (3) he held that although Great
Britain was pledged to assist both Spain and Portugal, yet her
moml obligation to the latter was far more binding, since
Portugal had placed herself entirely ill the hands of her allies,
had put her army at their disposal, and had contri buted all her
resources to the common cause, while the Spanish Junta had
shown a jealous and suspicious spirit, had refused to show
confidence in Great Britain, and had persisted 1Il carrying
out a military policy of its own, which led to a consistent
series of disasters; (4) the Portuguese army, though its
fighting power was not as yet ascertained, could be at least
relied upon for obedience; experience had shown that the
promises of the Spaniards could not be trusted, and that any
clUllpaign undertaken in their company might be wrecked by
somc incalculable piece of slackness or miscalculation 1.
Accordingly on November 20 ''Vc1lington declared his
I \\'ellillgloll's (IrgullIellts must be culled from Ilia l'arioua disPlltclles to
Lord Liverpool and other ministers ill November and December lBW.
For tile first of the moth'cs quoted above sec 'Vellington to Liverpool
Dec. O. 'The object in occupying tllis proposed position [in Bcira] i~ to
be at the point of the defence of Portugal, to divert the attention of tIle
French from the South of Spain, when tlley shall rcceil'e their reinforce-
ments, and thus to give time to the Spmlish GOl'crnment to repair their
lo~~es... " Tt ia aLsolutely necessary to crOO8 thc 'J'lIgus immeuiately. us it
lllay be tlclltmdt..u upon tlmt ll,c cncmy's liro;;t effort, after receivillg his
reinforcements, \\"ill he ll]Wll tIle lroops to U,e NorU, of t1le Tagus.' Very
much the same opinion is expressed ill t1le earlier dispatcll to Lord Lil'erpool
of November 14. EXllrefSions of Wellington's conviction tllat it was
impoSllible to co-operate with tIle Junta or the Spaniell generals may be
fonnu ]lasgim in allllis confidential letters. Sec for example that to Sir J.
Anstruther) Ill'. 3OG-D of Supplementary Dispau;hu, 1'01. vi.
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intention of withdrawiug his arllly-save onc single division-
to the north of the Tagus, und of placing it llt nLl'iOllS points
in the province of Bcira, so as to cover aU the practica.ble
roads to Lisbon from the side of Old Castile. On the
twenty-sixth he sent formal notice of his intentions to
Seville, well knowing the storm of indignation that would
be roused thereby. At the same time he advised the Junta to
reinforce Albuquerql1c's army of Estremudura with troops
drawn .from Del Parque, adding that to keep Albuqucrque well
to the front, in.his present positions at Almaraz and Arwbispo,
was the best means of protecting the western approaches of
Antlalusia. Del Pm'quc's corps, whose reason for c:dstencc
was the 'contn.ining' of the French troops in Old Castile,
would be able to spare troops to strengthen the army of
Estremadura, because the English host, in its new position,
would be behind it, and opposed to the fOI"Ces under Kellermann
and Marchand, which had hitherto had nothing in their front
but the 'Army of the Left.' Moreover, it would be an
appreciable relief to Del Parque, who was finding the gren.tcst
ditliculty in feeding his army in the thinly.peopled mOlllltnin
region between Ciudad Rodrigo and Dejar, to be freed from
the bll.l't1en of maintnillillg onc or two of his five divisions.
The Junta, as might have been expected, took \Vellington's
determination to remove from Badajo7. with the worst of graces.
They could hardly have failed to do so, when one of his main
reasons for departing, barely concealed in his dispatches to them,
WItS his fear of getting invoh'ed in their operations, and his
reluctance to place his troops in line with the Spanish armies.
Nor could they havc bL'Cll expected to agree with his strategical
view that Lisbon, not Cadiz, would be the main objective of
the grand advance of the French armies, when the spring
should come round. '1'0 every man or body of men their own
possible dangers naturally seem more imminent and more
interesting than those of their neighbours. The departure of
the English from Badnjoz was formally announced to tho
Junta 011 November 26, and began to be carried out Oll
December 8, when the brigade of Guards marched for Porta·
legre, and was followed on suceessive days by the other brigades
of the army. By the 24th of December Wellington and his
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staff alone were left in the Estremaduran fortress, and next day
his head quarters were at Elvas, across the frontier. The second
division, under Hill, halted at Abrantes, where ''Vellington
intended to leave it, as the nucleus of a covering force which
was to guard Lisbon from any possible attack from the south
side of the Tagus. The rest of the army pursued its way
!\.Cross the mountains of Beira, and by January 3, 1810, head
quarters were at Coimbra, and the main body of the British
troops was beginning to take up billets in the small towns of
the valley of the Mondego.
COllYinced that no more was to be hoped froro Wellington,
the Executi\'e Committee issued their orders for a new arrange-
ment of the line of defence of Andalusia. Albuquerque was
ordered to leave no more than a small corps of observation on
thc 'l'agus, in front of Ahnaraz, and to bring back the nl3in
body of the army of Estremadura to the line of the Guadiana,
in order to link his right wing to the left of Areizaga's forces.
On December fl4 his new head quarters wcre at Don Benito,
and he had some 8,000 men collected there and at the neigh-
bouring town of Merida; the rcst of his small army was
ftlrnishing the garrison of Badajoz, and the detached force 011
the Tagus, whose duty wns to wakh the movements of the French
2nd Corps, which still lay in its old post at Talavera, and
remained entirely quicscent.
FrOlil Albuqucrque's post at Don Benito there was a gap of
seventy-fivc miles to the next force in the Spanish line. This
consisted of thc w.recks of the two old divisions of Copons and
Zcrnin from thc arlllY of Arcizaga, not more than 4,500 strong 1.
They were encamped at Pow Blnneo and at Almaden, the mining
town ou the Aleudia, where the frontiers of Estremadura. Anda-
lusia, and La :\fancha meet. This place lies near the northern
exit of the two passes, the Puerto Blnnco and Puerto Rubio
which lend down from La Mancha on to Cordova, the one by
Villaharta, the other by Villanueva de la Jara and Adamuz.
Both are difficult, both pass through a desolate and uninhabited
country, but eitherof them might conceivnblyserve for the passage
1 The pallets in the Madrid atellives SIIOW that COllOllS had about 3,000
men, Zerain (whose division had been almost entirely destroyed) about
1,500.
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of an army. Sixty miles cast of Almllden was the main body
of the rallied Army of the Centre, occupying the group of passes
which lie around the high-road from Madrid to Andalusia.
Head quarters were at La Carolina, the central point upon
which the routes from most of these passes converge. About
13,000 men were disposed in front, covering the llluin clwuss!:e
through the DespcJ1a-Perros, l}!!~ ~si~T. defiles of the Puerto
del Rey and the Puertgt-dt~iliau*t"" Here Areizaga had
concentrated the remains of the divisions of Zayas, Castejon,
Giron and Lacy, of which the last two were mere wrecks, while
the two former eounted about ·1-,000 bayonets apic(,'C. Finally.
some fifteen miles off to the right, the remnant<; of the di \·jsiolls
of Vigodet and Jacome, perhaps 6,000 men in nIl, covered the
two easternmost passes from La Manchn, those of Aldea Quemada
and Villa Mnnrique, which descend not upon La Carolinll.,
but on Ubeda and Linares, the towns at the headwaters of the
Glladalquivir in the extreme north-eastern angle of the Andnlu-
ilian plain. AreiJ~a.ga's artillery was all in the plL."-,*s, placed in
the various new entrenchments which wel'e being thrown lip,
His cavalry had for the most llart been sent back to recruit and
reform il<>elf in the interior of the province, being llfleless in the
mountains.
Thc mere description of this disposition of forces is sufficient
to show the hopeless condition of the defence: of Andalusia.
Areizaga was trying to cover every pOSSible linc by which the
French might advance, with the result that his army and
that of Albuquerque were strung out on a front of 150 miles,
and could not concentrate 15,000 men on any single point.
~l'he passes which they were trying to guard were not only
numerous, but in severnl cases very pructicuble, where road~ lay
1I0t between cliff:; or precipices, but ovcr slopes whieh could bo
ascended by infillltry 011 each side of the pass. The fortifications
and the troops holding them could be turned by enemies who
took the trouble to climb the side acdivities, It was clear that
if the French chose to attack the Sierra l\'(orena with no more
thall the 60,000 men who had been concentrated after the
battle of Ocafia, the)' could bring an overwhelming force to
benr on nn)' one or two of the passes which they might select,
while leaving thc garrisons of the rest alone, or thrcatcning them
~
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with trifling demonstrations. If the enemy should choose to
strike by Almaden at Cordova, the Spanish ecntre and right
wing would be cut oft' from their retreat on Sedlle, and would
have to take refuge in the kingdom of Mureia. If the Des-
peiia-Perros and its neighbours should turn out to be the selected
objective, Arcizaga's right wing must suffer the SlllllC fate. And,
if dri\"cll frOID the pu..'>SeS, thc army would havc to cucounter, in
the broad plain behind, the overpowering force of FrCllcl\ cavalry
which Kiug Joscph could bring IIp. The problem set before
the defcnce was a hopeless onc, and most of the gcnerals under
Areizaga were awnre of the fuct-as indeed were t.hc rank and
file. Disnslcr was bound to follow if the cnemy mUllnged his
busincss with ordinary prudence.
OIU". III
SECTiON XVIII: CHAPTER II
THE COl\"QUEST OF AKDALUSIA. KING JOSEPII
AND HIS PLANS
':VUE~ considering the action of the French after the vielory
of OClula, it is necessary to remember that King Joseph and
Soult 'were noL in the position of ordinary invaders, who have
just succeeded ill demolishing the last army of their enemy.
In wars of a Ilorm),} type the victor knows that the vanquished
will sue for terms when further resistance appears hopeless; he
proceeds to dictate the cessions of territory or payments of
indemllilies that he thinks proper, as the price of peace. liut it
was not 11 profitable treaty which Napoleon desired: he had
put it out of his own power to cnd the wur in such a fashion,
when he dcdnl'cd his brother Kiug of Spain. For him there
was no Spanish government in I.:xistellcc 8a\'e that which he hud
set up at Madrid: the Central JUIl~ and the Cortes when it
should meet, were mere illegal u:;:;cmblies, with which he could
not deign to enter into negotiations, It was 1I0W pedectly
clear that the Spaniards would never submit of their own
accord. Their position in December 1809, desperate as it
might be, was no worse than it had been ill the March of the
smne year. Areizaga'fi army had sufrered no morc at OClllla than
had those of Cuesta and Cmtaojal nine months before, 011 the
disastrous fields of Medcllin and Ciudad Heal. Indeed, thel"t~
were probably lllOrc mcu actually ill line to defend AlldHlusia
ill December thllll there had l>eeu in April. l\loreovel', in the
clU'ly spring Soult had becn in the full career of conquest in
rortugnl, and nothing save Cradock's insignifiCtlut force
appeared to pren;nt his onward march to Lisbon. At mid-
winter, on the other hand, the flank of Andalusia was covered
by'Wellington's victorious army, and by the reorganized Portu-
guese host of Bcrcsforo. If the Junta had refused to listen to
the insidious advtlnt'Cs of Sotelo in April I, there was 110 reason
I Sce "01. ii. PI), lGa--O.
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to suppose that it would lend a ready ear to any similar
advocate of submission in December. Indeed, its e\'ery action
showed a resolve to fight out the losing game to the end.
Joseph Bonaparte would never be King of Spain till every
proviuec was held down by French bayonets. Not only must
cach corner of the land be conquered, but after ronqucst it
must be garrisoned. For, where there WllS no garrison, in!;urrec-
tion burst out I'lt once, and the weary process of pacification
had to be repeated.
It WAA this Inst fad that restrained King Joseph ftom follow-
ing up his pursuit of the wrecks of the Spanish army to the
Sierra Morena, llnd the gates of Seville, on the moming after'
Ocmia. To make up the host that had defeated Areizaga, and
the other smaller force that was dealing with Del Parqne in
Lean, the King had bN!n forced to concentmte all his divisions;
fLnd the consequence had been that the control of the brond
tracts behind him had been lost. We haTe already had occasion
to mention! that throughout Old Castile and Lean, the open
countr.v was now in the hands of the guerrilleros, who had been
growing in force and llumbers ever since the time of Talavern,
and had risen to the height of their confidence after the day of
1'amames, and Del Parque's repCtltcd occupation of Salamanca.
Navarrc, and many parts of New Custile were equl\lly di!;turbed,
and Aragon, which Suchet had b~lllecl during thc autumn, WllS
begiuning once morc to move. There were no French troops
in the disturbed regions save scanty garrisons at Burgos, Vl\lIa-
dolid, Bclltl\'ente, A"ila, Scgoda, Gun.dalu.jllra, Palencia, Tudcla,
Tafulla, and a few ollter strategic points. These were eut ofr
from each other, und from Mudrid, save when a f,f()vernor sent
out his messenger with an escort many hundreds strong, and
even sueh a force bad often to fight its wuy through ha.lf a dozen
hands before reaching its destination. The gnrri80ns themselves
were not always safc: so powerful were the bands of some of
the guccrillero chiefs that they aspired to Wagillg regular war,
and did not confine themselves to blocking the road!;, or inter-
cepting couriers and convoy!;. The Empecinado, whose sphere
of activity Ja~' 011 the borders of Old und New Castile, got
possession of Guadulajara for a day, though he retired when.
1 See p3ge 83.
,~
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reinforcements from Madrid were reported to be approaching.
Somewhat later, the younger .Mina-'thc Student,' as he was
.called t.o distinguish him from his more celebrated uncle Espoz,
stormed the town of Tafalla, and shut up the remains of its
garrison in its castle, while the flying.ooluffins of the governor
of Nnvarre were seeking him in e"ery other direction. He too,
like the Empecinado, had to seek safety in retreat and dis-
persion, when his exploit drew in upon him forces sent from
Suchet's army of Aragon.
The acth'ity of the guerrilleros did not merely constitute
a military danger for King Joseph. It nfl:ected him in another,
and an equally vexatious. fashion, by cutting off' nearly all his
sources of te\'enue. While the open country \I'M in the hands
of the insurgents, he could raise neither imposts Ilor requisitions
from it. 'I'he only regular income that he could procure during
the later months of 1809 was that which came ill from the local
taxes of Madrid, and the few other large tOWIlS of whicb he wu.s
in secure possession, And save in the capital itself, his agents
and intendants had to fight hard with the military governors to
secure even this meagre pittance I, The King could lIot COln-
. mand a quarter of the sum which he required to pay the
ordinary expenses of government. His courtiers and ministers,
:French and Spanish, failed to receive their salaries, and the
Spanish arm}', which he was busily striving to form, could not
be clothed or armed, much less paid. Nothing vexed Joseph
more than this: he wished to make himself independent of his
brother's generals, by raising a large force of his own, which
should be at his personal disposition. He formed the cadre of
regiment after regiment, and filled them with deserters from the
foreign troops of the Junta, and with any prisoners who could
be induced to enlist under his banllers in order to avoid trans-
portation to France. But the recruits, when sent to join the
new regiments, disappeared for the most part within a few
weeks. Joseph thought that it was from lack. of pay and
proper sustenance, and raged at the idea t,hat, but for the want
1 For a t}'pil:al example of the relations of French gOI'ernors BlId the
King's officials see Thiebaud's acoount of l\is quarrel with Amoros in
his autobiography, h', 350-5, Cf, Miot de )felito, chapters xi-xii of
\'01. ii.
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of money. he might haH~ at his disposition Do formidable IlMny
of his own. But he deceived himself: the' juromentados' had
for the most part no desire save to desert and rejoin their old
colours: the real renegades were few. In the ranks of the
Junta's Ilrmy the soldier was even worse clothed, fed, and paid
thitn in that of Joseph. No amount of pampering would have
turned the King's Spanish levies into loyal servants.
Pending the reduction to order of the couutry-side of the two
Castiles. which he \'!linly hoped to see accomplished during the
next six months, J oseph found only onc expedient for raising
money. It was a ruinous one, and could not be repeated. This
was the confiscation of property belonging to all persons who
were in the service of the Junta, alltI of uIl the religious ordcrs.
This would have givcn him vast sums, if only he could have
found buycrs. But it was not easy to persuadc allY onc to pay
ready cash for lands ovcrrun by the gucrrilleros, or for houses in
towns which were practically in a state of siege, and were also
subject to a grinding taxation. Property of immensc value
had to be alienated for wholly inadequate sums. The afrall'
cesad08, whom .Toseph was most anxious to conciliate, got such
payment as he could afford, mainly ill the form of vain grants
of property which they could not turn to account. The only
ready money which was in circulation was that which came
from the coining down, at the Madrid mint, of the considerable
amount of plate belonging to the monasteries and the churches
on which the King had laid hands. Naturally, he was regarded
as a sacrilegious robber by his unwilling subjects-though few,
or none, murmured when the Central Junta filled its exchequer
by similar expedients. But the Junta had not decreed the
abolition of the religious orders-it only purported to be raising
tl patriotic loan from their resources. A minister of Joseph
sums up the situation sufficiently well in three sentences.
'Spanish public opinion was inexorable: it rejected e\'erythillg
coming fronr us-even benefits: thus the King and his COUIl~
cillors spent themselves in fruitless labours. Nothing answered
their expectations, and the void in the Treasury, the worst
danger, showed no sign of diminution. On the contrary, the
financial distress increased every day, and the unpleasant means
which we were compelled to employ in ~rdcr to supply the
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ne\'er-ceasing wnnts of the army completely nlicuated the
nation from us 1.'
The orders issued by the King and Soult after the battle of
Ocafia, sllow that they had no immediate intention of pursuing
Areizaga's routed host, and entering Andalusia at its heels-
tempting though such a policy might be from the purely
military point of view. After '·ictor and the 1st Corps had
joined him, 011 the day following the battle, Joseph had nearly
60,000 men in hand. Dut his first move was to disperse this
formidable army; Gazan's division of Morher's corps was nt
once hurried off' towards the north, to reinforce K~llermanll in
Loon-for the battle of Alba dc 'l'ormes had not yet taken
place, and it was thought that the 6th Corps needed prompt
ussistance. Laval's division of Scbastiuui's corps was detacheJ.
ill another direction, being told off to escort to Madrid. ulld
nfterwurUs to Burgos ami Vittoria, the vast mass of prisoners
taken at Dcana. Milhaud, with his own dragoons. and an
infantry brigade taken from Sebastiani's corps, was directed to
push eastwards by way of Tarancon, and then to march on
.cuenca, where it was reported that many of the fugitives from
Arei:f.aga's army had rallied. The brigade of Dessolles' division
which had been present at Ocalia and Joseph's own troops
returned to Madrid. in company with their mastcr. When the
capital was again adequately garrisoned, numerous f1yillg-
eolunms were sent out from it, to clear the rrn\cls, and disperse
the guerrillel'os. Mortier, with that part of the 5th Corps which
had not been detached WIder GUUUI, was drawn buck to Toledo.
Thus of all the troops which had been concentrated on Novem-
ber flOth. only Victor's corps and the Polish di\'ision, with the
cayalry brigade of' the 4th Corps, were retained in La )1aneha,
facing the Sierra Morena. The 1st Corps \Vas pushed forward
to Ciudad Real and its neighbourhood, with its advanced
Cltvalry watching the passes. The Poles remained at Ocafia and
Ln Guuroiu, with Perrc)'moml's three regiments of light horse
ill frollt of them at 1Iu.dridejos 2.
I Miot de Melito, ii. p. 3.51,
~ For all these details see Soult's dispatches to the Minister of War at
I'uris, dated Ko\'. 21 and No\'. 24, from Arnlljuez and :\Iadrid. I'erreymollll
had reeeil'ed the cavalry brigade of the 4th Vorps wiJcul'aris fell ill actioll.
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In the dispatch which detailed to the Minister of Wal' ut
Paris this disposition of the anny, Soult explained his reasons
for holding back. It. was a more pressing necessity to restore
order in the provinces of the interior than to pursue the wrecks
of Areizaga's force, which was so completely dispersed that no
further danger need be feared from it. Before undertaking
any large general scheme of operation, the King thought it
best to consult his imperial brother as to his wishes. It was
rumoured that N!lpolcon himself might appear OIl the scene
within a few weeks, and it was ecrtain that the first columns
of reinforcements from Germany, which might prove to be the
hcralds of his approach, werc just about to cross the Bidassoa.
Moreover, it would be prudent to discover what hm] becomc of
AJhllqnerque and of the English, before any great move to the
southward WM made, as also to make an end of the ann)' of
Del Parque, by means of the reinforcements whieh had just
been sent to Kellermunn 1.
'Vithin three weeks the situation had changed, and many of
the reasons which had induced the King and Soult to adopt
n. waiting policy had diSAppeared. On November 28th, as we
have already seen, Kellermanll routed Del Parque at Alba de
'formes, though he had not yet received the succours which
Ga7.an was bringing up to his aid. The Army of the Left
1 SOlllt to Clarke, Nov. 21: 'Su )lujesM 11 pen;;(i 'IU'il ctllit inlltilo
qll'dlo s'engageiit vers la Sierra lIIorella, ala pOllrsuitc des dcbris de I'armce
<10 la]\J IIIIC1l0, qu'On nepourra plusjoin<lro,et q ui sesauvent indiyiduellemont
sur toutes IllS directions, <I'aut..'lnt plus quo tout porte a croiro qu'iI y
aura encoro des mouvement!l sur la <lroite, et qll'i1 convient <le se mettro ell
mesure <le repousser les nouveaux corps [Albuquerque, Del I'arque, an<l t110
English] qui pourraient se presenter pour la fOTcer. n est aussi presSllnt
de prendre des dispositions pour retablir l'ordre et IH trallquillitC dans les
provinces de l'illMrienr, et IMJllr assurer la liberM des comnUlllkntiOIlS.
A}lrCiol la blltaille d'OCl'na le roi tl ultssi ClI vne de se mettrc en mesurc
tl'attendrc (lue Sa MlljestoJ L'ElIlilCrenr ait juge a llr01MJS de faire cOlllmitrll
ses intentions sur IllS operations ulterieures qui devront etre f3ites.' 111e
elltirelr false supposition tllat Albnquerque and tho English were 011 Ule
move was, as Soult afterwards explained, due to a dispatcll received from
Heudelet at Tnlnl'ern, who sent ill an alarming report that \\'ellillgton
WIll; CXp(l'cted ut Truxillo in a fl,lw dnr~. As to the idcn dmt Oel Parljuc
might join Albuqllerqlle, the Junta. had actually given him an order to lio
so (see page 0i), but lIe Ilat! ignored it, aulillHlrclJed 011 Salamanca.
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being no longer n source of danger, Kellermnnn not onl}' sent
orders to Gnzan-who had reached Scgovia-to return to New
Castile, since he WitS no longer wanted in the North, but prc~
sently sent back to the King Rcy's brigade of Dcssolles' division
which had been lent him early in November. Thus 10,000 men
",ha had been detached came back under the King's control I,
and .were once more a\'ailable for offensive operations.
Still more important was the fact that in the first days of
December the reinforcements from Germany had at last begun
to cross the Pyrenees, and were arriviJlg in Navarre and Biscay
in enormous numbers. Two strong divisions, commanded by
Loison and Reynier Md counting more than 20,000 bayonets,
had ulrendy appeared, and the bend of the int.erminable colulllll
which followed them had reached Bayonne. It was certain that
at least 90,000 men were on the march, to fill np the void in Old
Castile whieh had been causing the King and 80ult so much
trouble. Th~ roads would soon be cleared, the isolated garrisons
relieved, and the communications with Madrid made safe. The
newly arrived generals had received orders to sweep every vfilley
on their southward march" and to disperse every band of
guerrilleros 2. Another possible source of danger, which had
preoccupied thc minds of Joscph and his Major-general after
Oeaiia, had also been removed. The English had made nQ
forward movcment towards the Tagus; they were reported to
be still quiescent at Badajo1.. and rumours (which afterwards
turned out to be correct) had already reached the l"'rench head
quarters, to the effect that Vlellingtoll was just about to retire
into Portugal. Moreover, Milhaud's expedition to Tarancon
and Cuenca, and the excursions of the flying-columns sent out
from Madrid, had all proved successful. The insurgents had
been dispersed with ease, wherever they had been met with.
Of all the reasolls for delay which were "alid on November
QOth there was now none left unrcmovcd save the most impor~
I At tJle New Year Ga'tan had 6,600 men .present with the eagles, Rey
4,100. See Tables at the end of this \"olume.
! See Orders for Loison (ill Napoleon to Bertbier of Dec. 9), and fOr
Heynier (in Napoleon to llerthier, Dee. 14), in the COl7e8jJQlldance.
Reynier WIIS superseded by Lagrange, and sent to command the 2nd COrjlS
a little later.
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tant of all. The Emperor had not )'et made his intentions
known; though pressed to declare his will by every letler sent
by his brother or by Soult, he gave no answer as to a general
plan of campaign. Several of his dispatches had reached
Madrid: they were full of details as to the troops which he
was scnwng across the Pyrenees, they contained some advice as
la finance, und some rebukes for the King concerning petty
matters of administration I, but there was no permission, still
less any order, to invade Andalusia or Portugal; nor did
Napoleon deign to state that he was, or was not, coming to
Spain ill person. It was onl}' when Joseph received the first
dispatch opening up the matter of the divorce of Josephine~.
that he was able to guess that, with such an affilir on hand, his
brother would not Bet out tor the Peninsula during the winter
or the early spring.
By the middle of December Joseph had made up his mind
that it would be politic to attack Andalusia without delay. He
had won over Soult to his ideas-the Marshal having now
abandoned the plan, which he had urged 50 strongly in the
autumn, that Lisbon not Seville should be the objective of the
next F'rcnch nd\'ance. It is easy to understand the King's point
of view-he wished rather to complete the conquest of his own
r*ealm, by subduing its wealthiest and most populous province,
than to do his brother's work in Portugal, where he had no
personal interest. It is less obvious why Soult concurred with
him-as a great strategist he should have envisaged the situation
from the military rather than the political point of view.
Apparently Joscph had won him over by giving him all that
he asked, and trClLting him with effusive courtesy: their old
quarrels of the preceding SlllllllH~r had been entirely forgotten.
At any rate Soult had now become the ardent advocate of the
invasion ofAndalusia, though-as his predecessor Jonrdan tersely
puts it-' the English army being now the only organi7.cd force in
a state to fn.ce the imperial troops, and its presence in the l'enill*
sula being the thing that sllstained the Spanish government and
] TIle Emperor scolds his hrother for not scmling to Paris the flags
taken at Ocaiia, and for callillg Sebastiani's 3rd DiI'isioll 'the Polish
division' instead of' the division of tlle Grand DucllY of Warsaw! '
~ III a dispatch dated from the 'frianon Oil Dec. 17,
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gave COllfidence to the Spanish people, I imagine that we ought
to have set ourselves to destroy that army, rather than to have
disseminated our troops in garrisoning the whole surface of
Spain 1.' The same thought was in the Emperor's mind when
he wrote in January-too late to stop the Andalusian expedi-
tion-that ~ the anI>, danger in Spain is the English arllly; the
rest are partisnlls who CUD never hold the field Ilgainst liS 2..
On the 14th of December, 1809, Soult ut last made a formal
appeal, in a dispalch to Berthier, for leave to eommencc the
march on Seville. 'At no time since the Spanish ',Var began,'
he wrote, 'have circumstances been so favourable for invading
Alldalusia, and it is probable that such a movement would
have the most adl,tllltagcous results. I have already informed
your Excellency that preparations would be made for this
movement, while we waited for his Majesty to deign to
make known to us his supreme will: Soult adds that if only
Loison's division of the reinforcements may be brought up
to Bm'gos, and a second division sent to Saragossa, in order
to free Suchet for field service, the invasion can be begun, as
soon as the army in ~ew Castile has completed its equipment
amI received its drafts,
No direct reply was received to this dispatch, nor to several
subsequent conllllullicntiollS, in which Soult and Joseph set forth
the arrangemcnts which lhey II'crc makiug, always subjcct to
the Imperial approval, for concentrating an army for the
Andalllsian e.;:pedition. Strange as it may appear, it was only
in a letter written on January 31, 1810, when the King had
already crossed the Sierra Morena, that Napoleon \'ollchsafed
a word concerning the all-important problem 3: It is clear
that be had ample time to have stopped it, if such had been
I Jourdan, .tlimoim, p. 294.
~ Napoleon to lkrthier, ,fnn. 31, llllO-giving directions wllicll couM
Dot be carried out, because the iuvasion of Alldnlusia 11nd begun ten uara
before the dispatch had been written.
3 Soult writes plaintively to llerthier, from Madrid, on January 1, uno:
, Le Hoi croit ne pOllvoir uiffirer davantage : aiusi i1 se met en mesure
d'cxecuter les dispositions gillcrales de I'}o;mpereur, lors'1ue Sa l'fajestC aura
daigne les fnire conllll.itre ; ct il est naisemblnble qll'avant que la Sierra
i'oloN!na soit passee,les ordre!!, qui ant lite UCI\1l1IlMlI depuis plus u'uu
lUois, serout p.'U\·cnus.' Hut the ordcr uever came.
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his will; the ultimate responsibility, therefore, lay with him.
But he refrained from orrlering it., or from approving it, thus
reserdng to himself all the possibilities of ex-post-facto criti-
cism. Since no prohibition came, Joseph mnde up his mind
to strike; it was natural that he should be fascinated by the
idea of conquering in person the one great province of Spain
which relllUiued intact. A brilliant campaign, in which he
would figure us cOlllluunder-in-chief us well us king, might at
lust convinee the Spaniards of his cnpacit.y. T-Ie was prcpafC(l
to play the part of Il. mercifnl and generons conqneror. At
the worst the revcnues of the wealthy Andalusia wonld bc 0.
godsend to his depleted treasury.
Two plans were drawn up for the invasion. The first was
more cautious, and more consonant with the strict rules of
strategy. The second was bolder and promised more immediate
results. According to the first the Killg was to concentrate his
main army in La Mancha, and to threaten the passes, while two
great flanking columns Cll.nied out the preliminary conquest of
Estremadura and Valencia. Mortier was to march with the
5th and ~nd Corps upon Badajoz, to crush Albuqucrqne, and to
occupy the valley of the Guadiana. Simultaneously Suchet
was to make a push from Aragon into Valencia with the bulk of
his corps, while his place at Saragossa was to be taken by a large
foree drawn from the newly-arrived reinforcements from France.
Only when Badajoz and Valencia had fallen, and Suchct and
:Mortier could advance parallel with him on either flank, was
the King to march against Seville. Thc weak point of the
schemc was that cither Badajuz or Valcncia might make a long
resistunce; if their garrisons fought like that of Gerollu the
centml a(hance on Audalusia might bc delayed for an indcflllite
timc.
The second plan, the one that was adopted, was to letl\'c the
2nd Corps alone to watch Albuquerque and Estrcmadura, to
order Suchet to advance against Valencia, but to strike straight
at Seville, without waiting for the completion of either the
Estremaduran or the Valencian operations. In the original
draft tor this campaign 1, nearly the whole of the King's army
I It mal' be fouud set forth ill full in :SOult'g disllatch to Bcrthier of
Jan. 1,1810.
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was to concentrate at Almaclen and Ciudad Real, and from
thence to strike straight at Cordova, by the difficult and little-
used passes of the central Sierra Morena. Meanwhile
Sebastiani, with no more than a single infantry division and
l\Iilhaud's dragoons, was to demonstrate against the main group
of passes in front of La Carolina, along the line of the high-
road from Madrid, so as to distract the attention of the
Spaniards from the reul point of attack. More than 50.000
men were to descend suddenly on Cordovn, for the whole of the
Ist and 5th Corps, Dcssollcs' Reserve division, the King's
Guard, and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, were to march ill a
mass by the unexpected route via Almaden, VilIanucvfl. de la
Jara, and Adamuz. The Spanish centre would undoubtedly be
broken, and it was probable that Cordova, Seville, and Cadiz
would be carried by the first rush, for Areizaga's army would be
cut off from them and driven eastward towards Mureia.
The plan, an admirable one from the point of view of strategy,
had to be abandoned, for it was found that the conntry betwt'Cn
Almnden and Gordova was so absolutely barren and uninhabited,
and the roads so bad, that it would be impossible to carry a very
large body of troops ncross it at midwinter. It was doubtful
whether the passes were practicable for artillery; it was certain
that no food coulU be obtained, and the train required to carry
rations for 50,000 men would be so large and heavy that it
would probably stick fast in the mountains.
On January 11, when :Mortiel', Dessolles, and the rest of the
army had already mO\'ed outortheircantonmellt.~ and taken the
road for La Mancha, the revised draft of the plan of campaign
was issued. It was inferior in unity of t.'ollception to the first
plan, tUld did not seem likely to produ~ sllch good results; but
it had the merit of being practicahle. Dy this schemc Victor
alone was to march on Cordova, with the ~~,OOO men of the
lst Corps: he was to endea\"our to take his artillery with him, ~ut
if the passes proved too rough, he \\'1IS to send it back by Almaden
to join the main army. Mortier, Dessolles, Sebastiani, Milhatld,
and the King's Heserves were to strike at the group of passes. in
front of La. Carolina, and to drive the Spaniards out of them:
it was hoped that they would thrust Areiw.gll.'s host into the
arms of Yictor, who would Uc descending into thc valley of the
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Guadalquivir just ill timc to mcct thc encmy rctiring from thc
defiles. For this operation the King was to take with him rather
more than 40,000 men.
It may be remarked that this plan divided the French army
into t"·o scparnte columns entirely destitute of lateral communi-
cations, and that, if the Spaniards had been stronger, considerable
danger would have been incurred_ Arei7.ll.ga might luwe con-
centrated every man against one Ot other of the columns, and
have brought it to a staml, while merely obsening the other.
Dut to do so he would have required a far larger force than he
actually possessed: he had, as we ha\-c seen, only ~3,OOO men
under arms, and e\'en if he collected every available bayonet in
one mass, either half of the French army was strong enough to
meet and to beat him. The King, therefore, was running no
real risk when he divided up his troops. As a matter of fact,
Areizaga had made matters easy for the enemy, by splitting his
small and dilapidated host into three sections-Zerain, with
4,500 men ollly, was on Victor's road; the head quarters, with
13,000 men, were at La Carolina opposite the King; Vigodet
with 6,000, was far to the right in thecnstcrn passcs1• Disaster
was incvitablt· from the first momcnt of thc campaign.
On JlUlullry 7 King Joseph and Soult moved out from Madrid
ill the wakc of the columns of Dessolles and the Royal GUllrd,
which had lllrM.dy started. all the 8th they were at Toledo,
on the 11th at Almagro, near Ciudad Real; here they conferred
with Victor, and, in consequence of his reports concerning thc
state of the passes in the direction of Cordova, recfL"t their plans,
and adopted the scheme of operations which has just been
detailed. On the following day Victor and his corps marched
from Ciudad H.eal for Almadell, to carry out the great turning
movement. The main army waited for six days to allow him to
get far forward on his rugged route, and only on the 18th started
out to deliver the frontal attack on the DespeI1a-!)erros and the
other passes ill front of La Carolina.
It may be mentioned that Joseph had left behind him to
garrison Madrid the French division of the 4th COrps,2 and not
I See (or details pages 111-12.
I With the exception of the 68th Regiment, Wllich went on with Sebastiani
to the frout.
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Dcssollcs' troops, who had ~n wont to occupy the capital
during the earlier operations. Both Dessolles' and Juscph's own
rescn·es, his Royal Guard and a strong brigade of his newly-raised
Spanish army, joined in the invasion. Since the German divi·
sion of the 4th Corps was still absent, escorting the prisoners of
Ocaf'in, it resulted that Sebastiani had with him only his Polish
di\'isioli, his cavalry, and some details sufficient to muster up
a total of just 10,000 men. His corps was never proper!)'
reassembled during the whole of the rest of the war, as some of
the regiments which he now left. behind never rejoined him in
Andalusia, but were left in garrison in New Castile till 1812,
and practically became part of the' Army of the Centre.'
Besides the garrison of Madrid, J oseph left to cover his rear
the whole 2nd Corps, still under the provisional command of
Hcudclct, which lay at Talavcra and was charged to watch
Albuquerque. If the rumour of the departure of the English
from Badajoz were true, there would be no danger in this quarter.
But Joseph was not yet quite certain that Wellington had retired
into Portugal. The only serious preoccupation which·vexed his
mind, at the moment when. he was preparing to attack, was the
idea that the English might r:.till come np by Truxillo and join
AJbllquerque in a raid -on Madrid. Heudelet, the constant
purveyor of false information, did his Ocst to scare his master
on Jalllmry 18, by sending him a report that Welliugton was
still at Badajoz with 28,000 men 1. But later and more trust·
worthy news from other quarters, showing that the English army
had marched off for Abrantes long before Christmas, at last set
the King's mind at rest on this all-important topic.
There was nothing to be feared from the west when Wellington
had taken his departnre. Albuquerque's small force was power-
less, tllld if Del Pllrque moved down from the Sierra de Frnncia
into the valley of the l'agus, the 6th Corps could make a corte-
I Heudelet, writing from 'l'alavera on Jan. 13, assured the King that he
lmd certain infonnation, by gnglish dcscrters, that Wellington's army,
16,000 foot amI i,OOO Cll.vlIlry, was at Merid!\., Bndajoz, and .I':I\·IlS on Dec. 31.
As a matter of fnet, the army had marched off betwecn Dec. 9 und Dec. 20,
Ilnd Wellingwu himself hud retired iuto Portugal Oil Christmas Eve. 011
the day when Helldelet \Hot~ he and his head quarters were at Vi"ell, ill
tho Beira.
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spondillg movcmcnt. Ncy had now returned to take COlllllllUld
ILL SulamallCH, and the confidence of his troops, shaken somewhat
by :llurchand's incapable leadership, was now restored. Be.llind
Nc)" tllld Kellermann were the innumerable oottalionsofthe new
l'einfon:cmcnts from Germany, the head of whose column had
now reached Burgos. The King's rear, thcrefore, was well
guarded whcn he began his great ofl-ensive movement against
Andalusia.
SECTION XVIII: CHAPTER III
THJ-; CO).,'QUEST OF ANDALUSIA. JAl\UAIl\'_F~llRUARY lijlO
0::-;, the 19th of January, 1810, the unfortunate Areizaga
began to receive from all quarters dispatches which left him no
doubt that the fatal hour had arrived, and that the whole of
his line, from Villamanrique ot} the east to Almaden on the
west, was about to be assailed by the enemy. From every point
on his front of 150 rnile~ his subordinates sent him ill reports
lo the effect that strong hostile columns had come up, and had
thrust in their outposts. Indeed, Zerain, from his remote
cantonment Oil the c.'i:treme left, had announced that an ovcr~
whelming for(.~, coming from the direction of Ciudad Real, had
beaten him out of the lawn of Almaden as early as the 15th,
and had compelled him to retire towards the south·wesl, leaving
the direct road to Cordova uncovered. This was, of course, the
corps of Victor, whose flanking movement was already threaten·
iog to cut the line of communication between La Carolina and
Seville. But it would take some days for the Ist Corps to puss the
rugged defiles of thc Sierra de Los Pcdl"oches, which lie betwccn
.A.lmaden and the vallcy of thc Guadalquivir. An c\'cn more
pressing duuger seemed to be foreshadowed from the less-remote
right of the Spanish line, where Vigodet reported, from the
pass ofVillamanriquc, that he had been'driven in to his final
fighting position at l\1ontizon, by a French column marching up
from Villanueva de los Infantes. In the centre, the enemy had
advanced to Santa Cr\l? de(S>Mudela, where the rOaQs to aU
the group of passes about the Despeiia-Pcrros branch off, but
had not yet shown how many of them he intended to use.
Areizaga could not determine whether some of the French
movements were mere demonstrations, or whether C\'cry one of
them portended a real attack on the morrow. Zerain was too
far off to be helped; but Vigodet's demands for assistanc'e were
so pressing that the Commander-in-Chief sent ofl' to his Ilid,
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on the night of the 19th, the onc division which he had
hithcrto kcpt in reserve at La Carolina, the 4,000 bayoncts of
QUitejoll. This left him only thrce divisions-those of Zayas,
Lacy. and Gil'on, not marc than 9,000 mcn in all, to defend
the high-road to Madrid and the subsidiary passes on its
immediate flank. .-/
As a matter of fact, the appearance of the French advanced
guards implied a genuine attack at every possible point of
access. King Joseph had resolved to carry the whole of the
defiles by a simultaneous onslaught on the morning of the ~Oth.
His policy seems to have been one of very doubtful wisdom,
for it would have been as effective to pierce the Spanish line at
one point as at four, and he could have concentrated an over·
whelming force, and have been absolutely certain of success, if
he had launched his main body at one ohjectiv~ while demon-
strating against the rest. He had preferred, however, to cut
up his arm)' into four columns, each of which as&'liled a different
pass. Sebastiani, on the extreme French left, separated by a gap
of twenty miles from the main column, was the enemy who had
driven in Vigodet at the opening of the Villamanrique pass.
He had with him the remains of his own 4th Corps-of which
such a large proportion had been left behind in New Castile,-
a body of about 10,000 men I. His orders were to force the
defile in his front, and to descend into the plain in the rear of
the Spanish ccntre, by way of Ubeda and Linares, so as to cut
oft' the enemy's retreat towards .l\:lurcia, and to envelop him if
he should hold the Despei~a~Perros too long.
Ne.·<t to Sebasliani in the French line was a column composed
of Girard's division of the 5th Corps, the King's Guards, and
the Spanish regiments in Joseph's serviceS. It was nearly
14,000 strong, and advanced straight up the Madrid chau&'Jee,
aiming at the Despei'ia-Perros and the Spanish centre. 1f the
enemy should fight well, and if the flanking movements should
1 Viz. by tbe 'morning states' of January 15, ill tIle Frellch 'Var Office,
Sebastiani had: Polish Division, 4,(100 men; 60th of tIle Line, 1,630 meu;
.i\Iilhaud·s Dragoons, 1,721 men; l)erreymond's Light Horse, 1,340 men;
Artillery and fo:ngineers, 660 men; or a total of 10,070 sabres and bayonets.
~ Strengtb apparently: Girord, 7,040; Royal Guards, about 2,600;
Spaniards, about 2,000; Qwalry, uoout 1,600; Artillery, &c., BOO.
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fail, this column would havc the hardest work berate it; for,
unlike the minor passes to east and west, the Despeila.-Perros
becomes in its central length a narrow and precipitous defile,
casilJ capable of defence. The Spaniards had run elltrenchM
ments across it, and had mined the road at more than one point.
But its fatal weakness lay in the fact that the by.paths from
the western passes descend into it to the rrot of the point
where these obstrllctions had beeu placed. If they were seized
b>' the advancing French, the forlificatiolls across the duw,u(.e
would prove a mere trap for the troops which held them.
Mortier, with Gazan's di,·jsion of the 5th Corps ulId Dessollel'
troops, about 15,000 strong, was told off'to Il$sail these flanking
defiles on the Spanish le~l_J~j;~es are the P~lerto del
Rey and the Puerto def -Muraetar:' The former got Its name
from Alfonso VIII, who in U12 had turned the position of the
Almohad Sultan Mohammed-abu·Yakub by this route, and so
forced him to the decisive battle of Navas de 'l'olosa, a few
miles to the rear. In 1810 it was a tortuous and rough road,
but practicable for artillery: the slopes on either side of it,
moreover, were 110t inaccessible to infantry. A mile or two to
its left, nearer the Despeila-Ilerros, was the still rougher path
of the ,Puerto del Muradlll, which was practicable for infantry
but not for guns, Between this deme llnd the entrenchment..
across the Madrid c!UltWl&, the crest of the Sierra was accessible
to troops advancing in loose order and prepared for a stiff
climb: the Spanish engineers had therefore placed a large
earthwork on its culminating point, known as the Conado de
ValdeazoTes. Giron's weak division of no more than 3,200
bayonets was entrusted with the defence both of the Puerto d.cl
Hey and the Pnerto del l\Iuradal. Those of Lacy and Zayas,
abont 5,Oqo in all, held the Despefia-Perros and the entrench-
ments 011 each side of it. Areh·.aga lay behind them, with
a reserve of 1,000 men at most-having sent off Castejon and
his division to join Vigodet 011 the preceding night, he had 110
more with him than his personal guard, the 'Batallon del
General " and some detached companies.
Mortier, like the good geneml that he WaS, did not confine
t Gazan's division, rorming the thirll French column, had 6,414 h:lyonets j
Dessolles', the extreme right-halltl column, 8,3.54.
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his operatiollR to an attack against the narrow front.I' of t.he two
pa.%eIi, but. a.<;sailed the rough hillside on each Ride of t.hem,
senrlillg out whole hattalions deployed as likirmishers to climb
the slopes. Of' GIt7..tln'S division, one brigade marched against
thc !)uerto del 1furadnl, but the other went up, in open order,
on the space between the Puerto and the Spanish redoubt at
the Collado de Valdeazores. Similarly, Dessolles attacked the
Puerto del Rey with a few battalions, but sent the rest up the
less formidable portions of the flanking slopes. Girard and the
King's Reser\'es, meanwhile, did not press their attack on the
Despei'la-Perros, till the troops on their right had already begun
to drive the enemy before them.
The results of these tactics might have been foreseen from
the first: Girou's 3,flOO men, attacked by 15,000, were driven
in at a pace that ever grew more rapid. They could not defend
the passes, because the slopes on each side were tUnled by the
enemy. Their line was broken in two or three places, and they
Red ill haste down the rear of the Sierra, to escape being cap-
tured by flanking detachments which were pushing all ut full
speed to hend them off. The mOlllent that the Despe,itl-Perros
was turned by MOI'Uer's movement, the troops occupying it had
to retreat at headlong speed, just as Girard was commencing
his attack on them. All did not retire with snfIicient prompt-
ness: the battalion ill n redoubt on the Collarlo de loo Jar-
dines, on the right Rank of t.he high-road, was cut off and
captured en 1/wsse. All the guns in the pass were taken, there
being no time to get them away down the steep road in their
rear. After two hours of scrambling ratller than fighting, the
main passages of the Sierra 1forena were in the hands of the
French. The mines on the high-road had been fired when the
retreat was ordered, bnt did not wreck the chaussk in such
n way as to prevent the enemy from pursuing. The losses of
the Spaniards were no more than a few hundreds killed and
wounded, and 500 prisoners; those of the French were less
than lOO in all I. There had, in truth, been hardly the
semblance of' a battle.
I 8ou1t'8 slawl.lleut that he lost' some 25 men' (80u1t to Berthier,
Jail, 21) is 110 douht a little exaggcnted. But Martinien's illl'aluable
/.abIes "how t11at Mortier's corps, which did nearly all tile fighting, lost only
<2
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The full reslIlts of the disaster were only developed next day;
the troops which had defended the central passes escaped,
though in dreadful disorder. But those further to their right
were destined to a worse fate. While Mortier and the 'King
were forcing the great defiles, Sebastiani had been fighting all
day with Vigodet, in the defiles al)out Montiwn and St. Estebnn
del Puerto. He had no sllch snperiOl'iLy in nnmbers over his
enem}' as had the King on the main field of operations 1, heJ1(.'C
his progress was sloll'el', and his victo!')', thongh complete, \I'll!>"
not so prompt Illld crushing. Vigodet and his 6,000 men were
dispersed by the afternoon, and Red down the "alley of the
Guadalen towards the plains, with Scbastiaui's camlry in pur-
suit. Having fought much longer than Lacy and Giron, their
losses were heavier than those of the central di"ision-probably
1,000 killed, wounded, or taken. Shortly after, there appeared
on the scene, moving along the steep hill-path f!'Om La Carolina,
the Spanish division of Castejoll, which had been, sent .off 011
the previolls night to support Vigodet. It found the St. Esteban
position in the possession of the French, and turned hastily
hack to rejoin Areizaga. nut, while it had been on the march,
the Commander-in-Chief and his army had been routed, and I~a
Carolina wn,<; in the lumds of the French. Castejoll fonnd
himself enclosed between Scbastinlli (lnd the ](ing, in a most
perilous position. On the morning of the 21st, he tried to
escape by the by-path lo Linares, but Oil arriving near that
place found that Mortier's troops were ah'Cady across his road.
A Lrigllde of Sebnstiani's corps was in hot pursuit ill his real',
and Castejon, seeing himself thus enclosed, surrendered at
Arquillos, with his whole intrlct division of over 4,000 mell
and ten guns.
Already, before the capture of this Spanish corps, the King
and Sebastiani had joined hnnds, their reconnoitring parties
having met in the valley of the Guadalen. On leul'Iling of the
complete sllc<:ess of both columns, Joseph and Soult resolved to
lIrge the pursuit in two separate directions..Sebastiuni II'IlS told
tlCQ officers out of 640 present, probably, therefore, it lost no more than
forty men, Dessollcs must have lost about the same.
I Of his whole 10,000 men only G,400 were infantry, and Vigodet (with
the wrecks of Jacome's dil·ision) had nearly as mall)'.
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la pllsh rorward by way of Ubedu uml Btle7.[l. to .Jtlell, while the
l1Iain column IlHu'ched by Baylen 011 Andujar and Cordo\'n. It
was hoped that news of Victor would soon be received: if 1\11
had gone well, he would ha\'e reached the Guadalquivir sollle-
where in the neighbourhood of Cordova, so as to be in the real'
of any Spanjsh force that might ha\'c retreated fi'om La Carolina
ill the direction of Seville,
As a mattel' of fact, howel'er, both Vigodet and also Areizagl1
with the wreck of the troops from the central passes, had
abandoned any hope of covering Seville, and hud retreated
southwards on Jaen. There was no fol'(''C whate\'er left llPOIl
the COlUOva road, and the King lllet no resistance upon the
22n£1 or the 23n1. On the latter day Sebusliuni, arriving ill
front of Jaell, found the Spun ish COllllllulIdcr-in-ehicf with sollle
7,000 or 8,000 men prepared to defend the town. I-le attacked
at once, and routed these dispiritt'd troops, who made liWc or 110
show of resistant't'. Pradically the whole foret' went to piece:; :
the French captured forty-six gUllS, mostly those of the rl..'scne-
(lurk of the Army of Alldl~lusia,which had becn depositcd ill Juell.
Of the wrecks of that 1111lmpp'y forc~, Areiznga cllrrit.-d off 1\ Slllllll
remnant to GUMix ill the eastern mountains, near the bor(ler~
of Mureia. Lacy, with another fraction, retired on Granada.
But the large majority had left their colours, and dispersed to
their homes.
King .Toseph and SOlllt meallwhile, ndvancing unopposed
along the! high-road to COrdO\'1L and Scville, got into to)Jch at
Andl1jar with the advanced cavalry of Victor on the night of
the 22nd of January. The march of the 1st Corps had beel!
toilsome in the e."i:treme, bllt almost unopposed save by the diffi-
culties of the road. Af::er driving Zerain's little detachment
out of Almaden on the 15th, they had haluly seen an enemy.
Zeraill and his colleague Capons had retired by the road towards
Seville SQuth-westwarq. Victor, though he sent out flying parties
of cavalry to threaten Bellalcazur and Hinojosa, to his right,
had really pushed further to the left, on the easternmost of the
two rough passes which lead to Cordm'a. The day after leaving
Almllden he had sent his artillery back to La Mancha, the
dilapidated and nbandoned road to which he had (:ommittcd
himself proving absolutely impracticable for anything that
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travelled Oll wheels. But he pushed 011 with his infantry and
horsemen, and passing Santa Eufemia, Torrecampo and Villa·
nueva de la Jara, came down into the plain of the Guadalquivir
at Adamu..., fifteen miles to the east of Cordo VB., on January 21st,
the day after Soult and King Joseph had forced the Despefia
Perros and the Puerto del Re)'. "fishing to get into touch
with them before attacking CoroO"a, he halted his infantry,
but sent out his cavalry to the gates of that city on the OIlC
side, and Oil the other to Montorl) .and Andnjar, where they
lIlet the vcdettes of the llI11in army all the cvcllillg of the 2211(l
Thus the French host WIl8 oncc more concentrated: the mllrch
all Seville could be continued without delay. Victor 1I0W
became the advanced guard: he entered CordovlI, which opem.-'d
its gates without resistance, on the 24th. There was no Spanish
force in front of the }~rench army, since Zerain and Copons had
retired towards Seville by a road far to the west, while the
wrecks of Areizaga's army had been dril'en oft' in a south-
easterly direction.
Soult and King Joseph, therefore, had leisure to plan out the
remainder of their campaign without any disturbance from the
enemy, Oil the 25th I they resolved to detnch Sebastiani and
his 10,000 men tor the conquest of Granada, to leave Dessolles'
division at ConloWl. and Andujllr, but to march 011 Seville in
n single lllasS with the rcmaining 50,000 sabrcs and bayonets of
the Army of Andalusia. The desire to seize the capital from
which the JUlltu hOO so long defied him, seems to htwe masten..u
cvery other idea ill the mind of the intrusive King. The rebel
brovcrnment should be captured, or at least forced to take refnge
ill POltugal 01' the sea. Then at last the prodllccs wOllld ~ubll1it,
the regular armies would lay down their arms, the gllerdllel'o
bands would disperse to their homes, aud he might rcign us
a real king, not as the mere tool of his imperious brother. 'l1lC
capture of Seville would be the last act but one of the drama:
aftcr that he would become the national monarch of a submissive
people, and carry out aU the schemes of vague bene"olence 011
which his mind was wont to dwell in his more hopeful hours.
That the resistance would <-'Olltinue, even if Seville were his own
I For details of their plalls soo tlle uisp.'ltell of Soult to Herthier, frOIll
Allu\lj;~r under the date of that day.
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and the .Juntn were scattered and di~cl'e(lited, he did no(; dream.
And Se\'HIe, he knew, must fall; to defend it there could be, a...
he concluded, nothing but a. half-armed Blob, backed by the few
thousand dispirited soldiers who had fled before Victor from the
western sectioll of the Sierra ~'1orena. Even it' the rebel capital
made itself a second SarR.eO'()ssa, he had at his disposal an army
double the strength of that which had reduced the obstinate
Aragonese city.
III subsequent years critics, wise after the event, never tired of
declaiming against the policy which Joseph and Soult approved
on January 25, 1810. It was easy in 1811 01' 181Ztopointout
that a division or two might have been spmw from the victorious
army to execute a mnfch upon Cadiz, while the main fon.'C WI:I.S
dealillg with Seville. The islund-fol'trcss, which wus to defy
the French during the next thn.'C years, might have been cllught
while it \I'M still ungarl'isoncd and panic-strickcn, if only the
invaders had detached n column from Carlllona, where the rond
from Cordovll bifurcates to Seville 011 the right and Cadiz on
the left. It is certain that, if any suggestion to that efl-e<.i was
made at the time, Soult, l\forlier, and the other generals present
!It the council of war passed it over I. The fact was that Seville
loomed large before the imaginations of them all: Cadiz seemed
but a secondary affair at the moment. It appeared probable
that the whole of the scattered forces of the enemy would mass
thcllIsel\'l!.\l to defend the insUfb"ellt capital. On January Jl5th,
when thc original plan WI\S drawn up, no one realized that there
ww:! n Spanish UTili)' approaching, whose presencc ill Andalusia
had not yet become known, 01' that thc gencral of tb!it army
I There was a C(I11Sidel'aMe contro\'ersy among French military writers
a~ to wllether the omissiou to marcll on Calli;.; was the fault of Soult or of
the King. 'n,e authors of Victoire.f cl COllqU€tu, having put all the blame
on the latter (vo!. xx, page 7), his friends hastenetl to reply. His aide-de-
camp .Bigarre, who was present with him at the time, explicitly says in llis
autobiography (pp. 266-6) tllat the King raised the poiut, but was talked
down by Soult and Dcssolles. Miot de Melito (ii. 385) bears wituess to
the smlle effect, sayiug l1mt he heanl Soult c1iueh his argument Lt}' crying
'Qu'ou me r61}()lIde de S6ville, moi je rcpollds de Cadix.' Both 8Ry that
the filml decision WllS made at Carmona. See "Iso Dncagse's O~JIO'ldfl7lC(J
fill rei J(NJf!ph, \'ii. 142~a, and x. i'1" 39.5-6, where the same story is ~,·cu
Ll'the King himself.
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would deliberately lea...e Seville to its fate, as iUCClpnble of defencc
and doomed to destruction, and hasten by forced marches to
throw himself into thc island-city which wns destined to become
the new capital of insurgent Spain. Unable to foresee such
a development, Joseph wrote to hili brothel' on January 21 t1mt
Seville would probably submit without fighting, and that he
would then ellter Cadiz 'sails coup ferir.'
Albuquerque's operations, which ultimately turned out to be
the most important sedion of the Andalusian campaign, need
n word of explanation. It will be remembered that, early in
January, he had assembled, at Don Benito and l\Iedellin, the
small field-force that he could command, after providing the
garrison of Badajoz and leaving a detachment above Almaraz
to watch the French 2nd Corps. It did not amount to more
than 8,000 men, of which solne ] ,000 were cavalry. I-lis
position at Don Denito was intended to protect the flank of
Zerain llnd Copons, who lay to his right, covering the passes
that lead from Almaden on to Cordova. On January 15th he
received from Zerain the news that he was about to be attacked
ttt Almadell by a French column of at least 20,000 men. The
Duke promptl>' bef,Tttll to march cnstward to join' his colleague,
amI reached Campanario on January 16th. Here he was met
by the information that Zerain had been dri \'ell out of Almadell
011 the preceding day, and had drawn back by Benalcazar and
Hinojosa on to the Seville road, Copons from POlO Blaneo was
retiring in the same direction. The Duke thereupon concluded
that his duty was to fall back by a route parallel to that of
Victor's advHnce, and to draw nearer to Sevil1e, strcngthcllilJg
himself fl,.'; hc apprO!\chetl that city by Zeraill's and CopOIlS'
small corps.
Accordingly he sent off three of his weakest battalions to
strengthen the garrison of Badajoz, which was very small at tlle
moment, directed his ultillery (with a cavalry escort) to take the
good but circuitolls high-road to Seville by Merida, Los Snntos,
amI Santa Olalla, and started off' t\cross the lllountains with his
infantry and 500 horse. i\1arching vcry rapidl,>', though the
roads were bad and the days sholt, he moved by Zalamea and
Maguilla to Guadalcanal, on the borders of Andalusia, which
he reached on January 18th. Here he received fl'Om the Central
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Junta an absurd order, apparently based 011 the idea that he
was still at Campanllrio, which bade him stop Vidor's adnUlce,
by falling on his flank and rear by the road to Agudo and
Almaden. But since the marshal had seized Almaden on the
15th, and was known to have moved southward from thence, it
was clear that he must now be more than half-way to Cordova :
it' the Army of Estremadura plunged back into the mountains
to seek Agudo and Almaden, it would only reach them on the
~nd or 23rd, and Victor would be at the gates of Cordova 011
the 21st. The .Junta's order was so hopelessly impracticable
that the Duke took upon himself to disobey it, and wrote in
reply th!\t hc should move so as to place himself between Vidor
and Seville, and 1V0uld cover the Andalusian capital' so far as
\\'US possible with the small force at his disposition.'
Al.'Cordingly A]buqucrque, instead of returning nOlthwanl
into the Estrcmaduran mountains, 1Il0ved a stage further south,
to El Pl.-droso, 011 the road from Guadalcuual to Seville, and
sent orders to COllons and Zerain to join him with their small
(Jjvisiolls. Two days later he received the order which sllould
have been sent him on the 18th, instead of the insane directions
that were actually given; by it he was directed to march on
Se\·ilIe with all speed. On the ~grd, therefore, he arri\'ed at
the fen'y of Cantillana, twenty miles north of Seville: here he
received news that his artillery and its escort had safely com-
pleted its round, and were about to cross the Guadalquivir at
Hinconada, fiftccn miles to the south. At Cantillana, however,
the Duke got the last dispatch which the Central Junta ever
issued; it was dated on the QSrd, a few hours before the
members dispersed and fled. By this he was directed to march
1I0t on Seville but Oil Cordova, which at the momcnt the
document came to hund-the mOl'lling of the 24th-had just
becn occupied by Victor.
'11mt day AlbuqucrtJuc cl'os.-;cd thc Guadulqllivir uud occupi<..-d
Carmona, where he WIlS joined by his artillery, tl!ld by part of'
CoPOllS' division, but not (apparently) by Zerain's, which hud
rctil1..-d intu Seville. He had now about 10,000 men, of whom
1,000 were horsemen, and 20 guns. From CurlllOna hc threw
out a cavalry scrum on all sides: his vedettes on the ~7th struck
French emulry at Eeija, allll were dl'i\'en in ; they reported that
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the enemy was advancing ill enorlllOUS force from Cordova-as
was indeed the case. Meanwhile news had come up from Seville
that the Junta had fled 011 the night of the ~rd-24th, that
anarchy reigned in the city, and that a new revolutionary
go\'erllment had been installed. There was no longer any
legitimate executh'c from which orders could be received.
Albuquerque had to make up his mind whether he would
retire into Seville, and put himself at the disposition of' the mob
and its leaders, or whether he sho1l1d seek some safer base of'
operat.ions. 'Vithout" moment's hesitation he resolved to leave
the Andalu~iull capital to itself, and to retire on Cadiz, which
he knew to be ungurl'iSUllCd, yet to be ubsolutcly impregnable
if it were properly held. 'fhis wi!;C rcsolutioll, it IIItt.V be !;Rid
without hesitation, saved the cause of Spain in the south. If
Cadiz had been left tllloccupied there would have been no
further resistance in Andalusia.
But we must return to the operations of the }'rench. 011 the
25th Victor had ad"anced from Cordova, taking the direCt road
to Seville via La Carlota and Ecija, while Mortier and the Uo)'al
Guard followed him at short intervals, The Duke of Belluno
occupied Ecija 011 the 27th find Carmontl. on the 28th, On
these two da,}'s his adl'allced guard got into contact with
Al1.mqucrquc's cavalry screcn, and learnt from prisoners that
the Arm)' of Estremadura, whose presence in Alldulusiu thus
became known, was in front of them 1, On reaching Carman!\.
Vi~torobtained the still more important news that Albuquerque,
after sf:l!.yillg in that place for two days, had not retired into
Se,'iI1e, as might have been expected, but had marched south-
ward to Utrera all the road to Cadiy" leaving the greater city
ullcovered. On the night of the fl9th the leading division of'
Vietor's corps, the dragoons of Lntour-Maubourg, appcm:oo ill
front of Seville, and reported that works were being hastily
thrown up around it on all sides 2, and that they had been fired
1 See Soult to llerthier, from Carmona, Jan, 31.
! Soult, in his dispatch of Jau. 31, says t1lat the advanced guard of tile
1st Corps appeared before Seville hil:r all ~r} i. e. on the 30th. But HIe
Spanish authorities gi\'e the e\'ening of the 29tl1 as tJle true date, and
aeem to be correct. rosaibly Soult is speaking of the first solid force of
iufautry, aud does uot couut the cavalrr as a real advauced guard. but
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Oil by masses of armed irregulars at every point wherc they had
pushed forward "'edettes towards its suburbs I.
Seville was at this moment, aud had been now for six days,
in a state of chaos. The Ceutral Juuta had absconded 011 the
~rd, taking along with it both its Executive Committee and
the Ministers of State. The panic Imd begull 011 the 18th,
when the ncws hud come in that Victor's corps had thrust
Zcrain ont of Almaden three days before, and was marching on
COI-dova. It had grown worse two days later, when Areizaga
reported thnt Illlother J<'rench army wa.~ marching against the
Despella-Perros. The Junta published a proclamation Oil the
~Oth, exhorting the Alldalusians to have no fear, for Albu-
querque had been directed to fall on Victor's flank, alld Del
l'arCJue with the Army of Castile was on the march to join him,
so that the enemy would be forced to turn hack to guard him-
self. Such orders were indeed sent, but any man of sense eould
:see that the)' must arrive too late. If Victor was at Almaden
all the 15th, he might be at Cordova on the 21st: if King
J oseph was at the foot of the passes on the 19th, he might be
across them on the 20th. ,.yhat use, therefore, would be
a sumlllons scut to Albuquerque in Estremadura, or to Del
l'arque in the mountains between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo?
The French would be ill the valley of the Guadalquivir long
before Del !'arque had even received his orders to IllOV~. As
It mutter of fad, thut gencxal got his dispntch Oll JUlluary !t:4,
the day that Victor enten...u. Cordovu, and cven Albuquerque
ouly as a re<:ounoitring force. As Latour.Maubourg was at CarmOlla on tile
:!Uth, it seems certain tllat lie must hal'e reachC(1 Seville (eighteen miles
only from Varmolla) on the 29th, 110t the 30th.
I Napier (ii. 2!l8) seelllS unjust to the arrangemcnts of the King IIlId
~oult whcn hc writes: 'From Andujar to S<l\'ilIc is ouly 100 miles, and
the French took tell ,lays to tral'CrBC tltem, a. t<mlillCSS for which tllcre
appears 110 adequate cause.' He tlleu attributes it to Killg Joseph's wish
to make spectacular entries, and to diSJ)lay Ms bencvolence to the
Andalusian towns. Hut the facts are wrong. Josel'}l reached Andujar
late OIl Jail. 22; Victor's cavalry was ill front of Se\"ille Oil Jan. 20: this
makes seven, 1Iot ten, day!;!: Klld the distance by the dirl'Ct road via t;cija
lIud CarmolJn is lIot 100, but 130 miles. A rate of eightccn miles 11 tiny is
110 b..,d record for liIl Ilrlll}' IIlh'llllcing through a hostile coul/Lry, cvcn if it
is meeting with no actual resistance. And January da.ys arc fihort, with
sunrise late and SUllSet early.
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WIIS informed of the Juntu's behcsl:s only 011 the 18th, when he
rCllched Guadalcanal.
The obvious ineptitude which the Government had shown,
and the imminent peril to which Se\"ille was c.'i:posed, ga\'e
another chance to the lo.cal conspirators, who had already twice
prepared a prommciam%llto against the Junta. On the ~~nd
riots broke ont, and demagogues were preaching at every street
comer the necessit)· for deposing these incapable rlllers, and
Illl bstituting for them a regency of true patriots, and a Committee
of Public Safety, which should show the energy in which the
Junta hud been so lneking. The people c1umolll'ed at thc doors
of the Arsenal, nskiug fOI' muskets and CUUIlOIl, they Illustered
outside the prisons where Palafo:.:, Montijo, and other chiefs
who htld beell arrested for their earlier plots, were still confined,
Many of the members of the Junta left Seville on this and the
following day, Oil the plausible pretext that it was necessary
for them to betake themseh'es to Cadiz-which, by a decree
of Jan. 13, had been designated as the meeting·place of' the
approaching National Cortes-in order to make preparatiolUl
for the meeting of that august assembly. Indeed, the Junta
hud becn directed to meet o.t Cmli", 011 February 1 for that
purpo:>c, The news that King Josepb had forced thc pusses of'
the Sierra l\Iorena, which came to hand early on the 29ll1d,
sufliced to make nn end of any shadow of power which the
Junta still possessed. Next day those members who had hitherto
stuck to their post, and the Ministers, left the town with
elaborately contrived secrecy, Seville fell into the hands of
the mob, who, led by a Capuchin friar riding on a mule and
bro.ndishing a crucifix, burst open the pl·isOllS and the Arsenal,
armed themselvcs, and numinutt.'d a new 'Supreme Ntttional
Junta.' Its executive was to be composed of llalafox and
Montijo, the Marquis of La H.omana, General Eguia, and
l"ralleisco Saavedm, an aged and respectable person, who had
been president of the old .Tunta of Sc\·ille, the original cam·
mittce which had been suppressed by the Central Junta. He
is said to ha\'e been used as a mere tool by l}alo.fox and Montijo,
and to IUlve been disgustt:d by their acls. This new, and
obviously illegal, Govemment issued decrees stigmatizing the
fugitive' Centralisls' as cowards and traitors, and claiming
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authority not only over Andalusia, but o\'cr all Spain. They
orden.-d the calling out of the! levy en ?lIlLS3e, and issucd COlU-
missions displacing generals and governors in all the prorinces.
One of these documenw dcclarcd Del Parqnc removed from the
command of the Army of the J~ft, and nl1llle<l J.a Romanfl 'as
his successor. The marquis, glad to escape from the! tmnult,
rode oft' at once, prescnted himself at the head quarter's of the
Ca.<ltilian army, and was recognizoo without difficulty as its
chief-though his authority might well ha\'e been contested jf
any genffi'al had chosen to take up the cause of the discredited
Central Junta,
But that unhappy body hud no longer a single friend: its
Illembers were mobbed lIud tll'reslt.-d on their flight from Se\'ilIe
to Cadiz; its Preside!nt the Archbishop of Laodicen, its Viee-
President the Conde de Altamirfi, and the 'Var Minister
Comel were seize<l at .Jerez by a fl·antic moh, and would have
been murdered, if General Castrulos, whom the Junta had treated
ro badly in December 1808, had not arrivoo in time to Sll.ve
their li\'es. Twenty-three members reached Ctldiz,and there, by
a prodamtltion dated January 29th, abdicated their authority,
and nominated a Regency, to which they resigned their power,
and the duty of receiving and welcomhlg the expected Cortes.
The Re!,"'Cllts were Castanos, the Bishop of Orense, Admiral
Escano, Saavedra-the president of the new and illegal Junta at
Sc\·illc-and Fernandez de Leon, an American Treasury-official.
who wil.S to rcPl'~llt the Colonies l • It will be noted that the
nominators were wise enough to refrain from appointing Illly
of lheir own lllllnber to serve in the Regency.
Meanwhile, the duty of resisting the first shock of the French
adwtllce fell not on the Regency, but on the Revolutionary
Gm·emment which htld installed itself in power at Seville.
These usurpers proved themselves quite as incapable as the
men whom they had superseded. 'Vhen once in possession of
power,Palafox tlnd his friends had to count up their resources:
they had at their disposnl an armed mob of QO,OOO men, and
a mere handful of regular troops, consisting of the regiments
which had sen·ed as the guards of the late Junta, tlnd four or
I After a "ery short tenure of office 1"errmude1. dc Leon was SlIllerse(\cd
hy l.ardir.al~'\l, lI110tllcr l\meriCIlIi,
145t TI-If: CONQUEST OF Ai\DALUSIA [.fA:oI.31
five isolated battalions from the divisioll of Zerain, which
had finally sought refuge in Seville. These troops seem to have
been about 4,000 strong at the most '. There was an immense
quantity of artillery from the arsenal; it had been dragged ant
to line the new earthworks, on which the populace was busily
engaged, but not two hundred tmillcd gunnel's existed to man
the batteries. It was hoped that Albuqucrqllc's Estremn.duron
army would come to their aid, but-as we have already seen-the
Duke deliberately refused to acknowledge the authority of the
Seville Junta, and, instead of falling back upon the city,"marched
southwards to Utrera on the Cadiz road, leaving the great
chall88~e Ecija-Carmona-Se,·iIle open to the I·'rench.
On the ~8th, the leaders of the Junta. having taken stock of
their position, and discovered its danger (for the lines which
the people had thrown np would have required 50,000 men to
man them, and not half tllllt force was forthcoming evell if
e\'ery rioter armed with a musket was counted), copied in the
most ignominious fashion the prudence or cowltldk-c of the
Central Junta, which they had so fiercely denounced five days
before. Under the cover of the night Eguia, 1\fontijo, Saavedra,
and Palafox absconded from Seville without taking leave of
their followers, Saa\"edra fled to Cadiz, where it is surprising
to find that he WflS made a member of the new Regenc)', Palafox
lo Albuqllerquc's camp, Montijo to the southem mountains,
where (as he announced) he was intending to collect an arm)'
of succour for Seville. 'Vhen, therefore, on the next evening
Latour-l\faubourg's dragoons appeared before the entrenchment<;
of the city, there was no longer any responsible government to
turn the ardour of the multitude to account. Nevertheless,
mobs, headed by frantic fliars, ran to the entrenchments, and
discharged musketr), and cannon-shot ut every French vedette
that showed itself.
On the afternoon of the 30th, Victor appeared to reinforce
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, bringing with him the bulk of the
I It is difficult to make out what precisely were the b.lttaliOllS ill Seville
011 January 23-29. But they certainly included a battalion of the 1st
Walloon Guards [the Junta's old guard], with 1st and 2nd of Espana and
Barbastro from Zeraiu's division. It is alinost certain that most of
Zeraiu's other battalions were with these three.
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infantry of t.he 1st Corps. The King, Soult, and Mortier were
close behind l. On this day it had been settled at a Coullcil-of-
War held at Carmona that the whole of the army sbould march
on Seville, leaving Cadiz alone for the present, and detaching
only a brigade of cavalry to pursue the army of Albuquerque.
On the next morning Victor received assurances, from persons
who had escaped from the city, that it was doubtful whether
he would be opposed, since the mob was panic-stricken at
the flight of itR leaders, and the senior military officers were
convineed that resistance 'I'M impossible. Certain that the
defence would be feeble, if auy were offered, Soult gUile orders
that the Ist Corps should storm the lines 011 FcbrULU)' Ist.
But no military operations were necessary: on thc cvening of
January 31st the corporation of Seville had sent out a deputa-
tion to negotiate for surrender. They ollcrcd to admit the
enemy. if they were guaranteed security of life and properly for
nU who should submit:, and a promise that no extraordinary
war-contribution should be levied on their city. 'l'o this the
King. who was anxious to enter the place as a pacific conqueror,
without storm or bloodshed, gave au ~"'Cr COllscnt. While the
eivil Iluthorities were treating with Victor, the small body of
regular troops in Seville, under the Visconde de Gand, quietly
left the place by the bridge leading to the western side of the
Guadalquivir, and retreated in haste toward the Condado de
Niebla and the borders of Portugal.
On the afternoon of February I, Joseph entered Seville in
triumph at the head of his Guard, and longed himself in the
Alca7.8.I', the old residence of the Kings of Spain. He was
welcomed by a deputation which comprised some persons of'
mark. The impression made on the citizens by the conduct of
the two Juntas, and the turbulence of the mob which had ruled
during the last eight days, had been so deplorable that a con*
siderable number of the Se"illians despaired of' the national
cause, and rushed to acknowledge the usurper. Indeed, there
were more' .Josefillos' found in this city than in any other
J Dessolles' division had been left behind at Cordova alltl Audujal', to
garrison Upper Andalu.sia, and to e"tend a helping hand to Sebastiani, if he
i<hollld meet with an}' resisttlnCe in his conquest of tlle kingdom of
Granada.
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corner of Spain. The' intrusive king' released Cl number of
politicul prisoners, whom the Ins! Junta had urrested on SllS-
picion of treason. Apparently this suspicion had been well
grounded, as IIlUllY of the cupb \'CS, heudcd by the Swiss generals
Preux and Ucding \ did homage to Joscph, and accepted office
under him.
Encouraged by these defections to his cause, and by the fact
that deputations had presented themselves from Cordova and
Jaen to bespeak his protection, Joseph hastened to publish an
absurd address to his army. couched in the magniloquent st)"le
which all French writers of proclamation!; at this time were
wont to borrow from their Emperor. 'The barriers placed by
~nturc betwccn the North and the South of Spain hll.Yc fallen.
You have met with friend;, only bc)'ond the Sierra Morena.
Jaell, COrdovll, Seville have Rung Opell their gates.... The
King of Spain desires t1mt between the Pillars of Hercules
a third pillar shall arise, to reeall to posterity, and to the
navigators of both the new and the old world, the memory of
the officers and men of that French army which drove back the
English, saved thirty thousand Spaniards, pacified the ancient
Baetica, and regained for France her natural allies.' The rather
puzzling passage concerning the 'thirty thousand Spaniards
$Il.ved' refers to the prisoners of OeRnR and the Sierra. Morena,
whom the French, ar.:cording to thc ICing, 'rccogllil'.ed 1\8 brethren
led n.stray by the common enemy. Yon spared them, and I have
receh·ed them as my children.'
Some elation in the King'l! language was, perhaps, pardonable
at the moment. The moral effect of the surrender of Sevillc
was considerable in France, England, and the rest of Europe,
thou:,.m less in Spain than elsewhere. The tangible trophies of
the conquest were enormOlls-the place had been the central
arsenal of S!)ain, and the amount of artillery, ammunition, and
warlike equipment captured was vcry large. The cannon-foundry
and other military factories were taken over in excellent CO)1-
dition, and kept the French army of Andalusia well supplied
during the three years of its existence, Tobacco to the valne,
as it was said, of £1,000,000 was found in the great central
magazine, and quinine, quicksilver, and other commodities of
1 Younger brotller of the victor of DayleJl.
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government monopoly lo a considcrable additiol.lal :mm.
Nothing had been done, sim:e the news of the passage of the
Sierra Morenll had arrived, to destroy or remove all this
\"aluable slate property.
On the day following their entry into Seville, Joscph and
Soult direck'<1 Victor to march in pUl"Suit of Albuquerque, amI
to take possession of Cadiz. So complete had been lhe lUMck
uf the Spanish armies since the Andalusian campaign began,
that it seems to have been supposed that the Army of E..-tre-
madura. would ofter no serious resistance, even if it should
succeed in throwing itself into Cadiz before it was overtaken.
i\Iarchiug with laudable expedition, the Duke of lleIlnllo
covered the eighty-three miles between Seville and Cadiz in
four days, and presented himself ill front of the pJat.>e Oll the
evening of l"ebruary 5th. But Albuqllerque, unmolested ill his
llIarch from Utrera, had arrived Oll the 3rd, bringing with him
not ouly his own troops and those of COpOIlS, but several
recruit-battalions pickt.>d up at Xeres, Lebrija, San Lucar. and
l)uerto Santa Maria, where they had beeu organizing. He had
sollle l~,OOO men in all, not counting the civic militia of Cadiz,
which had hitherto been its sole garrison.
Cadiz, ill the days when the practicable range of the heaviest
artillery diu not exceed !?l,500 yards, was one of the strOlI&'CSt
places ill the world. The town lies 011 the e.xtrellle point of
a long Stluuy peninsula, which runs out into the sea from the Isla
de Leun, v. large isluud scpanlted fmm the lllUiullllld of Audll,.
lusitl by the slIlt·wnter c1mllllcl 01" the Uio Santi Pdri, nil u.fm
uf lhc sea vurying l'rom 300 lu 400 yards ill breadth, and
lIulI'illg through marshes which make access to its banks very
dillicult. The 18114 protected by this enormous wet ditch, has
a frout towards the continent of about seven miles, from the
naval arsenal of La Carf/U'A at its north end to the Castle of
Stt.nti Petri at its south. Batteries had already been thrown up
at all the commanding points, and Albuquerque had broken
the only bridge, that of Zuazo, which crossed the marsh and
the Rio. It would be impossible to pass the channel save by
collecting great quantities of boats, and these would have to
move under artillery fire. Vellegas, the military governor of
Cadiz, had already ordered all the vessels, small and great, of
OlU". III L
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the vill~<res round t.he bay to be destroyed or brought across to
the city_ l\{orco\'cr, there were a score of gunboats ill the
channel, manned from the Spanish fleet, which could be used
to oppose any attempt to cross the Rio. Indeed, naval assist-
Rllce to ally amount was available for the defence of Cadiz:
there were a dozen Spanish and four English line-or-battle ships
ill the harbour. All through the three IOllg years while the
French lay in front of the hIn, 110 attempt was ever made to
throw a force in boats across the channel: the venture seemed
too hazardous.
If, however) Victor had, by some expedient, succeeded in
crossing the Rio, there were two lincs of ddcllec behind it, of
far greater strength than that formed by this outer ditch of the
Cadiz works. The triangular 181a 'de Lcoll fonm; with its upex
a loug sand-spit, which projects for four miles into the Atlantic.
Half way along it the breadth of the spit is contracted to 110
morc than 200 )'ards, alld herc there was a continuous entrench-
ment from water to water, called the Cortadura, 01' the battery
of San Femando, armed with many lleavy guns. Supposing
this isthmus to havc been passed, there lies, two miles further
along the sand-spit, the outer cnceinte of Cadiz itself, with
a front of not more than 400 yards in breadth, and deep water
on either side.
Cadiz had been captured more than Ollce in carlier wars, but
always by an enemy who could attack from the sea. Neither
the bill de Leon lior the San FerlUl1Ido line could be held against
(Ill attack supported by a fleet which came close in shore, und
buttcn-d the works from fltUlk and rear, or lundl.'<1 troops behind
them. 11le sea, it may be remarked, is four fathoms deep to
within a ShOlt distance (about 300 yards) of the shore, all along
the south front of the !sla and the Isthmus, so that there was
nothing to prevent a fleet coming close to the works. But
llgainst any lll\Val attack Cadiz was, in 18101 absolutely secured
by the pn.uolllinunee of the English lied. Thel'C 'I'M no tU'med
French vcssel nearer t1l1ln Ba)'onne 01' Barcelona, Ilor allY
possibility of bringing one round. All that was done by, the
besiegers ill a three years' leaguer was to build some gunboats
in the northern inlets of the bay, and these they never dared to
bring out into the open water.
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The fila! danger to Cadiz lay 1I0t from the sea side, nor 011
the Isla front, but from the illller side of the harbour and the
east. Here a long spit of land runs out from beside the town
of Puerto Real in the direction of Cadiz. It is culled the
'l'rocadero, from a villugc situated 011 its south-eastern side.
At its extreme point is a fort Illlmed San Jose, while another
fort, nlUlled San Luis, lies alongside of the other on It low
mud-island. In advance of both, built right in the marsh, llnd
surrounded by wutel· at high-tide, was a third ealled Matagordn.
ThC>iC three forts were the oulel· defen<:es of the harbour against
tI Iw-vul nttack, amI could cross fircs with the town batteries tUld
II castle ealled PUllwlcs, which lies on the easternmost point of
the isthmus, a mile from the buttery of San FerlltUldo. l\ittta-
gorda is only 1,200 yards from Puntales, and 3,000 yll.rd", from
the CtlSt.ern point of the city of Cndi:t. If the French took
possession of it, and of the neighbouring San Jose and San
Lni~, they eould bombard the Puntalcs castle and all the
Ilcighbourillg section of the Isthmus, to the gmve danger nnd
discomfort of all who Imd to pass between the city flud the
hIu de Leon. They would al.so be able to annoy sliips lying iu
nil the eustel·n reaches of the great harbour. But before Victor
urrived in front of Quiiz, Sun Jose, Sml Luis, and MtLt;ngorda
were blown up, with the lca,"e of the governor VcnegM, by
a detachment of seamen from the British fleet. There could,
therefore, be no trouble from this direction, unless the enemy
succeeded in restoring and rearming the three forb;,-nq easy
tMk under the fire of the Pun tales castle and the fleet. It was
lIot till some months had passed that the stl'uggle bcgtm for
the:;e ruined works, the only points from which the defeuce could
be seriollsly incommoded.
On his fil':>t urrival Victor SUIllUlOIlL-'(1 the towlI, und received
a IWOIllpt uul! tUlgry nnswcr of refusul frolll the h"Ovcrnor and
the local JlllltU. The marshal inspected the city's outtlr de-
JCtlC()s, und WU.8 forced to report to the King ut Seville that it
8L'CIllCd that nothing could be donc lIh"l\inst the place till he
had brought up heavy artillery, and built himself boats. Joseph,
unwilling to believe anything that contradicted the hopes of
complete triumph that he had been nourishing ever since Ule
passage of the Sierra Morellu, came up to Puerto Santa j\laria,
L~
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on the bay of Cadiz, luoked at the situation, did not find it
reassuring, and wrote to his -imperial brother to propose that
he should send out his '1'oulon fleet to attack the place on the
sea side 1. Napoleon, stilI smarting under the memory of how
Admiral Martin had destroyed an important section of that
fleet in the preceding October, ignored this proposal. He did
not forget, though his brother had apparently done so, the tact
that the Bl'itish MeditelTanean fleet was still in existence.
Thus the position in front of Cadiz assumed the shape which
it was 10 maintain for months, and even for years, Victor's
corps could providc enougll mcn to ohscn'c the whole shore of
the hay, alld to blockade the garrison. But thc Spaniards
recovered their courage when they saw the enemy reduced to
inactivity, and began ere long to receh'e reinforcements. The
first to arrive were 3,000 of the regular troops which had been
at Se\·ille. This corps, under the Visconde de Gand, had
escaped we!>tward after the capitulation, find, though pursued
by n brigade of MOl'tier's corps, reached Ayamonte. at the
month of the Guadiana, and there took ship for Cadiz. Some-
what later there arrived some troops sent by "Vellington. The
Spalliard~ in their day of disaster had forgotten their old
jealousy about Cadiz, und asked for aid. Wellington, though
loath to spare a umn from PUI'tUf,'1.W, sent them in the early days
of February three British 2 and two P01'tuguese battalions from
LisLoll, under General \Villiam Stewart. So promptly were
these troops :;hippcd umlluudetl, that they urrived tit Cudiz
bctwl'ell the lOth amI the 15th of Februat·y, to the 1ll11l1hel' of
about 3,500 bayonets 3. Thus the town was pla(,'ed ill security
from all)" CQUP de main 011 Victor's part.
The intenlal situation ill Cadiz, however, lell much to be
(}e~ired. The town had elected a local Junta of defence, of
which the governor Vel1ega.~ was made President, and this body
1 'Sire, il parait que Cadix veutse defeudrc. Kou8 verrons dans quelqucs
jours ce qu'cUe fern lor8que 110US aUr0l18 quelqucs loattcries montees. Si
votre Maje;;te pouI'ait disposer de l'escadre de Touloll, l'occasiOll pourrait
are oonull,' J06epli to Napoleon, Su. Maria, Feb. 18.
~ 7gth, 211d batt. 87th, and 94t11 regiments, and the 20th Porlugucee
line regiment.
, See Wellingtoll to Dart. }'rcre aml Gcneral StcwarL, from Torrlls
Vcdras, Feb. 5th, and Vizcu, l'cb. 27, 1810.
iSpan;~hll(\ :-<'~._::>,"
___.....-_Came;
JPunt. de
S.nti I"etri
~U.llo1fJ
S.ntri !YLr;
IS/LA
" )() '1'
,'DE .,).
, ):{D ):(
O No ••}~''''~Y!',~~.
•
TorMl
Gorthl
,
•
.:
"0,.,
'.
".,,
-----,
•
INNER
HARBOUR
..,:,::.
;;:';ndJ
C~"'P
Fort ~
SanJose -1~. lJ
....:~....
,'b
.....
h
.n
.0\~
.,
\
'" -r ~~ t:: _.... --- ... - ... -
--......... .4".-
...... ~.•- \.tr"
' ....., ',,'
'" G ~ aI"rto
, "Re, ,
..... ...,'
I,
,
•
.........
• ' •••1(••.
, ••1- 'Usu.1 "'.
:····positio" ", ~
: Flut .
...
OUTER
,
,~
,~
':J,\~,
\
\
Puerto de
Sta.Ma.ria.
•~.
ta
SCIrlU 0' v....\11
---------....--- ,
.• ",R.T ,_---.... "1P'"::'"........ .... ,
.......... M.f~',..pIi ,
• JI. "
-" -
,
/-
,-
,
,~
I'l''' __-'--_·_··o·_,-~:~StkoF
"
, ,J,,- S~(It;,c.ab/ifll
(/l,;.U;udJ/J
" HARBOUR
" "
CADIZ.
" - - -
AND ITS ENVIRONS
1810] THE REGENCY AND THE CADIZ JUNTA. 149
had frequent disputes with thc ncw Regency, nominated by the
Central Junta at lhe time of its abdication, and also with
AlbnqllCl'que, whom Venegus did not wish to recognh',c as hi::;
hierarchical superior. The local body could make a fair show
of objections to recognizing the legitimacy of the Regenc)': the
old Central ,Junta itself had a doubtful origin, and the govern·
ment nominated by those of its members who had taken refuge
in Cadiz could not claim 11 clear title. But to raise the point
at this moment of crisis was factious and unpatriotic, and the
condnct of the local Junta became mercly absurd when it tricd
to arrognle to itself lluthOl'ity e.~tending outside its own city,
and to issue orders to the outlying provinces, or the colonies of
America. Still worse, it refused to issue clothing and footgear
to Allmquerque's arm)', whose equipment had been worn Ollt
by the long march from Estremadurn, or to subsidize the
militar.y hospitals, though it had It considerable stock both of
money amI of military stores at its disposition. At the cnd of
February the Regency nominated VCllcgas Viceroy of Mexico,
and having bought him off with this splendid pie<.'C of prefer-
ment, Illade Albu(juerque his su(.'('cssol' in the governorship of
Cftlli;.:. But even thus they diu not s\J(.'(:ecd in btetting proper
cOlJtrol o\'et the city, for the Junta refused to allow the Duke
to place his head quarters within the walls, or to issue ortler3
to the civic militia. A llIod1/3 vivendi was only reached
when the Regents made all ignominious pact with the local
oligarchy, by which the latter, in return for recogni7.ing their
legitimate authority, ar.d. undertaking to pay and feed the
garrison, were granted the control of the port-revenues and
other royal taxes of Cadiz, as well as of all the subsidies arriving
from America. How the functions of gO\'ernment became still
further complicated, when the members of the IOl1g·expected
Cartes began to arrive, and to claim their rights as the sole
legitimate representatives of the nation, must hI:! told in another
chapter 1.
Leaving matters at a deadlock ill and about Cadiz, we must
turn back to the operations of the French in the outlying parts
I For a l!eathing account of the conduct of the Cadiz Junta aud its
doiugs see Schelleler, vo!. iii. MO-5. NlIpier very rightly calls it 'all
imperious body without hOllour, talents, or Imtriotism' (ii, 334).
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of Andalusia. Sebastiani, it will be remembered, had laken
.Jaen on Janulu:y ~3rd. He was directed to march from thence
on Granada and Malaga, 1:0 scatter the remains of Arci"Atga's
army. and to subdue the valleys of the Sierra Neyada and the
long sea-coast helow them. All this he accomplished with ease.
On the :i!8th he routed at Alcala la Heal a force composed of
some of' Arch-.aga's ftlgitin~s, which had been joined by l"reire
and all the cavalr>' of the Andalusian army. These regiments,
which had been cllntonoo in the valley of the Guadalq uivir, since
they were useless in the passes, had been collected by Freire to
the !lumber of ~,OOO sabres. They were routed and dispersed
by i\filhaud's and Perreymond's dragoons and chasseurs, losing
over 500 men and the whole of their artillery. The sUfl'ivors
dispersed, and retired in small parties eastward, only rallying in
the pro\'ince of l\Illl'cia. That same evening Sebastiani pushed
on towards Granada, and was met by a deputation of its magis-
tl'ates, who brought the keys of the city and a promise of
submissiOll. The French vanguard entel'erl it next day. Lacy,
who hOO taken refuge there with the small remains of his
division, retired to Guadix. Sebnstiani levied a military COI1-
tributioll of 5,000,000 reals Oil the city, placed a garrison of
1,500 men in the Alhambra, and marched with a mixed force
on Malaga, the only place ill this quarter where organized resis-
tance ShowL>d itself. Here the local magistrates had been
deposed by a popular rising, and several thousand irregulars
had been collected by a Colonel Abello, a Capuchin friar named
Fernando llerroeal, and three brothers, notaries, of the name of
San Millan. They seized the passes of the Sierra de Alhamn,
am! called all the hill-country to arms. Sebastiani, Illflrching by
Antequem, cleared the passes on F'ebrunry 5th, bell.t the lUllf-
/trilled insurhTCnt L/tmls outside the SUbUl'bs of Jlalaga, and
stormed the tOIl'II. He eXa.l:ted a contribution of 12,000,000
reals, and hung the three San l\fillans and se\'eral other leading
insurgents. After this he extended his troops along tbe coast,
and occupied \'elez }'blaga, Motril, and Almuneca.r. The roads
and the towns were his, hilt many of the illSurgenL'l took
to the hills, and maintninoo a guerrilla warfare, whieh nevel'
ceased throughollt thc neJ.."t three )'ears. Thcrc wcrc uJwnyl'o
bllllds on foot in the Alplljn.rl'U! llnd the Sierrll dc Honda,
1010] KING JOSEPH'S CIRCULAR TOUR 151
though the 4th Corps expended much energy in hunting them
down.
Meanwhile Giron, Lacy, Freire, and the rest of the fugitive
generals had retired eastward. They had now come under the
onlers of Blake, who superseded Areiznga. and took over charge
of 3,000 or 4,000 dispirited men at Guadix on January 301h.
He retired at once within the borders of the kingdom of Mureia.
Small parties amI stragglers continued to come ill for muny
weeks, and by March there were 10,000 foot and 1,500 horse
collected-all in the worst state of equipment, and thoroughly
demoralized by their late disasters.
'Vc must now turn to the other end of A.ndalu:;ia: Kiug
Joscph, when'departing to inspect the ou1works of CmUz, Imd
left Mortier ill command ill this quarter. The Marshal, a£lel'
hunting the little force of the Viscollde de Galld out of the
Condru.lo de ),liebla, hud been directed to de!\l It stroke ut
Badajoz. Accordingly, leaving a brigade in Seville and another
ill the COlldado, he marched with one infantry division and his
light cavalry into Estremadura. He reached Olivenza with
9,000 men, and summoned Badajoz on February 12th, but he had
arrived too late. A considerable Spanish force was now before
him, the old host of Del Parque, which the Central Junta had
called down to the Guadiana when the original Army of Estre,
madura marched under Albnquerque to succour Andalusia.
How l\forlier and La Romana, the successor of Del Parqlle,
dealt with each other in the months of the spring lllust be told
in a later chapter t.
The King, meanwhile, spent the months of February and
March in a circular tour through Andalusia, where he affected
to perceive nothing but friendly feeling among the inhabitants.
He visited Uonda, 1falaga, Granada, Jaen, celebrating le
DewT!ls, and giving bull,fights and banquets. It is certain that
a sufficient show of submission was made to nourish his happy
illusions as to the finality of his conquest. Threats or bribes
induced many notables to present themselves at his receptions,
and it seems that a considerable portion of the Andalusians
hopoo to sit\'e themselves from the rapacity of the military
llulhorities by profcs.'ling fill enthusiasm for the King. He, for
1 See Section xi,,:, chapter iv of this volume,
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his part, did his best to protect them-but he WAS soon gone,
and the native officials w}lQm he appointed were powerless
against Sebastiani, the church plunderer, And Sault, the
judicious collector of' works of art. • At the very moment
when the King was lavishing assurances and promises,' writes
his devoted sen'Allt l\Iiot, 'and everywhere extolling the
thorough disinterestedness of I"ranee, severe and crushing
exactions were being laid all the provinces in our occupation.
An iron hand was grinding them to the dust. The King was
powerless to resist the open violation of the promises which
he was daily gh'ing '.'
Open resistance, however, had ceased. save at Cadiz and in
the in8.c(.'cssiblc recesses of the Sierra Nevada. Andalusia had
been subdued from end to end, and neither the King nor
Soult yet rea1i?ed that a lamentable strategic mistake had
been made when 70,000 veteran troops had been pinned down
to garrison the newly conquered realm, while Portugal and
Wellington's army remained untouched. In their conception,
as in that of the Emperor, the conquest of Portugal was to be
sllfficientIy provided for by the new reinforcements which were
now pouring over the Ebro, to the number of over 100,000
sabre; and bayonct~.
I Miot, ii. 432. Compare Joseph's hysterical letter to the Emperor
(Oucasse, vii. 236) : 'La pacification generale de I'Alldalonsie sera ope:ree
... Mais, sire, an nom dn sang fraw;ais et dn saug espagnol rappele~
J..oisoo, Kellennann, 'J1LOuvenot ~ Ces 1lOmmel11lous colltcnt bien cher ! '
It is curious that lie, in tile same letter, quotes as' hornmes honnHes;
along with Mortier, Sllcllct, Rlld Rcynier, both Soult Rnd &>bastiani, ",ho
were 1111Llulcrers on fI.~ large 11 scale as Kellermullll or Loi«on.
SECTION XIX
THE PORTUGUESE CAMPAIGN OF 1810.
THE PRELIMINARIES
CHAPTER I
TIlE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF PORTUGAL
Tm: continual existence of Portugal down to the present dny
in face of the persistent hostility aud il11JJlcllscly superior force
of its lleighbouI" Spain seems at first sight to be onc of the most
inexpliCAble phenomena in modern history. It appears nil the
more fI."tounding when wc remember that the lesser kingdom wn~
once conquered, and held down for sixty years, b}' the greater
power. }~ew slates have won back and maintained their inde-
pendence in sllch musterful fRShion as did POl'tngnl, in t.he long
'War of Independence' that followed the instll'reclion of ]64-0
under the house of DrngnnZll. But intense national spirit and
heroic obstiutlcy Oll the part of the smaller people are Ilot
sufficient to a<.'Count for the survival of the Portuguese kingdom
(I..'j 1\ liepnratc entity. Its geography, which at the first sight
seems hopelessly Wlftl\'ourablc to its defenec, turns out 011
investigation to be eminently suitable for resistance against an
attack from the east. On a first glance at the map it appears
l\.':i if Portugal was composed of no more than the lower \·ulleys
of thr{.'C great Spanish ri,'crs, the DouI'o, the Tagus, and the
Guadiaua, so that the state which OWIIS thr{.'C-qum'tel'll of the
course of et\eh of these streams has but to send down its armies
from the uplauds of Loon and ~ew CU.h'tile, to eQllquer the lll\rrOIl"
Iond which lies about their estuaries, :But nothing CllU Le more
deceptive tlmll the map, whell the Iberiau PeninSllht is ill
question, As we obserl'ed in our earlier volume I, the rivel'S of
Spain and POl'tugal are not highways, 01' lines of COlllllHlllicatioll,
l See \'01. i. pp. 7o, 7G.
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but. barriers-ton'ents sunk in gorges cut. deep below the level
of the face of the lanu. The chief roads, with few exceptions,
Ilvoid, instead of courting, the neighbourhood of the great
streams. The leading routes which descend from Spain into
Portugal in no case follow the lines of the Doul'O or the Tagus.
Though the coast-plaius, which form the heart of the kingdom
of Portugal, its most wealthy and populolls regions, lie about the
months of those ri\'ers, it is not by deliCending their oonks that
COlllJlIl~st or trade arrh'es most easily at its goal. As fl. matter
of fact, Spnin and Portngal turn their backs upon each other:
the smaller rcnlm looks out upon the sea; her stt'Cngth and
w<.'ulth lie upon the Atlantic eoast.: t.he inland Umt. touches
Spain is rugged and UIlPCOplt.'<1, in mall)' parts a mcre waste of
rock and heath. Nor, on the other hand, do Lean and New
Castile look towards Portugal: thc real ports of Madrid are
Valencia and Alieante, not Lisbon. and that not from political
reasons, but simply because those are the points where the sea
can be reaehed with the minimum of mountain and desert to
be passed through. The way down from the central tableland
of Spain to the :\1editerranean is less difficult than the way down
to the Atlantic. Hence comes the fact that the higlH'oads
leading from Spain into Portugal are so surprisingly few, and
that the two main alternath'e routes frolll Madrid to Lisbon fun,
the one much further north, the other mnch further $louth. than
might have been expected. There i$l not now, ann never hll~
uccn, nlly straight road down thc 'l'agus betwccn the two
capitals, obvious though the line looks upon thc map. The
lwo main gates of Portugal arc at Almeida and ElVtlS; at
Alcantara, which appears the natural point of approach, there
is but the most miserable of posterns-ns JUllot discovered in
November 1807. much to his discomfiture. l\Iarshal Berwick
had made the same experience ill 1705, during the WnJ' of the
Spanish Succession l ,
In the old wars between Spain and Portugal the whole land
frontier of the smaller kingdom was exposed to attaeks fl'Olll the
larger. But the circumstances of'181O differed from those of'
I A student of the "'ar of the Spa-uisJI Succession is always surprised to
see 1101'1 mllell fighting took place on fronts which were left severely aloue
by the English and Frencb ill 1000-12,
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1705 or 1762 or 1801, in that the subsidiary campaigns in the
extreme north and south, which had always accompanied the
main clash along the frontiers of Beira and Alemtejo, could 1I0t
011 this occasion take place. The French were no longer in
possession of Galicia, from which the Spaniards had been WOllt
to demoll:;,1:rate agnillst Oporw, nor, at the other extremity of
the lifle, had t.hey Il firm grip 011 Huelva, and the Condtldo de
Niebln, fWIll which alone un uttuck could be dil'Ccted IIhtfl.inst the
remote sout.hern pl"Ovim-,c of .Algarve.
Portugal presents thre<! sections of frontier to all invader
comillg from the side of Spain. The northernmost, that from
the mouth of the :\'Iinho to j\Iirfludn-de-Doul"O, WflS not within
the scope of operations in 1810. It C1.111 only be approached
from Galiein; that pro\·inee was not snbdmxl, nor had the
Fl'cnch any intention of dealing with it till nner they should
have dealt with Portugal. An invasion of the Tms-os-:\1ontes
flnd the Enlloc-Doul'O-c-Minho would have ix:<!ll nn objectless
operation: they would fall of themsckes if once Li.:>bon were
captlll'ed and the English expclled f!'OlIl t.he Peninsnla. A
move against OP0l'to by some flanking division of the invading
army might ha\·e been conceivable, bnt such l\1l attempt wonltl
he made, if made at aU, from the south of the Domo, throngh
northern Reira, and not throngh the mOllllto,ins of the '1'1'as-os·
:Monteii.
Therc remnill two other sections of the Portuguese frontier: the
one from the Douro to the Taglls, and the other from the'l'llglls
to the Gnadiana. Doth of these were accessible to the French in
1810, silK'e they were in possession alike of the plains of Leon and
of L.t Mancha, and of northern Anrlalusill. It wn.~ open to them
to choose one or the other f!'Ont for attack) 01' to attack both ut
once. Lisbon being the objective, it wus cleur that an attnck
on the northern or Beira frontier possessed a paramount advantage
over an attack on the southern 01' Alemtejo fi"ontier. A suc{.'Cssf'ul
advance north of the Tagus brings the invader directly to the
gates of Lisbon; one south of the Taglls brings him only to the
heights of Almada, where he is sepal'atcd from the Portuguese
capital by the broad estuary of the Tagus. Napoleon's power,
like thnt of the devil in mediaeval legends, ended at the edge
of the salt Wl\ter ; and ill face of the naval strength which the
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English always maintained ut Lisbon, a victorious French army
camped on the heights of Almada would be almost as far from
final success as when it started from Spain. The 1,900 yards
of strait which protected the Portuguese capital could not be
cros.'>ed. The most that the invader could accomplish would be
to worry the ships in the port, und the lower quarters of the city,
by a distant bombardment, if he could bring ·up heavy gUlls
fmm Spain 1. For lletl.rly twenty miles inland from Lisbon the
e>itllEll'Y of the Tagus expands into it broad brackish lagoon
fOlll' to eleven miles broad, a complete protection against any
altack from the cast. Only at Alhandra does this illland sea
contract, amI for some further miles northward from that point
the eastern bank of the TRgUS is formed by broad salt-man;hes
(kzirimt) cut up by countk"Ss channels of water, alld practically
inaccessible. It is only at Salvaterra, thirty miles north ofLisbon,
that the Tagus assumes its ordinary breadth, and becomes an
ordinary military obstacle. From that point upwards all invader
from the Andalusian side might endeil.\"our to cross it, and it
presents no more difficulties than any other broad river. But,
t.hough even llhines and Danubes may be passed in the face
of" an enemy, the operation is not one which a prudent general
conrts, and the '1'agm; is broad, nbsolntely bridgeless, and fickle
in the extreme in its alternations of high nnd low water. '1'0
iight one's way from the mlley of the Gua.diana in order to meet
such a problem t\t the end does not seem inviting. And even
if the Tagus is passed, there are still thirty miles of road, includ-
ing somc formidable defensive positions, bctW(.'ell the invader
and Lisbon 2. Yet there was one contingency under which nn
advance on the left bank of the rh'er might be advanlae,"'COus to
the invader, and so possible was this contingency that Wellington
from the very first had declared that he thought it probablc
that. the French would move troops in that direction. It' the
I See Map of the Lines of Torres Vedra.s, in &ction "X of this volume,
for tlle environs of Lisbon.
i Eliot, ill his very julliciolL~ rema.rks on 1.'. 100 of 11i!lDfff!ll~ !if l'orlu9/11,
published j~t before l\IflSIlCna's invasion, sum~ Illl the situation with-' a
jll\S..."'lgC may without H1ly difficulty be forel.od to the left bank of the Ta..gns:
hut then the enemy is a~ far from tllc aceomplishment of his project liS
hefor\!, tho river fornling fin insuperable barrier if well defended.'
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Allglo·Portuguese army were drawn away to the Beira frontier,
between Tagus and Douro, in order to rL'Sist a front attack
ddivcrL'<1 from the plains of Lcon, and if it bccl'LllIe involved ill
UIl act.ive campaign SOllll:where fur to the nort.h, Oil t.he line
of Uu: Coa, or t.he MOlldego, or the .A.lva, a subsidiary Freudl
force, st.riking south of t.he 'l'agus from the direction of Spanish
EsLremadura, might give nreadful t.rouble, If it conld cross Lhe
'l'aglls anywhere between Abrantes nnd SalvaterflL, it might get
lK!tweell the Anglo-Portuguese army and its base, and either fall
upon its rear or capture Lisbon, For this reason WellingtOll f
so far back I\S October 1809, had made up his mind that, if the
li'l'ench had nll army Oil foot anywhere in the direction of Badlljo7.
and Eh'as, he must leave a considerable proportion of his 011'11
forces to watch them, and to defend, if need be, the line of the
lower Tagus 1, As long as the enemy had not yet subdued
.Badajoil and the neighbouring fortresses, and while there was
still a strong Spani8h army in that quarter, the need for pre·
caution was 110t so pressing. Nevertheless, all through thc
SUlllmer of 1810 'Vellingtoll kept Hill witholle English and onc
l~ortuguese di"ision at l)ortalegre, south of the Tagus, though
he withdrew this detachment when :Massella marched on Coim·
bra. i\-Iatters were much more perilous after the l"Mtttle of the
Gebora and the fall of Badajoz in February 1811. }'rom that
time onward, all through 1811 and 1812, nearly a third of the
Anglo.Portuguese arm)' was kept in the Alemtejo, first under
1 Wellingt<lll to Col. Fleteher, cOlll111andinp; Hoyal Engincers, Oct, 20,
"lOO!) (.Di8palchu, ,', 235) : <The enelllY will proloablyattack on two olistiud
lines, the one south, the other north of the Tag-us, ami the s)'stem of
defence lUuSt be founded upon tMs general basis.. , ' His object will be,
1.1)' mCl\ns of the corps south of the Tag-us, to tUl'll tile positions which wc
shull take up jn front of tile corl'" 1111I1,h of thllt river, to cut off from
Lisbon the COTJlS OllPOSed to him, and to (lestro)" it 1.1)" ,m attack in frout
amI rear, 'l1.is call be avoided only by the retreat of the right, centre,
aud left of the allies to a point at which (frolU the state of the river) they
I;lInnot be turned, by the passage of the Tngus by the enemy's left corlls.'
Six days later (Disp, ", 245) Welliugtoll wrote to Admin.1 Berkeley in
Ilimilar terms: 'Tt is Ilrobable thal iu tllC e,-ent of the enemy beiuj.{
enabled to invade this country in force, he will make lLis main attack
by the right of the Tagus: but he will employ oue corps 011 tIle left of the
river, with the object of embarrassing, if not of prevclltillg, the embarcation
of thll British army,'
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Bel'cstord, thcn undcr Hill, ill order to guurd against the pos-
sible slab in the back from t.hl: Frellch Ilrmy of Andlllusill.
But thc tlttack south of the Tugus was in lVellillgtoll'S, and
a1:;o, wc Illay add, in Napoleon's conception 1, only It secondary
operation. The main invasion was almost inevitably bouud to
take place on the Beira, not on the Alemtcjo frontier. Betw~l1
l"re/:.reueda, where the Portuguese border line quits the DoUl'o,
to the pass of Villa Velha on the Tagus there is It distam:c
of somewhat more than lOO miles. The division between Por-
tugal and Spain does not lie along all)' well-markt..od natural
teature, such AA 11 mountain range or a broad river-though two
small f>ections of the frontier are coincident with the insignificant.
strCllms of the Elga Rnd the Agueda. It is rather drawll, ill
II somewhat arbitmry and Imphnzurd fa:;hioll, through UIe midst
of the dCSCI-t. upland, where Spain and Port.u/:,rnl turn t.heir backs
t.o each other. For the only piCt."C of flut plain-lund on the whole
border i:s that from the Douro t.o Almeida, a mere ten or twelve
miles, uml illuneoitltely bchilld the Coo, only three or four miles
from Almeida, the lllOllutuins begin. The rest of the frontier
rUlIs through thillly·pcopk>tl, barren highlands, from which the
Coa, the Mondego, the ZC'.lcre, and the }lon\'ul fall away towards
Portugal, and the Agueda and the Alagon towards Spain.
The mOWltains are Hot, for the most part, very high-the
culminating peak of the Serrs. da Estrella is only 6,540 t€€t-
but the)" are singularly rugged and scarped, and llluch cleft by
ravines, along whose sides the few roads crawl miserably, in
constant precipitous dips and risc5. This broad belt of uplalld,
onc long series of defiles for tUl ill\'llder, is liOllie hundred mileli
broad, ulld does not celCSC t.ill Coimbra, on the one side, or
Abmntes, on the other, is reached: only then does the plain-land.
begin, and the country-side become fertile and thickly peopk--d.
Only from those points onward is it possible for an army t.o
live on the local produce: ill the upland it must carry its
fOod with it; for a single division would exhaust in a day the
stores of the poor villages of the mountains; and the small
1 So much so that ill C()rre~"p., xx. p.li52, we find llim informing Ma:'<l€ua
that Badajoz and Elvas need not be toucllcd till after Lisbon has fallen_
The first contrary view, ordcl'iJlg a demoustration ou the Lower Tagus,
appears ill the dispatch 011 p. 273 of '·01. :.:xi.
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poverty-stricken towns of Guarda, CelOl'ic.:o, Sabuglli, Pennwn-
cor, llnd Idauha ha"e few resources, Castello Brallco and Vil,ell
are the only two places in the upland where there is a valley
of' some breadth and richness, which can supply all army for
many days, ]n this simple fact lies the explanation of the diffi-
culties of the Portuguese campaigns of 1810 and 1811. Both
the invader and the defender must bring their food with them.
and protraded operations can only be kept up by means of
illccssalltcOIl\·o~'sfrom the resr. The ctllllpaigll lIOt infrequent1j·
Occmnc a l>1:ur\'iug-lllatch, and the combatullt who first exhausted
his provisions had to retire, and to disperse his divisiolls ill search
of the whcrcwithul to live. T11lfUlks to 'Vcllillf,t1:on's proddcllce
it was nlways the Frellch who were forced to this cX!)L'(liellt.
The Beira froutier is divided into two "';L>ctioIlS by the mugc of
lllouutuiws which crosses the border ut right llllgle;, half way
betwL'ClI DOlll'O mid 'l'ngus: it is knowll us the Sierras de Gnta and
lie Janlnm while ill SpniuJ us the Serm da Estrclla when it reaches
Portuglll. Its eelltrnl gnuglioll lies between the high-I)"iug towns
of Subugul uuu PcuulIlucur ill Po1'tugttlulld the !)lU;S of Pemles
ill Spain. Froll! this poiut rUll oil' lhe gretlt SPUTS which sCJmmte
the nllleys of the POlJ~'lIl, the Zczere, the AglHxla., the Coa, ami
lhe Alub"Oll, An invader must make his choice whethel' he will
ndvuncc into POI'tngnl south or nOl1:h of thc Serra da Estrellll :
to uttelllpt to do so on bulh sides of the l'Ull&'"C would be riskillg
too much, if there is an enemy of filly strength in the l1c1cl, sillce
the COlUllIllS to llle right and to the left would be hopelessly
:;eparuted, and liltble to be beaten ill detail, In lhc whole
Penillsnlar \Vur there was 0111)" onc invasion mude by the southern
rouLc, that of Junot in the winter of 1807-8. It Wll1) successful
because it WI\;; absolutely ullopposed. Neverthcles... the French
lost lIlallY mell, had to leave their artillery behind them, and
olllyarrived with the shadow of un army at Abrantes, It is
true that Juuot chose absolutely the worst path that could be
found between the Se1'1'a da EstrelJa and the Tagus-the pass
of HosmarinhalJ close aboye the latter river-and that he would
have fared not quite so badly if he had marched from Zar/..a on
Idanha and Castello Branco, But even at the best this reh>1011
is most inhospitable: there are points where water is not pro-
curable on stretches of eight or ten miles, others where the main
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road is so steep that a six-pounder ft'quires not only a dozen
horses but the assistance of fifty men to get it lip the slope.
Except ill the immediate neighbourhood of Castello llranco, the
cowluy-side is almost uninhabited I. The whole' corrcgidoria,'
which took its !lUllIe from that town, and extended from the
Elga to the Ze-tere, had only 40,000 souls ill its broad liillits-
it was forty miles long by thirty broad, the size of a large English
COWlty. JUllot's experiences served as a warning to his sm:cessors,
and no :French army during the rest of the war endeavoured to
cross this corner of Portugal when advancing on Lisboll. Castcllo
Branco was seized once or twice by a raiding force, but it was
never used ll.~ the starting-point of an army making a serious
attempt to ad\'lUlce towards the Portuguese capital.
Tlu:re remains to be considered only the section of thc frontil:r
between the DUllro uuu the Serm do. Estrcllu. the front 011 whieh
.Masscna's great blow was delivered in the llutulIln of 1810. It
wus a region which had from the earliest times ~Il the battle-
ground of the Spanish and Portuguese, Half a d07..en times
since the Middle Ages armies from the plains of Leon had
invaded the Deira on this front, Such campaigns always began
with a siege of Almeida, the sentinel-fortress pushed out in front
of' the mountains to face the Spanish Ciudad Uodrigo. Almeida
gellcmlly fell-it is too advallced a position for safety, and (as
DUllluuriez relll!U"kcd in his militat·y study of Portugal) its vnlue
woultlluwc doubled if it had only been pltK'(.'(} upon the west
imleud of the cast buuk of the Cuu, close to the frieudly 1lI0Ull-
taiWi, Imd 1I0t 011 the outskirts of the perilous plain. But rare,
illd{'(.'(I, were the occasions 011 which the Spaniard succeeded in
piercing the broad belt of tangled upland beyond Almeida, and
appearing at the gates of Coimbra or Oporto.
There are fOlU· lines of further advance open to all invader
who has captured Almeida. The fjn;t, a march Oil Oporto via.
})illhel and Lamego, may be mentioned only to be dismissed from
cOllsidcl'lltion. It is of no use to nn army which aims at Lisbon,
t\nd proposes to conquer Portugal by a blow at its heart. Ma;,:·
sClla, whose directions were to drive the British into the sell ill
I 'fllc ahove notes 011 the Caswllo .Branco country amI its rootle are
mostl}· del'iI'cd from Eliot's Diftnwfj Q/ PQrlugu!. Eliot has marclJcd all
m·er Ule region; see his pages 78-81.
f)
I
I
.v
18JO] THE ES'l'RADA NOVA l6l
the shortest and most effective fasllioll, could not have contem-
plated such It secondary object as the capture of Oporto for
a moment. There remain three other roads to be investigated.
(1) The road north at' the river Mondego, by Celorico, Vizeu,
BlIssaco,aud Coimbra. (2) The corresponding and parallel road
south of the Mondego, D'om Celol"ico by Chanlll8<".[J, Maceira and
Ponte de Murcella to Coimbra. (3) The road which, striking
south from Celorico, crosses the headwaters of the Zezere, by
Belmonte and E\mdiio, and then, climbing the Serra de Mora-
da!, descends to Castello Branco, and from thence reaches
Abrantes by the Sobreira Formosa, It may be remarked, by
the way, that nothing in all the geography of Portugal seems
more astonishing than that there should not be a fourth alter-
native road, one down the long valley of the Zezere, which,
running in a straight line from Behnonte to Abrantes, looks on
the map as if it ought to be a main artery of communication,
and seems to indicate the obvious road to Lisbon from Abneida,
since a straight line drawn between these points would run along
the river for some forty miles. But as a matter of fact there
was neither a first nor a second-rate road down the Zezere: the
only to\ms on its course, Covilhao and Belmonte, lie hard by its
sources, and its central reaches were almost uninhabited, The
only good line of communication rUllning near it is a by-road
or duplication of the third route mentioned above, called the
Estrada Nova, which, leaving the upper Zezere at Belmonte,
keeps high up the side of the Serra de Moradal, and rejoins the
Castello Brallco road at Sobreira Formosa, This route was much
employed by WeHington in later years, as a military road from
north to south, usable even when Castello Branco was threatened
by the French. But in 1810 he had ordered it to be rendered
impassable, and this had been done by IIlt\killg several long
cuttiugs at points where the track passed along precipices, the
whole l'Oadwa)' being blow11 or shovelled down into the gulf
below 1. The French were, of course, unaware of this, and
, For the periloilll adventure among these cuttings of a small French
column which crossed the EIltrada Nova, that whicll e3COrted Foy back
to Slllltoreltl in ~'e", 1811, see the lLutohiogral'hy of General Hulut,
pp. 326-33. A cOilsider.lhle number of men and llOrseS fell down these
cuttiugs in a forcetlnight-march, and in aU several hundred men of Foy's
o,u,I!,!la M
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l\1as:;cna is said by his confidant FOJ lo have taken the Estrada
Nova into seriou.':I consideration, and to have dccidc'{l ugaiust it
because of the necessity for forcing the passage of the Zezere
when the defiles were passed, and for laying siege to Abrantes 1.
A far more practical objection was its extreme wildness; it rnns
along an absolutely uninhabited mountaiIHide, and the neigh-
bourhood is destitute not only of food but of water for great
sections of its length. This l\1assena ought to have known, if
his Portuguese advisers had been competent. Apparently he was
wholly unaware of its character, just as he was necessarily
ignorant of the fact that his prescient adversary had blasted
away huge sectiolls of it, so that it was absolutely impassable for
guns or wagons, as also that carthworks had been carefully
constructed to cover the point where it debouches on to the
Zezere.
'I'he Castcllo BrallCO road, therefore, with this dependent by-
road, the Estrada Nova, was practically left out of consideration
by the Marshal. There remains the choice between the
two northern roules, Celorico-Viy.eu-Coimbra, and Celorico-
Chamusca-Ponte de :Murcella-Coimbra. Both traverse rough
ground-but ground less rough than that to be found on some
parts of the Castello 13ranco road. Along both there is an
intermittent belt of cultivated land, and not nnfreqllent villages.
Both are intersected by many good military positions, on which
a defending army can offer battle to un invader with ad\'unmge.
In especiul, the northern road strikes and climbs the granite
ridge of Bussnco with evcry disadvantage for the attacking side,
and the southern road is contracted into a difficult defile at the
passage of the Alva near Ponte de l\furcella. On the whole,
column perished, starved and storm-beaten on this iul\Ospitab16 road.
TIl6l!urvivors only got through by cutting a slil'l>ery foot-track along the
preeipices: nothing on wheels could have passed that way.
I III Foy's interesting minute of his cOll\·ersatioll witll Napoleon about
the in\"asion, on No\'. 23, IBlO, when he had taken home l\1assena's
dispatclles: '::.\Iontr6'.l-ffioi les deux routes de }lollte de Murcella et de
Castello llranco,' says the Emperor. Tllen after a llause: (Et I'Estrada
Nova? l'ourquoi Massena n'a-t-il pas deoouche par l'Estrada Nova?'-
<Sire, a cause d'Abrantes et du Zezere.' -' Dui, Massena a bien fait;
mail}tenant it faut prendre Ahrantes: Elva!! ne nons servirait de riell.'
See Foy's Memoire', p. lII.
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however, thi~ last is the better line for advance :-the strongest
testimonial to the fact is that 'Velli1l6rtoll expected Masselltl to
take it, and erected at the passage of the Alva almo~t I the only
earthworks, save those of the lines of Torres Vedras, which he
constructed in his preparations for the reeeption of the imader.
When he first heard that the Marshal was moving forward from
Almeida to Celorico, and was clearly aiming at the )'lolldego
valley, he announced that he should endeavour to stop the
invader on the Alm 2, not apparently thinking it at all prob-
able that Massena would move by Vizeu and the north bank of
the Mondego. On realizing that this was really his adversary's
design, he observed with some exultation that, while there were
certainly lIlany bad roaUs in Portugal, the enemy had taken
decided!y the worst of those open to him 3; moreover, he had
commith:d himself to attack the heights of Bussaco, thc most
formidable position ill the whole of northern Portugal. How
the French commander came to make this choice we shall discuss
in its proper place. Suffic.:e it to say that 'Wellington had not
realized how hall was Masscnu's information, how worthless his
maps, !lull-what is most surprising of all-how eutirely desti·
tute of local knowledge were the Portuguese truitors-luoruo.,
}lumplonu, and thc other rcncgadc officcrs-whom the Emperor
had sent as guides und advisers to the Marshal. And ill truth,
the unsuspected ignoran(,'e of Massena and his advisers added an
incalculableelcment of chum:e to the problem set before "Velliug-
ton. He was obliged to make his plans 011 the hypothesis that
the cncmy would make the correct move: alld not unfrequcntly
the cnemy, for reasons which the English general could not
possibly foresee, made the wrong onc.
The French invasion was bound to commcncc with a pre-
liminary clearance of the outlying fortr(,'SSCS st.ill ill the hallds
of the Spaniards. These to some extent protected the Portuguese
frontier in 1810, though they had been built with the express
purpose, not of protecting, but of threatening it, Rnd had never
I Thcre wcrc some othcrs thrown Ill' on the extreme lower COUrstl of the
Ze-lero, by BarClI Nova aull PLIllhete, to guard against a IJ.Oll!Iihle hut
unlikely use of tiJe Castello Branco road by tl,e enemy.
~ Wellington to Hill (IMp., ,·i. p. 441), Se!lt. 15.
~ Wellingtoll to Chas. Stuart, Sept. 18.
,,2
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before been attacked by an enemy coming from the east. Only
three of these fortresses were of any imporlance-Astorga,
Cilldad Rodrigo, I1ml Dadajoz. The other strongholds ofSpallilih
Estremadura, Alcantara (which had stood Cl. siege in the Wm'
of the Spanish Succession), Albuquerquc, Olivcn:ta, were either
not in a state of dcfcm.'c at all, or were hopelessly antiqutl.tcd,
tllllllittle suited to face modern artillery and modern sicgecl'aft.
Astorga lies so far to the north that it might have been
neglected without much peril to the :l"rench scheme of invasiOll.
.Hut the Emperor had ordered that it should be reduced before
the great enterprise began: it gave the Spanish army of Galicia
l\ foothold in the plains of Leon, from which it might operate
against Massena's rear, if he should pass it by. Its capture,
loo, was considered a matter of slllall difficulty, for it was but
Cl. lllooiacn..I walled town, to which somc hasty outworks had bccn
added during the last year. It will be remembered that when
Moore passed that way in January 1809, Astorga had been
treuterl by both sides Wl an open towlI, and no attempt had been
made to garrison or defend it. Since then La Romana had
repaired its dilapidated ell(:einte, stockaded its suburbs, and
armed it with guns brought from FerroI. As late as January 11,
1810, Napoleon sC€ms hardly aware of this fact: in a dispatch of
that date he orders Loison to make his head quarters there,
evidently under the impression that it is not held by the Spaniards,
or at least that it is a place which they will evacuate at the first
appearance of El. serious attack 1. It is only in March that he
writes to Junot that Astorgll. mmt be besieged tUld takeu, in
order to occupy the attention of the Galicians !\ud to thrust
them back into their mountains 2.
Ciudad Rodrigo was a more serious business. It was a regular
fortress, though only one of the secop.d class:. its prestige, as the
only Spanish stronghold on the Portuguese frontier, was great. It
commands the whole southern stretch ofthe plains of Loon, being
the only place out of the control of Rn invader who is superior in
Cavalry, and therefore master ofthe defenceless Tierrade Campo,t.
There was also a small Spanish army depending upon it, and
clinging to the skirts of the SiCl'ra de Gala. This was the division
I Nap. ()orrtSp., xx. p. 117. Napoleoll to Berthier.
t Ibid., p. 271.
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of Martin de la Carrcrn, which had bccn left behind whcn tbe
greater part of Del Parque's Army of the Left marched down
into Estremnduflt in January 1810, in order to replace there
the troops which had gone off' to the defcncc of Cndiz. It was
clear that Ciudad Rodrigo must be taken, and Martin de la Car-
rent bnlshed away or destroyed, before Itn)· serious attempt to
invade Portugal WItS begnn. If the Emperor thought that such a
remote place RS Astorga WItS worlh his notice, it WllS obvious that
he would regllnl Ciudad Rodrigo 8..'1 absolutel)· indispellsable to
his designs. It was for its reduction that he gave MltSsentl. the
great battering train of fifty heavy guns, with Q,5oo artillerymen
and sappers, which was assigned to him, independent of the
artillery of the three corps of the Army of Portugal.
Dadajoz, far to the south, in Spanish Estremadura, stood to
the defence of Southern Portugal exactly as Ciudad Rodrigo to
the defence of Northern Portugal. It possessed also in Elv8..'i
a t'Otmterp.'lrt to Almeida. Dut Dadajoz is immensely larger and
stronger than Rodrigo,justas Elvas is infinitely more formidable
than Almeida. The two fortresses on the frontier of Leon are
small places crowning mere mounds set in a plain. lladajoz and
Elvas ha"e towering citadels set on rugged hills, and overlooking
the whole country-side. They have also stJ'Ong detached forls
on dominant positions: the circuit. of ground that must be taken
tlp b)' an army that intends to besiege them is very Inrge, 1l11d at
Badnjoz t.here is a first-class ri vert the Guadinna, which cuts in two
the lines which the assailant must occupy. It may be added that
bnsed 011 Dadajm: there was a whole Spnnisharmy of 15,000 mcn,
not a mere division of 3,000, like that which lurked in the moun-
tains above Rodrigo. Noting the strength of Badajoz Bud
ElvllS, 111e Emperor had made up his mind that they should be
obsen'ed and' contained' by troops from the Army of Andalusia..,
but not attacked till Lisbon had been conquered and the English
expelled from Portugal. •Les Anglais une foig hattus et rem-
barques, Badajo1. et ElvB.$ tombent d'eux·memes,' he wrote in a
holograph minute addressed to l\1ass6na,just before the advance
across the l'ortuguese frontier began 1. It was only when the
invasion had been brought to a standstill before the lines of
Torres Vedras, that h~ came to the conclusion that pressure must
I NRpoleon to MasseUR) July 2fl, 1810, COrrtllp., xx. p. 1562.
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be applied south of the 'l'agus, to distract 'Vellington, and that
Solllt, JIS a preliminnry to all nUack on the Alemtejo, must
captnre Dadajoz and Elvas, and disperse the Spanish Army of
Estremadurn. 'fhe idea came to him tardily: thanks to
\Vellingtou's careful starvation of the main French army.
Massena was forced to retreat into Lepn when Soult had only
recently captured Badajoz, and had not yet shown it man in front
of EI\'as, The seheme was hatched, like so many of Napoleon's
Spanish plans, about three months too late for effective reali7A-
tion. As late as November 1810 the order;; to Soult are merely
to demonstrate agl1.inst Dadajoz, and to hinder the departure
of La Romana's army for the lilies of TOl'res Vedrns, but not to
besiege thc Estrcmadumu fortress. Probably it was Fay's infor-
mation us to the cxistenec and strcngth of the unsuspected lines
of Torres VeW-as, which reached himlatc in November, that made
the Emperor realize the advisability of that secondary attack by
the south bank of the Tagus which Wellington had forese€n and
taken means to me€t a full year before. Fortunately a capable
general on the defensive always knows his own weak spots long
before they are discovered by the enemy. By the time that
Soult had at lsl.iit captured Badll.jo7. and the small dependent
places-Oli\"enza. Albuquerqnc, Campo MiJ.yor-'Vellingtoll had
got rid of i\fussclla from the ncighbolll'hood of Lisbon, and was
preparing to chase him hOllle across Northern POl·tugal. 'iVithin
a few weeks of its surrender by thc traitor Ima:.:, Badajoz Was
being besieged by a detachment of the British army, and Soult
had his hands full, as he strove at once to hold down Andalusia
and. to relieve the beleaguered fortress.
SECTION XIX: CHAPTER II
Wl<:LJ.INGTON'S PREPARATIONS FOil DRn:NCF.
As far buck as September 1809, while his army still lay at
nadajoz and the Talavera campaign was hardly oyer, \Vellington
had foreseen the oncoming invR.~ion of Portugal, which did not
actually begin till Augnst 1810 1• ·Writing to his brother, then
Oil his special mission to Seville, he had laid down his con-
clusions. Bonaparte would, in consequence of the cessation of
the Anstl'ian war, be enabled to pour unlimited reinforcements
into Spain. The British army. even if raised to 40,000 men,
would not be strong enough to cover both Seville and Lisbon.
Considering the temper of the Spanish government and the
Spanish troops, he thought it would be most unadvisable to
commit himself to the defence of Andalusia. But he was prepared
to undertake the defence of Portugal. He implored the British
Ministry not to sacrifice its strong position on the T~"'lls in
order to embark upon a hnr,ardous campaign in the South 2. His
views lIS to Portugal were simply the development of those
which he had drawn up for Castlereagh's eye 011 his first sailing
for the Peninsultl s. Portugal though 'ull frontier' might be
defended against l111y French army of less than 100,000 men,
if its resources were placed at his disposal, and he were given
a free hand to utilize them o.ccording to his own plan. The
Portland Cabinet, though much doubting whether Vlellillgtoll
could CUl"l'y Ollt his pledge, llnd though reluctant to abandon
the idea that Andalusia. might be defended and Cadiz made
1 For his views just after Talal'cra see vol. ii. of t11is work, pages 609-10.
~ 'I strongly re<:Olnlllend to you, unless you mean to ineur the risk of
the loss of your army, llot to have allytllillg to do with Spanish warfare, on
any ground whatever, in the existing slate of things.... If you should
t.1.ke up Cadi." you must lay down Portugal.' Wellhlgtoli to Castlcreagh,
Di8ptllChu, v. 90.
3 See vol. ii. pages 2iIG-B.
168 'WELLINGTON'S rnEPAUATIONS (Apltu,
secure by British troops, finally yielded to t.he Gellcl'ul's
appeal.
But on December 2, 1800, the Portland Cabinet ga"e place
to Spencer Perceval'g new administration, and Wellington had
to reiterate the arguments which he had used to Castlereagh
and Canning to new correspondents, Lord Liverpool and
Lord Bathurst. Fortunately the incoming ministers resolved
to adhere to the promises made by their predecessors, and to
persist in the defence of Portugal. It was of immense vulue
to Wellington that his brother Wcllcsle)' soon rephu:ed Lord
Bathurst at the Foreign Office, so that he could command in
this Ministry a supporter as firm as Castlereagh had been in the
last. Nevertheless his position was not entirely fortunate: the
new administration was being fiercely assailed by the Whigs
over the general policy of risking British armies on the Conti-
nent. The calamities of ,the 'Walcheren expedition supplied
a text on which the Opposition could preach intel'minable
sennons. The men who were not ashamed to allege, for party
reasons, that Wdlingtoll wns a rash general, and that the
Talavera campaign had been a disaster, were continually harass-
ing the Ministry, by their suggestions that when the French
Emperor marched in person to Spain the British army in the
Peninsula must ine\"itabl}' be destroyed. It was probably to
aid them that Napoleon kept inserting in the ilIolliteur articles
in which it was asserted that the maintenance of the incapable
•Sepoy General' at the head of the British forces was the thing
which France must most desire. In Lord Liverpool's correspon-
dence with Wellington it is easy to see that the idea that it
might be necessary to emcuate Portngal, when the French
attack was delivered, almost prcpondcrntcd over that of pre-
paring for the defence of that realm. While ,'"ellington's
whole mind ig set on working out the details of a campaign
from which he hopes great things, his correspondent is always
thinking of the possibility of a diSll.Strous embarkation at the
end of it. The General could not pledge himself that Portugal
might be defended against any odds whatever: it was possible
that the Empcror might lead or send against him an army of
absolutely overpowering strength, though he did not think such
a contingency probable. But since he could not say that his
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position was impregnable, he was being continually worried
with suggestions as to all the possible contingencies that might
occur to his discomfiture. The ministers dreaded that the
Peninsular venture might end in a fiasco, like the Duke ofYork's
Dutch expedition of 1799, and thought that such a failure
would lose them their offices. Hence they were nervous about
evel,)' ft~lsc rUlllour that reuched them from Fram:e c.:ollcel'lling
the Emperor's approaching departure; and the more certain
infonnation about the immense numbers of troops that were
passing the Pyrenccs filled them with dread. It re<luired all
W"cllington's robust self-confidence to keep them reassured. He
had to be perpetually repeating to them that all his preparations
for retreat and embarkation, if the worst should happen, had
been already thought out-they might make up their minds
that he would do nothing rash. 'But he was inclined to think
that there would in the end be no need to depart. ' I shall
delay the embarkation,' he wrotc,' as long as it is in lily power,
and shall do everything that is ill my power to avert the
nel:essity of embarking at all. If the enemy should invade this
count.ry with a fonoe less than that which I should think :so
superior to ours as to create a necessity for embarking, I slmll
fight a battlc to SAve the country, and for this I have madc tile
prcpamtiolls.' Hc did not think he could be beatcn; but if, by
SOlUe mischance, the fortunc of war wcnt against him, he had
still no doubt that he could bring off the army in safety. 'If
we do go, 1 feel a little anxiety to go like gentlemen, out of the
hall door (purticularly after all the prepl\rations I have made to
enable us to do so), and not out of the back door or by the
area.'
It is cllrious to find that in th.is most interesting dispt~tch to
Lord Liverpool 'Vellillgtoll distinctly asserts that his worst
enemy was the ghost of Sir John Moore l . 'The great dis-
advantage under which I labour is that Sir John Moore, who
was here before me, ga\'e his opinion that Portugal could not
be defended by the amlY under his command. It is obvious that
the country was in a very different situation at that time from
what it is at prescnt, llnd that I am ill a very different situation
from that in which he found himself ... , yet persons who ought
1 See also vol. H. page 286, of tllis book.
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to be better acquainted with these facts entertain a certain
prejudice against the adoption of any plan for opposing the
enemy of which Portugal is to be the theatre. I have as much
respect as any man for the opinion and judgement of Sir John
:Maore, and I should mistrust my own if it were opposed tu his
in a case where he had had the opportunity of knowing and
considering. But he positively knew nothing about Portugal,
and could know nothing abont its existing state I.'
The most vexatious thing for "Vellington was that' the
persons who ought to have known better,' yet were perpctllally
uttering melancholy vaticillatiolls as to the approach of disaster,
included some of his own senior officers. I have seen a letter
from a general in Portugal to his friend in England containing
such phrases as this: '1 most strongly suspect that before many
months are over our heads there will be no opportunity for this
employment (that of a cavalry brigadier) left to any Ol1e, on the
Continent at least. The next campaign will close the e"entful
scene in the Peninsula, as far as we arc concerned; for I tun
decidedly of opinion that ncither (Marshal) Wellington nor
(Marshal) Bcresford will prevent thc approaching subjugation
of Portugal.' Or again: 'I am quite surprised at Lord ·W.'s
pliant disposition.. 1 suspect he feels himself tottering on his
throne, and wishes to conciliate at any sacrifice 2.' The frequent
complaints in Wellington's correspondence as to the sort of'
letters that were going home to England in the spring of 1810
sufficiently show that these down-hearted "iews were not un~
L'OmmOIl among his subordinates. If the generals Oll the spot
foresaw disaster, it is no wonder that the ministers ill London
felt anxious, and refused to be L"Omforted by the confident
dispatches of the Commander-ill-Chief.
1 All tllese quotations are {roln Wellington ro LoTll Lh'crpool, April 2,
1810, a long dispatch written from Vaeu, e\'cry word of which is well
worth 8tudy.
t I found these pasHlgCS ill letters to Sir Jollll Le Marchant, then ill
command at the Staff College at High Wycomoo, from a highlr-placed
Criend in Portugal. It is notable that other contemporary epistles from
younger men, old pupils of Le Marchant, show a Car more cheery spirit.
The correspondence (from which I shall have many other passages to quote)
was pl:u:ed at my disposition by the kindness of Sir Henry Le Marchant,
grandson of Sir John.
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The preparations which 'Yellington was making during the
winter of 1809-10 and the ensuing spring, for the reception of
the inevitable French invasion, may be arranged, in the main,
under three heads. 'Ve must first treat of the complete
reorganization of the Portuguese military forces, not only the
regulars but the militia, and the old levee en 7Il0$$C of the
Ordenanza. Second come the elaborate plans for the construc-
tion of enormous field-works for the protection of Lisbon, the
famous lines of Torres Vedras, and the fortification of certain
other, and more advanced, points. The third, and in some ways
the most important of all, was the arran.6rement of the great
scheme for devastating the country-side in front of the in;;ader,
and fighting him by the weapon of starvation, a device new to
the French, but not unprecedented in the earlier history of
Portugal.
The Portuguese regular army had taken hardly any part in the
campaigns of 1809. The only sections of it that had been under
fire were SUveira's two regiments, the fOltr battalions that marched
with Wellington to Oporto in May,and Wilson's.Loyal Lusitanian
Legion, which had fought with more valour than success at the
bridge of Alcantara and the Pass of Bafios I. Beresford, with
the greater part of the troops that were in a condition to take
the field, had been out on the border in July, and had remained
for some days in Spain, on the side of Coria and Zarza Mayor,
but he had nevel' been in contact with the enemy~. The fighting
power of the reorgani7.erll'orl;uguese army was still a doubtful
quantity.
The field-strength of the Portuguese regular forces should
ha\'e been, according to its establishments, 56,000 men. III
September 1809 there were only 42,000 men with the colours a,
and of these much more than half were recruits, who had recently
been thrust into the depleted cadres of the old army. There
were many regiments which had been practically destroyed by
the French, and which showed, when Beresford first marched out
to the frontier, only 200 or SOO men instead of their normal
t See vol. ii. pages 440-1 and 620.
! Sec vol. H. pages 000-1. BeresIortl had somc 18,000 mCIl witll
him.
~ ~ce mbles ill vol. ii. pages 629-31.
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1,500 I. l\:[uuy others had less than half their complement.
The first thing that required to be done was to fill up the gaps,
and this was accomplished during the winter of 1809-10 by
a stringent use of the conscription law already existing. The
line regiments in the llussaco campaign showed, with hardly an
exception, 1,200 or 1,300 effectives present-i.e. if the sick and
'details' are added they were nearly or quite np to their
establishment of 1,500 2. The cavalry was less eflective: the
Humber of men could be filled up, but horses were hard to
find, and in the cnd ""Vcllillgton· sent four of the twelvc
regiments to do dismounted duty in gurrisoll, and servoo out
their 'mounts to the remaining eight, which ne\'erlheless (:Qlud
never show more than 300 or 400 sabres present, out of
their nominal 594. Portugal is not a horse-breedipg country,
and the British cavalry was competing with the native for
the small supply of remounts that CQuld be procured. The
artillery, on the other hand, was high in strength and very
satisfactory.
Mere numbers are no test of the efficiency of' a host. The
weak point of the old llati0l1l1l army had been-as we mentioned
in another place-the cHew and unmilitary character of its
booy of officers-more especially of its senior officers J • The
junior mnks, filled up since the French invasion with young
mcn who had tAkcn up the milibuy career from patriotic
motivcs, were iufinitely bettcr. By thc second )'cllr of the war
there were mall)' admirable officers alllong them. But it WM
men capable of handling a battalion or a regiment that wcre
wanting. We saw how Beresforo had been forced to introduce
many British officers into the service, though he was aware that
the personal pride of the Portuguese officers was bitterly hurt
thereby. His justification ma)' be deduced from a confidential
I On Sept. 10,1809, the Z2nd, Wllich had been llestroyed by Soult at
Oporto, had onl)' lOO men. The 8th had but 360, the 15th 6i1, the 24th
605.
~ Ten regiments present at Bussaco llad over 1,100 men eaell, only one
less than 800. l11is was the 22nd, mentioned above as practically 1I0U-
existent a yenr before. It had only recruited up to the strength of one
battalion: /1.11 the rest IlIld two. TIle strongest regiment WII.S the 11 tit
witll 1,<138 mell.
s See 1'01. ii. pages :nO-I5.
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memorandum written tor him by his ch.ief-ot:·the-staff, llenjamin
D'Urban J, which is well worth quoting:-
'There aloe yet among the field officers, CIlptains, and older
subalterns a number of incorrigible officers of the old school,
who are a dead weight Upoll their respective regiments, and
mischiemus in the way ot' example, Whenever it may be
thought expedient, from time to time, to get rid of them, thel'e
will be no difficulty in finding e."{cellent young men to replace
them t'I'om the ranks l"espectively below. , , , But I feel it in-
cumbent upon me to give ili you as my decided opinion, resulting
from u. close imcstigation into the causes of the defects of the
Portuguese, that it will be utterly impossible either to makc
a regiment fit for senice, or to preserve it when made so,
without giving it an English commanding-officer and at least
two English captains,
"'TIle Portuguese soldier is naturally indolent. He falls with
the greatest facility into slouching and slovenly habits, unless he
is constantly roust¥ and forced to exert himself, But many
a Portuguese officer, if not constantly spurred and urged to do
his duty, is at least as indolent as his men. Nothing (I am
persuaded by experience) will counteract this, and create
activity among the officers and consequent diligence and care
among the men, but the strictness, energy and vigilance of an
English commanding-officer.
'E"en supposing a. sufficient energy of character in the l1ati\'c
officer, he does not aud will not, if he be not a Fidalgo himsclf,
exercise coercive or strong measures to obli,bte one of that class
to do his duty, He is aware that in doing so he makes a
powerful enemy, and all the habits of thought in which he has
been educated inspire him with such a dread of this, that no
sense of duty will urge him to encounter it. Thus, whenever
a regiment is commanded by a llon-Fidalgo, it never fails to
suffer extremely: f01" the noblemen are permitted to do as they
please, and afford a very bad example, for they are at least as
indolent as the ordinary Portuguese,
I This unpublished document here quoted, aloug with the whole 01
Sir Belljamin'll journal and correspondence, has been placed at mr dis-
posal by his grandson, Mr. D'Uroon. The}' are il\valuable for the
Portuguese aspect of the War.
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'The English captahlS will be found invaluable, especially
ill t.he hands of un English commandant. Their example is
infinitely lIseful. The Portuguese cllptains are piqued inlo
activity and attention, when they see their companies excelled in
efficiency by those of the Euglish. and they do from elllulation
what a sense of duty would perhaps never briug them tu.
There are a vuriety of by-paths and oblique metlns by which
the parts of a Portuguese corps arc constantly, and almost
insensibly, endeavouring to return to the old habits that they
are so Uluch attached to. To nip this, from time to time, ill
the bud, it is necessary to be aware of it; without the faithful
surveillance of English subordinate officers (who, ever mixing
with the mass of the men, can't well be ignorant of what is
going on) the commanding-officer can rarely be warned in
time.'
Beresford replied that all this was true, but that' the national
feeling required management,' and that to place every regi-
mental or brigade cormnand in British hands would provoke
such fierce jealousy that be was 'compelled to humour the
prejudices and satisfy the pride of the nation.' His device for
doing this was to make a general rule that wherever u Portu-
guese officer Wits ill chief command he should luwc a British
offk-er second in COlllmand under him, and vice versa 1. When
a brigade was given to a Portuguese, he malla.gcd that the two
colonels of the regiments forming it should he Englishmen;
similarly, if a Portuguese commanded a regiment his senior
major was always an Englishman. By this means it was secured
that a fair half of the higher pieces of promotion should be
left to the nati,'e officers, but that e\'e1'Y Portuguese placed in a
responsible position should have a Dl"itish officer at his buck.
Iu addition there were fmlll two to four British cuptains in each
battalion, but no subalterns; for, to encomugc good men to
volunteer into the Portuguese service, it was provided that all
who did so should receive a step of prolllotion, and a British
lieutenant became a IJortuguese captain on exchau&re, and a
British captain a Portuguese major. The system seems to have
, 'This rule] fiml definitely laid down iu a letter of Hardiuge, Berel!-
ford's Quartennaster.general, written as late as 1812, but tIle }lractice was
already in full use by 1810.
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worked well, und with fUI' less frictioll thull might huvc been
~.xpeeted I. The better cite;:.; of' lIati~·e ofTk'i:I"S wcrc piqul.'<1 into
emulation, just as D'Urhwl hwl expected; the worst was
gradually eliminated~. It must be noted that to every battalion
there were added one or two British sergeants, whose services were
needed for the drilling of the men in the English exercises,
which now superseded the old German system left behind by
La Lippe, the last reorganizel' of the Portuguese army. For the
whole drill of the infantry was changed, and the British formations
and manceuvres introduced. Dundas's' Eighteen Manceuvres'
were translated, Ilnd became the Bible of the Lusitanian no less
than thc British offiecr~. The employment of the two-deep line,
the essential feature of the system, was muuc the base of all
Portuguese drill; at Bussaco it justified itself. The Caradorc::>
were trained on the' RiSe Regulations' of Coote Manningham,
and their uniform was modified in cut, though not in colour, to
a close resemblance of that of the British rifleman·. The net
result of all these changes was that for the future the British
and Portuguese units of W"ellington's army could be moved by
the same won:ls of command, and in the same formations, and
that all the disadvantugcs resulting from the coexistence of two
different systems of urilI disappeared.
Two principal difficulties still remained in the administration
of the Portuguese army. The first was, what to do with the
few senior officers of llildoubted patriotism but more doubtful
capacit)" who were too important and influential to be placed
upon the shelf, yet might cause a disaster if placed in a critical
position of responsibility. The most notable of them W/lS
Si1vcira, who hud acquired much popularity by his obstinate, if
ill-mallRofJ'Cd, resistance to Soult in the spring of 1809.
\VellillgWn, with many scarchings of heart, pluccd him in com-
I For narratives of the daily life of a British officer in n Portuguese
regimcnt see BuuburY'8 Reminiscence, rif 11 Veteran, lmu B1akistoll'S
TweJt't Yew'" rif Militm"!J AUt'e11Iw"B. Both hau Uu!ir difficulties, but both,
on the wllOle, got on well with their colleagucs. D'Urbau's correspou-
denr,c supplies a frequent commeutary on r~illlental problems.
7 HOI,.. this was done may be read in Dlakiston.
~ See Bunbury, p. 54.
• TIICY were dressed ill dark browll instead of in the rifle green. 'J'he
shako, coat, and trousef!l were of the British model.
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mand of the Tras-os-Montes, where it was most unlikely that
any serious irruption of the :French would take place I. He had
a ltll'ge force ]llaced under him, but it did 1I0t include u. single
regular regiment, find, with militia only p,t his disposition, it
was hopt.'C1 that he would be discouragl,.'{! from attempting any
hazardous experiments. l\[oreovcl', he was gh'cn a British
seeond·i1Hommalld, first John Wilsoll and afterwards l\liller,
to curb his eccentricities so far as was' possible. Baccelar,
another officer of doubtful merit, but more dangerous from
torpidity than from rashness, was given charge of the militia
of the three northern provinces, so that Silveira was techni-
cally under his orders-though the nominal subordinate would
seem to hll\"C paid little attention to his superior. 'I'he most
important post, however, assigned to a Portuguese offieer was
the govcl'Ilorship of Elvas, the strongest fortress of Portugul,
and onc which would stand in the forefront of the battle if
the French made the subsidiary invasion south of the Tagus,
which Wellington was inclined to expect. The command of
this great stronghold and the 6,000 men of its garrison (of
whom half were regulars) was given to General !.eite, an active
and ingenious officer, and (what was more important) a man
who obeyed orders. Of all the Portuguese he was the Due
whom \Vellillgton most trusted; every British narrator oC the
war who came in contact with him has a word of praise in
his behalf. Of the other native generals, Lccor, in command
of a division, and FOllseca, in commnnd of a brigude, were
with the field arlllY. Miranda was given churge of the militia
of Northern Estremadura, who were likely to be in the thickest
of the trouble. But the other Portuguese units of the allied
host were under British officers: llack, Archibald and Alexander
Campbell, MaeMahon, Coleman, Harvey, Collins, and Bradford
I Si!voira wa.s the dl.'Sll<lir of Rore~fonl alld Ilis chief-of-thc-staff O·Urbnu.
Thll btl.llr write;; (Apr. HI, l81O): '111is glllHm,,1 i~ the mu~t olttl'1lOrdillll,ry
of all tllll peoplll in tllis extraordinary cUlllltry. ])erpetually fiuctuatillg
-itll:apah}e of stn.lldillg still-a.lw;J.y~ wi~hing tu move backward ur forwur.I
-all his mOl'emelLts to 110 purpose but tlmt of llaI"{'s~illg llis troops. The
mall is either very weak or very designing-perhaps both. AnyllOw he is
a mischievous c1uulatall, and I wish tlle Marshal would !lot yield to the
llrejudices of tlle people by employing him.'
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had charge of the regular brigades of the field army. The
native genemls, save those aboye mentioned, were placed in
administrathe posts, or in charge of those sections of the
militia which were probably destined to see no service.
The second point of difficulty in the organization of the
Portuguese army was the commissariat. In the old days it
had been a purely civilian bmnch of the scn'iee, non-military
illtclldants dculiug with contractors and merchn.nts. For this
had been substituted a Junta de Vivcres mainly composed of
officers, which pronxl 9.5 ineffective, if not as corrupt, as the
body which had preceded it. The British government had
taken over the responsibility of paying half the Portuguese
armyl, but not that of feeding it. and despite of the handsome
subsidies that it paid to the Regency for the general purposes
of the war, the native troops, especially those quartered far
from Lisbon, were often in a state of semi-starvation. •The
Portuguese corps ought to have a commissariat attached to
them, and [believe each brigade has a commissary,' wrote
Wellington, 'but they have no magazines and no money to
plll'chase snpplies 2.' One main difficulty arose from the fact
that the Junta de Viveres shrank from the heavy expense of
organizing a proper b:ansport train, and tried to make shift
with requisitioned carts und oxen, which were difficult lo get
(since the Brjti~h army was competing with the Portuguese for
draught animals) and still harder to retain-for the peasant
driver always absconded with his beasts when he found an
opportunity. Another difficulty was that the Junta tried to feed
the troops with requisitioned corn, instead of paying for it with
money down; hence it got grudging service. 'I know from
experience,' observes Wellington, 'that the Portuguese army
could not be in the distress under which it suffers, from want of
provisions, if only a part of the food it receives from the
conntry were paid for,' And he suggested as a remedy that the
British ministers should earmark part of the subsidy for use on
the commissariat and no other ptlrpO!;(!s. It was long before this
, Viz. the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th,
Hlt]l of tlle Hlle, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd C~adores.
2 Wellillgtoll to Hill, Jan. 24,1810.
• Wellington tQ Villiers, Jan. 25, llUO.
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matter was set to rights. Beresford's correspondence in 1810
bristles with complaints lIS to thc incfficicncy of the JUllm de
Viveres t •
If the regular army WllS badly fed, so that desertion and sick-
ness were both too prevalent in some corps, it was not to be
expected that the militia would fare better. WeIliugton had
ordered, and Beresford had arranged for, the embodiment of every
olle of the 48 militia regiments of the national establishment.
They shoul~ properly have given 70,000 mell, but such a figure
was never reached. Some of the regimental districts were too
th,inIy peopled to give the full 1,500 men at which each was
assessed. In others the officers placed in charge were incapable,
or the local magistrates recalcitrant. l\fany regiments could
show only 500 or 600 bayonets in 1810, few over 1,000 2• The
total llUmber uncle!' arms at the time of Massena's invasion may
have reached 45,000 bayonets. Of the 48 regimenl.. eight
belonged to the lancls south of' the Tagus, and were never
bronght up to the front; they furnished the garrisons of Elvas
and Campo Mn.yor, and a corps of obsen'ation 011 the lower
Guadiana, destined to wutch the French ill the dircdioll of
Ayamonte and the Condado de Nicblu., lest ally uncxpected
raid might be made in tl~t1t quarter 3• The th'e regimcnts
from the district immediately round the capital were at work on
the ever-growing lines of Torres Vedras. One regiment was in
garrison at Peniche, two at Abrantes, three at Almeida, The
main force, consisting of the remaining nnits contributed by the
, D'Urhan writes, i\lay 4, 'Such is the pOI'erly, imbecility, amI wallt of
arrangement of the Portuguese gO\'ornmellt, tllat allY regular 8)"stem of
flllppl)" is not to he expected. TIu'l wllOle civil hr"'dlwh of the arm)" is ill
such IL state of OOUfUllioll, that 1 hoIll it impO!>Sible to carr)' on active 0ltera-
tions for more thall a few weeks.'
, I note in D'Uroon's diary, ",lien he was making all inspection tour
with Beresford at the eml of the winter,' At Sardao a very good regiment
of militia, 1,100 strong, that of Maia.' 'Abralltes, two regiments of
militia, Lousiio I,03f), Soure 1,036, all armed.' But, on the other hand,
'Vizeu, Arganil, Trancoso, ordered to be assembled at Almeida, Ilal'eonly-
the first 667, the second 600, the last W5 tirelocks, and the description of
troops the I'e:ry worst.' Of course the numbers were somewhat higher by
the next August.
, These regiments were Lagos, Tavira, Deja, Evora, Villal·iciosa,
j)ortalegre, Alcaur do Sul, Setubal.
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NOI'~h and the Beira, was didded into five corps, destined purtly
for active operations against theellemy's flanks and rear, when he
should enter Portugal, partly for the defence of Oporto and the
Tras-os.l\Iontes, if any assault should be threatened in that
direction, These divisions stood us follows :~thn'C regiments
under Lecor were left in the Castello Branco country, to prob..'ct
it against raids from Spanish Estremadura. Seven under Trant,
all corps from the coast-land between the Douro und the
Mondego, were to cover Oporto from the south, or to oper~te
against the rear of the invading army, if it should leave that
city alone and keep on the direct road to Lisbon. Six under
Sil\'eira guarded the Tras-os-:Montes, and watched the French
detachments in the northem part of the plains of Lean.
Eight under Miller lay around Oporto, ready to support
either Silveira or Trant if occasion should arise I. After the
campaign began, and Massena's intention to leave the North
I It may be well to llame, once for Illl, the cOllllwsitiou of these Militia
Brigades, They were distributed as follows:-
G~lrriSOIl of Abrllntcs; 'Vith Trant, betwecll the DOllrOILlld
l..ollSl10 t)IO i\Iolldego :
Souro A,"eiro
Garrison of Ahncitla ; Feim
Vi7,eu Coimhra
Arganil Porto
Tmncoso :Maia
III the Lines: Penafiel
1,2,3,4 of LislMlll Olil'cira do Azemiil
Torres Vedms With Silveira about Brngallza;
With Lecor about CllSteUo 8rallCO ; Lamego
hlalliJa. Clmves
Covilhiio Villa Real
Castello Broneo Bragjlll2:a.
Under .Miller about Oporto: Miranda
Guimaraells Moncorvo
Viallll 'With Mirallda about Thomar:
Braga Tondclla
.Basto Santarelll
Villll do <":ollde Tllomar
Arcos Leiria
Barccllos
Barcu
Of Miller'sdil'isio!l, 1 think, but am !lot sure, that the Illst four were those
detached under WilsolI ill September.
~2
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,done became evident, half Miller's division was placed under
John ''Vilson (who had originally been Sih'eira's chief-DC-the-
staff and second-in-command) and sent south into the Heirs
to co-operate with Trant. Finally, four regiments under the
Portuguese brigadier 1\:(iranda lay at Thomar, apparently for
the purpose of aiding Lecor or strengthening the garrison of
Abrantes. This dh·jsion ultimately retreated into the lines
of 'l'orres Vedras.
A11 these troops were entirely unfitted for a place in the
line of battle; Wellington refused to mix them with the
regular brigades, save in the garrisolls of A]mcida, Abmntes,
and ElvllS. He directed the brigadiers never to risk them
ill battlc, C\'Cll ugainst a much inferior foree of the French.
Their sole purpose was to cut lines of commuuication, to
render marauding by the enemy's small detachments impos-
sible. and to restrict his power of making reconnaissances far
afield. They werc told that thcy might defend a pass or El ford
for a time, so as to delay the advance of a hostile column,
but that they were never to commit themselves to a serious
combat with any considerable body. Convoys, stragglers,
small detachments, were the game on which they must prey.
The programme was not a brilliant one to lay down before an
ambitious officer, and more than once Silveira, Trant, and
lVilsoll disobeyed orders, and tried to withstand El fulll~rench
division in some chosen position. Such experiments almost
always ended in a disaster. It was not surprising, for the
militia were not troops from whom much could be expected.
The best men in every district had been taken for the regular
army; all the trained officers were also lleeded there. The
militia cadres were composed of civilians who had to learn their
duties just as much as the primtes whom they were supposed
to instruct. All the patriotic and energetic young men of the
governing classes had sought commissions in the line; the less
willing and active were driven into the militia. Service therein
brought neither much credit nor much promotion. If the
Regency half-starved the regulars, it three-quarter-stan-ed the
militia, which was normally in a stale of destitution of cloth·
iug, shoes, and food. J-IardJy a regiment was pro\,jded with
uniforms; as a rule only the officers showed the regulation
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blue and silver. As long as the corps was in its own district
it wus fed somehow, but when moved to some strategical point
ill the rum:,reclmountnins of' the lleiro., it was liable to b"O wholly
to pieces from sheer privation, Fortunately the rortllgnese
pelL<;ant led /l frugal life ilt all times, and expected little;
the desertion, though large, was not ueurly so gl'eat us might
htll'c heeD expected. Thefaet was thut the men were essentially
loyul, and hated the French with a perfect hntrcd, They might
be very poor soldien;, but they wel'C very bitter persollul enemies
of the invader, Nevertheless, they were liable to panics on
very slight provucation. 'At the best they are a very daily
and uncertain SOlt of 6ghting people!,' remarked one of their
leaders, Another wrote in a more forcible lallgua",~ •Scripture
SAYS, Put not your trust in princes-I say. Foot is the man who
puts his trust in a damnable militia,' Each of these sentences was
indited the day after a disastrous and wholly unnecessary rout.
Over and above the regular Ill'my and the militia, the Portu~
glle.<;e military system contemplated the utilir.ation of the whole
lev/:e en maue of the nation under the name of the OrdenallM,
This was no foreshadowing of the modern idea of universal
scrYk'C, but u. sur\'ival of the mediaeval practice which, in
Portugal as in England. made every freeman liable to he called
out in time of extremity, at his own cost and with his own
weapons. Every peasant between sixteen and sixty was
theoretically supposed to be enrolled in one of the companies of
g50 which each group of villages was supposed to possess. The
organi1.ation had been eflectiYe enough in the old mediaeval
wars with Castile: it had even proved serviceable in the' "Var
ot' Independence' that followed the stlccessful rising of 1640.
But against modern regular armies it was comparatively useless;
when rolled out in the war of 1762 the Ordenal17A had not
justified its old reputation. Little could be expected of mobs
armed with pikes alld fowling-pieces, save that they should cut
ofI' a few convoys und stl·/lgglers. 01' occasionally obstl'lIct u defile.
A French officer who deeply studied this fOl'gotten cnmpaign
I D'UrIJaIl to H'i1soll. and Trallt to "'ilooll. after two unfortunate
incidents in 1812, when the militia llad been more or less under arms for
two whole years, The fonner are in D'Urban's the latter ill 'YiIsou's
correspondence.
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\\Tote that, 'whatever the Spaniards may say to the contrary,
this Wilr of the peasanlr)' is by no means important, except
aguiru;t ignorant !Uld l1udisdplined lroops 1.'
Whcn V,Tellington resolved to call out the Ortlenanza in 1810
he was ignorant of nonc of thcse faets. Ncvertheless, he insisted
that the Regency should issue the old royal' Ordinance' to call
Ollt the levy. His object was threefold: .from the political and
moral point of view it was necessary to take this measure,
because it was the ancient and established method of proclaiming
that the country was in danger. It was so understood by the
peasantry, ill whose memories the traditions of the Spanish
invasions were still fresh; they e.'i:peeted to be summoned, and
would have doubted the imminence of the emergency if they had
not been. The call was at once uu appeal to their patriotism,
und equivalent to a proclamation of martial law. Secondly,
Wellington hoped to find assistance to a certain degree for the
work which he had set aside for the militia, by the aid of the
Ordenanza. Pervading the whole country-side, and knowing
every goat-track and inaccessible fastness, their motley com-
panies would surround the invading army as it marched, prevent
marauding by small parties, and render inter-communication
between columns impossible, save by large detachments. :French
narrators of the campaign speak of 'the cruel callousness with
which 'Vellingtoll expo~ed these half-armed peasants to the
wrath of the most efficient army in the wol'1d,' and wax
5entimenw.1 over the miseries of the Portuguese. But sentiment
from such tl. quarter is suspicious: it is absurd to find old
soldiers writing us if the nmin duty of tl. general defending a
country were to spare its peasantry as much inconvenience as
possible. Did not Napoleon in 1814 make every cndeavour to
raise Lorraine and Champagne en maase in the rear of the Allies,
Qnd has any French critic ever blamed him for doing so? 'Vas
the actualmiscry su/lbrcd by the inhabitants of lleirn. so much
greater than what tllC)' would have endured if they had remained
ut home, and oflbred 110 resistance? The country-side would
have been stripped bare by an arlllY forced to make 'wllr
I DnmouriC'I., Sf'lle of PQr/uglll, page 22. There WIL'!, I,owc\'er, one
notable coml~.tat Villa l'ollca ill tl,c Tras-os_MoJl~where a wllOle Si'alli~h
column of 3,0CMl men was defeated by tbe Ordeu:LlI'ta.
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support war,' and one can hardly believe, judging from parallel
incidents in Spain, that outrages would have been conspicuous
by their absence.
But it would seem that the third of 'Vellington's reasons for
calling out the Ordenanza was far more cogent, and lay nearer
to the heart of his scheme than the other two. Throughout
.Portuguese history the summons to the levy en masse had always
been combined with another measure, from which indeed it
eould not be disentangled-the order to the whole population
to evacuate and devastate the land in face of the advancing
enemy. The use of the weapon of starvation against the French
was An essential payt of\Vellington's plan for defending Portugal.
When he told the British MiJlistry that he wOllld undertake the
defence of the realm, this was one of the main conditions of his
pk.J.gc. He bud I"enlized tilc greut fact that the conduct of the
war in the Peninsula depended on supplies: the old aphorism
that· beyond the Pyrenees large armies starve and small armies
get beaten' was at the back of all his schemes for the year 1810.
He calculated that the French would find the greatest difficulty
in accumulating stores sufficient to feed an army of invasion
large enough to attack Portugal, and that, even if such stores
could be gatherEd, there would be a still greater difficulty in
getting them to the front as they were needed. 1"01' not only
would it he hard to collect the mass of transport required for
all army of 70,000, 80,000, or 100,000 men, but the {.'OllVoys
which it formed would find it impossible to move over the vast
stretch of bad roads between Salamanca and Lisbon, when the
communications were cut and the Militia and OrdenanZll. were
infesting every pass and hillside. It was almost certain that
the invaders would make no such attempt to feed themselves
from the rear, but would start with a moderate train, carrying
no more than provisions for a week or two, and hoping to subsist
(in the usual French style) on the resources of the invaded
country. Such resources \Vellington was determined that they
should not find. They would ere long be starved out, and
forced to fall back on their maga7.ines, certainly losing a large
proportion of their men from privations by the way. If this
scheme had been carried out with rigid perfection, Massena's
invasion would have amounted to no more than a promenade to
184 WELLINGTON'S PREPARATIONS [MaY
'l'orres Vedms, and a prompt n~tllrn to the borders of Spain
with u. famished army. Unfortunalely t.he device, t.hough it
worked well and was ultimately quite successful, was 1I0t
perfectly executed in every corner and by every subordinate, so
that the French, showing a magnificent obstinacy, and suffering
untold privations, remained before the Lines for three months
before they retired. Dut retire they did, and with a loss of
a third of their army, and a deplorable dccru:lencc of their
morale, so that Wellington's scheme was fully justified 1.
The plan for defeating the enemy by the system of devnsta-
tion Wil.!l neither I dictated by the hard heart of a general
trained in the atrocious wars of the East,' as certain }~rench
authors have written, nor wns it (as some of the English authors
have supposed) suggested to Wellington by the measures which
had been taken in 1803-4 fOl' withdrawing all food and
transport from the south coast of England, if Kapoleoll should
be successful in crossing from Boulognc. It was an ancicnt
Portuguese devicc, practised from time immemorial agaiust
the Cnstilian invader, which Imd never failed of success. Nor
hud it COUle to an cnd with the 'Var of Illdl:!pendcnce of 1640, or
the war of the Spanish Succession of 1704. 'Vhen Spain had
made her last serious assault on Portugal in 176~ (Godoy's
miserable' mock-war of 1801 does not deserve to be counted).
the plan had worked admirably. When the Conde d'Aranda
invaded the Beira I the country had been "driven" in the most
systematic style, and everything that could not be canied off'
had been destroyed, so that the Spaniard found himself in
a desert, being unable to discover either !Jrovisions, curs, or
peusalltS: the inhabitants had abandoned their villagt..'8, and
carried off everything. 'l'hc enemy had to be supplied with
every neecssary from Spain: the infantry were harassed with
fatigue in remaking the roads, and the cavalry-horses destroyed
1 UlIlike the many French writers who content themselves witll
denouncing Wellington's inhumanity, Pelet (i\1assena's chief confidant)
confesses that the English general's plan was perfectly logical. In llis
Ape1V1t de la OampofJIlt de Pl>rtugal, he writes, 'On a critique sans raisoll
son systeme de guerre. 11 ctait it peu pres infaUlible contre un elluemi
illferieur en nombre. J\1ais peu de generaUlC oseront "sau,·er un paya"
d'uue teUe malliere.'
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in conducting provisions. At last d'Aranda retreated, leaving
his sick and wounded ut Castello Branco, with a letter com-
mending them to the attention of the allies I,' Of this same
war Dumouriez wrote: 'As soon as the Spaniards enter Portugal
the King publishes a declaration, by which he enjoins on his
subjects to fall upon the imaders, and the national hatred
always excites them to execute the "Ordinance." As the
Spanish army pushes on, the villages are depopulated, and the
inhabitants fall back on the capital. The peasanb'y arrive
there in crowds with wives and children, so that the king at
the end of three months has ~OO,OOO or 300,000 extra mouths
to feed 2,'
This sounds like a description of the great migration of
1810, but was actually written in 1766. It is clear, then, that
'Ve1lington did not invent the system of devastation, but simply
utilized, and carried oul to its logical cnd, Ull old custom
csscnti!tlly national, and familiar to thc Portuguese from time
immemorial. It was thc regular dcvit'C of the weak against the
strong in the Middlc Ages, and differed in nothing from' Good
King Robert's Testament,' the time-honoured system applied
by the Scots to the English in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.
• In strait placis gar hide all store,
And hyrnen ye plaineland thaim before,
Thanne sall thei pass away in haist,
'Vhcn that thai find na thing but waist,
So saIl ye turn thaim with grot a/frai,
As thai were chasit with SlVerd alVai.'
Fortunately for himself, for England, and for Europe, Wellington
had to deal with a peasantry almost as frugal, as tough, and as
stubborn in their hatred as the mediaeval Scot. They saw
nothing strange in the demand now made to them, and obeyed.
'fhe difficulty lay with the townsfolk of large places, such as
Coimbra, Thomar, or Santarem, which lay far from the frontier,
and had not the old traditions of the peasantry, since the
Spaniards had never penetrated to their doors since the seven·
1 Continuation of Vmot's Bi8tory of Portugal, ii. 61.
, DUllIourh.':\\'s State of PQrltl!Jllt, p. 2J, ll.
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tccnth century. Here there was much recalcitrancc, as was but
natural; the burgher had much to abaudon where the peasant
had. little. Yet, as we shall see, the scheme was carried out ill
the end, and those who stayed behind to greet the .French could
be counted all one hand in places of the size of Vizeu, Coimbra,
or Leiria. 'fhat fanatical patriotism went far towards pro-
ducing such a result is true, but doe1\ not explain the whole
mattel': quite as stl'Ong a motive WIL'; the unforgotten tale of
the horrors that had followed Soult's entry into Oporto. '1'0
the Portuguese citizens the approach of thc French meant
probable murder and rape, hence came the readiness that they
showcO to depart. There were exaggerated rumours abroad
of the ruthlessness of the French: was not Loison, the' l\faneta '
of whom so many atrocious (and mostly false) stories were told,
known to be in high command?
Wellington's scheme for the clearing of the countr)'·side in
fa.ce of the enemy had long been thought out, It included
not merely the evacuation of the towns and ,·illages, but the
destruction of bridges, mills, even ovens; the removal of all
animals and menns of transport, the destruction of all food-stuff'
that could not be carried off, the buming of all ferry-boats and
other small cruft on the lluvigilblc rivers. 'The moment that
the enemy crosses the frontier,' he wrote to Bel'csford, 'the
governor of the province of Estremadnra must he told that it
is necessary to order all carts, carriages, and other means of
conveyance, with all the provisions they can carr)', away, He
ought to ha"e all his arrangements prepared for ordering them
oft' as soon as the .French approach. The Captains Mal'l and
their Ordellan7A mllst be prepared to give the enemy all the
opposition in their power, not by assembling in large bodies,
but by lying out in the mountains and the strong parts of the
roads, annoying thcir patrols and small parties,and interrupting
their communications 2.' This comes from an order of February:
by August, whcn a new hurl'cst had been gathered in, the
<.Juestion of thc dcstructiou of food stuffs becamc more difficult.
The peasantry, as was natural, persisted in hiding mther than
I ,",or these officers and their t1ntiCil sce voI. ii. Ill" 221~2.
" \Vellillg!oll tu Heresfortl, Vi'wn, Fell. 28,1810, lung hefore the :wtual
illl·asioll.
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burning what could 110t be carried off. By one means or another
a certain number of these concealed stores, even when buried
in pits or removed to remote ravines, were discovered by the
French, and enabled them to prolong their precarious stay in
front of the 'l'orres Vedras lines.
As to the displacement of the population, Wellington COll-
sidered that in many parts it would be sufficient ifit took to the
hills for a few days, while the French army was passing, His
military arrangements were such that he thought it impossible
that the enemy would be able either to leave small posts behind
him, or to maintain his lines of communication with Spain, ]t
would suffice, therefore, that the peasantry in po'lrts off the main
roads, and remote from large towns or points of strategical
importance, should make ready for a merely temporary migration,
They must always, however, be ready to flit again, if fresh
colullIlls of the cnemy, ndvancing or retreating, should come
near their abodes. 111e townsfolk and thc inlmbitwlts of the
fertilc coast plains of Estrcnllldura and Wcstern Bcira were
recolllluendcd to retire either to Lisbon or to Oporto, !lC(.'Onling
ns they were nearer to one or to the other. It was clear that
the problem of feeding them there would be a matter for the
Government, for individuals of the poorer classes could not be
expected to earry or to buy provisions for many weeks. Hence
there was a lleed for the accumulation of immense stores, over
and above those required for the army. The Portnguese Uegeney
did what it could, but ill its usual slip-shod and inefficient
fashion, and there is no doubt that mneh misery and a certain
amount of stArvation fell to the lot of the unhaPPY,emigrants,
Fortunately Lisbon !Uld Oporto were great llorls and full of
food; but despite of this, the position of the refugees bccuuJe
deplorable, when Massenl\. tarried ut Salltarclll two months longer
thun 'VellingWn had considered probable. But their sufferiug
was not in vain: the Freneh were starved ou~ even if it was
a few weeks later than had been expected.
Ha,·ing dealt with the organization of thc military fort'C of
Portugal, find the I\rl'angelllcnt." for the depopulation of the
L'Otllltry, we have still to explain the third section of \Vellingoon's
gl1~at scheme of defellcc~thatconsisting of fortifications, WOe
have already mentioned that Ahneida and Elvas had been
188 WELLI~GTON'S PREPAHATIONS [MAY
repaired and ganisoned, the forlller with 5,000 mcn, wllsistiug
of oue regimcnt of regulars and three of militia, undcr thc
English general ,"Villiam Cox, the other by 8,000 Illcll,-lwo
regiments of regulars and five of militia,-under Gcneral Leite.
These were the outer bulwarks of the realm. Cmnpo Mayor, n.
small and antiquated fortress, n sort of outlying dependency of
Elvas, was held by Olle militia battalion under a Colonel'l'alaya,
a retired engineer officer. It was not expected to make a seriolls
resistance, but did so in the time of need, and detained a French
division before its walls for some precious days in the spring of
1811, to the great glory and credit of its governor.
Qnly two other of ilie ancient fortresses of Portugal were
plaeed in a state of defence, amlll1adc to play a notable part in
,"Vellington's general scheme for checking the French. These
were Peniche and Abrantes. The former is a very strong isolated
sea*fortress, Oll a projecting headland in the Atlantic, forty miles
north of Lisbon. It commands seyeral good creeks and landing*
places, suitable for the embarkation and disembarkation of
troops, and is nearly impregnable, because of the narrowness
of the isthmus connecting it with the mainland. Placed where
it is, just in the rear of the position which a.n enemy must take
who is meditating an attack 011 Lisbon, it offers unique oppor-
tunities for making incursions on his rear and his communica*
liolls. l\fol'(.'Ovcr, it afforded a refuge llnd a sa.fe point ofdeparture
by ~u, for any section of the alliL,<l troops which might becomc
isolated, and be pressed towards the waleI' by the advancing
enemy. Some of \VeUington's officers considered that it was all
even better 'place for embarkation than Lisbon, if the French
should prove too strong, and the British should be compelled to
abandon Portugal. The Commander-in-Chief thought otherwise,
but caused its fortincation to be carefully restored, and garrisoned
it with a picked regiment of militia '.
I D'Urban says ill llis diary (De<:. 8, 18(0) : < Inspected l'elliche. 'l1Je
isthmus over which the peninsula is apprOac1lcd is covcred widl water at
high tide, and from the line of works describing a sort of arc, vcr)' powcrful
cross-fires may be established upon every part of it. 'J1Jere are nearly 100
good guns upon the work, the brass ones especiaU)' good. 'l1lis is the most
favourable position that clln be conceived for emburking the British anny,
should it CI'er lie IltlCei:lSlIry to do so. The circumference aLoumlll with
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Even more important than lleniche was Abrantesl the one
great crossing-place of the 'l'aWJs above Lisbon where there wt\S
a permnnent bridge, and free communication by good roads
between Beira. and Alemtejo. It lies at the point where the
road from Spain by way of Castello Branco crosses the road
from north to south down the Portuguese frontier, from Almeida
and Guarda to Evora and Elvas. All invader who has advanced
towards Lisbon through Beira has it ou his flank and rear,
equally so an invader who has advanced on the same objective
fl"Om Uadajoz and the Guadiana. It is the natural point at
which to move troops north and south along the frontier, though
Wellington had established an altenlatiye temporary crossiJlg-
point at Villa Velha, thirty miles higher up the river, by means
of pontoons. But this secondar), passage was inferior in safety,
sillt.'e it was 110t protected by n fortress like Abrantes. Orders
were given to burn the pontoons if ever SI. French force from the
East should came near. At Abrantes, on the other hand, the
boat-bridge could be pulled up and stacked under the cit), walls in
the event of an attack, and did not need to be destroyed. The
town is situated on a lofty eminence upon the north bank of the
Tagus. Its fortifications were antiquated in 1809, but had been
for mrmy months in process of being rebuilt and strengthened
by the English engineer PaUOll. With llew earthworks and
rerloubts it had been made a strong place, which could not be
taken without n regular siege and plenty of heavy artillery.
Hcre Wdlingtou had placed a garrison of two militia regiments
under the Portuguese general Lobo, whose orders were to resist
to the last, and to make sure of burning the boat-bridge, down
to the lust plank, before surrendering. The French never put
him to the test, since they had no heavy guns with them, and
creeks and clefts in the rocks, iUllhlc which thore is always smootll water,
aod CllSyegress for boats. They arc out of the reach of firc from the
mainland: indeed, tllcre il; sufficient room to encamp a large foroo per~
fedly beyond tile range of the enem)'. If it should be thought worth
while, t1lis peninsula cou1l1 11e held by England, even if Portugal otller·
wisc were in the l)()wer of the enemy. There is abundance of water. Ifit
be the wisll of Lord Wellington be can retire upou Lisbon, give battle in
front of it, aud, if the day go against Ilim, retreat upon Pcniche and defend
it so long lIS he plc.'J.Scs.·
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therefore regarded it as hopeless to attempt UII attack Oil the
place I.
Almeida and El vas, Pelliche and Abrantes, were regular
fortresses with large garrisons. There were, however, other points
where vVellington ordered fortifications of a less permanent kind
to be thrown up, because he thought them at' first-rate strategical
importance. The two most important were one on the northern
line of advance which the French might take, the other on Lhe
central or Castello BrallCO line. The first was a line of redollbts
behind the river Alva,just where it joins the Mondego, 011 either
side of the brid,!:,"C and village of Ponte de MUr<:ella. It was here,
he thought, that Massentl would choose his road, along the
south bank of the :Mondego, if he marched on Lisbon by the
Beira line. But the Marshal moved by Vizeu, partly (as it
seems) because he had heard of the fortifications of this defile,
and the works were ne\'er used. Equally unprofitable (so it
chanced) was another important series of field-works, constructed
to cover the lowest reach of the Ze1.ere against an invader who
shollld come by the Castello Branco road, and should ha\'e
masked 01' taken Abrantes, This was a lille of redonbts and
trenches, almost a fortified camp, on the cast bank of the river
from Tanco!> to opposite MartincheI, blocking both the rollds
which lead from Castello Branco into Estremarlura. Massena,
coming not by the route which was guarded against, but from
Leiria and Thomar, took the lines of Zezere in the rear, and
they proved useless.
Along with the precautions taken on the banks of the Aim
and the Zezcre, two other pieces of engineering must be men-
tioned. The one, the destruction of the Estrada Nova,-the
mountuin-road which leads from FUlldiio and Ilelmonte to the
lower Zezcre without passing through Custello Drnnco,-hllS
alread)' been noticed, when wc wcre dealing with the possible
liues of invasion in Portugal. The other move was cOllstructive,
not destructive, in character, Foreseeing that Abrantcs might
be masked, or besiegt.'<1 on the northern bank of the Tagus, and
1 D'Urblln has a long disquisition on Abnllltes ill his diary. Its weak
points, he says, were au ontlyillg hill 011 thc ])ullllew road, which gave
a fal'oumble position for hostile batteries, and the frill.ble nature of the
grnvelly 6OiI, w],jeh dill not bind well in trellchcs antI outworks.
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all t.he roads in that direction thereby blocked, while it might
still be very profitable to have free communication between
Lisbon and the Castello Braneo region, he caused the road above
the south bank of the Tagus, from opposite Abrantes to the
flying-bridge at Villa Velhu. to be thoroughly reconstructed. This
route, by Gavill0 ant! Niza, was so much easier in its slopes than
the oM high-roud Abmntes-Castello Bmnco, that., even when the
latter was safe, troops movillg from east to west, along the Tagus
often used it during the next two years of the war, though it
invohed two Passab"CS of the river inslcad of onc.
But all the matters of engineering hitherto mentioned were
unimportant and merely subsidiary, whell placed beside the one
great piece of work which formed the keystone of Wellington's
plan for the defence of Portugal. His whole scheme depended
on theexistellcc of an impregnable place of refuge, available both
for his army, and for the emigrant population of the country-
side which he \\'as about to devastate. He must have a line OIL
which the invader could be finally checked and forced to halt
and starve. If such a line had not existed. his whole scheme
would have been impracticable, and after a lost battle he might
have been driven to that hurried embarkation which the
ministers in London foresaw and dreaded. But his eye had been
fixed upon the ground in front of Lisbon ever since his second
landing in the Peninsula in April 1809, and there he thought
that the necessary stronghold might be found. A full year
before Massena's invasion he had informed the British cabinet
that though he could not undertake to defend all Portugal, ' for
the whole country is frontier, and it would be difficult to pre\'ent
the enemy from entering by some point or other,' he yet con-
ceived that he might protect the essential part of the realm, the
capital, against anything save the most overwhelming odds 1,
The scheme had taken definite shape ill his head when, on
October 20, 1809, he wrote his famous dispatch to Colonel
Fleteher, the commanding engineer at Lisbon, directing him to
draw up without delay a scheme for the construction of two
successive lines of trenches and redoubts, covering the whole
stretch of country from the Atlantic to a point on the estuary
of the Tagus twenty miles or more north of the capital. This
I For these views of Aug, "nd Sellt, looIJ, sce vo1, ii, p. 610.
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was, in its essentials, the order for the construction of the lines of
Torres Vedras, for though the front designated does not exactly
tally with that ultimately taken up, it only differs from it in
points of detail. }'leteher is directed to survey a line from the
mouth of the Castanheira brook to the mouth of the Zi7..andre,
and another, a few miles behind, from Alhandl'a on the Taglls by
Bucellas and Cabcza de Montcchiqlle towards Mafra. These
roughly represent the two lines of defence ultimately constrncted,
though ill the end the extreme dght flank was drown back from
thc Castallheira to the Alho.l1dra stream. Fleteher is told that
the works will be Oil the largest scale: the fortified camp above
Torres Vcdras is to hold 5,000 men, the works at Cabeza de
l\fontechique alone will require 5,000 workmen to be set to dig
at once; great operations, such as the damming up of rivers and
the creation of marshes many miles long, are suggested,
How the great scheme worked out, and how the works
stood when Masscna's long-expected army at last appeared in
front of them, will be told in a later chapter, in its due place.
Suffice it here to say that all through the spring and summer of ,
1810 they were being urged forward with feverish haste.
It must not he supp;;sed that it was an easy matter to carry
out aU these preparations. The POliuguese government ended
by adopting all Wellington's suggestions: but it was not without
friction that he achieved his purpose. "While he was planning
wOI·ks at the vcry gates of Lisbon, and making provisions for
the dcvastution of wholc provinces in view of the approaching
invasion, he wus oftcn met by suggestions that it would be
possible to defend the outer frontiers of thc realm, and that his
schemes were calculated to dishearten the Portuguese people,
rather than to encourage them to a firm resistance. The Regency,
moreover, had enough national pride to resent the way in
which a policy was dictated to them, without any reference to
their OWl1 views. The governing party in J)ortugal had accepted
the English alliance withollt reserve, bllt it often winced at the
consequences of' its action. There WlL<; 0. view abroad that the
little nation was beiJlg set in the forcfl"(lllt of the battle of
European independeu<:e mainly for the benefit of Great Britain.
Fortunately the memory of JUllot's dictatorship and Soult's
ravages was still fresh enough to o\"crcome all' other collsidera-
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tions, A moment's reflection convinced Wellington's most
ardcllt critics that though the Bl'itish yoke might sometimes seem
hard, anything was better than 0. return to Freneh servitude.
The Reb'CllCY murnmrcd, but always ended by yielding, and
issued the edicts necessary to eoniirm all the orders of the
general.
The state of the Portuguese govemment at this moment
re<Juires a word of explanatiOll. The original Regency con-
firmed by Sir Hew Dalrymple in 1808 had been somewhat
changed in its personnel. It was now a more numerous body
than at its first installation; of the original members, only the
lla.triareh (Antonio de Castro, late bishop of Oporto), and the
Marque... deOlhil.o (Francisco de Meno e 'Menezes, the Constable
or Monteiro Mol', as he is 1I10rc frequently called), now sllrvi ved.
But four new mcmbers had been appointed. in 1810. '.rhe most
important of them was Jose Antonio de :l\!cllezes e SOllsa,
gencrally known as the I Prineipal Sousa,' an ccclesiastic who
was oue of the band of three Soma brothers, IVho formed the
backbone of the anti-French party in Portugal. The eldest
of them, Rodrigo de Sousa COlltinho, Conde de Linhares, was
prime minister of the Prince Regent at Rio de Janeiro. The
third, Domingos Antonio de Sousa Coutinho, afterwards Conde
de Funchal, was Portuguese minister in London. 'I1ms when
the llrincipal entered the Regency, this busy and capable
family could pull the strings alike at Rio, London, and Lisbon,
in the interests of their relations and dependants. This they did
without scruple and without ceasing. Domestic politics in
Portugal had always been a. matter of family allianees, as
much as of principles. They presented, indeed, a considerable
l'esemblance to those of Great Britain during the Whig domina·
tion of the eighteenth century. Hence there was considerable
danger that the policy of the alliance against Napoleon might
become identified in the eyes of the Portuguese nation with the
domination of the Sousa faction. That this peril was avoided
was not their fault; they did their best to keep all promotion,
civil and military, for their own adherents; hence came inter-
minable quarrels on petty personal questions both with
'Vellington and Beresford. Fortunately the two Marshals
could generally get their way in the end, when large interests
O".ul. III 0
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were at stake, beeuuse the Sousus were pk'l:lgcd to the British
tllliallce, anu uan.'l:l 1I0t break with it. To do 8U would havc
brought other politiciaus to the front. But, meanwhile,
unending controversies wasted "\VeUington's timc anu soured his
temper; more than once he is found writing in his dispatches
to Lord Liverpool that the' impatient, meddling, mischievous'l
Principal ought to be got out of the Regency and promoted to
some foreign emoo.ssy, or great civil post, where he could do
less harm. But the British government thought, and probably
was right in thinking, that it was better to bear with known
e\'ils than to quarrel with the Sousa family, and thel-eby to
break up the pro-British party in Pottugal. Wellington had
to elldure the Principal's small intrigues unu petty criticism till
the cnd.
The other members who entered the Regency in 1810 were
the Conde de Redondo, Fernando MUl'ia de Sousa Coutinho-
another of the Sousa clan-Doctor Raymulldo Nogueira, a law
professor of the University of Coimbra 2 and-far the most im-
portant of all-the newly appointed British Minister at Lisbon,
l\lr. Charles Stunrt. The nomination ofa ioreigner to such a post
touched Portuguese pride to the quick, and was looked upon by
all enemies of the SOUJ'la faction as an aet of miserable weaknes1\
011 the part of the Conne de Linho.res find the Prince Regent.
It was L'Ollsidcred doubtful policy on the part. of the Pcrccml
Cubinet to L'Onscnt to the appointment, considering the otfeuL'c
whidl it ww; certain to give. III their justification it must be
pleaded that both the Patriarch and the Principal Sousa were
men capable of causing any amount of difficulty by their ill-
considered plans and their personal intrigues, and that a
colleague who could be trusted to keep an eye upon their
actions, and to moderate their ambitions was much needed.
Stuart was a man ot'moderate and tactful bearing, but could be
I Wellington to Lord Liverpool, ./Ji4p(ltdla, vi. p. 430.
~ A mall of whom ull Portuguese ,vritcrs speak with rc!!pect j even
NUllier notes him (H. 3Bfl) as ':l Dum of talent a.nd discretion.' But
Wellington seems to have disliked him. 'The admissiou of Dr. Raymuudo
Nogueirn to lllO Regency, and tlle reasons of 1Ji& admission, were trul)'
ludicrous.... llis appointment is to be agreeable to the lower orders-from
lID10ng whom he is selected!' (Wellington to Charles Stuart, Celorico,
Aug. 4, 1810.)
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neither cajoled nor overruled. It was on his inAuence in the
Ucgency that Wellington relied most for liupport. At this
moment there were two questions in process of discllssion which
rendered it most necessary that the Portuguese govenllnen.t
shonlrl not be left entirely to its own guidance. Taking
ad\'fLlltage of the unhappy condition of Spain, and the weakness
of the newly appointed executive at Cadiz, the Portugnese were
!ll-essillg for the restoration of Olivenzn, Godoy's old conquest of'
1801, and for the recognition of the Princess Carlotta ot' Spain,
the wife of the Prince of the Brazils, as the person entitled to
act as Regent of Spain during the captivity of hel' brothers
at Valen~ay. Dom Peclro de Sousa Holsteill, the Portuguese
minister at Cadiz-a kinsman of Linhares and the Principal-
was actively urging both these demands on the Spanish govern-
ment. If he had succeeded in imposing them on Casmfios
.'\11(1 his colleagues there would have been desperate friction
between the allies, But by pl'omising the active support of the
Portuguese army within the Spanish frontier::;-which he had
no power to guarantee, and which 'Vellington had absolutely
refuscd to grant-the mini~tcr won some support at Cadiz.
Extra pressure was brought to bear upon the Spaniards by the
massing of Brazilian troops on the South Americun frontier, 011
the side of Rio Gralldc do SuI-a most unjustifiable !let, which
might have led to Rll actual rupture, a thing which the British
h1Qvernment 'faS bound to prevent by every meuns in its power.
The only way to prevent an open breach between Spain and
Portugal was to check the activity of Sonsa Holstein, an end
which Stunrt found much difficulty in accomplishing, because
the objects for whiCH the minister was striving, and especially
the restoration of Olivenza to its old owners, were entirely
approved by his colle~<JUes in the Regency. When it is added
that there were numerous other points of friction between the
British and the Portuguese governments-such as the question
of free trade with Brazil, that of the suppression of the slave
trade, and that of the (orm to be adopted for the payment of
the subsidies which maintained the Portuguese army-it is
easy to understand that Stuart's position on the Council of
Regency was no easy one. He often found himself in a minority
of onc when a discussion started; he frequently had to acquiesce
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in decisioll~ which he did not approve. merel)' ill order to nl'oid
friction on matters of secondary importance. Bul in matters
of really primal'Y moment he generally succeeded ill ~'Cttil1g his
way, owing to the simple fact that Portugo,l was dependent 011
Great Britain for the l'Olllinuance of her national existencc.
Consciuus of this, the other members of the Hegellcr would
generally yield n rclucbmt assent at the last moment, and
"'ellingtoo's plans, when set forth bJ Stuart, though often
criticized, deJa.ycd, llnd impeded, were in the end t'lLrried out
with more 01' less completeness.
SECTION XIX: CHAPTER III
TH-"~ FIt}o~!\'CH PRP.PAItATTONS; l\IASSENA'S AHMY OF
PORTUCAL
DlIltll'r: the summer campaign of lH09 the French Army (If
Spain had receh·cd hardly any reinforcements from beyond the
.Pyrenees. Every mall that the Emperor could aI'm was being
rlireded against Aushia in May and June. But when Wngralll
had b~\l WOIl, and the armistice of ZIlll.ym signed, and when
moreover it ht\d been discovered that the British expedition to
the [sIe of \Vnlchcren need not draw off ally pm"t of the .A.rmy of
Gm"many. the Emperor began to turn his attention to the
Peninsula. The tmnistice with Austria had been signed 011
July 12: unly six dnys later,Oll the 18th of the same month,
Nllpoleoll was already selLoctillg troops to scud to Spain, and CX~
pressing his intention of going there himself to ' finish the busi-
ness' in person l . But he had made up his mind that it was too
late in the year for him to transport nny great mi1lS!l of men to
the Peninsula in time for operations in the autumn, and had
settled that the expulsion of the English and the conquest of
Cadiz, SeYille, and Valencia must be delayed to the sprillg of
1810. On Septembcr 7 hc wrote 2 to approvc King Joseph's
decision that Soult should not be allowed to make any attempt
ou Portugal in the autumn, and a month later he advised his
brother to defend the line of the Tag-us, and drive back Spanish
incursiollll, but to defer all offensive movements till the reinforce-
ments should ha\'c begun to arri\·e 3.
The composition of the new army that was to enter Spain was
dictated in a minute to the Minister of War 011 October 7, in
, C Faites.moi cOlluaitre l;l nl;lrche que vous f;lites faireal1x GG", 820, 26",
etc., etc. : lor8qut ltlltrel"Ui el~ E8JXlyue cela me pourra faire une force de
18,000 hOnlmes.' Napoleon to Clarke, SchOnbrulln, July 18.
• NalXlleou to Clarke, SchOnbrunn, Sept. 7.
I Napoleon to Clarkc, memoranda for King Josellh, Oct. 3,1800.
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which the Emperor stated that the total force was to be about
100,000 men, including the Guard, that it was all to be on the
roads between Orleans and Bayonne by December, and that he
should take command in person 1. It may be noted that the
troops designated in this memorandum were actually those which
took part in the campaign of 1810, with the exception of the
Old Guard, which wu:, held back whcn ~apoJcon dctermined lo
remain bchind, Ilnd to send a substitute as cOllllllllndcl'-in-chicf
in Spain. Since the bulk of the immense column wus only
directed to reach Bayonne at the end of the year, it was clear that
it would not be within striking distance of the enemy till
March 1810.
Down to the month of December 18D<J, Napoleon's correspon-
dence teems with allusions to his approaching departure for Spain.
They were not merely intended to deceive the public, for they
occur in letters to his most trusted ministers and generals. ""Vc
might be inclined to suspect an intention to cajole the English
Ministry in the magnillcent phrases of the address to the Corps
LCgislatif on December S, whcn the Emperor declares that' the
moment he displays himself beyond the Pyrenees the Leopard ill
tenor will seck the Ocean to !woid shame, defeat, lll1d death.'
But business was ccrtainly meant when Hcrthier wus advised to
send forward his carriages antI horses to Madrid, and when the
Old Guard's departure for the frontier was ordered 2. Suddenly,
in the third week of December, the allusions to the Emperor's
impending departure cease. It would appear that his change
of purpose must be attributed not to the news of Ocaila,
where the last great Spanish army had perisherl, but to a
purely domestic cause: this was the moment at which the
question of the Impcrial Divon::c came into promincnce. It
would seem that when ~apoleoll had conceived the idm uf the
Austrilm mal'l'iuJ:,'C, and had learnt that his offers were likely to be
accepted, he gave up all intention of imading Spain in the earl)'
spring in person. The divorce was first officially mooted when
the' protest' was laid before a ['!'ivy Council on December 15'\
I Same to same, Oct. 7, 1009.
2 Napoleou to Derthier, Nov, 23.
I Napoleon to Clarke, Dec, 5. Minute for the Privy Council dated
Dec. I.5, in tIle OQrrtqXJ/ldmwe.
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alld after that day there is no more mention of a departure for
the South. All through January, February, and March the
negotiations were in progress, and on April 1-!:! 1 the Emperor
married his lIew wife. The festivities which followed lasted
many days, and when they were over the Emperor conducted
his spouse on a long tour through the Northern Departments in
May, and did not return to the vicinity of Paris till June, when
the army of invasion, which had long since reached the Peninsula,
had been already handed over to a new chief.
III the months during which the marriage negotiations Were in
progress, and the columns of reinforcements were pouring into
Navan·e and Old Castile, it is not quite certain what were the
Emperor's real intentions as to the allocation of the command.
Nothing clear can be deduced from an order given to .Tunot in
the middle of February 'to spread everywhere the news of the
arrival of the Emperor with 80,000 men, in order to disquiet
the English and prevent them from nndertaking operations in
the South 2.' This is but n nMe de gllel're; the marriage project
was so far advtlneed that the ratifications of the contract were
signed only four days latet' than the date of the dispatch 3, and
Napoleon lUust ha\"(~ known that he conld not get away from
Paris for unothel· two months at the least. But it was only 011
Apri117 that an Imperial Decree, dated at Compiegne, Wfl.S pub-
lished, announcing that not the whole French fOl'Ce in Spain, but
thrce urm)" corps (the ~Ild, 6th, and 8th), with eertain other
troops, were to form the Army of Portugal and to be placed
under the command of MassenR, Duke of Rivoli and Prince of
lksling. After this it was certain that the Emperor would not
cross the Pyrenees. I'lye days later this was made still more
clcar by an order to the Commandant of the Guard to recall the
old Chasseur and Grenadier regiments of that corps from the
various points that they had rCAched on the way to Bayonne,
and to send on to Spain only the Tiraillcur and Voltigellr
regiments recently raised ill 1809, and generally known as the
1 'I1UI civil ceremony took place on the first, tIle religions on the second
of these two days•
• Napoleon to Derthier, Paris, Feb. 12.
3 On Feb. 16 : see Napoleon to King JO~pll, Paris, Feb. 23.
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• Young Guard' '. Napoleon never took the field III person
without the \'eteran portion of his body-guard.
The lIoll-appeartU1Ce of the Emperor had onc most important
result. If he had taken the field, every marshal and general in
Spain would have been subject to a single directing will, and
would have been forced to combine bis operations with those of
his neighbours, whether he wished or no. On determining to
devote the spring and summer of 1810 to nuptial feasts and
state progresses, instead of to a campaign on the Tag-us, he did
llot nominate any single commandcr.iu-chief to take his place.
Masseua, from his seniority and big splendid military l'Ct:ord,
might have seemed worthy of such promotion. He was not
given it. but only placed in charge of three army corps, and of
certain parts of Old Castile and Leon and the garrison troops
there residing. This was a vast charge, embracing in all the
command of 138,000 men. But it gave Massena no conb'ol over
the rest of the armies of Spain, and no power to secure their co-
operation, save by the tedious method ofappeals to Paris. Indeed,
the Emperor had chosen the precise moment of King Joseph's
conquest of Andalusia to break up such hierarchical organil'.n-
tion of.command as e...xisted in tllC Peninsula. By a. decree of
February 8 he took the provinces of Aragon and Catalonia, with
the army corps there employed, completely out of the sphere of
the authority of King Joseph: Augereau and Suchet were for-
bidden to hold any communication with Madrid, and were
directed to make every report and request to Paris. This would
not have been fatal to the success of the main operations of the
}'rench arm)'. for Aragoll and Catalonia were a side,issue, whose
military history, all through the war, had little cOllncxion with
that of Castile and PortugaL But their scvcnl.nce from the
military hierarchy dependent 011 the King was followed by that
of Navarre. the Basque provinces, Burgos, Valladolid, Plllencia,:
and Toro, which were formed into four' Military Governments"
under Generals Dufour, Thouvenot, Dorsenne, and Kellermann.
These governors were gi \'el1 complete civil and military
autonomy, with power to raise taxes, administer justice, to name
and displace Spanish functionaries, alld to move their troops at
I NalKlleQll to Clarke, April 22, 1810. Not ill tllC aQrre~pond(lIlCt:, but
given at lellgth by Ducasse in llis Memairs qf King Jooeph, vii. 275.
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their own pleasure, under responsibility to the Emperor alone.
The '6th Government' (Valladolid, Palencia, Toro) was after-
wards placed under the authority of Massena; the others remained
independent Viceroyalties. Thus military authority in the
Peninsula was didded up for the future between (1) the Com-
mander of the Army of Portugal, who controlled not only his
army but all the regions which it occupied-Leon, the greater
part of Old Castile, and part of Estremadura; (!!) the military
go\'ernors of Catalonia, Aragon, Na\'arre, Biscay, Burgos; (3)
the King, who practically controlled his Army of the Centre and
the kingdom of New Castile alone, sim;e Soult, in Andalusia,
though not formally created a 'military governor,' practically
acted on his own responsibility, without any reference to the
King's wishes. All the viceroys reported directly to Paris, and
kept the Emperor fully employed with their perpetual bickerings.
How Napoleon came to create and (:ontinue such a vicious system
it is hard to conceive. Apparently the explanation must besought
ill the fact that he feared servants with too great power, and
acted 011 the principle of divim: et i1llpera, despite of the fact
that he knew, as a soldier, that the want of a commander-in-chief
is ruinous in practical wal'. At the bottom was the idea that be
himself could manage everything, even when his armies were a
thousauo miles away, and when it took three weeks or a month
to transmit orders to them. He sometimes acknowledged ill fI.
moment of self-realiULtion t1mt this was a bnd arrangement, and
tLat it was impossible for him to conduct or criticize lhe details
of strategy at such a distance, or under such conditions. But
after a lucid moment he would fall buck into his usual ways of
thought, and proceed to give ord~rs and directions which were
obsolete before the dispatches that conveyed them could be
delive]"(~d to the hands of his marshals.
To proceed to details-the old Army of Sllain had <:ome lo
!\ standstill after it had overrnll Andn.lusio. in February 1810.
Three corps under Soult were absorbed by that new conquest,
some 73,000 men in alII. Suchet with his Brd Corps,~OOO men,
I Note that the 4th Corps had left behind in Madrid 6,000 IlleD of its 1st
division (the 28th Uger, 32nd and 76th Line) and takell on instead
8,000 men of the division DessollcsJ properly fonniug part of the < Army
of the Centre.'
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held Aragon; Augereau with the vast 7th Corps, 56,900 in all,
did not hold dmfn, but was e....::ecuting military promenades ill,
the turbulent Catalonia. The ~nd and 6th Corps lay observing
Portugal, the former with head quarters at Talal'era, the latter
with head quarters at Salamanca. Ney had now returned to
take charge of the 6th Corps, and Reynier (an old enemy
of the English, who had beaten him at Alexandria and Maida)
was named chief of the 2nd Corps. This last hRA now been
shorn of its third division,-thtlt which hail been composed of
so Illany fmctional units in 1809; these had been made over
to the 6th Corps, which in 1810 possessed three divisions 1 and 110
longer two. Rcynier had about 18,000 men, Ney no less than
33,000 aftcr this rearrangement; he had been assil:,Fllcd wrges'
dragoon-dh'ision as well as the troops transferred from the
Qnd Corps. The King had 14,000 men in Madrid and New
Castile: the old garrisons of the Northern Province.'!, excluding
the newly arrived reinforcements, made up nearly ~O,OOO men
more. This 237,000 sabres and bayonets represents the old
army of 1809 2 ; the troops sent down by the Emperor after
the termination of the Austrian "'ar had not, for the most
part, been absorbed into the old units, though they had
crossed the Pyrenees in December and January.
It is now time to see wha.t troops constituted these sueeourfl,
the 100,000 men with whom the Empero~had originally intended
to llIarch in person to the conquest of the Peninsula. 011
looking through t.heir mnster roll the first t.hillg that. strikes the
eye is t.hat very littlc--olmost nothing indeed-had been tllkcn
from the Army of German)'. The Emperor, though Austria was
tamed oud Prussia was under his feet, did not think it safe to
cut down to any f,1'reat extent the /:,rarrisolls of Central Europe
and Eastern France: (1) Of all the corps that had taken part
in the Wagram campaign only one had been direded on Spain,
and this was a force of the second line, a unit originally called
I Loison's division of tJle 6th COrllJl received these stray battali01lS,
which were united to tllose of the same regiments which had crossed the
Pyrenees with Mm. They consisted of a. battalion each of the L(gion du
,Midi, of the Ltgi(}Il IlanQvritJlllt!, the 26th, 66th, 82nd of the line, amI tILe
32nd Ugcr.
2 All these figures lire inclu.tit'e of men sick Ilud detached, the former
about IG,OOO, the latter 44,000.
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the' Corps de Htfser\'e de I'Armee d'Allemagne' and afterwards
the 8th Corps. It had played only a small part in the late war,
and was mostly composed of the newly rnised 4th battalions of
regiments serving elsewhere, Recruited up to a strength of
30,000 men by the addition of some stray battalions from
Northern Gern1l.lny, it was the first of all the new reinforce-
ments to reach Spain 1. Indeed, the head of its column reached
llurgos h~' the 1st ot' .JamHl,ry, 1810. ]t was assigned to the
Army of Portugal, Dy the drafting away of some of its
4th battalions to join the regiments to which they appertained
it ultimately came down to aoout !lO,OOO men.
(2) Next in point of importance were the two divisions of the
Young Guard under Generals Roguet and Dumollstier, nineteen
battalion!;, with three provisional regiments of the Guard Cavalry,
nearly 15,000 men in aU. These units had been formed in 1809,
just in time for some of them to take their share in the hloody
days of Essling and W·agtam. The Emperor did not make
them over to the Army of rortugll.l. but retained them in Biscay
and Navarre, close under the Pyrenees. Apparently he disliked
sending any of his Guards so far afield as to rendcr it difficult to
draw them back to France, in the cvent (unlikely os it was at this
moment) of further tl'Oubles brcukillg out in Centntl Europe.
Thc Guard divisions stayed in Spain two years, but were ncver
allowed to go fal' forward iuto the interim'.
(3) Deeply impressed with the danger and difficult~'ofkeeping
up the lines of communication between Bayonne anu Maurid,
since ::\lina and his coadjutors had set the guerrilla war on foot
ill NavaITe and Old Castile, Napoleon had formed a corps whose
special duty was to be the keeping open of the roads, and the
policing of the country-side between the frontier and the Spanish
capital. This was composed of twenty squadrons of Gendarme$,
all veterans and picked men, each with a total strength of seven
officers and 200 troopers. 'rhe decree ordering their selection
1 .Tunot's original cOTlJS was reinforced by tile 22ml of tile line (4 halts.)
drawn from tbe Prussian fortresses, aud br some units whicb had hitllerto
been doing garrison duty in ~'a\'arrese and Biscaran fortresses, where they
were now replaced by tIle YOUllg Guard. Among these were the Irish
Brigade (2 batta.) and tlle Prussian regiment \\'hich had fonned the
ori~iual garrison of J'ampcluna.
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from among the ge1ll101'mel'ie of Southern and Central France was
publisherl on Kovembel" 24, 1809: bllt the nrst squadrons only
begun to pass the Pyrenees in February 1810, and mally did
not appear till Aprilllnd May. Yet 4,000 men were in linc by
the summer 1.
(4) A few new regiments which had not hitherto been repre-
sented in the Peninsula were moved dOWll thither. Among these
were the Neuch&tel troops from Berthier's prillcipality, a German
division from the minor states of the Confederation of the Rhine
under General Rouyer 2, which went to Catalonia, the 7th, 13th,
and 25th Chasscurs d Cheval. with two battalions of Marines.
The total did not amount to more than some 10,000 men.
(5) By far the largest item in the reinforcements was composed
of the 4th ba.ttalions of welllligh every regiment which was already
serving in Spain. The army which had marched across the
Pyrenees in 1808 had been organi7.ed on the basis of three field-
b.-'l.ttalions to the regiment, the 4th battalion being the depOt
battalion. nut Napoleon had now raised the standard to four
(or in n few cuses more) field-battalions, over and above t.he
deput. All the fonrth battalions were now existing and avnil-
I~ble; u few had served ill the Austrian Will', IOany of the others
had heen lyillg ill the camps which the Emperor hOO formed at
Boulogne, Pontivy, and elsewhere, to protect his coasts against
possible English descents. Those belonging to 40 regiments
already in Spain, with the fullcomplemellt of 840 men each~ were
first ordered to cross the Pyrenees: they numbered 33,600 men:
these were allll.t the front by May 1810. The Emperor somewhat
later dispatched the fonrth battalions of twenty-six regiments
llIorc to the Peninsula, giving to the temporary orgullit'.ation
the nallle of t.he 9th Corps. This should huvc given nIlOther
21,840 men, and IIcIlrly did So; their gross total, when all had
reached Vittoria in September 1810, was 20,£31. But the 9th
Corps should 110t be reckoned in the first 100,000 men which the
1 For details of this corps and its services see the monograph, Lu
Gelld(lnnerie en upagJlI! et PQrtugfll, by E. Martin, l'aris, 18!)B.
~ Niue battalions as follows; 'I\vo of Nassau, the others from Gotha,
Weimar, AltcDburg, 'Valdcck, Ilcuss, Schwanburg, Anhalt, allll Lippc;
strength about 6,000 men.
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21,000
158,100
~O,OOO
15,000
4,000
10,000
53,600
~O.OOO
5,000
3,500
Emperor set Ul:\ide for the spl'iug cUUlptdgn of 1810, it was n.
supplementary addit.ion 1.
(6) 'I'he Emperor dealt ill a similar wuy with the cavalry;
the regiments already in Spain had been reduced to a strength
of two or three squadrons by the wear aml tear of eighteen
months of war. The dep6ts had now got rendy two squadrons
fit for field service. Those belonging to sixteen regiments of
dragoons, organized into eight provisional regiments, were sellt
early to the front, and were all in Spain by January 1810.
(7) In addition to_ units like 4th battalions and 3rd and 4th
squadrons added to the strength of each dragoon 01' infantry
regiment, the Emperor did not neglect to send drafts to fill up
the depleted 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions and 1st and 2nd
squadrons. In the early months of' 1810,27,000 men, in small
drafts not amounting to the strength of a battalion or squadron
were forwarded to recruit the old units. They went forward in
'regimentsde marche,' which were broken up on reaching the
head quarters of the corps to which each party belonged.
Adding together all the units, with an extra allowance of
3,500 artillery for the new batteries that came in with JUllot's
Corps, the Guard di visions, and the 9th Corps, we get as a total
of the reinforcements poured into Spain between December 180B,
and September 1810, the following figures:-
.Junot's corps, at its final strellgth ill J unc, infantl')' only
Young Guard divisions
Gendarmerie .
New regiments
4th battalions, the first arrivals
4th battalions forming the 9th Corps
Cavalry in organized squadrons
Artillery in complete batteries
Drafts, not in permanent units, for Infantry, Cavalry,
and Artillery
I Tile 4th battalions ulUmately retained in J unol's C<lrps did lIot for tho
most part belong to regiments of the Spanish army, hut to regiment.'! in
Germany or tlle colonies. 11ley are over aud above tllc 06 fourth
battalions accounted for ill the list above. Jo'or details of the whole set of
reiuforcCmellt.'! see Tables in Appendix.
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This total f,'ll' exceeds the original 100,000 of which Napoleon
had spoken in t.he autumn ot' 1809, but is cCI·tainly l':t.ther below
the actual number of men received into the Penin511la; the
figure for drafts, in especial, is hard to \'erifj'. Dllt as the lotal
strength of the Army of Spain in the nuhUlI1l of ]809 was
237,000 \Ilen, alid in September 1810, 353,000 lllCIl, while at
lenst 25,000 had OC'Cll lost in the intervul l , the figures CUllllot
be far out.
Of this total, as we have already said, the Qnd, 6th, and 8th
Corps and the troops under Kellermann and Bonnet occupying
the pro\'inces ofToro, Palencia, Valladolid, and Santander formed
the' Army of Portugal' assigned to Massena; he was also given
an e~..tra unattached division under Serras 2, and promised the US(!
of the 9th Corps when it should ha\'e crossed the Pyrenees, The
gross total of this force was in May, when the new Commander-
in-Chief had taken up his post, about 130,000 men, of' whom
some 86,000 were effecth'e and available for active operations
at the moment. Serras, Kellermann, and Bonnet were tied down
to their local duties-the first had to look after the Spanish
llI'my of Gnlicia, the second to keep the plains of Valladolid
quiet, the third to hold Salltallder and (when it wus fully sub-
dUL'<1) to cntcl' und O\'CrrWl the Asturias. The 20,000 men of
the 9th Corps were not yet arrived in Spain 3. The troops in the
pro\'inces of Burgos, Biscay, and Navarre, though not placed
under the Marshal's actual command, were yet in existence to
cover his rear and his communications with France. If they are
added to the total of'the force which, directly or indirectly, was
employed for the conquest of l)orlugal, sOllle 30,000 more Illust
be taken into consideration. Dut, though they were uscful, indeed
I Ovel' alld above the ordinary death-rate for French trOOllS qual'terc<l ill
Spain,wllich was very lligll, we Imvc to ullol\' for the losses at Tamames,
Oeailn, the conquest of .i\ndaluaia-, the sieges of Astorga, Gerona, Ciudad
Ilmlrigo, and Almeida, awl all smaller eng:JgcmentS.
2 TILis llil'ision Imd charge of llle Proviuces of Loon, Zamora, anti Sala-
manca, whic11 were not a 'military government:
S Roughly, Oil May 15, 2nd Corps 20,000 men,6tb ditto 35,000, 8th ditto
26,000, Cavalry resen'e 5,000, effectives pl'esent under arms, besides the
sick, who made up about 12,OOOmore,lInd some 6,000 men detached. See
'rabies iu Appeudix,
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indispensable, fot, the conqul'!St of POl'tUgll1, it is fairer to lcuve
thcm out of consideration.
But the exact total of an ltrmy is, after nil, less important
than the character and capacity of its gencrals. The indivi-
duality ofMl\SSclIa was the most imporl:.ant factor in the problem
of the invasion of Portugal. He was fifty-two yean; of age-
ve:ry nearly the eldest of all the Marshals-and he was the only
one of those on active service, S!l.ve .Jonroan, who had achieved
greabless in the days before Napoleon arrived at supreme power,
He had led an army of 60,000 men when, of the three corps-
commanders now under him, Ney was but a lieutenant-colonel,
.Tunot a young captain, and lleynier tl brigadier-genel·al. Like
nearly all the men of the llevolution he had risen f.'Om below;
he sprang from a poor family in Genoa; according to his
enemies they were Jews, and his name was but l\Ianasseh
disguised. His personal character was detestable; many of
the marshals had an evil reputation for financial probity, but
Massena's was the worst of all. • He plundered like a con-
dottiere of the :Middle Ages,' wrote one of his lieutenants. He
had been ill trouble, ooth with the Uepublican government and
with the Empel'Ol', for his shameless malversations in Italy, and
had piled up a large private fortune by surreptitious methods l .
Avarice is not usually associated with licentiousness, but he
shocked even the easy-going public opinion of the French army
by the way in which he paradcd his mistress at unsuitable
momcnts alld in unsuitable company. Hc took this person, the
sistcr of one of his aides de camp, with him all through the
dangers of thc Portuguese campaign, where her presence often
caused friction and delays, and occasionally exposed him to
insults 2, Massclla was hard, suspicious, aud revengeful; an
intriguer to the finger-tips, he was always proue to suppose
1 'l1le Emperor once confis<:ated 3,000,000 francs which Massena llad
collected by selling licences to trade with the English at Leghorn and
other Italian ports. See the Memoirs of General Lamarque, who carried
out the seizure.
2 &-e Thicooult, i,', 375 ; i\rnrloot,ii. 380-1 j Dnchesse d' Abrnutes, viii. 60.
All these mny be called scandal-mongers, but the lady's IJl'CSeuCe, and
tIte troubles to which it gave rise, are cllwnic1ed by more serious
authorities.
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that others were intriguing against himself'. Though au
old Republican, who had risen from the mnks early in the
revolutionary war, he had done his best to make himseIr agree-
able to Napoleon by the arts of the conrtier. Altogether, he was
a detestable character-but he was a great genernl. Of all the
marshals of the Empire he was undoubtedly the most capable;
Dll.vollst and Soult, with all their abilities, were not up to his
level. As a proof of his boldness and rapid skill in sei7.ing an
opportunity the battle of Zurich is sufficient to quote; for his
splendid obstinacy the defence of Genoa at the commencement
of his career hus its parallel in the long endurance before the
lines of Tort'Cs Vcdras at its cnd. His best testimonial is that
'Vcllillgtoll, when asked, long yCtl.I'S aner, which of his old
oppolleub was the best soldier, replied without hesitation that
l\{llss~na was the mUll, aud that he had never permitted himself
to take in his presence the risks that he habitually accepted
when confronted with any of the other marsha1s 2•
The fati~,"ues of the late Austrian war, in which he had
borne such an honourable part, had tried Massena's health;
it was not without difficulty that the Emperor had persuaded
him to undertake the POltuguese campaign. Wheu he first
assembled round him at Salamanca the staR' which was to serve
him in the invasion, he astonished and somewhat disheartened
his officers by beginning his greetings to them with the remark,
'Gentlemen, I am her~ contrary to my own wish; I begin to
feel myself too old and too weary to go on active service, The
Emperor says thut. I must, and replied to the. rcasous for
declining this post which I gave him, by saying that my repu-
tation would suffice to end the war. It was very fiatteriug no
doubt, but no man has two lives to live on this earth-the
soldier least of all 3.' Those who had served under the Marshal
a few years back, and now saw him after an interval, felt that
there was truth in what he said. Foy wrote ill his diary, 'He
is no longer the Massena of the flashing eyes, the mobile faee,
1 Sce J.'oy's complilints 011 p. 114 of his Vie Militllire (cd. Girod tie r: Ain)
:l..'l tu the way in which tlllJ i\brshal suspcctt...1 him of uutlcrlllillillg his
favour with tiJo ElIlIJOror.
, See Lord Stallhope's ConversaiiolUt lCith lM Duke of lVdiillgtOlt, 1'. 20.
3 '111is comes from an eye-witness with no grudge against i\Iassina, H ulot.
commanding tIle artillery of the 8tll Corps. See llis Mbnoil'el) p. 303.
--:!1..."{IJJU;
,
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and the alert figure whom I knew in 1799. and whose head
then recalled to me the bust of Matins. He is only fifty-two,
but looks more than sixty; he has got thin, he is beginning
to stoop; his look, since the accident when he lost his eye by
the Emperor's hand I, has lost its vivacity. The tone of his
"oice alone remains unchanged.' But if the Marshal's bodily
vigour was somewhat abated, his will was as strong as ever. He
needed it at this juncture, for he had to command subordinates
who were anything but easy to deal with. Ney, though an
honest mun and nn admirable soldier, had the fuult of insub-
ordination in the highest degree. He never obeYL-d anyone save
the Emperor in thc truc militm'Y fashion. He quarrelled with
every eolleaglle that he llIet~lIotnbly with Soult~alld had an
old and very just.ifiable personnl dislike for Massclla. Even
before the latter appeared at the front, he bad been heard to use
threatening language concerning him. Junot was almost as bad ;
having held the chief command ill the last Portuguese expedi-
tion he had a strong, if a mistaken, belief that it was becoming
that he should be placed in charge of the second. His record
rendered the idea absurd, but this he was the last to understand,
being of an overweening and self-confident disposition. He was
stupid enough to regard l\1assena as his supplanter, and to show
sullen resentment. Of the three chiefs of the army corps about
to invade Portugal, lleynier was the only one on decent terms
with his Commander-in-Chief, but even he was not reckoned his
friend ~.
Mas....ena's chief of the staff was Fririon, a scientific soldier
and a man well liked by his colleagues; but it is said that he
WM not so much in the Marshal's confidence ss Lieut.-Colonel
, Foy, p. 101. The Emperor, a notoriously 1)3(1 wot, lodged some
pellets in the Marshal's left eye while letting fly at a pheasant. Napoleon
turned round and accused his faithful Berthier of llaving fired the sllOt : the
l'rince of Neuchatel was courtier enough to take the blame without a word,
and in official histories appears as the culprit (see e. g. Amic's Mtul.ma,
p. 272); for other lIotes see Guingret, p. 250. )Vhat is most astonishing is
that i\la.si>~ua was complaisant enough to affect to blame Eerthier for the
disaster.
, See the :ulmirahle summary of all this iu Foy's diary (Girotl tlo I,'Aiu),
1'. 101. l\lnrbot gin!!> the same views at ooUmu, !Jut with "is usual
exaggeration, aud with 'illustrative aUe>:ldetes,' occasiollally of doubtful
accuracy.
Olt.u<. III
'>
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I'elet, the senior aide de camp of his staff. Complaints are found,
in some of the letters and memoirs of the time, that Massena
would talk matters over with Pelet, and issue orders without
letting even his chief of the staff' know of his change of plan or
new inspiration. l'elet's own illdi~creet statemellts on this point
seem to justify the complaints made by others against him 1.
There W/l.S friction, therefore, even within the staff itself, and
all that the ).:1arshal did, or said, was criticized by some of those
who should have been his loyal subordinates, under the notion
that it had been inspired by others, who were accorded a more
perfect confidence by their common chief. Exact knowledge of
the displltes in the ttat Mqjor is hard to obtain, because, when
the campaign was over, every mall tl'icd to make ont that its
failure had been due to the ad vice gi ven to Masscua by those
of whom he was jealous, At the bottom, however, all this
controversy is not very important--there is no doubt that the
Marshal himself was responsible for all thltt had happened-
he was not the man to be led by the nose or oiler-persuaded
by ambitious or intriguing underlings.
.lailure or success is not the sole criterion of merit, Massena's
campaign was a disastrous business; yet on investigating the
disubilities under which he laboured, we shall be inclined in
the cnd to marvel tlUlt he did so lIIuch, 1I0t that he ilid 110
more. The fundamental error was the Emperor's, who gave
him too few men for the enterprise with which he was entrusted.
l\apoleon refused to take the Portuguese troops into considera-
1 Note IJelet's A~Y'fU rmr la C'ampogllc de Portugal, Ilearly forty pages in
the Appendix to Victoim et OQlUjrdta, vol. xxi : for his disputes with
l{arOll "FririOIl sce the Specl.aUllr J/ili/'dre for 18011. Pclet MyS, ignorillg
t.he chief of the staff entirely,' qu'il emit iUl'csti de la coufiallcc alII/QlIw
tlu Illarcchal: lju'il ffliS/lit 4eltl lloUprCS de lui tout le travail militaire et
politique, qu'i1 dirigeait la halite eorreSlKludallce Ilvec le major-gcncral
(Berthicr) et lcs chefs de corps, etc., cte.' For Fririon's eomparatil'c
impotellee see a story 011 I'. 387 of i\Iarbot's 1'01. ii l whieh mayor may
IIOt be true-probably the fomlcr.
1'c1et's writings give a poor im!IJ'CSI!iOll of his hrain-power :lilt.! his [om
of exact trntll. He I>3YS, for examl,le, ill his A]lcJ'fU that Masst!lla IJad only
40,000 men ill his army of invasion, when it is certain that he had 64J OOO.
See Baron Fririon's remarks on him in Speclateur MilUaireJ June 1841,
pp. 1-6.
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tion, when he weighed the llceds of the expeditioll. He
repeatedly wrote that' it was absurd that his armies should be
held in check by 25,000 or 30,000 British troops,' I\S if nothing
cl8C re<juircd to be taken into CQJlsidcnttioll. He dirl 1I0t
I'eali".e that "Vellingtoll had turned the P01'tUgUese regular
army into a decent fighting machin~ capable of holding back
l"rench divisions in line of battle--as was shown at llussaco.
He had not foreseen that the despised militia required to be
'coutained' by adequate numbers of troops on the line at'
communications. Still less had he dreamed of the great scheme
for the devastation of Portugal, which was to be not the least
effective of the weapons of its defender. But of this more
will be Said in the proper place.
SECTION XIX: CHAPTER IV
THE MQNTIl8 OF WAITING. SIEGE Ol" ASTORGA
M.'\SS~NA, as wc have seen, WitS only appointed Commander-
in-Chief of the Army of Portugal on April 17, 1810, and did
not appear at Valladolid, to take up his charge, tilll\{ay. The
campaign, however, had begun long before under the Emperor's
own diredions. There were pl,"eliminary operations to be carried
out, which could be finished before either the new General.ill-
Chief or the main body of the reinforcements fmm beyond the
Pyreue€s had arrived. These were the repression of the
illSUl'gCllt bouds of Navllrr~ Discay. and Old Castile, the firm
establishment of the line of communications betwccn Salamallca
and Bayollnc, and the capture of the outlying Spanish fortresses,
Astorga and Ciudad Rodrigu, which served as external defences
for the Portuguese frontier. 'Les besoins ell Espagnc sout
successifs,' wrote the Emperor carly in the winter of 1809-10 1,
'it faut d'aOOn! un l.'Qrps qui soumette les derriercs, Erollt CIl
Novembre il serait impossible de !"Cunir tous les moyens avant
dll commencement de jamiCl'. Et dans cette prcsqui:Ie coupcie
de montagnes les froids et les neiges de janvier ne permetttont
de rien faire.' All that he could do before spring would be to
send forward Junot's corps, and the otber earlier reinforcements,
to positions from which they should be readr to strike, the
moment that the fine weather began. With the coming of the
new year, when these corps hud rea.ched their destined positions,
the imperial orders begin to aboulld in elaOOntte directions for
the extermination of the guerrillas of the Uppcr Ebro and the
U ppcr Douro 2, ordeI'il which led to much Illarching and countcr-
marching of the newly arrived troops, but to little practical
effect in the war of repression, for skilled leaders like Mina, the
I Napoleon to Clarkc, Del. 30,1809.
! See for example Jan. 20,1810, toDertllier;Jan. 31, to same; Feb. 12,
to same.
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Empecinado, and Juliall Sanchez, nearly alwa)'s slipped between
t.he fiugers of their pursuers, and on the few occasions when
thc)' werc prelJSed into it comcr, simply bade thcir met! disperse
and unite again at some distant rendezvous. Thcse operations,
howcver, were wholly subsidiary: the actual adl'am.'c agaillst
pOI·tugal ouly (.'Ollllllen(.'{,'l!l with the orders gil'cn to Junut in
February to conccntrate his corps at Valladolid, to hand ol'cr
UlC charge of Sahummctt and Old Castile tu Kellel'mulIu's
dragoons and the di visiolls of the 6th Corps, and then to subtlue
the whole of the plain-land of Loon, as far us the foot of the
AsLurian and Galicinn mountains, including thc lowns of
Benavcnle, Leon, and Astorga. Bonnet and his division, now
I\S always bAsed on Santander, were already advancing to invadc
the Asturias, and to threaten Galieia from the east. Ney
with the 6th Corps was ordered to draw near to the frontier of
Portugal on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo, •to inundate all the
approaches to that kingdom with his Cll\'alry, disquiet the
English, and prevent them from dreaming of tronsfel'ring
themselvcs back to the south.' The news of the Ileal" approach
of the Emperor himself with 80,000 men wns to be spread ill
every direction '.
::\:Jcul1whilc the third great unit which Wl\S to (Ol'm pnrt of
the projected Arm)' of Portugal. the 2ud Corps (under the
temporury command of Gellcrnl Heudclct 2), was taking part ill
a separate and remote series of operations, (ar to the South.
This corps, it will be remembered, had been left on thc 'l'ugus
about Tala.vcra. and Oropcsu, to protect the rear of Sou1t and
King Joseph, whcn they marcll(.-'d in January with thc 1st, 4th,
and 5th Corps to COlltlllCl' Andulusiu. That exploit having
oeen u(''Colllplished, Morticr went, with lmlf of thc 5th COrjls,
to attack Bo.(hljOZ, and to subdue Estremadura, which SOlllt
imugined to be defenceless, since Albuquerque hud marched
with the old Estremadul'all army to save Cadiz. Mortier
udnmced unopposed to the walls of Badajoz, which llc reached
Oil FebruUl'Y l~ but found himself unable to undertake its siege
with his small force of 9,000 men. because a new Spanish host
1 Corre8pO/ldUIWIJ, vol. xx, NlIlKJleotl to Berthil,r, }'eb. ]2,1810.
~ Soult llad giveu U[l the 2nd Corps when he became King J06ellh's
"Iajor-General: lteyllier, appointed to command it, had not yet appeared.
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had just appeared upon the St.'Clle. LaRomana, with three of the
divisions of the army that had been beaten at Alba de 1'ormes
ill November, had marched down the Spani:sh-I)ortugllese frontier
by the l'a!>s of Perales; and on the same day that Mortier
appem'oo in front of lladajoz, his vanguard arrived at AI!Ju-
qU(:I'qUC, only twenty miles away. These divisions were 13)000
Shollg: La R0111auacoulll add to this force a few thousands more
left behind by AJbuquerque. Mortier rightly felt that he dare
not commence the regular siege of Badajoz when he Iut.d such
superior numbers in his front. He therefore asked for reinforce-
ments, both from Soult and fmm Khlg Joseph. The former
conld spare nothing from Anrlo.lusia at this moment, but the
2nd Corps was ordered to leave the Tngus and place itself in
communicution with Morticr. Hcudclet had other projects on
hand at the momcnt : he had just seized Plasencia on February
10) and was engaged in bickering with Carlos d' Espaila and
Martin Carrel'a, whom L1. Romana had left in the Sierra de
Gata. But, in obedience to his orders, he called in his detach·
ments, and marched by Deleytosa and Tru."l:illo into the valley
of the Guadiana. This movement, from the French point of
view, was a hazardolls one; by the transference southward of
the ~nd Corps, n 1001g gap was left between Ney at Salamanca
and Heudelet and Monicr ill Estremadurn. No tmops \\'ho.t-
e\"er covered Madrid from the side of the sollth~west and the
valley of the 'l'agus, and an inuption of the English 011 this line
wus one of the dangers which Napoleon most dreaded I. He
was unaware of 'Vellington's deeply-rooted determination to
commit himself to no more Spanish campail,l'Jls.
Long before Heudelet approached the Guadiana, l\fortier had
been compelled, partly by want of supplies, partly by the
threatening attitude of La ll.omana, who began cautiously to
turn his Ranks, to retire from in front of the walls of lladnjoz.
He gave back as far fl3 Zl1.t'ra Oil the road to the south, find six
days flfter mfll'chcd for Seville, leaving only a rearguard at Santn
Ollala, on the cxtt"l~mc bordet' of Estrclllllducu. Soult required
his presence, fol', Oll llccount of n rising in Gl'unllda, nnd a
, '11 fant Ilrb"oir que les Anglais peuvent man.:her sur Talal'era ponr
faire dil'crsioll; wrote Nllpolcon Oil Jail" :.n to llerthicr. liut Hcudcll't
had OOIJIl mOI"l~d before JIi~ caulioll could reach Madrid.
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threatening movement by the Spanish army of Murcia, the
French reserves in Andalusia had been moved eastward, and its
capital was almost stripped of' troops. Hence when the ~nd
Corps reached Cayeres on )iarch 8, alld appeared ill front of
AlbuquerquC! on :\larch 14, it found that the 5th Corps had
departed, and that it was nearly 100 miles from the nearest
friendly post. Heudclet, tbercforl', hllvillg all .LR Romautl.'s
army in his front, and no orders to CXl'CUtc (since the junction
with Morticr had failed), retire<] to Mcridll, where RCyllier
arrived frolll the north, superseded him, und took eOllllIllllld.
Here the 2nd Corps rcmuillcd pructiClllly passive for the rcst
of tllC sprillg, keeping open, but with difficulty and at IOllg
intervals, the communications between Madrid and Seville, by
means of detachments at Truxillo and Ahnarn7.. To 8. certain
extent Reynier kept La RoIllIl.IlIl.'S Ilrmy in check. hut he did
not fully discharge even that moderate task, for the Spanish
general detached southward two of' his divisions, those of
Contreras and Ballasteros, to threatell the frontiers of Andalusia
and stir up an insurrection in the Condado de Nieblll and the
other regions west of' Seville. DaUasteros snrprised the CSl.valry
brigade of Mortier's corps at Valverde, at lIIidnight 011 .February
19, and scattered it, killing Beauregard, the brigadier. He
then advanced to Ronquillo, only twenty miles from Seville,
where, on March 25-6, he had all indecish-e engagement with
one of GIl1..an's brigades, after which he retired into the Condado.
Mortier, thereupon, came out against him from Seville at the
head of a whole division. Unwisely offering battle at Zalamea,
all th~ Ri.o Tinto, on April 15, Ballasteros was beaten, and
retired into the mountains. Thither, after some time, he was
pursued by Mortier's columns, and again defeated at Arat;ena
on May 26. But he rallied his broken force in the Sierra de
Ara~ena, where he remained tor long after, a thorn in the side
of the Army of Andalusia, always descending for a raid in the
plains of Seville whell he was left unwatched. Soult was forced
to keep a considerable part of the 5th Corps in observation of
him-a detachment that he was loth to spare.
La Romana's central divisions, meanwhile, those of Charles
O'Donnel1 (brother of the Henry O'Donnell who had distin.
guished himself at Gerona in the previous autumn), IHelldizabal,
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and Contrems, bickered with the 2nd Corps ill the direction of
Cacreres ulld 'l'orresllovus., without allY Holable advuntage 011
either side. Butlls long us Re)'uicl' la)' at Mcridu, ulId l\1orticr
might at any moment come up from Seville to his !lid,
Wellington felt uneasy as to the possibility of a French advall(:e
between Tagus and Guadiana, and, regarding La Uomana'8 army
as an insufficient security on this side, moved Hill with a force
of l~,OOO men to Portalegre, close to the rear of Badajoz. Hill
had with his omI British dh'isioll, now consisting of three
brigades 1, another division composed of Portuguese, tmder
General Hllmilton 2, the English heal'y cavalry brigade of Slade,
a weak Portuguese cavalry brigade under Mndden 5, nnd three
batteries. He was ordered not to coulltenulH:e any offensive
Illovements 011 the part of La Roman!\, but to support him, and
to endeavour to cover Badajoz, if the French should unite the
~nd and 5th Corps, and make a serious move westward. There
was no need, as matters turned out, for any such support, tor
Reynier, though he executed some rather useless feints and
collnter-marches in April and May, undertook nothing serious.
One of his demonstrations drew Hill to Arronches, close to
Elvus, on :Mu)' 14, but it turned out to be mcaningless, Ilnd the
British troops returned to their usual head quarters at Portalegre
a few days later. There seems to have been some uncertainty
of purpose in all this manreuvring of the French in Estremadura.
J;leynier was not strong enough to ofter to fight La Homana and
Hill combined; he might have done so with good prospect of
success if MOIiier could have been spared from Andalusia; but
half the 5th Corps was usually detached far to the south, hunting
the insurgents of the SiClrra dc Runda, Rnd the other half had
to garrison Seville aud watch Bll1lasteros. Henoe Reynier, left
to himself, did no more for the common cause of the French in
Spain than detain Hill's two divisions in the Alemtejo, That
Wellington was thus obliged to divide his army was no doubt
1 Hill's dil'ision, two iJrigaUtlil strollg at T:llal'cl"'d in A.lIgust, hat.! reueil'(!ll
a thirt.! brigade ill Seplmnller under Cntlill Crauford, uOllsistillg of tllo
2/28th, 2/34th, nud 2/39t11.
~ Composed of tile 211U, 4th, 10th, and Hlll nogiments, each two
battalions strollg-, with 4,500 ooyonets.
~ Jst ant.! 4th Portuguese cavalry,
lino] BONNET IN THE AS1.'URIAS 217
a pcl'ltltlllcnt gain to the ellemy: yet thc)' obtained it by the
vcry doubtful expetlient of ICIl\'illg nothing 011 the TllgUS; a
push ill thc direction of llluscneia and Almaraz by evell
a small Spanish force would have ococn a very tiresome and
troublesome math;r for King Joseph, who would have been
fOJ.'(.'('(l either to bring down l\ey from Sahullunea, 01' to call
Rc)'nier back from the Guadianu, for :\fadrid was entirely
ullcovcrcd 011 the West. But nothing of the sort happcned ; Lt
Romalla kept his main body concentrated ill front of Budajoz,
Ilnd had the full approval of Wellington for doing so.
At the extreme opposite Rank of the Frellch front, on the
shores of the Day of Biscay, there was going on at this same
time It side-cnmpnign conducted with a much greater degree ot'
vigour, bllt equally indecisive in the end. The Asturins had
been almost stripped of troops by Del Parque, in order to
reinforce the army that fought at 'l'ammlles and Alba de '.formes.
'Vhen the Duke moved his main force south\vurd .after the Inst-
named fight, he carried ofi-' with him the division of Ballasteros,
which had been the core of the old Asturian Army. Genernl
Antonio Aree was left in the principality with some 4,000 men,
whom he kept at Colombres, behind the Deba, undel' General
Llano-Ponte. watching the l?rench force in the province of
Santander. New levies, little more than fl,OOO strong, were
being collected at Oviedo. In the end of .January General
llonllet, whose division at Sanwllder had received its drafts, llnd
had been strengthened up to 7,000 men 1, thought himself strong
enough t 0 drive in Arce's weak line and to make a dash at
the Asturian capital. On the 25th he attacked the lines of
Colombres, and carried them with no difficulty. On the 31st
he captnred Oviedo, which was evacuated by the Captain·Generttl
Arce and the local Junta without serious fighting. Blit that
active partisan Jnan Porlier at once cut off his communication
with Santander, by seizing Infiesto and Gijon, Bonnet at once
emcullted O\'iedo, and tumed back to clear his rear, Porlier
escaped along the coast to Pravia, and meanwhile the main body
of the Astnriaus, under Genemlllarcenn, reoccupied the capital.
Having dl'iven off Porlier, the French general marched west-
1 fIll had 7,094 meu with tll1~ colours, bcsitlell sick autl detached, by tllll
imperial muster rolls of Jail, ]6, ]810.
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ward once more, bmt Barccnu at the bridge of Colleto 011
February 14, und again made himself nmstcr of Ovicdo. The
Asturians rallied behind the ~arcea, where they were joined by
a brigade of 2,000 men sent to their aid by Mahy, the Captain-
General of Galicia.
That province, like the Asturias, had been left almost
uugurrisoned by Del Parque. when he took the old' Army of
Galicia' across the Sierra de Gata, and transferred it to Estre-
madm'a. Mahy had been left behind with the skeleton of one
division, which he Wi\.\I to recruit, ns best he could, by new levies.
His main preoccupation at this moment was the defence of
the newly fortified stronghold of Astorga, which '"fas already
threatened by the l''rcnch troops in the plains of Leon. But
seeing bis flank menaced by BOllnet's advance, he lent what mcn
he could spare to aid in the defence of the Asturias.
The Asturian junta. having deposed General Arce for inca~
pacity and corruption, and appointed Cienfuegos to take ove.·
his troops, ordered the resumption of' ofl-ensive opcrations against
UOlluet in March. Porlier, their great pal1;isan-hero, made
a circuit along the coast, and threatened the French communi-
cations with Salltandc.r. At thc same time their main fof(,'C
ad'·lI.11ccd nguillst Oviedo by the valley of the N'aloll. Bonnet's
advau<:ed brigade was dri ven in, after a sharp skirmish at Grado
on March 19, and disquieted by Porlier's simultaneous attack
all his rear, he evacuated the Aslurian capital for the third
time, and gave back as far as Caugas de Onis, in the valley of
the ana. He then CAlled up all the reinforcements that he
could obtain from Salltander, and marched- for the fourth time
in three months !-on Oviedo with his whole di\'ision; the
Spaniards retired without oftering serious opposition, and took
up a line behind the Narcea [March f.!9l This time lJonnet
left them no time to mUy, but forced the pnssage of that river,
whereupon the Asturians ascended to Tinea in the mountains,
while thc Gnlicinll Sllccours gave buck tu Navia, ulmost on the
edge of their own principality [April ~5-5WJ. After this,
Bonnet's offensive force was spent; having to occupy O"icdo
and its porbl of Gijon and Aviles, as well as all the central and
eastern Asturias, and, moreover, to defend his communication
with Santander from new attacks of Porlier, his strength
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suffil.,'ed fOI' no more. J-Jis 7,000 men were immobilized for the
rest of the year: he had conquered two-thirds of the Asturias,
and barely succeeded in keeping it down. But he was quite
unable to spare a man to aid in French operations in the plains
of Loon, 01' even to make a serious attempt to threaten Galicia.
Once or twice he succeeded in communiCAting with the forces
which Junot(and after him Kellermanll and Serras) commanded
in the plains beyond the Cantabrian range, by expeditions
pushed down through the pass of Pajares on to Lean; but the
road was always closed again by the guerrillas, and no co-operation
could take place, In short, the Spaniards lost the greater part
of the Asturias, and the French lost the further services of
Bonnet's division 1. It had no power to threaten Galicin,
because it was forced to keep garrisons in Gijon, A viles, Lastres,
Santona, and all the sea-ports, with a full brigade at Oviedo ill
the centre, to support them, Any concentration of troops,
leading to the evacuation of the smaller garrisons, at once let
loose the guerrillas from their mountains. Bonnet had but
7,000 men in all: of these, not more than half could be used
1 I C:IIIJ10t understand ~apier'8 narrative of tllis little emnpaigu, 011
pages 352-4 of his \'01. H. It rUlls as follows, and seems to have 110
relation to tlle facts detailed by Belmas, 'I'oreno, Artech£l, or any otller
lListorian. No mention is maue of the four captures of Oviedo !
, l'IIallY was organizing a second army at Lugo and in the Asturias. D'Arco
[Arce] commanded 7,000 men, 3,000 of wllOm were posted ut Cornelhlll1l
under Generall'ontc.... Uounct, from the Asturias, threatened G:llici~1 by
the Conciju 11'1008 : hllViJlg destroyed }lollte's force nt Potes de la SierTlI
[:m miles from Colombres, where the :lctllal light took lllace], Im llIC1meed
Galicia b}' the pass of Nav;! de Sllarna [a place which his vangnard did
\lot approach by a matter of 40 miles]' , , , Dut lie did 1I0t pass Nam de
Suarna, alld General D'Arco rallied tlle Astllrian fugitives at Louarca. It
seems probable that while Bonnet drew the attentiOIl of thr Galician army
towards Lugo [he was never within 100 miles of that place], Jnllot thouglit
to penetrate by Puebln Senabria. nut finally J IIIIOt, drawing 11 reinforce-
ment fTOm Ronnet, invested Astorga. with 10,000 infantry,' &c. [No troops
from Bounet's force ever allIJCl:lred IJcfore Astorga.]
This last bluuder is Hllpareull)' borrowed from 1'1ct(}i~ et Cqllqll2te8, xx.
12, whicll st...t.es t1mt Gener;ll Bolluet Iletaclll!tl Jeaulli.ll's bri.gaul!, the 46th
and G5t11, to Astorgll. But these regiments llill not belong to Bonnet,
but were, from the first w the last, parts of JUllOt'S own corpS, and never
entered the Asturias. Compare Napoleon, CQrruprmdmlce, xx. 21, tlle
muster rolls of Jail. 1, Feb, 16, and Belmas, m. p. 4G.
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for an expedition, ann such a force was loo slllall lo havc any
pruclicul eflcct all the b'"C.llcrul course of evcnls in north-western
Spain.
Bonnet's operations were, of eourse, wholly subsidiary; the
really important movements that were on foot in the early
spring of 1810 were those of JUllOt and Ney ill the plains 01'
Lean. In pursuance ot' the Emperor's orders to the effect that
the whole plain-land of Leon was to be occupied, as a preliminary
to the invasion of Pm1.ugal, LoisOll, who had re-entered Spain
at the head of n. Ilumber of battalions which were ultimate])' to
join the L'Orps of Ney, was ordered to lIIo\'e on from VnUudolid
und occupy the eountry about Benu\'cnte amI Astorga. He was
left free to select either of those towns as his heau quarters, and
was directed to communicate with Bonnet, when the latter
should have entered the Asturias, so that their operations should
threaten Galicia simultaneously 1. Loison's expedition, however,
proved a complete failure; he marched towards Astorga early
in February with nearly 10,000 men. On the 11th he appeared
before that town, and learnt that since Carrie's rccollllll.issance
in October 1809 2, it had been lllllch strengthened. LaRomann
bad repaired the breuches of its mediaeval walls. He had
thrown lip cntrcnchmCllts rouud the suburb of Ln Retdbilt,
which occupies that purt of the hill of Astorf,I'fi, which is
nol covered b)' the town itself. He had ttlso ~ablisllL'd
outlying posts in the suburbs of San Aml.res and Pucrta del
Hey, which lie at the foot of the hill, on its northern and
castcrn sides. Four~n guns, only two of them IQ-pounders,
the rest light, had been mounted on the walls. The place,
therefore, was a make-shift fortification of the most antiquated
style. General Garcia Velasco, who had been left behind in
Galicia with one division of the old Northern army whcn Del
Pnrque marched for Estremadura, was ill chtu'gc of this pO'rtioll
of the Spanish front, undcr the superintendence of 1\Iahy, the
Captain-General. He had placed half his troops-five battalions,
or 2,700 men, in Astorga, while he himself with the remainder
lay beyond the mountains, at Villafrnnca., in the Vierzo, with
about the same force. The total of organized troops in Galicia
1 Napoleon to Berthier, Jan. 11,1810.
2 See p. 76.
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ut this moment did not c.xccc<l 8,000 men, including the small
brigade which Mahy sent to the Asturias, and a detAchmcnt
Ilnrler Echevarria at Pllebla rle Senabria. Astorgn. had not beeJ1
expecting It siege at such an earl)' date as Fcbruary 11; it
was only provisioned for b-enty da),s, and the guns had not
ammunition to last for even that short space of time. The
governor, .Jose Santocildes, was a man of courage and resource,
who knew how to put on a bold face to an impossible situation,
or instant disaster might have followed.
Loison was disconcerted to find that Astorga, his destined
head quarters, was held and garrisoned against him. His
engineers reconnoitred its walls, and informed him that it could
not be taken without a regular battering-train. He had ani)'
field-pieces with him, the weather was abominable, and his
troops-aU conscript battalions from .France-were suffering
terribly from the continued rain and cold. ,Vherefore he
contented himself with inviting Santocildes to surrender,
promising him promotion at King Joseph's hands, if he 'would
implore the clemency of a sovereign who treats all Spaniards
like a father 1.' V.'hcn the governor sent a curt reply, intimating
that he and his people intended to do their dut),. Loison retired
to La Baneza, lmd reported to his chiefs that he was helpless
for want of siebJ"C-guns. He announced at the same time that
he had attempted to communieate with Bonnet at OviL>tlo, by
sending two battalions to the foot of the pass of Pajares, but
that the mountain roads were all blocked with snow, and that
this detachment had been forced to fall back into the plains,
without obtaining any news of what was afoot in the Asturias 2.
A few days ltlter, the head of JUllot's corps entered the
province of Lean, and Loison was diredeu to move southward
and join Ney at Salamanca. His place Oil the Esla and the
Orbigo WI\S lukcll by Clausel's division of the 8th Corps. The
newly ul'l'iVL1.1 general cxecuted unother rCCOllll(l.issallL'C to the
neighbourhood of Astorga, and on Februnry 26 sent StUltocildcs
n sccoml summous, in the IUUIlC of Junot. It l'(.'(:eil·ed the same
allswer lImt. Imd OC'C1l given to Loisoll. It was delll' t.IIU.t Astorgn
I For the IcU-cri! of 1,0i801! lo Sautocildes ami the reply of the Spanish
brigadier, see the correspondence in Belmas, iii. pp. 63-6.
~ l-oisoll to Derthier, Feb. 16, from La DallclIa.
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must be besieged, and that a battering train must be placed at
the disposition of' the force charged with the operation. But
in the present state of the roads it would take some time to
bring hCtwy guus to the front. l"urther operations had to be
postponed. The 6th Corps, it lUay be remarked, hud executed
at the same time that Loison appeared in front of Astorgu,
a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo. King Joscph had
written from Andalusia to beg Ne)' to threaten the place, while
the news of the French victories in the south were still fresh,
assudng him that the Spaniards were so cowed that a prompt
surrender l\'as probable. The Marshal, though doubting the
wisdom of these optimistic views, concentrated his corps,
advanced to San Fcliccs, and 011 February 1S summoned Rodrigo.
Hc got from General Herrasti, the governor, uu answer as bold
and confident as thut which Loison ft..'Ccivcd from ~antoci1dcs,
and returned to Salamanca to disperse his troops in cantonments
and ask for a battering-train1• His short and ineffective excursion
to the banks of the Agueda had taken him in sight of the
British outposts on the Spanish frontier, and had induced
Wellington for a moment to think that the invasion of Portugal
was at hand, It was impossible that he should have guessed
that Ney's advance had no better cause than King Joseph's
foolish confidence. Hence the withdrawal of the 6th Corps,
after the vain Sllmmons of Ciudad Rodrigo, was as inexplicable
as its ndvance. • I do lIot understand Ne}"s movement,' he
Wl'ote to his trusted subordinate, Robert Craufurd, •coupled as
it is with the movement upon Badajoz from the south of Spain.
The French are not strong enough for the two sieges at the same
time, and I much doubt whether they are in n state to under-
take one of them 2.' The prompt retirement of Ney from before
Ciudad Rodrigo, and of Mortier from before Badajoz, com-
pletely jnstified his conclusions within a day or two of t.he
writing of his letter.
There was nothing for the Frellch in the kingdom of Leon to
do, Sll,ve to await the arri\'al of the great battering-train which
I For !lOW as to ti,e (',ause :1Ilt! execution of tIJis abortive mOI·cnumt,
scc the diary of Nu}"s aide dellamv, Sllriillglill, lmgcs 402-3.
• \Vellillgtoll to Craufunl; Feh. 16. COIll'lare ~imilar remarks ill
'VelliugtoJl to lleresford, from Vi\(eu, Feb. 21, lBIO.
1810] JUNOT INVESTS ASTOUGA 2~S
Napoleon had bestowed upon his Arm)" of Portugal. I t "as far
to the rear: on February 20 its head was only beginning to
approach Burgos., and its tail had not quitted Bayollne. The
reason of this tardiness was the want of draught animals at the
~outhcrn depots of Fl'ilIl(.'C. The (''<Illipment of the train und
the urtiller)" of the 8th Corps, Md the other great reinfon:e·
ments which hOO just passed the PYI-ences, had exhausted the
!wnilable supplies of horses I, and when the authorities at
Dayolllle hnd to place the' grand park' all a war footing there
was intolerable delay. Even when detachments of the park had
started, they made slow progress in Spain, for the French horses
died off rapidly ill the bitter weather of the plateau of Old
Castile, and it was almost impossible to replace them by
requisition from the country-side. JUllot, bold to the verge of
rashness, and feverishly anxious to remake the reputation that
he had lost at Vimiero, could not endure the delay. He sent to
requisition Spanish gUllS from the governors of Burgos and
Segovia, dispatched his own teams to draw them, and when he
heard that a small train was procurable, ordered the 8th Corps
towards Astorga on March 15, leaving the cannon to follow.
The month's delay in the investment had enabled Salltocildes
to fill up the supply of food and ammunition which had been
so low in February; he had now got his fortress in as good
slate as was possible, considering the intrinsic weakness of its
mediaeval \falls, and had induced 3,000 of the 4,000 inhabitants
to retire to Galicia.
On March 21 Clansel's division invested Astorga, while
Solignac's came up to Lean and Benavente ill support, and St.
Croix's division of dragoons took post in advance of La Baneza,
to obsen'e the Spanish forces in southcrn Galicia and the
Portuguese of the 'l'ras-os-Monles. Till the gUlls should
arl'ive, there was nothillg to be done save to choose the point of
attack, prcPUI'C fuscincs and gabions, and Opell the first parallel,
out of harm's way from the slllall artillery of the garrison-
nonc of it heavier than a l!'l-pollndel·. Valazc, JUlIOt's chief
enginccr, opined that thc low-lying suburb~ !It the foot of the
hill of Astorg!l might be lIcglcck,<l, and the newly entrenched
1 .J<:"e.ll the 8tiJ Corpa hall to leave guns behind at Bayonne for want
of horses, Dolmas, ii, 13.
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Reteibia on the high ground masked by a false attack, while
the projecting aJld unflanked north-west corner of the old walls
of the cit), itseH' might be b.-'tttered from the slope,; below; here,
t1S in an its circnit, the place had neither ditch nO!' glllcis : there
Wtu; simply the stout mediacval wnll, brokctl every SO yards
by tl small square tower, which followed the sky-line of the
plateau.
The first three weeks of the siege had fill unusual character,
siuce the French could build what works they pleased, bllt
could not seriously batter Astorga with the sixteen field-guns
of small calibre belonging to the division lying before the walls.
The officer in temporary command of the artillery, Colonel Noel,
contented himself with opening fire from various false attacks,
from which the guns were repeatedly moved) in order to distract
the attention of the encmy from the chosen front 011 the north-
west, where the npprouchcs \\'Cl'C completed, and a great bnttery
constructed, ready for the siege-gUllS when they should arrive.
Meanwhile there was a good deal of infantry skirmishing in and
about the lower suburbs, in whose outskirts the French ultimately
established themselves, though they had no intention of pushing
up to the walls either from Puem del Rey or from San Andres I.
The garrison defended itself well, executed severlJ;l vigorous
sorties, and lost 110 post of importance, though the line of
resistance in the suburbs \\'as gradually thrust back. Santocildes
received severnl encouraghlg messages from his chicf Mahy, who
lUilIOllllCed tha.t he was bringing up to the pass ofFollcebadoll,oll
the edge of the plain of Astorga, every man that Galicia could
furnish. But even when the Captain-General had brought his
reserves from Lugo to join Garcia's division, they had only
5,000 bayonets. '1'0 hold them off, JUllot sent Clausel's division
to the outposts, and replaced it in the trenches b), Solignac's
uJld one brigade of Lagrange's. Mah)', in face of such all
accUlI1luutioll of mell) was absolutely helpless. Echcvarria, with
his weak bribradc from Pucbla de Senabriu, had pushed a little
forward, to give moral support to Mah)'. He was surprised and
routed near Alcanizas on April 10, by St. Croix's dragoons.
On the 15th the siege-train arrived from Valladolid; it \1"8S
I 'l'hereare good uarratives ill the alltobiographiesof No~lalld Hlllot of
the artilI~r}', beside the excellent aeeount in Belmas, voI. iii.
•FrenCh'::~~~~~2:~~~~~S~Trenc es
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small', but sufficient against an enemy so miserably provided
with gUlls as Santocildes. .JUllot himself came up on the 17th
to watch the effect of the attnck. It was instant and over-
powering. When once the artillery had been plat.-ed in the
works prepared for it, and had begun ih fire, the old walls of
Astorga began to crumble. The light Spanish pieces on the
cnceinte were overpowered, despite of the gallant way in which
the gunners stuck to their work t. By noon on the 21st of
April the north-western angle of the walls of Astorga had been
beaten down, and the fallen stones, there being 110 ditch, had
at:cumulllted at the fout of the broad breach, so as to give an
easy entram.'C. Fortunately for the defence, there was a large
chnrch just inside the angle: it.'! roof and towel' had been shot
down, hut the garrison had made themselves strong in the lower
parts of the building, and threw up traverncs from it to the
wall on each side of the breach. 'fhis gave them a second line
of defence, though but a weak one, and when Junot sent in
a summons in the afternoon Santocildes refused his ofter. At
seven the French general bade 700 men storm the breach; the
forlorn hope was composed of the voltigeur and grenadier
companies of the Irish Legion and the 47th of the Line. The
column penetrated to the foot of the breach without much
difficulty, though exposed to heavy musketry from the walls,
and a Banking fire from the suburb of the Retcibia. The breach
was carried, and, in addition, a house built with its back to the
ramparts just inside the enceinte. But the assailants could get
no further, owing to the murderous fire which the Spaniards
kept up from behind the ruined church and the traverses.
After an hour of desperate fLttempts to break in, they took
shelter; some in the house that they had captured, but the
majority behind the lip of the breach, where they covered
themselves as best they could, by piles of debris built in with
their ~aversacks,and even with the corpses of the fallen. Und!!r
I Only cOl\silltillg of four 24-pOUllllcrs, ono HI-poul\ucr, four 12-
pounucrs, Cigllt 6-inc1. howitzers, and ouc 6-inch mortar. Sce BelmllS,
iii.28.
t 'Les Espagnols rispost~rent a.Ve!: vivaciw; on s'ctonoait d'autaut plus
que, le parapet tftant en pierres seches, chaque boulet qui le frappait en
faisait jaillir de nombreux cclata: Debnas, Hi. 34.
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this poor shelter they lay till dark, suffering hea,·ily. During
the night the troops in the trenches run out a line of gltbiollS
from the front works to the foot of the walls, and Ly dawn
had opened a good communication with the men ut the breach,
though they had to work ulldera furious but blind flre from abo\'c.
At dawn Oil April 2~, Santocildes surrendered. He might
have held out some hours longer behind his inner defences, if he
had not exl18usted nearly all his musket ammunition in resisting
the storm. There were less than thirty cartridges a head left
for the infantry of the garrison, and only 500 pounds of powder
for the artillery. The defence had been admirable, and, it may
be added, vcry scientific, a fact proved by the low figures of
the dead and wounded, which did not amount to 200 men 1.
The French, in the assault alone, lost five officers and 107 men
killed, and eight officers and 286 men wounded 2. Junot was
thought to have been precipitate in ordering the storm: his
excuse was that there were less than two hours of daylight left,
and that, if he had deferred 'the attack till next morning, the
Spaniards would have retrenched the breach under cover of the
dark, and made it impracticable. The siege cost the 8th Corps
in all 160 killed and some 400 wounded, a heav), butcher's bill
fo .. the capture of a mediaeval fortress armed with only fourteen
light gUlls. Two thousnnd five hundred prisoners were taken,
as shown by Santocildes' lists, but Junot claimed to have
'captured 3,500 fine troops, all with good English muskeL<;,
and well clothed in English great coats,' as well us 500 sick und
wounded-impossible figures.
On the morning of the surrender ~fahy made a feeble demon-
stration against the covering troops, on both the passes of
Manzanal and Fonccbadon, while Echevarria beat up the force
:at Penilla which lay facing him. All three attacks were checked
with ease, the Galieian army not being able to put more than
6,000 men in the field on the three fronts taken together.
Its loss was heavy, especially at l\milla.
1 Two officers and forty-nine men killed, ten officers and ninety-nine
men wowldedJ according to his official report to the Junta, in wbich all
details are duly gh'eJi.
2 See the figures in Junot's dispatc1I, given on pages 00-7 of Belmas,
vol. iii,
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After detaching the lt~nd R€giment, which was ordered to
endeavour to communicate with Bonnet iu the Astw-ias, and
b1'l\rrisolling Astorgu. with two bllttalioll~, JUl10t drew buck the
greater purt of his corps to Vulladolid and Toro. He IUld becn
ordered to place himself neal' Ncy, in order to aid umI <:over the
6th Corps in the oncoming siege of Ciudad Roorif,rQ. At the
sume time he received the U1)welcomc ncws Hmt MIlSSCIlIl 11Ild
becll named COillnulIIder-in-Chief of the Army of pOI·tugul, and
that the 8th Corps was placerl under his orders.
Massena, as ha.'\ been already mentioned, did not i\l'l'ive at
Salamanca till May ~Bth: he could not well have reached "the
frollt earlier, since the Emperor had only placed him in command
in April. The long delay in the opening of the main campaign
must, therefore, be laid to ~apoleon's account rather than to that
of his generals. If he had sllspected that every day of waiting
meant that Wellington had added an extra redoubt to the ever-
growing lines of TOITe8 Vedras, it is permissible to believe that
he would have hurried fOl'ward matters at a less leisurely pace.
But his determination to conduct the invasion of Portugal in
what he called' a methodical fashion' is sufficiently shown by
the orders sent to Salamanca on May !29. 'Tell the l~rince
of Essling that, according to our English intelligence, the
army of General \Vellington is composed of no more than
!24.000 llritish and Germans, and that his Portuguese are only
25,000 strong. I do not wish to enter Lisbon at this moment,
becn.llse I could not feed the city, whose immense population is
accustomed to live on sea-borne food. He can spend the summer
months in taking Cindad Rodrigo, and then Almeida. He
need not hurry, but can go methodically to work. The English
general, having less than 3,000 camlr)', may offer battle on
gronnd where cavalry cannot act, but will never come out to
fight in the plains I.'
The Emperor then proceeds to add that with the 50,000 men
of the 6th and Bth Corps, the cavalry reserve, &c., Massena
is strong enough to take both H.odrigo and Almeida at his
ease: lleynier and the ~nd Corps can be called tip to the bridge
of' Alcantara, from whence the)' can menace Central Portugal
and cover Madrid. No order is given to bring up this corps
1 Napoleon to Berthier.J May 29, lBW.
.~
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to join the main army: it seems that the Emperor at this
moment had in his head the plan, with which 'Wellington
always credited him, of threatening a secondary attack in the
'1'agus valley. The !!nd Corps is treated as covering MasseuR's
left, while on his right he will be flanked by Kellermann, who
is to add to the small force already under lli" command in Old
Castile It whole llew division, that of Serros, composed of troops
just m'rived from Frt\llCC 1• This, ndded to Kellermann's fh'ugOOIlS,
would make a corps of 12,000 men, In addition, us the Emperor
remarks, by the time that the Army of Portugal is ready to
march on Lisbon, it will have in its rear the 9th Corps under
Droue~ nearly 20,000 men, who will be concentrated at Valla-
dolid before the autumn has begun. There will be o\'cr 30,000
men in Leon and Old Castile when Masseua's army moves on
from Almeida, and in the rear of these again Burgos, Navarre,
and Biscay will be held by the Young Guard, and by twenty-
six 4th battalions from France, which were due to start after
the 9th Corps, and would have made their appearance south
of the Pyrenees by August or September.
This document is a very curious product of the imperial pen.
It would be hard to find in the rest of the Corresp01llkmce 11
dispatch which w completely abandons the 'Napolconic methods'
of quick concentration and sharp strokes, and orders a delay
of three months or more in the completion of a campaign whose
preliminary operations had begun so far back liS February. We
may reject at once the explanation offered by some of Napoleon's
enemies, to the effect that he was jealous of Massena, and did
not wish him to achieve too rapid or too brilliant n success.
Dut it is clear that a hUllumitariun regard for the possible
sufferings of the inhabitants of Lisbon-the only rC8.S0n alleged
for the delay-is an inadequate moti\'e. Such things did not
nonnally affect the Emperor, and he must have remembered
that when Junot occupied Portugal at the mid-winter of 1807-8
, Serras' division consisted of the 113th Line, a Tuscan regiment
originallyemplo}'ed in Catalonia, which had been so cut up in 1809 that
it had beeu sent back to ~lill ita cadres; also of the 4th of the Vistula
(two battalions), a l'olish regiment raised in 1610, witl, four provisional
battalions, and three stray battalions helonging to regiments in the South,
which had not been allowed to go on to join Soult [4th b.'\ttaliolls of the
321111 and ~8t1J Line Ilnd of 12th Uger): his total strength was 8,000 men.
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famine had not played its part in the difficulties encountered
by the French. Nor does it sccm that an exaggerated estimatc
of the cnemy's strength induced him to postpone the attack
till nU the reinforcements lutd tlrrivL'{l. He llllder-~timntes
Wellingtoll's British troops by some 5,000, his Portuguese troops
by tIt least 15,000 men. He is utterly ignorant of the works
of Torres Vedms, thongh six months' labour ha'! already been
lavished on them, and by this time they were already defensible.
Three months seem an altogether exaggerated time to devote
to the sieges of the two little old-fashioned second-rate fortresses
of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. I,'rom whence, then, comes
this unprecedented resoh'e to adopt a •methodical' system in
dealing with the invasion of Portugal? It has been suggested
that the Emperor was very desirous to make sure of the absolute
suppression of the guerrilleros of the Pyrenees and the Ebro,
before pushing forward his field army to Lisbon. Possibly he
was influenced by his knowledge of the infinite difficulty. that
Massena would find in equipping himself with a train, and more
especially in creating magazines during the months before the
harvest had been gathered in. Some have thought that, looking
far forward, he considered it would be more disastrous to the
English army to be 'driven into the sea' somewhere ill the
rough months of October and November rather than in the fine
weather of June-and undoubtedly no one who reads his dis-
patches can doubt that the desire to deal an absolutely crushing
blow to that army was his dominating idea throughout. But
probably the main determining factor in ~apoleon's mind was
the resolve that there should be no failure this time, for want
of preparation or want of sufficient strength; that no risks
should be taken, and that what he regarded as an overwhelmiug
force should be launched upon Portugal. After JUllot's disaster
of 1808 and Soult's fiasco in 1809, the Imperial prestige could
not stand a third failure. The old pledge that • the leopard
should be driven into the sea' must be redeemed at all cosb
011 this occasion. Solid success rather than a brilliant cam·
paign must be the end kept in view; hence came the elaborate
preparations for the sustaining of 1\fassena's advance by the
support of Drouet, Kellermanll, and Serras. Even Suchet's
operations in Eastem Spain were to be conducted with some
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regard to the affairs of Portugal I, It was a broad and a
formidable plan-but it failed ill onc all-important factor.
\Vclliuhrtoll's strength was underrated; it was 110 mere driving
of !!5,OOO British troops into the sea that was now ill question,
but the J,'Cduction of a kingdom where every man had been
placed under arms, and every preparation made for passi vc
as well as for active resistance. \\Then Napoleon was ouce
morc foiled, it was because he had treated the Portuguese army
-1\ 'fas de coguins' as he called them-as a negligible quantity,
and because he had foreseen neither that s}'stematic denlStatioll
of the land, nor the creation of those vast lines in front of Lis-
bon, which were such essential features of Wellington's scheme
of defence. 'I'he French attack was delivered by 65,000 men,
110t by the lOO,()(X) whose lld\'ent the British general had feared :
al1d precisely because the numbers of the Army of Portugal
were nu greater, the nttuck was made on the Deim, frontier
only. Masseua hud no men to spare for the secondary invasion
south of the Tagus which Wellington bad expected and dreaded.
The Empcro.r's plans went to wreck because he had under-
estimated his enemy, and assigned too small a force to his
lieutenant. But it was no ordinary general who had so pre-
pared his defence that Napoleon's calculations went all astray.
The genius of Wellington was the true cause of the disastrous
end of the long-prepared invasion.
I See tile curious disl~'tcll 110.16651, of ,fuly 14, uirecting Sucltet to
1Ie ready to SOlid half his corps to Vl\lIauo]ill :after hc shoultl hal'O takcn
Tortos;,.
SECTION XIX: CHAPTER V
TUE MONTHS OF WAITING. TlIE SIEGE OF CIUDAD
ItODRIGO
'I'm: long mouths of delay that followed the first operations
of the French in rSIO were El. time of anxious waiting for
"\\relliugton. He had movL'<1 his head quarters to Vizeu on tbe
12th of January, and had lK.'<!1l I),jug ill that bleak and lofty
town all through the rest of the winter. 'Vilh him there had
come to the North all the old Blitish divisions save the 2nd,
whidl had b~1l left with Hill, first at Abruntes and then at
Portalegre, to watch the French between the Tagns and the
GuadianR. The 1st Division was placed at ViZCIl, the 8rd at
Tral1co50 and the neighbouring villages, the 4th at Guarda,
while the cavalry wintered. in the coast plain between Coimbra
and Aveiro. Only the Light Brigade of Robert Craufurd.
which takes the new style of the Light Division on March 1,
~'as pushed forward to the Spanish frontier, and lay in the
villages about Almeida I, with its outposts pushed forward to
the line of the Agueda. The Portuguese regular brigades,
which were afterwards incorporated in the British dhisions,
were still lying in winter quarters around Coimbra and Thomar,
drilling hard and incorporating their recruits. The militia
were also under arms at their regimental head quarters, save
the few battalions which had already been thrown into Elvas.
Almeida, Peniche, and Abrantes.
Wellington's front, facing the French, was formed by Hill's
corps in the AJemtejo, Lecor's Portuguese brigade in the
Custc110 Dralleo district, and Cmufurd's force 011 the Agueda.
Neither Hillllor Lccor wus in actual contact with the enemy,
and La RoIlIUIlU'S army, spread out from the Pass of Perules to
I '111e hwulllunrtcrs of the 43rd durillg January amI Febru"ry wem at
Vllh'erde, above the Coo, t1nl6e of the 1i21l11 at Piuhel, those of the 06th at
Villa Torpim.
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Zafra and Ara.cena in a thin line, lay between them and
Reynier's and Mortier's outposts. It was otherwise with
Crallfllrd, who was placed north of La Romana's left division,
that of Martin Carrera; he was in close touch with Ne.r's corps
all along the line of the Agueda, as far ns the Douro. Sincc
the outposts of thc 6th Corps had been pus]u:!d forward on
March 9th, the Commander of the Light Division wus in a most
responsible, not to say a dangerous, position, The maill arlllY
was forty miles to his rcur in its cantonmcuts at Vizcu, Guuroa,
and Trancoso. He bad with him of British infantry only the
first battalions of the 431'd, 52nd, and 95th, with onc battery,
and one regiment of cavalry, the 1st Hussars of the King's
German Legion. His orders were to keep open the communica·
lion with Ciudad Rodrigo till the last possible moment, to
cover Almeida as long as was prudent, and to keep the Com-
mander-in-Chief advised of every movement of the enemy. It
was clear that he might be thrust back at any moment: the
6th Corps, since Loison had joined it, was 30,000 strong: the
Light Division had only !!,500 infantry with the 500 German
light horse. On March !t8th Wellington sent up to rein-
force Craufurd two battalions of ~adores, tbe 1st and 9lnd,
The latter of these units was afterwards changed for the 3rd 1,
which, trained by Elder, the best of all the colonels lent to the
Portuguese army, was reckoned the most efficient corps that
could be selected from Beresforo's command, But the two
C~ador battalions onl)' added 1,000 bayonets to the Light
Division, and even after their arrival Craufurd's force was less
than 4,000 sb'Ong.
Roberl Craufurd, though only a brigadier, and junior of his
rank, had been chosen by Wellington to take charf:,re of his
outpost line lx."Causc he was oue of the very few officers then
in the Pe1lillsula in whose ability his Commander-in-Chief had
perfect confidence. Nothing is more striking than to compare
the tone and character of the letters which Wellington wrote
to him with those which he dispatched to most of his other
] On Crallfurd's complaint that the 2nd Ca~adores were badly com-
manded and too full of boys, He repeatedly asked for, alld ultimately
obtained, the 3rd battalion ill place of the 2nd, becallse of his cOlJlidcnce in
Elder.
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breneral officers. Only with Craufurd, Hill, and Ueresford, did
he ever condescend to enrer into explanations and state reasons.
The rest receive orders without comment, which the:)' are directed
to carry out, and are gi ven no opportunity to discuss1. The
difference was noted and resented by the others: when on
March 8th Craufurd was formally given charge of the whole
outpost line of the army, and his seniors Picton and Cole were
told to conform their movements to his, without waiting for
orders from head quarters, some friction was enbrendered 2.
Pidoll and Craufurd, in especial, were for the rest of the
campaign in a state of latent hostility, which more than once
loo to high words when they met-a fad which was lIot without
its dllngcrs to the welfare of the army 3.
The celebrated commander of the Light Division was at tltis
time well knowll for his ability, but reckoned rather an tllllucky
soldier. He had entered the army so far back as 1779, IUld
had seen service in every qnarter of the globe, yet in 1809 was
only a colonel. This was the lIlore tUltoullding since he was
onc of the few scientific soldiers in the British arm)' when the
Revolutionary War broke out. He had spent some time lit
Berlin in 17'8Q, studying the t...'\.Ctics of the army of Fredel'ick
I Note especiall)' Wellington's e:.:planator)' dispatch to Craufurd of
March 8, where he even goes so far as to give his subordiuate a free hand
as to the cJlOice of his line: 'You must be a better judge of tile details of
tlli~ question than I can be, and 1 wish you to consider them, ill order to
be able to carry the plan into execution when 1 shall send it to you.' In
another letter n'ellington writes: ' Nothing cau be of KI'eater advantage
to mc tJlall to hA.\'C thc uenefit of )'our opiuitlll 011 allY sulojcct:
• < I intend tJmt tile divisionsuf Gencl'llls Cole ami PiutOIl sllOuld support
you 011 the Coa, willlOut waitiug for orders fnllll me, if it "'llOuId loe nooet!-
sary, and they slml1 be directed accor{lillgly.· 8th March, from Vizeu.
~ It should 110t be forgotten tl1(lt Picton, no less than Craufurd, was at
this time living doll'u an old disaster. But Pi<:tou's misfortuue had not
been militarr. It was t]le celebrated case of Re.x v. PicJOII. He Jlad been
tried for permitting the use of torture to e:.:tra.ct evidence against erimilmls
while gO"enlQr of the newly cOlllluered islllud of Trinidad, and corn'icted,
t110ugll Spalli~ll law (Wllich was still in force in 'l'rinirllld) apl13tcutly
permitwd of the practice. Aner this Picton was a marked man. The
story of Luisa Culderon, the quadroon girl who Imd been tortured by
< I,icketing; had been appearing interUlittentl)' in tIle columns of every
Whig paper for more than three years.
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the Great, and had translated into English the official Pr~ian
treatise all the Art of War. His knowledge of German, a rare
accomplishment in the British army at the end of the eighteenth
century, caused him to be given the post of military attache at
Coburg's head quarters in 1794, and he followed the Austrian
army through all the· disasters of that and the two following
years. Again in 1799 he went out to take the same post at
the head quarters of the army of Switzerland, but quitted it
to serve on the staff of the Duke of York, dnring the miserable
Dutch expedition of that same year. He seemed deslined to
witness nothing but disasters, and though he was knowll to
have done his duty 'with admirable zeal and cllergy in c\"cry
post that he occupied, promotion lingered. Probnbly his
caustic tongue and fiery temper were his hindrances, but it
seems astonishing that he took twenty-six years to attain the
rank of colonel, though he was not destitute of political
influence, having friends and relatives in Parliament, and even
in the Ministry 1. In 1801 he was a disappointed man, thought
of retiring from the army. and. having accepted a nomination
borough, sat in the Commons for five years. [n 1805 he was
at last made a colonel, and in the following lear went on active
service with the expedition which, sent originally to the Cape,
was distracted in1B07 to the unhappy Buenos A)'res campaign.
This was the zenith of his misfortunes; it was he who, placed
in charge of a light brigade by the incapable Whitelocke, was
thrust forward into the midst of the tangled streets of Buenos
AJres. snrrollnded in the convent of San Domingo, and forced
to capitulate for lack of support. At the ensuing court-
martinI he WflS acquitted of nIl blame, but the fact that he
had surrendered a British brigade mnkled ill bis mind for the
I'est of his life. The ullshaken conlldence in his abilities felt
by the Home authorities was marked by the fact that he was
sent out in Octolxr 1808 with Haird's corps, which landed at
CorunllR, and again in June 1809 to Lisbon, each time in
command of a brigade. But his bad luck seemed still to
attend him: he missed the victory of Corunna because Moore
I Hi'! cider brother, Sir L'harles Craufurd, was Oeplltr-Adjutant-Gelleral,
and 1\1.1'. for Iletford. Windhnm, the Secretarr for "raf, \Vas llis devoted
friend.
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had detached his brigade on the inexplicable march to Vigo.
He failed to be present at Talavera, despite of the famous forced
march which he made towards the sound of the cannon.
]n ]810 Craufurd was burning to vindicate his reputation,
I.Uld to show that the confidence which 'Wellington pIu-coo in
him was Llot undeserved. He still regarded himsclf u.s a Illall
who had been uujustly dealt with, and had never been givcn
hi" c!lIl11CC, He could not forget that he was four years older
than Bcresford, live years older than \VellingtOn, eight yem's
older than Hill, yet WM hut a junior brigadier-general in
charge of a division 1, He was full of a consuming energy, on
the look-out for slights and quarrels, a verystriet disciplinarian,
restless himself and leaving his troops no rest, He WM not
liked by all his officers: in the Light Division he had many
ad.mirers 2 and many bitter critics, Nor was he at first popular
with the rank and tile, though they soon began to recognize the
keen intelligence that guided his actions, and to see that he was
a just if a hard master 3• In the matter of feeding his troops,
the most difficult task imposed on a general of the Peninsular
army, he had an unparalleled reputation for accomplishing the
impossible-even if the most drastic methods had to be
employed. The famous old story about WellingtQn and the com·
missary had Craufurd (and not, as it is sometimes told, Picton)as
I TIiOugl\ senior in the date of his first commission to nearly all the
officen of the l'eniusular army, Craufurd was six years junior to l'icton,
and one year junior to Hope. Graham, much his scuior in lIKe, had only
entered the army ill 1703.
~ Such as 5haw-KellIlOOY, Williatn Cnmpbell, KillCllid, Klld Lort! Scatoll.
S Fur Cn,ufurtl'& life lInd lICJ'$(I1Ullity sec his biogl'lll,lly b)' 11ill gramJJ>oll
tile Hev. Aim;:, Cmllfurtl, l..omloll, 1890. The 1lI0llt vivid llicture of him
is ill lliflemau lIarrig's chronicle of the Coruuna retreat, a wonderful piece
of narratil'e by a writer from tIle ranks, who admired his general despite
of all llis severity, and acknowledges that his methods were necessary.
'l110ugh .Napier as a historian is on the whole fairl}' just to his old corn·
mander, whose achie\'ementll were bound np indissolubly with the glories
of the Light Uivision, all a mall lie disliked Craufurd: in onc of his
books which I possess (Delllgtal'e's Oampogne de ]lIJ"rtugal) he has written
in t1Ul murgin s(wcnll bitter !.ersonnl remarks about him, I'er)' 1lI11ike the
lunguage employed ill his history. The llllllllblisJled Journal of Colonel
McT.A..'(l(l of till} 43rl1 is (as :'Ilr. Alex, Craufurd illforms me) written ill the
same spirit. , 50 is Charles Nallier's Diary,
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its hero. As It sample of his high-handed ways, it may be
mentioned that he once seized and impounded some church-plate
till the villages to which it belonged found him some corn for
his starving division. Craufurd, on one of his happy da}'s, and
they were many, was the most brilliant subordinate that
Wellington ever owned. His mistakes-and he committed
more than one-were the faults of an ardent and ambitious
spirit taking an immoderate risk in the hour of excitement.
From March to .Tuly 1810 Craufl1ro, in charge of the whole
outpost system of \Vellington's army, accomplished the extra-
ordinary feat of guarding a front of forty miles against all
active enemy of sixfold force, without suffering his Hue to be
pierced, or allowing thel'-'rench to gain tul)' information whatever
of the dispositions of the host ill his rear. Hc was ill constant
and daily touch with Ney's corps, yet wns never surpriSl...J., amI
never thrust back sa\'c by absolutely overwhelming strength;
he never lost a detachment, never faik-d to detect cvery move
of the enemy, and never sent his commander false intelligence.
This was the result of system and science, not merely of vigilance
and activity. The journal of his aide de camp Shaw-Kennedy,
giving the daily work of the Light Division during the critical
months of 1810, might serve as an illustrative manual ot
outpost duty, and was indeed printed for that purpose in
185Il.
Craufnrd's one cavalry regiment, the German Hussars, had
to cover a front of nearly forty miles, and performed the duty
admirably; it had been chosen for the service because it was
considered by 'Wellington superior in scouting power to any
of his British light cavalry corps. •General Crullfurd lVorked
out the most difficult part of the outpost duty with them. He
had the great adl'an~ooe of speaking Germall AuenUYl lllJd he
arranged for the outpost d~lties of the different purls of the
long line that he had to guard by his personal communications
with the captains of that admirable corps, men who werc
themselves masters of the subject. They each knew his plan
for the spa<.-e that they covered, though lIot his !,1'Clleral plan,
and each worked out his part most admirably, The General
communicated with them direct. He had the great advantage
I As:m Al'pemlix lo L.ol'd F, Fitz-Clnrenl'C'S Jfl/1/1lul 'If OtltplJlil D«I.ies,
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of possessing, with his great abilities and energy, uncommon
bodily strength, so that he could remain on horseback almost
any length of time, , , , When his operations began, the poiut to
be observed was the line of the Agueda, extending for some
forty miles, The country, although very irregular in its
surface, was quite open and unenclosed, and fit almost every-
where for the action of all thn,.'<! arms, \Vhen he took up
the line he kept his infantry hack entirely, with the exception
of fonr companies of the Rifles nbove the bridge of Dtu'ha del
]luerco, upon the cafcuIa/km of the time that would be required
to retire the infantry behind the Coa, after he received informa-
tion fi..,m the cavalry of the enemy's advance. If we are
properly to understaud Craufi.Ird's operations, the calculation
must never be lost sight of, for it was OIl calculations that he
acted all along. The hazarding of the four companies at BarOO
del Puerco fm'llls a separate consideration: it rested on the
belief that the pass there was so difficult, that four companies
could defend it against any numbers, and that, if they were
turned higher up the river, the Hussars would give the Rifles
warning in ample time for a safe retreat, . , ' Speciall'eports were
made of the state of the fords of the Agueda every morning,
and the rapidity of its rises was particularly marked. An
officer had special charge of all deserters from the enemy, to
examine them and bring together their information I, Beacons
were prepared on conspicuous heights, so as to commuuicate
information as to the enemy's offensive movements. To ensure
against mistakes in the night, pointers were kept at the stations
of communication, directed to the beacous, . , , As Napier has
remarked in his History, seven minutes suffieed for the division
to get under arms in the middle of the uight, and a quarter of'
an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to its alanll-
posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient
distance to the r<!ar. And this not upon a cOllccrtcJ signal, nor
us a trial, but at all times and certain 2.'
I One of the most curious points in Shaw-Kennedy's Diary [po 218J is
that from the reports of deserters Craufurd succeeded in rOOollstructillg
till.! exact COIllIM)l;ition of Ney's corps, ill brigades Rlld bnttnlions, lVith a
final error of only 0110 hattalion lam:! 2,000 mell too few,
'I Shaw-Kcllnedy, Diary, pp. 142 alld Hi.
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To complete the picture it remains to be added that there
were some fifteen fords between Ciudad Hodrigo and the mouth
of the Agueda, which were practicable in dry weather for nil
arms, and that several of them could be used even after It day
or two of rain. The French were along the whole river; they
har! 3,000 horse available in :March and April,5,000 in Ma)'
and June. Their infAntry At some points were only three 01'
four miles back from the river: yet Craufurd's line WIL'; never
broken, nor was even a picket of ten men cut off or snrrounded.
The least movement of the enemy was repOlt.cd along the whole'
front in an incredibly short time, the whole web of communi-
cation quivered at the slightest tuuch, and the division wa~
immediately ready to fight or to draw back, according as the
strength of the French dictated boldness or caution.
During February 'Vellington had rightly concluded that
Craufurd had nothing to fear; Ney's early demonstration against
Ciudad Rodrigo had no more serious significance than Mol'-
tier's similar appearance in front of Badajoz. But when March
arrived, and the 8th Corps appeared in the plains of· Leon
and commenced the siege of Astorgn, while Ney began to move
up his cavalry to the line of the Yeltes, and Loison's division,
coming from Astorgn, established itself on the lower Aguooa, it
seemed likely that seriolls work would soon begin. The first test
of the efficiency of Crallfurd's outpost s)'stem was made on the
night of March 19-~O, whcn Ferc)', commanding the brigade
of Loison's di\'ision which lay at Sail Felices, assembled his six
'o'oltigeur companies before dawn, and Illude a dash at the pass
of Barba del Pucrco. He had the good luck to bayonct tlle
sentries at the bridge before the)' could fire, and was half way
up the rough ascent from the bridge to the Yillage, when Beck·
with's detachment of the 95th Rifles, roused and armed in ten
minutes, were upon him. They drove him down the defile, and
chased him h..'lck across the rh-er with the loss of two officers
and forty-five men killed and wounded. Beckwith's riflemen
lost one officer and three men killed, and ten men wounded in
the three companies engaged. After this alarm CrlLufurd was
in anxious expectation of a. general adva.nce of t.he 6th Corps,
and made every preparation to receive them. Dut Ferey's
rceol1l1aiSSllIlCe had. no sequel, and a whole month passf!(l by
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without any serious mm'c on the part of the enemy. The
Agueda was in flood for the greater pm-t of April, owing to
incessant raills, which made the outpost work simple, as the
number of points to be observed went down from fifteen to three
or four. It was not till the twenty·sixth that 3faucune's and
Ferey's brigades moved up close to Ciudad Rodrigo, drove in the
Spanish outposts, and formed the blockade of the place on the
east side of the Agueda. Even then its bridge remained
unmolested, and Craufurd could communicalc quite freely with
the garrison, and did so till June 2nd. 1\fassClll\ at 1\ latc." date
blamed Ney for having established this partial and useless
blockade before he was ready to commence the siege in earnest.
'rhe two French brigades consumed, during the month of May,
the whole of the local resources of the district around Rodrigo,
so that, when the rest of the army came up, all supplies had to
be brought up from a great distance. It may also be remarked
that to advance a corps of no more than 7,000 men within
striking distance of the British army would have been very
ha1.ardous, if \Vellington had been entertaining any designs of
taking the offensive-and Ney at this time could not have been
sure that such a contingency was unlikely. The only advantage
which the Marshal got from keeping his detachment so close
to the fortress was that, in their month of waiting, the brigades
were able to prepare a great store of gabions and fascines, and
the engineers to make a thOl'ough survey of the environs.
Ciudad Rodrigo stands on a single circular knoll of no great
height, whose summit it exactly covers. It is a small place of
some 8,000 souls, packed tight in narrow streets within a stout
mediaeval wall thickly set with towers. A fourteenth-century
castle, on which the houses press in too close for strength, fills its
south-eastern corner; there is no other inner place of refuge.
The Agueda, divided into several channels, runs under the
southern side of the place; it is crossed by a bridge completely
commanded by the fire of the walls. On the water-front the
knoll is at its highest, on the opposite face it is much less steep,
and only very slightly exceeds the level of the surrounding
groWld. Round the circuit of the mediaeval wall a low modern
enceinte had been constructed, and served as an outer protection
([auJse-braye); it was only twelve feet high, so did not shield
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more than a third of the inner wall, which could be battered
over its summit. Its outline was zigzagged in the form of
redans, and it was furnished with a dry ditch. Its glacis,
owing to the rising of the knoll, gave it little protectioll, so
that both the older and the modern wall could be searched, tor
the greater part of their height, hy the artillery of It besieger.
Ouhide the eastern gate of Uodrigo lies the straggling suburb
of San Francisco, on \'f~ry low ground. It was so large and so
close to the walls that the governor Herrusti considered it
absolutely necessary to take it inside the circuit of his defences.
It had at:cordingly been surrounded by a strollg earthwork, and
the thrcc great lllOuastcries which it contaius-San Frauci!S(...o,
Sau Domiu!:."O, and Santa Clam-had bccu strengthcuoo aud
loopholed. The small suburb of La Marina, just across the
bridge, was retrenched and manned, as was also the convent
of Santa Cruz, which stands isolated 200 yards outside the
north-west angle of the town. Other outlying buildings had
been le\'elled to the ground, lest they should afford cover to the
enemy.
'l'he;e preparations were very wise and helpful, but they did
not do away with the main weakness of Ciudad Rodrigo
considered as a modern fortress. Like mally other mediaeval
strongholds it is commanded by outlying heights, which could
be disregarded as an clemcnt of danger in the fourteenth 01'
thc sixteenth t'Cutury, because of thcir distancc, but Ix>callle ull-
important with thc improvemcnt of artillery, III this case two
knolls, considerably higher than that on which the place stands,
lie outside its northern walls. The smaller, named the Little
Teson, lies only 200 yards from the northern angle of the town;
it is some fifty feet higher than the base of the ramparts.
Immediately behind it rises the Great 'resoll, which dominates the
whole country-side, its broad flut top, three-quarters of a mile
in dil!ometer, being a hundred feet above the level of the plain.
It was hopeless to think of holding thc little Tcson as an
outwork, since the greater onc looks down into it and searches
it from cud to cud. The Great Tcson, Oil the other haud, is so
larbte-its circuit is about the same as the city itself-that it
would be impossible to thiuk of defending it, as when entrenched
it would require a garrison of at least 3,000 men, and Hcrrasti
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had but 5,500 troops under his L"ommand. 1\:.$ slopes, moreo\'cr,
are gentie, and do not lend thcmselves to fortifica.tion. The
southern edge of the platean of the Great Teson being only
500 yaros froro the town wall, it was obvious that here was the
place from which Rodrigo conld best be assailed. Batteries on
its skyHne could breach both the inner a.nd outer walls, and
could command every square foot both of the town and of the
fortified suburbs. Accordingly the br'igades which lay before
the place in May had encamped on and behind the Teson,
and stored the gabions, fascines, and sandhags which they were
making in a park, near the cOllvent of La Caridad and the villuge
of Pedro de Toro, on its further side.
Herrasti, as we have said, had a gal'l'ison of 5,500 men,
composed of one line battalioll, two militia battalions, three
batta.liolls of new levics from the town and its vicinity, called
• Voluntarios de Ciudad Rodrigo,' alld one battalion of' Urball
Guaros 1.' None of these troops, sa\'e the Hne battalion 01'
1I.fajorca (which had formed part of the old Army of Estre·
madura) had ever becn uuder fil'e-a fact which makes their fine
defence a11 the more creditn.ble. There were only 11 officers
and 37 Illell of the artillery of the Hile in the place: these had
to train 350 men assigned to them fmm the infantry; but
fortunately the long delay in the opening of the siege had
allowed the instructiOIl lo be thoroughly carried out. Of
engilleers there were only 4 officers and 60 sappers-of ca\'alry
tloue-but the partisan chief Julian Sanchez with some ~OO of
his Lancers chanced to be in the place on the day when it was
completely invested, and was forced lo cut his wayout when
the bombardment began. Perhaps the main strength of Ciudad
Rodrigo, as of Gerona, lay in the personality of its governor.
General Andres Herrasti, a veteran of nearly se\'enty years,
was determiued to do his duty, and showed as lIluch ingenuity
and readiness as obstinacy in his defence.
Though the French had appeared before the wal1s of Ciudad
1 Herrasti's report gives1st of l\lajorea 706 officers alld men, Avila alld
Segovia rnilitia 857 and 317 respectively, tlnee batta.1iolls of volunteers of
Ciudad Rodrigo 2,242, Urban guard 750, artillery 376, sappers 60 ; total~
with sorne details addedJ 5,510J not inc1uding Sanche-¿'s Partida, See
Uelmas, iii. 314.
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Uodrigo on April 26th, it was not tilll\1ay 30th that. Ney came
up in person, with four brigades of infantry and MOlltbrnn's
division of reserve canllry, to complete the investment. The
main cause of the delay wa.", as usual, the lack of supplies.
Ney had to levy and forward from Salamanca two months'
rations for an anny of 30,000 men, and conld only do so after
long and harassing preparation. He nearly came to actual
blows with King .Joseph o\"er the matter, for he sent n. cavalry
brigade to raise requisitions in the province of Aviln, which was
outside his command, and General Hugo, the King's gavel"nor,
put his troops under arms and n~fused to allow the dragoons to
enter his district. All imperial rescript, however, soon arrived,
which placed Avilll at the disposition of the 6th Corps, and the
royal authorities hud to yield 1 •
.All ~ey's troops were now concentrated for the sieblll, his out-
lying detachmcnts in cvcry direction hllving been relievcd by
Junot, who, ut M!ls:;cna's orders, brought dowll the 8th Corps
from the Douro, plllccd a brigade to wutch the Puss of Banos,
left garrisons in Zarnora und Toro, and advanccd with the
remainder of his troops to the line of the Agueda. Clausel's
dh·ision Ilud St. Croix's division of dragoons took post at
San Felices, in immediate touch with Craufurd's division.
Solignac's division lay a march and a half to the rear at
Ledesma. San Felices is only 20, Ledesma is 40 miles from
Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the 8th Corps, deducting the outlying
brigades, could have joined Ney in two days. These distances
were the governing factor in Wellington's policy during the
next month. Ney had 26,000 men of the 6th Corps and
Montbrun's 4,000 drl!.auoons in front of Rodrigo; Junot could
join him with 8,000 infantry and ],800 cavalry in a day;
a second day would bring up Solignac with 7,000 men more.
Unless the 6th Corps could be surprised in its camps, and
forced to fight before it received its reillfon:ements, there
would be 47,000 French to facc. Of their numbers Wellington
was roughly aware; the Ilgurcs sent in to him by Cfllufurd
were accurate to within (l few thousands 2, and estimak-d the
enemy at 40,000 men. The COlllmundcr-ill-Chiers own calcu-
lation was even nearer the truth; early in May he reckoned
1 See Sprunglill's JrJurnal, p. 417. 1 Ma.y 2, to Cr-,wfurtl.
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1,800
2,500
1,000
8,000
700
000
;-.Iey, with Loison's division included, at 30,000 men, Junot
and Kellermann at 30,000 1• Earl}' in .Tune he made out that
the two corps in his front, without Kellermaun, amounted to
50,000 men,2 which was only 3,000 over the true total. He
himself had at this moment only 18,000 British troops under
his hand, and within striking distance. He had on April 27th,
brought up his head quarters and the 1st Division to Celorico,
and moved forward Pieton and the 3rd Division to Pinhel,
while Cole with the 4th remained at Guarda, and the Light
Division was, as usual, facing the Agueda. 'l'he cavalry had
also come up from the Mondego valley, and lay behind
Almeida. Morcovcr, the n\'c Portuguese brigades of Hllrvey,
Collins, Pack, Coleroan, and Alex. Campbcll were ortlered up
to the frontS, and joined the army in the first days of May.
'Vellingtoll thereupon incorporated Harve)"'s brigade with the
3rd Division and Collins's with the 4th, a system which he
afterwards carried out with Illmrly all the Portuguese units.
The whole of this mass of troops came to some 15,000 men~.
, Oil June 1 Craufurd calculated the troops ill frout of Ciudad Rodrigo,
by counting regiments "ml battalions, at over 26,000 men, 'Inere were
really 30,000, nnd the untlcr-estirnate came from nllowillg olll}' .560 Illen
to a b....Ulllioll, while thoy really averaged 660. Al>out tllC S<llllO lime
Cranfurd estimntell the parts of JUllot's corps in the neig11bourhood to be
13,000 mCIl: tllCy wcre really nearly 17,000. Thc cause of error was the
same. See Shaw-Kelluetly'S Diary, pages 1~. TIle estimates are
corrected, 011 fuller information, early in July, !>ee ibid., p. 220,
2 To Charles Stnart,June 8, and to Hill, June 0.
, '11lis movement, unchrollic1ed elsewhere, appears in D'Urban's diary,
April 26. {The Portuguese ordered to the front, consisting of t\\'O brigades
of artillery, 4th and 6th C3I1adores, 1st and 16th (Pack), 7th nud 10th
(Colcmau), 6th nnd 18th (Ale.'C. Campbell), 11th and 23rd (Collins),Oth
and 21st (Harvey) of Ule Liue, Tbey all go into march 011 the 28th, and
will arrive by successive briglUlcs at Celorico in four days.'
• At tllis moment the total force of the allied llrmy was ;-
1st Divisioll (all Britisll). 6,000 bayonetil,
ard "Britisll 2,500 witl\ Han'ey's Portuguese
4t1t" " 4,000 with Collins's "
Light- n " 2,600 with 2 Ca~ador Batts,
Pack's, Campbell's, and Coleman's Portuguese brigades
Cavalry (British) 2,100 J'ortuguese
Artillery " 1,000 Portuguese
18,100
It 2
14,000
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These, with the British, makhlg It total of 32,000 men, were
all that lVellington could count upon, for he could not dare
to move Hill's 1~,000 men from the south, where they were
observing Reynier, nor to displace the small reserve, which lay
at Abrantes and Thomll.r to guard against n possible l?rench
move along the 'l'agus by Castello Brallco. Lisbon could not
he left unprotected 011 this side, so long as Reynier la)' between
the Taglls llnd the Guadiana,
B}' bringing up evcry lllall 'Vcllillgton could havc att/lckcd
Ney's 30,000 in front of Rodl'igo with 33,000, of whom nearly
half would hal'c consisted of thc newly organised Portuguese
brigades, of which hardly a. battalion had been under fire.
He would ha,·c had under 3,000 CRvulry to face 5,000, and
0. marked inferiority ill tutiller,Y also. No prnctical WlSistance
could have been got by inviting the co-operation of ){artin
Carrera's depleted Spanish di\'ision of 3,000 men, which lay
on the hills about the sources of the Agueda, watching Ne}"s
flank. If the first stroke should fail, and Ney were not surprised,
Wellington would have Junot's 17,000 men to count with
within forty-eight hours. Ciudad Rodrigo lies on a plain, a full
day's march from the hills, and by advancing to relieve it the
British army must commit itself to an action in the open.
Tt is no wonder then that Wellington rcfused to attempt the
movement; weak in cavalry and with 15,000 troops of uncertain
vulue in his ranks, he would havc been mad to cmbal·k upon
such all operation. It was most improbable that ~ey could
have been surprised, and forced to fight without Junot's aid,
when he had 5,000 horsemen at hand, to discover and report
the first movement of the Anglo-Portuguese. Napoleon had
been right when he told Massena that it was practically
impossible that Wellington would ofter battle in the plains.
I-Ierrasti had been sent a.s.'ll1rances that the llritish army would
do anything that was feasible for his relief, but he was wanled
in Il supplementary letter of June 6th that it might be impos-
sible to aid him. •You will believe,' wrote Wellington, • that
if I should not ~ ablc to attempt yOUl' relief, it will be owing
to the superior strcngth of the enemy, and to the llecc!lSity for my
attending to othel' important objects 1.' Notwithstanding this
I Dillpalcha, vi. p. 172.
1810] WELLINGTON REFUSES TO ADVANCE 245
caut.ion it would appear that the Spanish governorst.ill hoped for
prompt assistll.nce. It seemed to him, 3S it did to all Spunish
IUld some English oflk:ers ut the time I, tha.t "Vellill,b..wn would
not be able to endure the spectacle of Ciudad Rodrigo being
taken while his outposts were lying only fiix miles in front
of' it. Those who held such views little knew the infl.e.'l:ible
character of' the mnn with whom the}· had to deal, or his con-
tempt fOl' considemtions of pride or sentiment. To take a
great risk, when victory would mean only the raising of the
siege of llodrigo till Junot and Kellermann should have joined
Ney, while defeat might mean the loss of ll ortuga.l, waS not in
consonance with 'Vellington's character. The possible gain and
loss were too unequal, and he very rightl)" and not without
much regret, remained in observation at Celorico 2. He sums up
the matter thns :-' I must leave the mountains and cross the
plains, as well as two rivers, to raise the siege. To do this
I have about 33,000 men (including Can-era's Spaniards), of
which 3,000 are cavalry 3. Included are 15,000 Spaniards and
Portuguese, which troops (to say the best of them) are of
doubtful quality. Is it right, under these circumstances, to risk
Il. general action to raise the siege of' Ciudad Rodrigo? I should
think not ~,' And again, (My object is to be able to relieve the
place, if it should be advisable to attempt it, in cOllsequence of
tiny alteration in the encmy'!> force. This does not appear to be
a very probable event at present, and ought not to be provided for
according lo the L"OlIllllOll rules of pnIdcilCC, at all)' considerable
l'isk 5,' Expressions of rcgrctarc added, ' I do not give the matter
I D'Urban, for example, wrote ill his journal 011 June HI that he took
the dllring step .of suggesting a surprise attack on Ne)' to the General.
No notice was taken of his suggestiou.
• l'icton Slimmed lip the situatiOIl ill n letter to a friend [see llobinsoll's
LVii of Picloll, i. 273] I'llI')' dearl)"; (If we nttelllllt to reliCl'e thc placc the
.1"rellcl, will ,hive us out Ctf Portugal: while if they get llUSSl..."'ISioli of
it, tlHly will lose lime, Wllich is more illll)()rtant to them than Ciudad
Hodrigo, But tlley llave got to find this ouL'
! A slight under-estim:l.te, as it would seem, for with La Carrera's force
the whole would hal'e been 36,{I()() sabres and b.1)"onets. Of t11e 3,{I()()
cavalry 700 were Portuguese and 300 Spaniards,
• Wellington to Henry Wellesley, JUlle 20
~ "rellington to Craufurd, June 24.
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up; if they hold out like men the)' are worth saving, and undcr
certain circumstances it might be possible to" illcur the risk.'"
But thc 'ecrtuill circulllstam..'Cl>' llCI'CL' CUlIlC about; thc)' lSCcm
to ha\'c bccn the possibility cither that (1) Ne)' or Junot might
make detachmcnts, or move their corps into a less concentrated
position than they at present occupied, or (2) that the)' might
form a covering army, and advance to drive him off from his
present quarters, which were too close to Ciudad Rodrigo for
their comfort. This last contingency almost happened, as we
shall see; probably if the enemy had come out to attack him
'Vellington would have accepted battle, in one of the defensive
positions that he knew so well how to select.
Ney, as hflS been already mentioned, arrived before the
fortress with some 20,000 men on May 30th. On June lst he
threw a bridge across the Agueda, a mile and a half above
Uodrigo, but sent no troops across it. '1'10'0 days later Massenu
came lip from the rear, approved of the plau that had bL'Cn
formed for brcuching the city from the side of thc two TCSOIlS,
und, huving reviewed the 6th Corps, took his way back to
Salumanca. At this moment he gave orders to Re)'llier and
the 2nd Corps to leave 'l'ruxillo Ilnd the valley of the Guadiuna,
and to cross the Tagus to Coria and Plaseucia, from wheu<.oc they
could threaten Castello Brllnco and Abrantes. This was ill accord-
ance with the orders of the Emperor, who had bidden him call
up Reynier from the Guadiana, to cover his flank. Sueh a move·
ment had been foreseen by vVellillgton, who as early as June 9th
had directed Hill to leave Portalcgre with his a,ooo men, and
to eross the Tagus at Villa Ve1ha the moment that ReYllier
should have passed it at Almnmz 1. Some days lutcr the
Gll1icillll geucl1l.1 Mllhy scnt to the Bt'itish heud quarters four
duplicates of Napoleon's dispatches to Massena and King
Joseph, which had beCIl intercepted by guerrillas on the way to
Salamanca~, They corroborated all Wellington's suspicions,
, Wellington 10 Hill, July n.
~ These were KalKlleon's dispatcIles nos. 16,50u, )O,ii19-20, and HI,r.o-l,
as is shown by the excellent analysis of them given by D'Vrban ill Ilis
diary. He read tIlem over with Beresford on July 1. No. 16,519 was
"ery valuable, as giving tIle exact strengtlL of the 2nd, Gth, and Ot11 Corps
-the first absohltely certain analysis of them that Wellington obt:lined.
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and enabled him to provide "gainst the danger on this side
e"en before it had begun to arise. Hill's route by Villa Velha
being appreciably shorter than that of Reynier, he was in
position be)'ond the Tagus before the 2nd Corps had reached
Coria. Their cavalry met and skirmished at Ladoeiro 011 the
Zarza-Castello Dranco road on July 22nd. Thus the relative
position of the two hostile forces ill the south was exactly
preserved: Wclliugton knew that he could caU ill Hill to join
hi~ maill mmy us quickly as Masseua eould draw Rcynier to
himself through the ])ass of f>cmles-thc ouly reure possible for
him. Hc felt all the more secure Uccausc he had now sOllle
British troops at Abl'Ulltcs ready to support Hill. Three newly
arrived battalions 1, which landed at Lisbon early in April, ha.d
been passed up the Tugus to Thomar and the line of the Ze7.ere,
where, uniting with two Portuguese brigades, they formed
Leith's '5th Division,' n fresh factor in the situation. This
detachment, with two batteries added, could assist Hill with
7,000 men, if Reynier should push forward in the direction of
CllStello Brullco.
Whether at this moment Massena was proposing to order a
serious attack on this side, or whether he was from the first
intending to bring up the Qnd Corps to join the main army,
is 1I0t eertniu. Napoleon in some of his dispatches seems to
recommend the rather ha7.ardous 'attack on double external
lines '-a result of his general under-estimate of VVellington's
resisting power. On l\,fay ~9th he told his lieutenant that with
50,000 Illen of the 6th and 8th Corps he could capture both
Ciudad Rodrigo and Almcida, and then march' methodically'
into Portugal, while Reynier at Alcantara could cover the com·
munication with Madrid and menace Upper Beira. 'le prince
le Illaintiendra dans cette position sans le lRisser entamer.'
l\lassenit, however, did not think his main army strong enough,
and, being left a free hand by his master, ultimately called in
Reynier to join him, and so freed Wellington from the harassing
doubt as to whether he might not have to defend himself on the
Zezcre and on the Mondego at the same moment.
, These were the 3jlst, ljl:lth, 2j38th, which arrh'ed at Lisbon April 1-8.
Leith's di\<ision was formally constituted onl)' Oil July 16, but really
existed since J IlIlC.
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Long before the orders reacherl the 2nd Corps to move up
from Truxillo to Coria alld Zur1.u, the siege of U<Xlrib'O had
begun ill earncst. all June 1st, us we have already seen, Ney
had cust a bridge across the Aguedn above the town; four days
later a second was cOllst!'uctcd at the ford of 1.ora, below the
pluL'C, The moment that it was completed, Marchand's division,
half Mermet's, and the light cavalry brigade of Lamotte crossed
the river and established camps on its western bank, The
horsemen pushed back Craufurd's pickets to Murialva and l\1an-
zanilla, and completely cut his communication with Rodrigo,
which had hitherto been intermittently open. The troops which
had passed the river threw up redoubts to cover the bridge
heads, and slightly entrenched their cam~ On June 8th Ney
received the first convoy of his siege train, which continued to
come in by detachments during the next week, till he had fifty
heavy guns in hand, with 700 rounds for each, and ~,OOO gunners
and sappers of the' Grand Park 1,'
On the 15th the French opened their first parallel on the
Great 'reson, on a front of 1,500 yards; it was only 500 yards
from the glacis of the town. Hcrrasti kept up a furious fire
lIpon it, and vexed the workmen by two sorties, which were not
pressed home und did no harm. On the 19th six batteries on
the Tcson were commenced.; the work was easy owing to the
great store of gabions and sandlw.gs already in store, which the
brigade.<; of Maucunc and Fercy had prepared in May. \Vhile
the cmpluL'ClOents for the guns wcre being got ready, the 8appers
pushed forward zig-zags from the right end of the first parallel
down the slopes on the flank of the Little Teson. One approach
was directed toward the isolated convent of Santa Cruz, the
other toward the extreme northern angle of the town. The
Spaniards, though firing furiously day and night, could not
preyent either the construction of the batteries or the adnl,llce
of the approaches; wherefore .Julian Sal1che~, seeing that his
cava.lry could not live under the oncoming bomlw.rdmcnt, got
leave from the governor to quit the town. On the night of the
2ht-22nd he crossed the bridge, broke through the lines of
Marchand's division, and escaped by the Fuentc Guinaldo roud
with his 200 Lancers. He callle into Craufurd's camp, and gave
L See the Emperor's dispatclH!S to llertllier of }'la}' 27 and May 29.
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a full report of the state of the garrison and the progress of the
enemy's works.
It \\'US impOSiiLlc for the E'reuch tu open their second purttllcl
so long us the convent of StUlUt Cruz was held, for the fire of
Uus outll'ork would have enfiladed its whole length. On the
night of the 231'<1-24t11, therefore, Ne)' tril..xl to storm the
COIl\'Cllt with n picked body of Grelll\clicrs; they blew in its
dool' with a petard, and set fire to its lower story, but were
finally driven off: The convent was partinll)' destroyed, but the
galTisol1 gallantly clung to its l'uinfi, and oo\'creel themselves in
the debris. The French lost fifteen killed and fifty wounded
that night. On June 25th the batteries opened, without
waiting for the reduction of Santa Cruz, with forty-six gUllS
placed in six baltcl'ies along the crest of the Tcsoll. The
counter-fire of the besieged was vel')' effective; two expense
magazines containing 9,000 lb. of powder were blown up in the
trenches, lllllny guns dismounted, and one battery silenced.
The loss of the besiegers was hellvyl, The Spaniards suffered
less, but fires broke out in seveml quarters of the town from the
shells thrown by the French mortars, and mallY houses were
destroyed. The ruins of the convent of Santa Cruz, moreover,
were so lhOl1lughly battered to pieces that the garrison retired,
when nil nssault wns made upon it by gOD Grenadiers after night-
fall. This cnabh.'<I the French to push forward their worb
much nearer to the town.
Four days of furious artillery engabJ"Cment followed, in which
the besiegers, though suffcriug heavily, succeoocd not only ill
setting morc than half the tOWIl 011 fire, but, what was more
sedous, in making a bre~\ch in the faussc-brayc, at the projecting
angle of the north side of the city, 011 which four of the batlcries
had been trained, and ill illjurillg the inner mediaeval wall ut
the hack of it. Believing, wrongl)' as it Sf..'ClllS, that the breach
WM prndicable, Ney sent an officer to summon the town,
Herrnsti replied lhal he was still in a position lo defend himself,
I ~IllSS(Ina came up from Salamanca this da.y to inspect the bombard-
ment, Rnd made (liS WIIS hill WOllt) a mtiler memlucioulI reIJort thereOIl to
Hlo t;mpcror, declaring that the Fruudl logs had been 12 killed find 41
w01lIl(le.:1., wllercu8 it IIM exuocoded lOO (sce BclmllS, iii. 1'. 233J, und t1mt
the defence of the place WIIS serioulIly illlpllired~which it WRlIllot Rl> yet.
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and 'that aftet fatty-nine years of service he knew the laws of
war and his military duty.' He made, however, the unusual
request that he might be allowcd to send a lctter to Welling-
ton, and that a suspension of arms should be granted till the
return of his messenger. The Marshal, as was natural, sent
a refusal, and ordered the bombardment to reCOlllmel1(:e
(June ~8th).
Up to this moment the French engineers had been under
the impression that Ciudad Rodrigo would probably surrender
when it had been breached, without standing an assault, Now
that they recognized that the governor intended to fight to
the last, and noted that he had spent the night following the
summons in clearing the ditch and repairing the dam!\,.o-ed.
faussc-bmye with sandbags, they resolved that the breaching
oolteries must be brought closer in, Blld the approaches pushed
up to the foot of the walls. Accordingly a second parullel was
opened along the front of thc LitUc Tcson, two hundred llud
6ft)' yards in advancc of thc first, 011 the night of July ht.
On the same night a colulDu uf 600 mcn stormed the cunveut
uf San Franci&:o in the suburb, a post which would have
enfiladed the southern end of the new parallel in the most
dangerous fashion. Having obtained this lodgement in the
suburb the :Frcnch set to work to conquer the whole of it,
and after some stiff street-fighting stormed Santa Clara, its
central stronghold. Herrasti thereupon evacuated the rest of
the scattered houses, and withdrew all his troops inside the
toWIl (July Std).
The Ilew battery on thc Little 'l.'esou Wils costly to build and
mailltaiu-oll onc night the French lost sixty-ollc mell killed
and wounded in it 1. But it was vcry effective; the original
breach was much enlarged, and the old wall behind it was
reduced to ruins. Meanwhile a mortar battery, placed in the
conquered suburb, played upon the parts of the town which
had hitherto escaped bombardment, and reducecl many streets
to ashes. The position of the garrison was unsatisfactory, and
Herrasti sent out several emissaries to beg'Vellington to help
him, ere it was too late. Most of these adventurers were
captured by the French, but at least two reached the British
I Bclmlls, Hi. 2415, July 2.
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commander I, who had recently come lip to the ftollt to obsen1e
for himself the state of the enemy's forces. He found them
too strong to be mL>ddlcd with, und sent back a letter stating
that he was ready to move if he saw any chance of success, but
that a.t present none such was visible. He then retired, after
lenving Crallfurd two squadrons of the 16th I-ight DI'agoons
to strengthen his thin outpost line. Herrasti, though much
dispirited by Wellington's reply, continued to make a vigorous
defence, but the town was now mostly in ruins, and the
breach gaped wide.
On July 4th l\iasscna, who had again come up to visit the
siege, obtained intelligence that Wellington had been with the
Light Division at Gallegos, and detennined to push back
the British ontposts, in order to discover whether the front
line of his enemy had been strengthened by any troops from
Portugal. It seemed to him likely enough that the British
general might have massed his army for a bold stroke at the
besiegers, now that the strength of Ciudad Rodrigo was running
low. AccordinglJ' St. Croix's division of dragoons, supported
by a brigade of Junot's infantry, crossed the Azava brook and
drove in Cranfurd's cavalry pickets. They l'etired, skirmishing
vigorously all the way, to Gallegos, where the five infantry
battalions of the Light Di \'ision had conccntrated. Craufurd,
having strict orders from his chief that he was Dot to fight, fell
back on Fort C'...oncepcioll, the work on the Spanish frontier
half way to Almeida. Thercupon the French rctired, having
obtained the information that they wanted, viz. that Craufw1.l
had 1I0t been reinforced by auy considerable body of troops
from the real'. The Light Division had manreuvred with its
customary intelligence amI alertness all day; its flanks were
being continually turnoo by horsemen in overpowering numbers,
but it beat them off with ease, and lost only five men wounded
while falling back across tcn mile'! of absolutely open country.
The French lost five officers and over twenty mcu 2• mostl)' in
combats with the German Hussars, who surpassed themselves on
I See Shaw-Kennedy's Diary, pp. 2(18-9 aud 211.
~ Belmas, Hi. 250. For the conduct of the HUSS3.I'S see Beamislt's
Gerrmm Legioll, i. I'p. 27~, J\Iurtinicn'g lists show that the 1st ~'rench
tlragoons lost onc, the 2nd three, and the 4th onc offiL'er 011 this day.
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this day, and repeatedly c1111rged the heads of the hostile columns
011 favourable occasiolls, For the future Craufurd kept behind
the Dos Casas, while the .French took up his old line on the
Azava. This move made any attempt to help Ciudad Uodrigo
a harder business than before, since the British ontposts were
now fifteen instead of onl)" six miles from the town. All attempt
to storm by surprise the French camps on the near side of the
place was for the future impossible.
Warned by this activity on the part of the enemy, Wellington
agt\in rcinfol-ced Craufurd's cavalry, giving him three squadrons
of the 14th Light Dragoons, so that the Light Division had
now some 1,200 horse to watch its long and much exposed
front. But the :French advance now halted again for a full
fortnight, the demonstration of July 4th having had no other
purpose than that of ascertaining the strength of the British
obsening force behind the A7.llVa.
On the four days that followed Cl,'aUfllrd's retreat the I"rench
batteries were thundering against the northern IUlgle of Ciudad
nodrigo, and had redw:;ed it to one vast brCllch more than
120 fed broad. But ~ey, more sparing of life thau was his
wont, refused to order an assault till the whole of the Spanish
artillery on thc ncighbouring front should havc been silclleed,
and till the cngineers should have worked up to and blown ill
the counterscarp, This last preliminary was accomplished on
the night of the eighth, when a mine containing 800 lb. of
powder was exploded with success just outside the collnterscarp,
and cast down a vast amount of earth into the ditch, so that
there was now an almost le"el road from the advanced trenches
to the foot of the inner wall. The garrison repeatedly built
up the lip of the brench with pnlisades and sandbags, under a
heavy fire aud Ilt great expense of life. Dut their flimsy l'epldrs
were swept away again IInd again by the batteries 011 the Little
'l'esoll, and an their gullS on this front of the ,~allswere gradually
disabled or destroyed, Early 011 the afternoon of July 9th
the engineers informed the Marshal that Ciudad Rodrigo was
untenable, and that a storm could not tail of success. 'l'hrec
battalions, composed of picked voltigeur and grenadier com-
panies, were brought up to the advanced trenches, under the
Marshal's personal superintendence. Before letting them loose
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all lhe urulld Ilcc1ivity of rubble before them, Ney asked for
three volunteers who would take the desperate risk of climbing
up to the crest of thc breach to see if it were retrenched behind.
A corporal and two privates made this darillg venture, raJl
lightly up to the summit, fired their muskets into the town,
and descended unhurt, under It scattering fire from the few
Spaniards who were still holding on to the ruins. On receiving
lheir assurance that nothing was to be feared, Ney ordel'ed the
storming battalions to move out ot' the trenches, but ere they
had started all officer with a white flag appeared 011 the breach,
and descended to inform the Marshal that the Governor WM
preptll'C<l to capitulate. .Finding that Ney was immediately
below, Hel'ffisti came ont in pel'Son with his staff'l\ few minutes
later, and settled the whole matter in a short conversation.
Ney congrntulated the white-hainxl veteran on his handsome
defence, retnrned him his sword, and told him that he should
have all the honours of Wll.l'.
Accordingly the garrison marched out next morning about
4,000 strong, laid down its arllls below the glacis, and WIIS
Illarched off' to Bayonne. The Spaniards had lost 461 killed
and 994 wounded, just .11. quarter of theil' force, in their highly
honourable resistance. The)' had only a few days' pl'o\'isions
left, and, though their' munitions were by no means exhausted,
they would have been forced to yield for want of food, even if
lhe storm had failed, whieh WItS absolutely impossible, The
French captured 118 guns, most of them in bad order or
disabled, and 7,000 muskets. Not t\ house or church in the
place was intHet, Hlld a large majority were rool1ess 01' levelled
to the ground. Thcre wus 110 Ui>(! whatever in protracting the
resistance, und it is clear that Hermsti had done all tJmt a good
offieer could. In his dispatch to the Junta he spoke somewhat
bitterly of the fact thll.t Wellington had made no eHbrt to
relieve the place, showing feeling natural enough under the
circumstallces. :Martin La Carrera, who had been commanding'
the Spanish divi~ioll that llly in the mountains south of the
town, expl'e~scd his wmth still more bitterl)', and marched aa'
to Estremadum ill high dudgcon, the moment that the news
of the surrender reached him.
The French had been forced to lIluch greater exertions in
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the siege of UlXlrigo than they had expected when they first
sat down before its walls. Their artillery had thrown 11,000
shells and 18,000 round shot into the place, which almost
c-xhausted thcir store of mnnitions-only 700 rounds for each
of their fifty gUlls huving been provided. They had lost 180
killed and Oyel' 1,000 wounded, mainly ill the costly work of
pushing forward the approa.chell towards the wall, before the
Spanish tU'lillery fire bud bL'Cn silenL'Cd. Professional critics
attributL>d the delays and losses of the siege entirely to the
fact that the engineers believed, when they first planned their
works, that the enemy would surrender the moment that It breach
had been made, all idea which had neycr entered into HcrrasH's
head 1. i\lnssClla showed his ill-temper, when all was over,
by sending the civilian members of the Junta ail prisoners to
France, and imposing a fine of 500,000 francs on the miserable
ruined town. It is sUl'I>rising to learn that he actually suc-
ceeded in extracting half that sum from the homeless and
starving population.
011 the day that the garrison of Rodrigo marched out
(July 10) Craufuro had suffered a misadventure. Seeing that
the French foragers were busy in the villages between the
A;,,.ava and the Dos Casas, he had resolved to make an attempt
to surprise some of their bands, and went out from .Fort Con-
cepcion with six squadrons of cavalry2, six companies of the
Rifles and the 43rd, a battalion of Cw;adores and two guns.
Coming suddenly upon the :French covering party near the
yilIage of Barquilla, he ordered his cavalry to pursue them.
The enemy, consisting of two troops of dragoons and 200 men
of the 2!!nd regiment from Junot's corps, began a hasty retreat
towards their lines. Thereupon Crallfurd bade his leading
squadrons, one of the German HUSSJl.Nl and one of the 16th, to
charge 3. They did 50, falling upon the infantry, who halted and
I See the criticisms ill Relmas, iii. 2,S0. Compare the views of the
a.rtillerrma.n Hulot, pages 306-0 of his autobiographr.
~ Viz. three squadrons of the 14th, onc (Krnnchellberg's) of the
1st HUSSMS K.G.L., ami two of the 10th. The other two SljlmdrollS of
the hussars, and tile 4th squadron of the 14th, were hol(ling the olltllost
Hne to right and left.
S It is certain tllat both charged, ami both were beaten off. But the
regimental diarists of the tll"O regiments each mention only the repulse
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formed square in acorn-field to receive them. The charge. made
hy men who had been galloping for n mile, Ilnrl had heen much
disordered by passing some enclosures, tailed. The troopers,
opening out 10 right and left under the fire of the sqnnre. swept
011 and chlliied the French caynlry, who were making off' to the
flank. They followed them for iiome diiitance, finally overtaking
them Ilnd milking two officelos Ilnd twenty-nine men priooners.
Meanwhile CraufUl'd called up the Ill;xt squadron from the
rolld, the leading one of the 14th Light Dragoons, and sent
it ill Bgainiit the little square. Headed by their colonel Tal bot
the men of the 14th charged home, but were nnable to break
thc Frcllch, who stood firm and wnited till the horses'
heads were within ten paces of their bayonets before firing.
TILlbot find sc\'cn of his mcn fcll dead, and some do...cn more
were diiillbled. Before another squadron could come up, the
Fnmch slipped off' into the enclosures of the village of Cismeiro
Ilnd got away. It WM said that no effort WM mnclc t.o stop
them because two outlying squadrons of' British cMalry I, which
had ridden in towards the sound of the firing, were mistaken
for a large body of l?rench horse coming up to the rescue of
the infantl·y. Both Craufurd and the British cavalry were
much criticized over this affair 2; but it was, in truth, nothing
more than an example of the general rule that horsemen could
not hreak steady infantry, pl'Operl)' formed in square, durillg
the lleninsular '¥ar. The instances to the contrary are few.
It was said at the time that Craufurd might have used his
of the squadron from tbe otllcr corps. Sce Tompkillsou (of the 16th),
Diary, p. 31, and Von Liusiugen's letter (from the Ist Hussars), prillted ill
Beamish, i. 279-60.
1 Von Grllbell's squadron of the K.G. L. Hus~rs, and tbe fourth squadron
of tllC 14th Light Dragoons, neither of Wllicll formed part of Craufurd's
little expedition. The former had beeu watching Villa de Ciervo, the
lattcr was on outpost duty.
I Charles Napier in his diary [Lif~, i. p. 132] Blld Tomkinson [po 31]
accuse Craufurd of rcckless haste. Harry Smith, in his autobiography (I.
p. 22], llolds tlmt thc Rifles coul,llmvc got up ill time to force the square
to surrender, Leacb [p. 142] makes mllch the S3me comment. All tJle<;e
were oye-witnesses. Yet it would ha,·c taken some time to briug up the
guns or the infantry, and the French were near broken ground, o'·cr
which they might bave escaped, if not imme\liately assailed. See also
Craufum's Life by his graudson, pp, 114-16.
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leading squadrons to detain and harass the French till his guns
or his infantry. which were a mile to the rear, could be brought
up. This may have been so, but criticism after the event is
easy, and if the guns or the riflemen had come up ten minutes
late. and the French infantry had been allowed to go oft' UIl·
charged, the General would have been blamed still more. He
lost in all an officer and eight men killed, and twenty-three
wounded, while he took thirty-one prisoners, hut the defeat
rankled, and caused so much unpleasant feeling that Wellington
went out of his way to send for and rebuke officers who had
been circulating malevolent criticism 1, The French captain
Gonache, who had commanded the square, was vcry properly
promoted and decorated by Mnssena: nothing could have been
more firm and adroit than his condtlct 2,
I Among these officers was Gcneral Stewart, the adjutant.-general, see
Wellington to t:raufurtl, from Ah'erl,)ll, July 23, a very iJlteresting letter,
COlflIllCllW,1 011 ill the Lijt tifOro",rurd, PII. 117-20.
: Hulot (p. 36) says that JII;l met the square retiring, aud noticed that
numbers of Ule bayonets allll gun-harrel.s bad been cut aud Leut by tllc
Mows of the English dragoons, as they tried to forcc their way in, See
Massena's dispatch to 8erthier of Aug. 10, in Belmas's Piece8 Ju8t!ficalivt8.
SECTION XIX: CHAPTER VI
COMBAT OF THE COA. SIEGE OF ADIEIDA
O:so July 10th the Frcllch had entered Ciudad Rodrigo. but
tell d!~ys more elapsed Wore they mndc any further advallce.
Masscllil, whu had returued to the fronl;, was resolved to follow
his master's orders and to nct 'methodically,' It was clcnrly
incumbent on him to bel:,rin the siege of Almcida as soon as
pOHSible, and, as that plu(:c is only twenty-olle miles from Ciudad
HodribJ'Q, one long llIarch would have placed him before its walls.
But since he had only a few thousand rounds of ammunition
left for his heavy guns, he refused to move on till all the available
reserves were on their way from Salamanca to the front, and
requisition for a further supply had been sent to Bayonne. He
had also to do his best to scrape together more food, since the
magazines that Ney had collected were nearly exhausted when
llodrigo fell. Moreover, 1,500 draught animals had died during
the late siege, and it was necessary to replace them before the
Great Park could move forward.
On July !il1st, however, some COllvOyS having come up from
Salamanca, Massella directed Ney to a(hance with the 6th Corps
and to drive Craufurd back on to Ahneida. The main point
that he was directed to ascertain on this day was whether the
English intended to make a stand at Fort Concepeion, the
isolated Spanish work which faces Almeida on the frontier,
beyond the Turones. This was a solid eighteenth-century fort,
covering the bridge where the high-road passes the river, It
had lately been repaired, and could have resisted a bombardment
for some days. But it would have required a garrison of 1,000
men, and, since it lies in the midst of the plain, there would
be little chance of relieving it, if once it were surrounded.
Wellington, therefore, gave orders that it should be blown up
whenever the French should advance in force toward Almeida,
and that Craufurd should make no attempt to defend the line
0 ....,.. In S
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of the Turones, and should send bflCk his infantry to .JunCll, ll.
village about a mile outside the gates of Almeida \ keeping his
cavall·y only to the front. On the 21st ~ey advanced with the
whole of Loison's division, and TreiUllrd's cavalry brigade.
Thercupon Cmufnrd, with somc reluctauce, retired and blew up
FOlt Concepcioll liS hc wcut. The Frcnch advan"Coo, skirmishing
with the 14th ;Light Draf,1'001ls and the Gcrman Hussars, but
finally halted nt Val de MuIa, four miles from Almcidll. Crau-
furd t'Stablishcd himself at Junea, only three miles from the
cnemy's line of pickets. On the next evening he ret-eivcd n
strong suggestion, if not quite an order, from his Chief to send
his infantry aeross the Coo. 'I am not desirous of engaging
an affair beyond the Coa,' wrote Wellington. 'Under these
circumstances, if you are not covered from the sun where yOll
are, would it not be better that you should come to this side of
it, with your infantry at leastP2' The tentative form of the
note well marks the confidence that the Commander-in-Chief
Wl\..'l wont to place in his subordinate's jurlgement. This time
that confidence was somewhat misplaced, for Craufmd tarried
two days longer by the glacis of Almeida, and thereby risked
a disaster.
It must be remembered that Almeid!l is not 011 the Coa, but
two miles from it, and that its gUllS, therefore, did not cover
the one bridge over which CmufurU could make his retreat.
Indeed, that bridge and the river llJso are ill\'isible from Almeida.
The fortress is slightly raised above the level of the rolling
plain, which extends liS far as Ciudad Rodrigo: the rh'er flows
in a deep bed, so much below the plateau as to be lost to sight.
Its ravine is a sort of canon which marks the cnd of the plains
of Lean. It has often been remarked t1111t Almeida's value
would have been doubled, if only it had been on the near side of
the Coa, and commanded its bridge. But Portuguese kings
had built and rebuilt the old fortress on its original site, with
no regard for strategy. Craufurd, then, should have remembered
that, if he were suddenly attacked in his camp outside the gates,
he risked being thrown baek into the town (the last thing he
would wish), or being hustled down to the bridge and forced to
I 'Vellingtoll to Craufurd from Alvereu, .fllly 16.
~ "rellington to Craufurd (rom Alverca, July 22, 8 JI.rn.
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pa.",,, his division across it in dangerous haste. Dut he had so
often challenged, held back, and evaded Ney's and JUllot's
advanced guards, that he evidently considered that he wa.<; taking
no very serious risk in staying where he was. He was, moteovel',
discharging ll. valuable function by keeping Almeida from being
invcsted, as stores and l;llUnitiollS werE: still being poured into
the place. The only peril \\'"as that he might be attll.Cked both
without warning uncI by O\'crwhclming sllperiority of numbers,
wit.h the defile at his back. Neither of these misad\'entUl"Cs had
yct happcned to him dmiug the four and ll. Imlf months whilc
hc hud broil defying the 6th amI thc 8th CoI'pS tllong the banks
of the Agucda. The French had never assailed him with much
more than it division, nor hnd thcy cver pressed on him with
headlong speed, so as to prevent an orderly retreat properly
covered by a moderate rearguard.
Now, however, Ne>', untrammelled by any other operation,
had his whole corps concentrated behind Val de Mula, and
having learnt of the defile that lay ill Craufurd's rear, thought
that he might be hurled into it and crushed or caught. Before
dawn he arrayed his whole 24,000 men in one ~road and deep
column. Two cavalry brigades, Lamotte's Srd Hussars and
15th Chas5eur.>, and Garoanne's 15th and 25th Dragoons, were
in front. Then came the thirteen battalions of Loison's division,
in n line of columns; behind them was Mermet with eleven
battalions more, whilc three regimcnts of l\:Iarcband's division
(the fourth was garrisoning Ciudud Rodrigo) formed the reserve.
III a grey Illol'lling, following u night of bittcr rain, the Frcnch
horscmcn rode at the British cavalry pickets, and sent them flying
helter-skelter across the three miles of rolling b7l'Ound that lay
in front of the Light Division. On hearing the fire of the
carbines Craufurd's mcn turned. out with their accustomed
celerity, and in a very short space were aligned to the right of
Almcida, with their flank only 800 yards from t.hc glads, and
thcir front covered by tl scries of high stonc walls bounding
suburban fields. There would have been just enough timc to
get cavalry, gUllS, and impedimenta across the bridge of the Coa
if the GCllcl'al had started off at oncc. But, not rca.lizing the
fearful strcngth that lay behind the French C8.yalry advance,
he resolved to treat himself to a rearguard action, and not to
s~
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go till he was pushed. On a survey of the f,rround it is easy to
understand the temptation, for it would be hard to find tl.
prettier battlefield for a detaining force, if only the enemy
were in no more than moderate strength. A long double.
headed spur runs down from the high plateau on which Almeida
stands to the Call.. Successive points of it can be held one
after the other, and it is cros.'iE'd by many stone walls giving
good cover for skirmishers. \Vith his left covered by the fire of
the fort.J'eS.'>, and his right' refused' and t.rendillg back towards
the river, Craufurd waited to be attacked, intending to give the
leading French brigade a lesson. There WllS a dcluy of more
than an hour before the French infantry was up; but when t.he
assault came it was overwhelming. Craufurd's line of three
British and two Portuguese battalions 1 was suddenly assaulted
by Loison's thirteen, who came on at the pas de charge' yelling,
\\·ith drums beating, and the officers, like mountebanks, running
ahead with their hats on their swo~ capering like madmen
and crying as they turned to wave on their men, "Allons,
enfants de la Patrie, le premier qui s'avanyera, Napoleon le
recompensera 2.'" The rolling fire of the British stopped the
first rush, when suddenly a French cavalry regiment, the 3rd
1-1ussars, charged across the interval between Craufurd's left and
the walls of Almeida, braving the fire of the ramparts in the
most gallant style. Some fell, but the gunners were flurried Rt
this unexpected development, and fired wildly, so that the
hns.~rs Rwept down unchecked on the extreme flank of the Light
Division, where a company of the 95th Rifles was annihilated 3,
und bega.n riding along the rear of the line and rolling it up.
They were luckily checked for a moment by II st.one wall, but
Crnufurd saw that he must retreat at OllCC, sincc he was turned
Oil the side where he had thought that he was safest. The
cavalry and guns wel'C ordered to gallop for the bridge, the
I The 43rd 011 the left, the two ~ador battalions in the ceutre, the
52nd on the right, while the Rifles were partly dispersed along the front,
partly with the 43rd.
~ Simmous's Ji)U'r1Jal rif 4 British Rifleman, p. 77.
• Of this, O'Hare's Company of the Ij9lith, sixtY4!c\'en strollg, an officer
DUll eleven men were killed or wounded and forty-five were taken
prisoners,
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CB.l(adores to follow them, and the rest of the infantry to (all
back in echelon f!'Om the left, defending each enclosnre and fold
of the hillside as long as possible. But it is hard to make an
orderl}' retreat when a foe with twofold strenKth in his
.fighting linc is pressing hard. Moreovcl', the road to the
bridge has an unfortunate peculiarity; instead of making straight
for its goal it ol'crshoots it, in order to descend the slope 'at an
easy point, and then comes back along the river bank for a
quarter of a mile. 'fhe cavalry and guns, forced to keep to the
road because the hillside was too steep for them, had to cover
two sides of a triangle with a sharp turn at the apex, which
delayed them terribly. To add to the trouble an artillery
caisson was upset at a sharp turn, and took much trouble to
right and send forward. Thus it chanced that the covering
infantry were dri\'ell down close to the bridge before the
C~adorcs and the last of the guns had crossed the river. The
retreat of the three llritish battalions had been most perilous;
at one moment a wing of the 43rd found themfl€lves checked by
a vineyard wall ten feet high. while the ]?rench were pressing
hard on their rear. They only escaped by shoving a long part
of it over hy sheer strength-fortunately, like all other walls in
this part of Portugal, it was made of dry flat stones without
mortar. Finally the 43rd, the Rifles, and part of the 5211cl
were Illassed on Il long knoll covered with pinc-b'CCs, which lies
t~bove the bridb'e tUld completely masks it agaillst an attack
from above. 'While they held firm, Cruufurd muged the gUlls
and the Cu~udores on the slopes upon the other side, so us to
comllland the passa/:,'e when the rest of the troops should huvc to
cross. He then begun to withdraw the 43rd, 1\1Id part of that
battulion had already crossed the water, when five companies of
the 52ud. which had occupied the extreme right wing of the
dil'isioll, were St.~1I hastening along the river Lank SOllle WilY
ulJovc the bridge. They had held out a little too long 011 the
slopes above, and seemed likely to be cut off, for the French,
noting theil' position, made a vigorous effort, and carried the
knoll which protected their line of retreat to the point of
passage. This was a desperate crisis, but such was the splendid
eourage and initiative of the regimental officers of the Light
Division that the disaster was averted. At one point Beckwith,
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colonel of the niftes, Ilt another Major McLeOO of the 4$1'(1,
ct\llcd 011 the di60rdered 1l1llSS of men, who had been dri veil buck
to the bridge hend, to charge ng'llill and Sll\'C the 521ld. The
soldiers grasped the situation, cheered llnd followed; they
recaptured the knoll that they had just lost, and held it for ten
minutes more, gaining time for the l:olllpanies of the 5::lnd to
pass behind and cross the bridge. 'No onc present,' wrote an
eye·",itness, 'can fail to remember the gallantry of Major
McLeod. How either he or his horse escaped being blown to
atoms, while in this daring manner he charged on horseback at
the head of some ~oo skirmishers of the 431'd and 95th mi:l:ed
together, and headed them in making a dash at the line of
l:'rench infantry, whom we dislodged, I am at a loss to imagine.
It was one of those extraordinar)' cscapes which tend to implant
in the minrl some faith in the doctrine of fattllity I.'
The moment that the 5flnd were Mfe, the troops on the
knoll evacuated it, and crossed the bridge behind them at full
lipced, while the French reoccupied the wooded eminence. If
Ne)' had been wise he would have stopped at this momcnt,
and have contented himself with havhlg driven in the Light
Division with a 1055 of 300 men, while his oll'n troops had
suffered comparatively little. But, Cltrried away by thc excite-
meut of vidory, he rt."SOlved to storm the bridge, thinking thltt
the British troops were too much shaken and disordered to
make another stand, even in a strong position. There were
plenty of e."iamplcs in recent French military history, from Lodi
to Ebersbcrg, where passages had been forced under difficulties
as great. Accordingly he ordered the 66th, the leading regiment
of Loison's division, to push on and cross the rh·er. This was
a dire mistake: Craufurd already had the Cfu,'adores in position
behind stolle walls a little above the bridge, and Ross's gUlls
placed across the road so as to sweep it fhml cnd to end. The
British battalions were no sooner across the river than they
began to string themselvcs out behind the rocks and walls, which
lie in a sort of small amphitheatre on the slope commanding
the paSSt\f,TC. The bridge, a two-arched structure seventy yards
long, crosses the Con diagonally, at a point where it is narrowed
down between rocks, and flows very fiercely: it was flooded at
I Leach's ReminiHcence8J pp. 149-.50.
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this momcnt froUl thc rain of the pre~'ious night, and was
swelling still, for a tropical storm had just begun and raged at
intervals throughout the afternoon. The cavalry, useless at the
bridge, was sent up-stream to watch some difficult fords near
Al\·eirenos.
The French 66th, ordered by the Jofarshal to carry the
brid~ formed its grenadiers 011 the knoll, to lead the columll,
and then charged at the passa&'E!. nut the leading company
was mown down, before it had brot half way across, by a con-
ccntrated musketry salvo from the hillside in f!'ont, and the
enfilading fi!'c of' the gUlls f'l'Om the right. 'The column broke,
and the mell recoiled and dispersed among the rocks and trees
by the bank, from whence they opened a fierce but ineffective
fire upon thc well-sheltered Dritish battalions. Ney, who had
now lost his temper, OIucrcd np a bataillon tt'elite of light
infantry 1 which lmd distinguished itself Itt the sicge of CiudaJ
Uodrigo, and told his aide de camp Sprunglill to take the
commund and cross at all (:OSl8 2• There ensued a most
f,'1llhmt effort and a hideous butchery. The Chusseurs fiung
themsclvcs ut the bridge, and pUShL'<1 on till it was absolutely
blocked by the oodics of the killed und thc wounded, und till
they themselves had been almost literally cxtermiImtcd, for out
of a battalion of littlc more than 300 mcn 90 were killed.
and 147 wounded in less than ten minutcs. A few sun"ivors
actually crossed the bridge, and threw themselycs dOlVll among
the rocks at its wcstern end, where they took shelter from the
British fire in a little corner of dead ground, but could of course
make no further attempt to advance.
1 The (Jhaa8el1.ra de la Sii:ge formed of picked marksmen frQOl all the
regiments of tlltl 6th Corps.
~ '{113t Ney himself was the person responsible for this mad adventure
seems proved by the journal of Spriillglill, who writes '.A midi je reyus de
1\1. le Marechallui-meme l'ordre d'emporter u tout priJ7le pont de la COR,
d'oil deux COnlllilgnics lie Gremuliers vcnaitmt d'ctre repousses. J'ln'ais
:300 homlllcs ; je formai mOll Latuilloll ell COIOllllllllt abordai les Auglais
it la ba'jOlluctte, et all (~ri 110 Vit'll rf:;lIlfW,TtJllr. Le jJ()ut fut CllIllorlc, rnais
j'eus 4 officiers et BC soldaLE ttltfs, et 3 olliciers et 144 soldats blesses. Le
25 le baui1lon, etant dtftrllit, fut dissous.' TIlRt the bridge was' emporLC'
ill allY other SCll!ie thau that a seore or so of survivors got to the other
side, alld tllcn returlled, is of course untrue. Sprunghll,lJ. 439.
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Key, irritated beyond mca5ure, now bade a mounted o11iccr
sound for a ford at a spot above the bridge, where the ri \'cr
spreads out into a broad reach. But horse and mall were. killed
by a volley from the British side, and floated down the swollcn
stream 1. Finding the river impracticable, the Marshal again
ordered the 66th to go forward: tills third attack, deli vexed
without the dash aud determifltltiou of the first two, was beaten
back with little trouble. The firing then died down, and
during one of the fierce rainstorms of the late afternoon the
few chasseurs who had crossed the bridge ran back and escaped
to their own bank, Craufurd held the position that he had
occupied till midnight, and then retired on Pinhel. He had
lost S18 men only z, and was fortunate therein, for half his
division might have been destroyed if the officers had shown
less intelligence and the men less pluck. The French had 521
casualties, four-fifths of them in the mad attempt to fm'ce
the bridge, in which the colonel of the 66th and fifteen of his
officers had fallen, and the battalion of Chnsseun had been
practically exterminated 3. Ney forwarded an honest chronicle
of the dny's doings to his chief, which Massella wrote up, and
sent to the Emperor turned into a work of fancy, ill which he
declared that he had destroyed 1,200 of Craufurd's men (whom
he estimated at 2,000 horse and 8,000 infantry, double their
real strength), taken 500 prisoners, a colour, and two guns.
Making llO mention of the complete check that Loison's division
had suffered at the bridge, he stated that' the Imperial troops
have showll once again this day that there is no position which
can resist their intrepidity.' He added foolish gossip, 'Their
Estafete-Mor (chief llortuguese courier) has been captnred with
all his dispatches, in which are several of the ~5th and Q6th
instant, which declare that the English army is in complete
rout, tllat its deplorable state cannot be exaggerated, that
the English haxe nc\'cr been in such a hot CQrner, that thcy
1 For all interesting description of tllis incident, sec Gcorge Napier's
autobiography, p. 131.
1 Thirty-six killcd, Hill woulltlctl, B3 missing, Sco Tables ill Apllcndix.
S Martinien's invaluable lists SllOW 7 officers killed aud 17 wounded,
which at the normal rate of 22 men per officer, exactly correspollds to the
actual loss of 117 killed and 410 wounded (Kocll, l'H. 1W).
1810] j"IASSENA'S :\fENDACITY 265
have lost sixty officers, of whom they buried twent)'-four on the
battlefield, about 400 dead and 700 wounded I.' Apparently
these 'dispatches' are an invention ot' Massena's own. It is
incredible that any British officer can have written such stuff
after a combat ~f which every man present was particularly
proud, and in which the losses had been incredibly small, COD-
1 It is a curious fact that ill tho draft. of :i\laSSClla's dispatch ill the
Al'cMlmI du NiniswrtJ de lit GuerJ'/!, wc actually catell llilll in Un} act of
falsifJ'ing returus, 11lere is fir;;t written 'Nolls leur ;WOIlS Ilris 100
llOmmes et deu:"!: pieces de canon, :t\'otre perte a l'fte de pres ,le 500 Itommes
tant tulis que blesses.' '11len tlle figures 100 are scratched out aUlI abol'e
is inserted' illl drapeau et 400 hommes; while for the French loss f;{)() is
scratched out and 300 inserted. :t\'ey, whose dispatch was lying before
Massena, had honestly written that Craufurd 'a ete chasse de sa ~itioll
al'ec une perte considerable de tues et de blesses, nous lui al'OIlS fait en
outre line centlline de prisoulliers.' Ney reported also a loss of about
liOO men, which .l\IassCna deliberately cut dowll to 300. Belmas (Hi, 370)
has replaced t11e genuine figures ill his reprint of )lasseua's dispatch,
though both the draft ill tl1e ArchilJU aud the original publication ill the
J/imitcur givo the falsilicatiolls. l\Iassella says llought of the ch(lCk at the
bridge, though Key honestly wrotc 'au dcl;\ du Coa, UIlC reservc qu'il
1I1"lit lui IlCrmis de se rCCOllllnitre, et iI continue sa retraitc sur l'inllc\ ll~
nnit till 2-J.' As to thc gUllS l."aptured, it was lJerfcctlr true that somc
cannon II"cre takell that Ilay, but not in figllting, nor from Craufurd.
The gOl'crnor of Almeid~ "'as mounting two small gUllS (4.-pollnders) on
a windmill some way outside the glacis. 'ner had not been got up to
their pofitioll, but were lying below-remO"ed from their carriages, in
order to be flung up more easily on to the roof. ·Ole mill was abandoned
WIWll Ney came up, and HIe dismoullted canUOll fell into his hands. lie
said not a word of Illem, any more than he did of the imaginary flag
allegecl by :i\Iassena to have been captured. But the l)rillCe of J<:SSling
brougllt in both, to please the imperial palate, which yeamed for British
flags and gUllS, His dispatch, published some weeks later in the MQlli!ellr,
came into Craufurd's halllls iu NOI'ember, ami llrol'oked him to write a
vimlicatiun of his cOllduet, and a cOlltmdiction of (the false assertiOJlS
I:Ollt;liued in Marshal i\lassclla's fIlllOrt of all adiOIl which was But C1ll1)'
higllly llOnourabl,;,lo tlle Light Division, but p06itil'el}' terminated ill iUi
favour, notwithstanding the extraordiuary disparity of llumbers, for a
corps of 4,000 men perfonned, in the face of an army of 24,000.. one of
the most difficult operations of war,-a retreat froDl n broken aud exten-
sh'e positioll over one narrow defile, alld defended. durinK the whole day
the first defensible position that was to be found in tlIe neighbourhood of
the place wllere tIle action commenced,' for the whole letter see Alex.
Craufur<!'s Life o/'Oraufurd, pp, HO-I,
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siderillg the risks that had been run. Four otfi.cers, not twellty-
four, had been killed, and one made prisonel" TllStead of'
being in •complete rout' the Light Division had retired at
leisure and unmolested, without leaving even a wounded man
or a single cart behind.
Wellington was justly displeased with Craufurd for accepting
this wholly unnecessar}' combat: if the Light Division had been
withdrawn behind the Coa on the !!flnd, as he had. advised, 110
danger would have been incurred, and the bridge might have
been defended without the preliminary retreat to the water's
edge. Yet so great was the confidence in which Craufurd was
held by Wellington, that their correspondence shows no break
of cordiality or tension of relations during the ensuing days 1,
though unofficially the divisional geneml was aware that the
COlllmandcr-in-Chicf had disapproved his action, and felt the
blame that was tlllspoken ill the keenest fashion z. There was
ullothcr British general invoh'ed in a serious debrree of culpability
on the 24th: tltis was Picton, who hearing at his post of Pinhel
the firing in the morning, rode up to the bridge of the Coa;
there he met Craufurd, who was just preparing to resist Ney's
attempt to cross the river. Picton was asked to bring up the
Srd Dh'ision in support, which could have been done in less
than three hours, but roughly refused, saying apparently that
Craufurd might get out of his own scrape. The generals parted
after an exchange of some hard words, and Picton rode back
to omel' his division to get l"Cfidy to retreat, havillg committed
onc of the greil.test militAry sins, that of refusing to snpport
a comrade in the moment of danger, because he did not choose
to cOllllJromisc his own troops 3.
1 See tlle letter to Craufurd ill tIle Dispatches, dated July 20 aud 27.
His letter to Lord Liverpool of July 25 offers, indeed, excuses for
L:raufurd. Hut iu that to Henry "'ellesley of July 27, and still more in
that to his relative Pole of July 31, he expresses vexatioll. '1 had posi-
tivel)" forbiddcll the foolisll affairs ill wJlich Craufutd involved his out·
posts, ... aud repeated my iUjUllctioll that IJe slJOuld 1Iot eugage in all
affair 011 the right of the ri"er, .. , YOll will say in Ulis case, " Why not
llCCUSC Craufunl?" I answer, "BecallS\} if I am loll 00 llllllgcd for it, 1
l~l1not accuse a man who I lmlicl'6 IIUS mellut well, Ilwl wlJOse error II'IIS
one of judgement, not of intention.'" ~ See Crau!urrf8 Life, pp. 149--60.
, This iuterl'iew was dellied by HobinsOll in llis Life of l'ictrm (L 294)
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Having cleared the country-side beyond the Coo by pressing
back the Light Division, and having ascertained by a reCOll-
naissance that Picton had e,'acuated ])inhel Oll the night of the
2.5th, l\:IassCna was able to sit dow11 to besiege Almeida at his
leisure. The investment was assigned to Neyand the 6th Corps,
while JUIlOt and the 8th Corps were brought lip from the
Agueda, and placed ill the viIJages behind and to the right
of the besieged place, so as to be able to support Ney at a few
hours' notice. The extreme steepness of the banks of the Coa
during its whole course reudered it most unlikely that Wellington
would attempt the relief of Almeida by a direct advance. He
would have had to force it passage, and the Coal unlike the
Agueda, has very few fords. Its only two bridges, that opposite
Almeida, and that higher up at Castello Hom, were held in force
b~' the 6th Corp>;. The siege howe,'er might not improbably
prove 1001g. Almeida wa.~ in far better repair than Ciudad
Rodrigo, and had les.~ defects. The little town is situated 011
the culminating knoll of an undulating plateau, a very slight
emhlence, but one which was not commanded by any higher
ground as Uodrigo was by the two Tesons. The outline of
the place is almost cilXlular, and exactly fits the round knoll
on whieh it stands. It hns six bastions, with demi-lunes ffild
u co,'ered wily. There is a dry ditch cut ill the solid rock, for
Almeida lies on a bal'e gl'(lllite plateau, with only two or three
feet of ellrth covering the hard stratum below, It wus well
urmed with over 100 guns, forty of which were lB-pounders
01' still heu\'ier. It hurl casemates completely proof against
bomb fire, and large enough to cover the whole garrison. This,
as has been uh'cady said, consisted of one regular regiment,
the 24th of the Line over 1,200 strong, and the three militia
l'cgilllcnl:.s of Argullil, Trancoso, tmd Vizcu-in all some
4-,000 infant!'y, with 0. squadron of the 11 th cavalry regiment
and 400 gunllers. The governor was lVilIiam Cox-an English
on the mere allegation of some of l'ictoll'S staff that they had not heart!
of it, or beell present at it. But tlle evidence of Wi1liam Campbell,
Vl'lmfunl's brigatle-mlljor, brought forwllrd by Napier at Robinsou's
challcngc, is cQllclusi,·c. See Napier, vi. PI', 418~IU, for the' fiery looks
and violcnt rcjoinucl'll' witllcsscd by Call1l'bell. Picton had beell sIJeCinlly
ordered to sl1l,port Cl'llllfunl if llCCC6S3ry. See WeliillgtQII JJilJpatcM/!,
v. pp. 535 and 547.
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colonel and II Portuguese brigadier; he hud with him five other
English officers, all the rest of the garrison being Pm·tug-uese.
There was an ample store both of food and of ammunition,
which'Vellington had been pouring in ever since the siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo began. Only two serious defects existed ill
the place: the first was that its glacis was too low, and left
exposed all unduly large portion of the walls I. The second,
a far worse fault, was that the grand magazine was established
in a rather flimsy mediaeval castle in the centre of the town,
and was not nearly so well protected as could have been de~ired.
Nevertheless "'ellington calculated that Almeida should hold
out at least as long as Cinda.d Uodrigo. and had some hope
that its siege would detain 1\fnssena so much that the autumn
rains would set in before he had taken the place, in which
cme the iil\'Bsioll of POl'tngal would assume a ehameter of
difficulty which it was fM from presenting ill August or
September.
For some days after the investment of Almeida had been
completed the 6th Corps remained quiescent, and made no
attempt to break ground in front of the place. Ney was waiting
for the Grand Park and the train, which had no\\' started in
detachments from Ciudad Rodrigo, but were advancing vety
slowly on account of the lack of draught animals. For a moment
WeUillgton thought it possible that the enemy was about to
mask Almeida, and to advance into Portugal with his main
army without delay 2. This hypothesis receh'ed some support
from the facts that Junot had moved up from the Agueda, fmd
that Ile)'l1ier had shown the head of a column beyond the Pa~
of Perales. This last appeared a most significunt movement;
for if the 2nd Corps was about to march up from the Tngus to
I This l;allle from the extreme Imnllll'$ of the soil, whkh illllul;ed the
JJllilders of tile IHlh-eeutury enooinw to jHllleeg e;trLlI into the glat:is than
wa£ ueeded, since it had to bescralled 1111 awl carried from a gre;,t distance,
owing to the fact that t]le coatiug of soil all around is SO thill above the
rock.
~ 'Vellington to Hill, Ail'erca, July 2i, 'There is not the smallest
apl~arallce of the enemy's intending to attack Almeida, and 1 COil-
c1ude that as SOOIl ill! they have got together their force, they will
make a dash at us, aud endeavour to make Ollr retreat as difficult all
possible.'
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join Massena, the deduction was that it was required ~o join
in a general invasion, since it was clear that it was not needed
for the mere siege of Almeida.. Wellington accordingly wrote
to urge Hill to keep a most vigilant eye on lteynier, and to be
ready to move up to the l\Jondego the moment that it was
certain that his opponent had passed the Sierra de Gam and
linked himself to the main French army. As a matter of fact
there was, as yet, no danger from Reynicr, The advance of
one of his flanking detachments to Navas Frias beyond the
Pass of IJemles, alld a raid mude up:m Penamacol' Oil July 31
and upon Monsnnto on August 1, by anothcr, were pure matters
of foraging and rC(''Ollllaissancc. ReYllier had no ordcrs to move
up his whole forcc to join Musscna, and was ollly amusing him·
self by demoIlstratiolls. His actiolls bCctlmc l1Iost puzzling to
'Vellillgtoll when, a few days latel', he called back all the troops
that had moved northward, and concentrated his force at Zar.t.a
la Mayor, on the road to Castello Branco, so as to threaten
once more to invade Central Portugal by the line of the Tagus.
This was no device of his own, but the result of a dispatch from
Massena dated July !!7, ordering him to keep more to the south
for the present, to threaten Ahrantes, and to afford Hill no
chance of joining Wellington.
Ueynier's feints meanwhile had given I-Iill some trouble; the
appearance of a northward move on the part of his adversary
had C1l.tlSed the British general to make ready for a parallel
march on Fllndiio and Guarda, so as to connect himself with
his chicf. I-le transferred his head quarters first from Castello
]lrallco to Sa17..eda... and then from Sarzedas to Atalaya, at the
foot of the pass thnt leads to the ]Hondego valley, intending
to cross the mountains the moment that Heynier had passed
over the llerales defiles with his main body. Dut seeing the
2nd Corps unexpectedly turning back and concentrating at
Za17.a, Hill also retraced his steps, and lay at Sat"'l.edas again
from August Srd till September !tlst, with his advanced guard
at Castello Bmnco and his cavalry well out to the front along
the Spanish frontier. watching eveI')' movement of the Jl!nd
Corps. During this time of waiting the Portuguese cavalry
of his division had two small but successful engagements with
Rc)'nier's horse. of whom they cut up a squadron on the Srd of
210 SIEGE OF ALMEIDA [Al:G.
August near l'ellnmacor and another on the 22nf! nt LadoeiJ'o,
when two officers and sixty men of the I-Iulloverian Cl,asseurs
aClIeval were killed or tnkcn 1.
'Vcllingtoll's doubts ns to l\'lnssclla's intentions in the first
days of Auti'1.lst were provoked not merely by the movements
of the 2nd Corps, but by a demonstration made on an entirely
new front by General Serras, the officer who had been left with
an unattached division to hold the plains: of Lean, when JUllOt
and the 8th Corps went off to join the main army 011 the
Agueda. In obedience to Massena's orders, on July 27 Sel'ras
collected at Benavente as much of his division I1S could be
spared from garrison duty, ant;! mO\'ed fOl'ward to threaten
the frontier of the 'l'rns-os-Montes, far to the nOl'th of Portugal.
He ad\'anccd with somc 5,000 men as fill; lIS Pucbla dc Scnabria,
from which Oil July 29 he drovc out a slllnll Spanish force
Ullder Gencral Taboarla-thc weak brigade which Echevarl'ia
had formcrly commanded. Sih'cira immediately collected all
the Portuguese militia of his district at Braganzn, and prepared
to defend the frontier. But Serras unexpectedly turned back,
left a battalion of the 2nd Swiss Regiment and a squadron of
horse in Puebla de Senabria, and retuM1ed to Zamora. The
moment that he was gone Sil....eira and Taboada united their
forces, attacked this small detached f()rce, routed it, and shut it
up in the to\\'1l on August 4. It was forced to surrender some
six days later, about 20 officers and 350 men, all that remained
of 600, being made prisoners. Serras, who had hurried back
when he heard of Silveira's offensive movement, Wll.$ WO late by
twelve honrs to save his men, and found Pnebla de Senabria
empty, for the allies had gone oft' with their prisoners and takcn
to the mountains. He then retired to Belltwente, and Taboada
reoccupied Pnebla de Senabria, where he was 1I0t agnin dis~
turbed. Serras soon after wns drawn away to the north-east by
the demands of Bonnet, whose communications with Salltander
had once more been cut by Porlier's roving Asturian bands.
He called on his colleague to attack this partisan force in the
rear, and while Serras was hunting it at PQtes and Alba, ill the
I For details of tllis combat see Foy's observations Oil p. 97 of his Vie
Mililllire, ed. Giro<! de L'Mu.
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Cantabrian hills, Kot·them POI'lugal and Galicia were left
undisturbed in September l •
While glancing at the subsidiary operations in this remote
corner of Spain, it may be worth while to note, as a proof of
the slight hold which Bonnet and Serras possessed on their
allotted districts, that on June 7 Mahy threatened Astor{,'it, while
the Asturian bands of Colonel Barcena, eluding Bonnet, came
down into the plains by the Pass of Pajares and surprised Leon 2•
They got into the town by escalade at night, held it for two
days, and only evacuated it when SCITRS came up iu strength on
.June 9. }>rovoked at this bold adventure, Bonnet made his last
attempt to conquer ,"Vestern Asturias, and so to destroy the
indefatigable and evasive partisans in his front. He fC/rced. his
way aero5.'i the Narcea and the N8.Yia, and his vanguard had
reached ClUltropol, on the Galician border, upon July 5, when
he heard to his disgust that the enemy had slipped behind him.
BSI'cella was threatening his base at Ovied.o, while PorHer's band,
C'••fllTied round by English ships, had landed near Llanes and cut
thecommunication with Sanlander. These clever moves brought
Bonnet back in hl\Stc: he c\'ncnated \Vestern Asturias, called
up Serras to his {Ioid, and wus engaged in August and September
in thc hunt ttftcr Pudicl' which wc have already mClltioncd s.
But to return to the main focus of the war in the North.
Oil August 15th Ney's troops, having at last received the siege~
train and a good supply of munitious from Ciudad Rodrigo and
Salamanca, broke ground in front of Almcida. W"ellington was
much relieved at the news, as it was now clear that Massena
was about to besiege the place, and not to lllask it and march
forward into Portugal. The front which the engineers of the
6lh Corps had chosen for attack was that facing the bastion of
San Pedro on the south-east front of the town. The first parallel
was drawn ala distancc of only 500 yards from the walls; it was
fowld very difficult to complete, owing to the shallowness of the
1 For a IJarrativl.l of tlll~l;eolJSCl,lrecamllaiglls see Schnllcr's So«t'ellirM /f«n
offieier FribourgeWJ, pp. 29-37.
! See ibid., pp. 32-3.
, For a narrative of these interesting but obscure movements, see
Sehepeler, iii. 696-0. It is impossible to give a full account of them here,
but neeessary to mention them, to show the Sisypllean character of
Bonnet's task.
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carth, and had to be built with gnbions and sandbags rather
than to be excavated in the rocky subsoil. In many plnees
outcrops of stonc calllC to thc surface, and had actually to be
blasted away by the sappers, in order to allow of a trench of the
shallowest sort being formed. It was clear that the construction
of approaches towards the town wouM present the greatest
difficulties, since there was little earth in which to burrow.
Between the 17th and the 24th no less than eleven batteri~
were constructed along the first parallel. They were 1ll'mOO
with more than filty heavy gnlls, for there wn.~ artillery in
abundance; in addition to the old siege-train many of the
Spanish guns taken in Cindad Rodl'igo had been bl'Ought
forward. The Portuguese kept up a vigorous bllt not "ery
destructive fire all the time; but on the 24th they succeeded in
prevcntillg the COllllDCllcement of a second parallel, driving out
the workmen before thc>' could cover themselves in the stony
ground. At six o'clock on the morning of the 26th August the
baueries were all completed and opened fire. Several quarters
of the town were in flames before the afternoon, and the guns
on the t1Jl'(~C bastions attacked were unable to hold their 011'11
against the converging fire directed on them. But no serious
damage had been dOlle to thc defences, and the gO\·crnol' was
undismayed. At se,'en o'clock ill the evening, however, a fearful
d..isaster occurred-one in its own way unparalleled in magnitude
during the whole Peninsular 'War. The door of the &I'reat
magazine in the castle had been opened, in order to allow of the
sending out of a convoy of powder to the southern ramparts,
where the artillery had been hard at work all day. A leaky
barrel was handed ont, which left a trail of powder behind it
along the ground; it was being fixed to the saddle of a pack-ass
when a French bomb fell in the courtyard of the castle. In
bursting, the bomb chanced to ignite the train; the spark ran
along it and exploded another barrel at the door of the
magazine, which was still open 1. This mischance fired the
I TIlis version of tlIC cause of the disaster is given by Soriano da Luz
(Hi. 73) from the mouth ofan artillery officer (one Jose )forcira) wllO lmd
it from the only man ill tllC castle-yard who escaped. '111is soldier, seeing
t110 train fired, jumped into an ol'en-hole wltich lny behind llim, nud
chanced not to he killed.
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whole store, and in two seconds the castle, the cathedral at its
side, and the whole central portion of the town had been blasted
out of existence. •The earth trembled,' wrote a lrench eye·
witness, 'and we saw an immense whirlwind of fire and smoke
rise from the middle of' the place. It was like the bursting of
n VOlCllllo-olleof the things that I can never forget after twellt,Y-
six years. Enormous blocks of' stone were hurled into the h'eIlChes,
whcre thcy killcd and woundcd some of our men. GUllS of
heavy calibre were lifted from the ramparts alld hurled dowlI
far outside thcm. \Vhcll the smokc cleared ofJ~ a great part of
Allllcida had disappean:~d, amI the rest was a heap of debris I.'
Fil'c hundred of the garrison pcrished, including nearly evcry
mall of thc two lltlllCl.rL>(Illrlillerymen who were scrvillg the guns
011 the front of attack. Some inhabitants were killed, hut not
lllany, for the majority had taken refugc in thc cascmates
whell the bombardment began that morning. It was the
unfortunate soldiers who were manning the walls that suffered.
l~caring that the :French might seize the moment for all
cscalade, General Cox ran to the ramparts and, assisted by a
Portuguese artillery officer, loaded and fired into the trenches
somc of the few h"llns on the south front which were not disabled.
He turned out the whole garrison, and kept them under tmllS
that night, lying bchillu the walls in expectation of an assault
which never came. The moming light enabled him to realize
the full extent of the disaster; the bastions and curtains had
suffered little, the shell, so to speak, of the town was still intact,
and the casemates had stood firm, but cverything within the
enceinte was wrecked. Only five houses in the place had kept
their roofs: the castle was a deep hole, like the crater of a
volcano: the streets were absolutely blocked with ruius, so that
there wa;; no goillg frolll place to pltlCC save tllong the rumpurts.
There were still 4,000 lllCII LlllIler arms; but the officer
l'OlIlllltlllding the urtillcl'J l'~ported tllut thirt)'-lliue burrcls of
powder, and tL few hUlldrL-'(l rounds ill the small cxpellsc-
magtw;illcs 011 the ramparts, were all that had e:;capcd the
explosion. That is to say, thcrc was not powdcr ill thc place
to keep np a reply for onc day to the battcries of the bcsi~er.
The infantry had 600,000 cartridges in their l'egimental stores
Spri1ngliu's Jounwl, I'1l. 44.4-5.
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(150 rounds per mall) but that was of 110 use for the hooyy gllllS.
Moreover, more than half the gunners had perished in the
disaster of the previous night-only ~oo were left to mall nearly
100 guns that were still serviceable. It was clear that Ahneida
was doomed, since it could lIot dcfcnd itsclf without powder:
but there was a ehance that VVellillgton, whose outposts must
lmve heard and seen the explosion, might think it worth while
to dllsh forwnrd and endeavour to SR\'C the gal'1'iSOll during the
next twenty-four hours. Therefore Cox resolved to protract
his resistance as long as was possible, to give his chief the option
of fighting if he should so please. But the defence could not
be prolonged fOl' more than a day or two at the most.
At nine Oil the morning of the 9t7th :\Iassena sent ill his
aide de camp Pelet to demand the surrender of the fortress.
Cox had him blindfolded, and taken into a casemate for their
interl'iew, so that he might not be able to judge of the awful
effects of the explosion. The usual haggling followed-the
French offieer threatened that the place should be escaladed
at once, and the garrison put to the sword. The govemor
replied that his walls were intact, that he could still defend
himself, and that the 'deplorable accident' had not appreciably
diminished his resisting po,ver 1• But he finally consented to
send out nn officer to the l~rench camp to negotiate for terms.
All this was merely done to gain time, and the semaphore on
the western ramparts was signalling desperate messages to
WelliJlgton all the morning.
Cox's attempt to gain time was fruitless, for a reason that
he had not foreseen. The garrison was hopelessly demoralized,
knew that it must surrender, and did not see why it should
expose itself to another day's bombardment for a lost cause.
During the conference in the cnsemate General d'Alol'lla and
other POl·tugl.lese officers on Massenn's staff' came out of the
trenches, and boldly presented themselves at the foot of the walls,
callingto their compntriots above and beseeching them to accept
the good terms offered, and not to risk their lives for Wellington,
who would abandon them just as he had abandoned Herrasti at
Ciudad Rodrigo. The .officers on the ramparts ought to have
I There is 11 good account of this inten'iew in Sprilngliu's .'!Q/mud,
p. 44ti, the diari.st lla\'illg l\.Ccompanied Pelet into tho toWll.
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driven the renegades away, by shol:s jf ncccsSl\t'y; but, far from
doing so, they entered into long conversation with them and
approved their arguments, D'Alorna recognized some old
acrJUtlinhtllces among the l'egulars, and pledged his lVord lo
them that an assault was imminent, and that they were doomed
if they made any resistance. ,\rhat was still more wllucky for
Cox was that the officer whom he sent out to the French camp
to treat, Major Barreiros of the artillery, was one of those who
were most convinced that further defence was fruitless; he
divulged the hopele'ss state of the place to the l\Iarshal, and
bade him press his attack without fear, for the garrison would
1I0t fight. He himself remained at the French head quarters,
and did not return to Almeida. Massena, therefore, sent back
a blank refusal of f\.11 Cox's demands and conditions, and
ordered the bombardment to recommence at se\'en in the
evening, while approaches were thrown out from the second
parallel towards the ramparts. A feeble musketry fire alolle
replied.
The renewal of the bombardment speedily brought matters
inside the place to a head. A deputation of Portuguese officers,
headed by Bernardo Da Costa, the second in command, visited
Cox and informed him that further resistance was madness, and
that if he did not at once hoist the white flag they would open
the gates to the enemy. The Governor was forced to yield, and
capitulated at ele\·en o'clock on the night of the 27th.
.Massena granted him the terms that the regular troops should
be scnt as prisoners to Frauce, while the three militia regiments
should be allowed to disperse to their homes, on giving their
parole not to serve again during the war.
On the morning of the 28th the garrison marched out, still
4,000 strong, its total loss during the siege having been some
600-nearly all destroyed in the explosion. The French had
lost fifty·eight killed and 320 wounded during the operations.
The capitulation was no sooner rntificd than it was violated:
instead of dismissing the militia and marching off the regulars
towards France, MassellR kept them together, and set the rene-
gades d'AlornR and Pllmplonn to tempt them to enter the
lo'rench service. The officers were promised confirmation of their
rank, the men were invited to compure the relative advantages of
d
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prison allu of joining the victorious side and keeping their
liberty. The arguments of the traitors seemed to prevail;
almost the whole of the regulars and 600 of the militia signified
their consent to enlist with the enemy. The rest of the militia
were turned loose, but d'Aloms. was able to organize a brigade
of three battalions to serve the Emperor as the' Second
Portuguese Legion 1.' Dut the intentions of these docile recruits
were quite other than MasstSlla hnd supposed. 'l1ley had
changed their allegiance merely in order to escape being sent to
Fnmcc, !md while left unguarded during the !lext three duys,
absconded in bunds of 200 or 300 at a time, oHiecrs and ull, mId
kept presenting themselves at Silveira's and Wellington's out-
posts, for a week. The French, undecei\'ed too late, disarmed
the few men remaining in the camp, who were packed off to
}~rance, to rejoin Cox and the half-dozen officers who had
loyally refused to accept D'Alorna's ofters 2. Wellington had
been somewhat alarmed when the first news of the adhesion of
the garrison to the French cause reached him, fearing that it
implied serious disaffection in the whole }lorlnguC8C army~.
He was soon uudeceiyed on this point, as the troops gradually
streamed in to his eamp ". But he was then seized with grave
doubts lI.S to whether he oould, consistently with military honour,
accept the service of these perjured but patriotic people. •It
was well enough for the primte mell, but highly disgraceful to
the clmruetcr of the ollh:ers 0,' he observed, and was punderhlg
what should be done, and proposing to cashier the officeni, when
he rec~ivcd a proclamation from the Regency approving the
conduct of the deserters and restoring them to their place in the
army. Finally he resolved that, since Massena had ob\,jously
broken the capitulation by his action, it might be held that
I 'ne lo'irst Portuguese Legion, wllich served against Austria in 1809,
was composed of the troops drafted out of the IJeninsula. by Junot ill 1808
during his domination at Lisbon.
Z D'Uroon's diary reports that 460 men and 18 officers of the 24th of
the Lille came in Uctwccn the 2nd and 4th of SelltclllUcr to Sil\'eira's out-
posts; a still larger Ilullllocr rC/LCIlCu \Vcllingloll's.
, D'Urooll has most gloomy remarks 011 the sllbjccl ill IJis diary, undcr
the date Aug. 30.
f 'fo Chas. Stuart, from CeloricoJ Aug. 31.
6 To ChaA. Stuart, from Celorico, Sept. 11.
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it was not binning 011 the prisoners, and ordered the 24th
Regimcnt to be re-formed at its hend quarters at BragallZa.
'l11C militia he dismissed to their homes, on the scruple that the
French had let some, though not all of them, go free after the
capitulation 1. Thel'C remained the problem of what was to be
done with the Portuguese offieel':! who had played a trcuchcrous
part on the 27th, especially Barreiros, the negotiator who had
betrayed the state of the town to JIasscna, nud Do. Costa, who
had headed the mutinous deputation to Cox, which forced him
to surrender. Finally, their llames were included with those of
the officers who had served on Massena's Portuguese staff during
the campaign, in a great indictment placed before a special
commission on traitors (called a JUllta de blCOIifidencia), which
sat at Lisbon during the autumn. All from D'Alorna down-
wards were declared guilty of high treason, and condemned to
death on December ~2, 1810, but only two were caught and
cxccuted-Joiio de Mascarellhas, one of d'Alorna's aides de
camp, and Do. Costa, the lieutenant-governor of Almeida. The
former was captured by the Ordenan7A while carrying Masscna's
dispatches in 1811, and the latter was apprehended in 18B!;
MlISCArenhas died by the garotte, Dn Costa wa.s shot. Of the
othcrs, some never returned to Portugal, the others were Rardoned
nt \'Arious dates betwccn 1R16 and 1820 2.
During the siege of Almeida, the Bl'itish army had been held
in a position sOlllcwhflt less achflllced and more concentrak'<1
than that which it had occupied ill July. Wcllinglon had
brought buck his head qut\rtcrs from Alvcrcu. to Celorico, where
he had thc Light Di vision under his hand. A few miles behind,
on the high-road running down the south bank of the Mondego,
I nTellingtoll to i\InssCnll, Sept. 24. 'Votre excellence s'cst cngagee
'Iue lcs offieiers et les 90ldnts de lllmilice retollrnernient chw. cux : malgre
eet engagement vous en nvel: retcllu 7 offieicrs et 200 soluats de chalJue
regiment, pour en f[lire un corps de piolllliers. La (',apitulatioll d'Almeiun
est done nulle, et je suis en droit d'eu faire cc que je voudrais. l\Iais je
puis VOIlS assurer qu'il n'ya pas un seul soMat de la milicc qui 6tait ell
Almeida au service.'
z "'or details of all this, including tlle curious terms of the l'ortuAUese
seutence for lligh treaSOIl, see SoriallO da Luz, iii. 80-109, aud 719-22.
The attempts to exculpate Barreiros seem inadequate. Da Costa was shot,
not for treason, but for cowardice and mutiny.
278 SIEGE OF ALMEIDA [AuG.
WM the 1st Divisioll, at Villa Cortcs. Picton and the 31'()
Divi9ioll had been drawn back from Pinhcl to Cru:apichillll, hut
Cole and the 4th remained firm at Guarda. The Portuguese
brigades of Colcman and A. Campbell were at Pinhanc;os, that of
Pack at Jegua. The whole of thc ca\'alry had come up from
the rear to join the brigadc that had recently operated under
Crallfurd's ordcrs. They now lay in a thick line of six regi-
ments from in front of Guarda, through Alverca and 1<'reixMa9
to Lamegal. Thus the whole army was concentrated on a short
front of fifteen mil~ covering the watershed between the Coa
and the IHondego, and the bifurcation of the roads which start
from Celorico, down the two banks of the last-named river.
The ,French held back, close to Almeida, with f1. sb-ong advance
guard at Pinhel, and occnsionall)' raided the low country towul'(h
the Doum, in the dircction of Villunova de Fosboa and Castel
Rodrigo. About August 19 Wellington moved forward 'u
day's march, the front of his infantry columns being pU9hed up
to Alverca and Freixadas, on a false rumour that "M_na was
lea"ing the 6th Corps unsupported at Almeida, and had drawn
back Junot into the plains of Leon. !fthis had been the case,
'Wellington intended to make a push to rclieve the besie::,w
fortress. But he soon discovered that the report was baseless,
and that the 8th Corps was still on the Amva and the Agueda,
wherefore he halted, and was still lying twelve miles in front of
Celorico when the noise of the explosion at Almeida, and the
cessation of fire on· the next day, betrayed the fact that the place
had fallen, and that there was no longer any reason for maill-
tuilliJlg a fm'ward position. On the night of the 28th, therefore,
the whole army was drawn back once more to the strong line
betwccn Guarda and Celorieo, and arrangements were made for
a further retreat, in case the French should follow lip the
capture of Almcida by UIl iustant and gcneral advance. Massena
seemed at 61'St likely to make this move: on September 2 a
brigade of iufantry and 1,200 horse drove in the British cavalry
outposts to l\Ia<;!\1 dc Clmo only fivc mile", in front of Celorieo.
Looking upon this as the commenccment of the serious invasion
of Portugal, ,,-rellingtun sent back his infantry tu Villa Cortes,
Pinhun~~os, und Moim, fur down the high-rand on the south of
tllC Mondego, alld bade Cole draw in the 4th Division from
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Guarda to San Marlinho, under the north side of the Serra da
Estrelln.. Only cavalry were left at, and in front of, Celorico
and Gunrda. This retreat shows that Wellington was fully
convinced that the French would Advance along the high-road
to the south of the Mondego, where he intended to stand at bay
on the Alva, behind the entrenchments of Ponic de MUl'Celln.
The main point of intel'CSt at this moment WM the movements
of the F~llCh 2nd Corps, which still lay in cantonments at
Zal'za and Coria ill frout of Hill. Guurdtl being no longer
held in force, it was cleal" that Hill could not safely join the
main arm)' by the road Atalaya-Fundilo-Guarda, if Reynier
mo\·ed up by the Pill:iS of Perales to Alfayalcs und Sabugal.
'Vellingtoll began an anxious daily correspondence with Hill,
giving him a new line of march by Sobreira Formosa, Villa d'cl
Rei and Espinhal, for his junction, but ordering him to be sure
that he did not move till Reynier had thoroughl), committed
himself to the transferenL'e of his whole force to the north of the
Sierra de Gata. For it would be disastrous if feints should indnce
the British detaining force to leave Villa Velha and Abrantes
unco\'ered, and Reynier should turn out to have selected them
as his objective, and to be meditating an invasion along the
Castello Branco line I. It was e\'en possible, though not likely,
that Massella might briug up the 6th aud 8th Corps to join
Reynier, instead of bringing Heynier across the mountains to
join them 2. But every contingency had to be provided agaillst,
1 See Wellington to Hill of Aug. 31, Sept. I, Sept. 4, Sept. 6. The
Commandcr-in-Chief was much worried by a false rumour t11at Re)"lIier
1I'1l,'l1llrcady in furce at Sllbugnl OIL Aug. 31, nml then by 1111 equally fillsc
onc that Um whole 2nd Corps Imd marched south towanls the Tagus, allll
was aliout to cross it near Alcantara (seo the letter to La Romalla of
Sept. 0). As a matter of fact, Reynier made 110 definite move from Zarzn
till Sept. 10, tllougll lie 11ad made feints, in boUI the directions indicated,
with small forces.
~ '11lat this possibility was in Wellington's mind is shown by the letter
to L:t Romana of Sept. G, from GOllvea, in which }Ie writes, 'VOllS au~,/;
nppris les mouvements du corps de Rcgnier de la part (Iu G6u!ral Hill.
Du I'cunem; \'11 fnire le mOlll'cmcnt sur llotro droit<: (dontjo VOllS lIi ecrit)
011 il va faire1e siege do Bmlajoll. Ou l1it fluO (lu callon a Ilasse u' Almeitla
aSabugal,et 110 la "01"9 Regnior, maisjo Ile sais pas si c'est vrai,oll si c'est
uu cauon l1e siege. ' .• VOllS s:wez co qll'i! faut faire si on se met entre
nous uellx, en passallt le Tage it Villa Velha, Oll au-dessous de la jonctiOll.
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the unlikely ones as well as the likely. As a corollary to Hill'r-
march, that of Leith had also to be alTanged; he must wait at
Thomar till it was certain that the !i!nd Corps had moved, but
the moment that certainty was obtaill~:l, mu,>t march for Pantc
de Murcella, and join the main army. if the French had gone
1l00th, but support Hill on the Ca.stello Dranco road if they h:HI
taken the other, and les;; probabl~ course.
:;OTE ON ALMEIDA AND THE BRIDGE
OF THE COA
Tin; small circular towu of AIOlelda 11as !lever recovered from the
disa3ter of 1810. 'nle population does !lot fill up the area within
the walls: open spaCeiI are frequent, and some of the more important
buildings-especially tlle old palace of the governor-stand in ruins.
Others sllOw solid sevellteenth- or eighteeuth-eentury masonry on tlle
g'l"Ound floor, and flimsy modern repairs abo\'e, where tile upper stories
were bIOII'D away by tile explosion. The cathedral has never been proper!)'
rebuilt, and is a mere fragment. The railway passes twelve miles south of
Almeida, so that the place ha;; had no chance of recovery, and remains in
a state of decay. The \\'alls stand just as they were left after Wellington's
11lIsty repairs in J811. 'ne Vflst bomb-Ilroofsilelters repeatedly mentione'l
illllarratives of the siege IIrc still I'isihle, damp hut inlaet. Tht'surrOllnd-
ing COUlltry-side is f\ loll', rolling, tTl.'Cless upland-the eUl('e of the l'fI.t
Illuins of (,coil, It contrllSts I'ery strongly with the hilly lIlld pietllrestJlI1J
scenery tllll.t is reached whel' once the Coa has been II.'lSsed.
From Almeida the ground slopes down sharply to the placc of CraufuTll's
celebrated skirmisll. '11Ie town is not visible after tlle first mile of the
descent towards tlle deep-sunk gorge througll wllich the Coa cuts its way,
'11Ie high-road is very bad for artillery, being steep, filled lI'itll great
stones, and ill mallY places shut in by high banks, which tOll'er abol'e
it and make it llarrow. TIle ShaT(1 turn at tlle end, where it descends
to the ril'er with a lmddell twist, must ha"e beell specially tiresome to
a ferca witll cavalry and gUllS, compelled to a hasty retreat. All the
slopes about the road are cut up into small l1eMs by high walls of
Ilndressed stone, without mortar, such as are seen Oil Cotswelll. '111e
bridge is not visible till the traveller approaching from Almeida has got
down to the lel'el of the river: it is completely masked by tlle high
fir-clad knoll described in the text, so long liS he is descending the slope
above. From the llOint where the ro."d swervC!> lISide, to lLvoid tllis knoll,
there is lL rough goat-track deII'll to tl'e still invisible bridge, Imt this i~
not al'ailahle for gUllS, horses, or jiJrmed infautry, euly for men scrambling
individually,
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'111{l two-arched IJritlge ill l'eventy yards long j it crosses the Coa
diugotmlly, willl II cnriollll twist ill tile middle, where there ill II little
mOllUment l'ecordiug the reparation of the structure by John VI, ill
the ilay~ after the WIll' was over. There i8 no mention of CrallfurI!'s
light ill tIle inserilJtion-ollly a laudation of tIll:! King. TIle brill/!;'C
Cl"l)!l$e!l the river at 3 sort of gorge-tile place wlllHe tI,e rocks 011 the
two sides come neare8-t. Hence the stream runs under it very fiercely,
lllling constricted to far less than itg normal breadth. Ull-stre.1m the
channel broadens amI tIle pass.'lge looks much less formidalJle, but for
some distance on each side of the bridge the river is I'ery rapid, dartiug
ootweeu rocks and boulders, The little corner where tlle few French who
passed the bridge found a ~mall angle of dead.grotmd can be easilr
identified. It was just to their riglit after crossing. All the rest of the
gronnd 011 the west bank could be thoroughly searched by tlle Britisll
guns, Wllicll were placed a few llundred yards up the road DU the left
haud, as well as by the fire of the infantry ensconced among rocks and
boulders above the bridge.
Of the French attacking force during tJle earl)' part of the skirmisll,
those who were on their left, nearest the river all(l opposite the .52ud, llad
far easier ground to cover than those on the rigllt, opposite tile 43rd. It
is not so high or rough, and less cut up by stone walls. Hence tIle streS!l
on the 52nd ought tu have beell the heavier-yet ther lost ollly 22 mcn
to tlle 120 of the 43rd. '111e damage to the latter must have been caused
pMt-iy when the CIIvalry got in among them, just lIS the retreat heg:m,
llartly wllcn thc)' ~tormcd the knoll to eover the retrcat of the .52n(1.
The seene of the fight is most IJidllre~'l.\le 011 a slllalllllJale-olle of the
llrettiest eorners in Portugal, all roek, fir-trees, ami ru-"hing water.-
(Notes made on tile 81Mlt on April 14, 1006.]
SECTION XX
OPERATIONS IN THE EAST AND SOUTH
OF SPAIN DURING THE SPRING AND
SUMMER OF 1810
CHAPTER I
SUCBET AKD AUGEREAU IN ARAGON, VALE:SCIA, AND
CATALONIA
THOUGH Suchet had successfully pacified the plains of Aragon
during the autumn of 1809, and though Augereau in the last
month of that year had received the surrender of the much-
enduring garrison of GeronR, the position of the French in
North-Eastern Spain was still far from satisfactory. It was not
yet possible for the Srd and the 7th Corps to combine their
operations. While the broad strip of territory in Westel'll
CatalOllia reaching from the foot of the Pyrenees to the sea-·
whose places of strength \\'ere Lerida, 'l'arragona, and Tortosa-
still remained intact, Angereau and 811chet could still cam-
llI11llicnt.e only by the circuitolls route through Frnllce; a letter
from Saragossa to Thtrcelolll\ took a fortnight or more to arrive
at its destination. It was high time that thcy should cndenmur
to get into touch with euch othel', by cut.ting through t.he
Spanish line of defence. Bot.h of the corps-communders had
now a compamtively free hand, and could ussclIlblc a considerable
force fOI' offensive operations. Suchet's position wus the happier:
he had uo Spanish army opposoo to him at the moment.
His only opponents were-to the West the bold guerrillero
Milia the Younger 011 the borders of Navarre; to the South
Villaeampa with the dilapidated remains of his band on the
side of the Sicrm de Albarncin and Molina; and to the East
the governor of Lcrida. who kept a flying fort'e under Colonel
Perenu on foot betwcen the Cinea find the Segre, for t.he
ellcour~O'(!mellt of the insurgents of Eustcrn Amgol1. NOlle of
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these three opponents could do any serious mischief to the
Srd Corps, which had risen by the New Year of 1810 to a
strength of ~4,OOO men I, now that its drafts from France were
beginning to arrive. Mina was the most tiresome of the three :
he was a young man of ulltiring energy, and kept the borders of
Namrre in a perpetual ferment, till he was finally put down by
mere force of Ilumbers. 1·'01' while Suchet sent !\ number of
colnmns under GenerAl T-Jarispe to hl1llt him, IAgrange'R dh,jsion
of the newly arrived 8th Corps came down frolll the side of
Pampelnna, and swept the valleys of the Argn and the Aragon
from the other qnartC!r. Pursued from one refuge to another
by l~,OOO men, Mina ended by biddiJlg his followers disperse.
He did not appear again as a combatant till the 8th Corps had
passed 011 into Castile in the month of February 1810.
Villacampa and Perenn. being very weak MVerf'aries, Suchet
could now dispose of the greater part of his corps for offensive
operations. Two lines of attack were open to him: the morc
nuturul and obvious Olle was to attack Leridil or Tortosll, while
Augereau and the 7th Corps moved against them from the other
side. This was Suchet's own intention, and he had rt..'Cci \'ed dis-
patches from Paris which appro\'cJ of the plan. But another
objl..'Ctive was pointed out to him from another quarter. It will
be remembered that while King J oseph and Soult were planning
the details of their Andalusiall expeditioll, one of the schemes
which they discussed was the use of the 3rd Corps as a flanking
detachment to cover their attack on Seville 2: it was to march
on Valencia wllile 3:Iortier marehed on Badajoz. The plan was
rejected in favour of the direct frontal march against the passes
of the Sierra Monma. Nevertheless, when the defiles had been
passed, and the King had entered Cordo\'a in triumph, he
recurred to his original schemc, and on January 27 Soult SCllt
orders to Suchet directing him to make a dash at Valencia, and
tlSsuring him that the demoralization of the Spaniards was so
great that he would probably entel' the city without meeting
with much resistance. Similar orders, as we have already seen,
1 Sachet in his AfClIlQirea (i. 7i) says that ill Jllll. 1810 his corps wus only
i'O;OOO stroug. But the irnl'cri[ll IllHster-rolls show that it Iml! 23,000
prbrenta 8(JlIlJ 1", fi1"IIWJI, 1Je~illcs 1,H19 men ill 1I000lJital amI 973 uelached, ill
tlmt month. ~ See ]J. 123 of this \'olume.
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were sent to Ney, who was directed at the same moment to
make himself master of Ciudad Rodrigo I, which Soult and the
King imagined to be likely to surrender at the first summons.
Suchet, though doubting (as he says) the wisdom of the plan
of campaign imposed upon him, prepared to obey, and COlleen-
trated 8,000 men, comirding of Laynl's dh'ision and half that of
l\fusnier, at 'femel, on the borders of Valencia, while Hllbert,
with six battalions more, was to move in a separate parallel
column from Alcluliz, !Uul to strike down on to the sea-coast of
Valencia by way of l\1orclla. On their way to Terllel sollle of
Lnyal's columns lTll.\.{le a side-stroke at Villacampn, and drove
off' his band into the mountains of New enstile.
The march on Valencia had already begun, when Suchet
received at Teruel, on March 1, the dispatch from the Emperor
which announced to him that the kingdom of Aragon had been
made an independent' military government' under his charge~.
and that he was for the future to take no orders from Madrid,
but to seek all his instructions from Paris. By the same dispatch
Suchet was informed that the Emperor approved of the plan for
directing the 3rd Corps against Lerida and the rear of Catalonia
which he had himself always advocated. Hut since Habert's
colmlln hnd already disappeared in the mountaills, and could
not be recalled, find since his own advanced guard had actually
crossed the borders of Valencia, Suchet thought that it was now
too late to turn back, and that he must cndcll\'Our to carry out
Sonlt's orders, even though they were now collntermanded by
the Emperor. Accordingl)' he murched by Sarrioll, 011 the
road which leads from Terucl to Segorbc, and from thence to
Murviedro on the Vulcllcian coast, where Habert was to join
him.
The force opposed to Suchet was that Valeucian army which
the governor-or rather the dictator-Jose Caro had so per-
sistently refused to lend to Blake ill the preceding autumn for
the relief of Gerona. It was about 12,000 strong at the
moment, and as some nine months had elapsed sincc the disaster
of Helchite, where the Valenciall troops had fared so badly, the
regiments had been recruited up to their old strength, and had
lx."'en thoroughly reorganized and re-equipped. Nevertheless.
I See p. 222. ~ See p. 200.
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Caro did not wish to risk them ill the open field, and, when
Suchet's approach was repOlted to him, ordered the troops to
prepare to retreat within the walls of the city of Valencia,
which had been so successfully defended against Moncey two
years before. He was probably right in his decision; having
no great superiority of numbers over the I"tench invading
columns, he would have been risking over nmch if he had
offered battle on the frontier, even in an advantageous position.
Behind the fortifications of Valencia, which had been improved
and enlarged during the last two years, he could at least be
certain of making a long and formidable resistance. If the
enemy appeared without a great battering-train, and unprepared
for a regular siege, the garrison would be absolutely safe.
Accordingly, Caro sent out only a single brigade to observe and
retard Suchet's advance: this force, assisted by SOllle armed
peasants, tried to hold the defile of Alventosa against the
.French (Mt\.l'ch 4), but 'l\'as beaten out of the position with
ease, lost four guns, and retired by Segorbe and Murviedl'O on
to Valencia., without offering further resistance. Suchet, follow.
ing in the wake of the Spanish detachmen~ reached Murviedro
011 March 5, and there met Habelt, whose march by Morella
and Castellon.de.la-I)lana had been absolutely unopposed.
A day later the .French appeared in front of the fortifications
of Valencia, Having surveyed the outworks, and summoned
the place in vain, Suchet found that there was no more to be
done, His bolt was shot: the city hltended to defend itself:
it was full of troops, and the whole population had been armed.
CAll) had given notice that the defence was to be conducted in
the style of Saragossa., and as a. foretaste of his intentions court-
martialled and hanged several persons who were accused of
being traitors I. After lying four days in front of Valencia,
SlIchet marched off again on the night of March 10-11, having
I \Vllcther t1lC Q:Ull]C de PO'MlI,lallCO and tile other persons executed
were really traitors is very doubtful. Nallier takes U,em as such (ii. 3(3),
Sucllet denies it (p. 100); Schepeler says (iii. 627) that proclamations of
King Joseph and treasonable letters were found in the Count's llouse.
Torello (ii. 124) remains doubtful, but points out that Cam and Pozob]anco
\Vere old enemies, and tllinks that, at any rate, there was personalllpite ill
the matter.
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cominccd himself that he had been sent on a fool's errand by
Soult and King Joseph. For the expedition had only been
underLukell 011 the hypothesis that the enemy was dcmoro.lh,:oo
and ready to surrender-which was clearly not the case. No
siege train had been brought, and without heavy artillery
Valencia was impregnable. The retreat of the French was
hastened by the fact that their communications with Aragon
had already been cut off. Villacampa, uudismayed by his defeat
ill February, had returned to the front the moment that the
invading columns had passed on to the Valencian coast. He
had blockaded the garrison of Tetuel, cut oft' two small columns
which were moving in its neighbourhood, and captured four
guns and some 300 prisoners. At the same moment, though
Suchet was unaware of the fact, Colonel Pcreno, with n detach.
mcnt from Lericln, had made a demonstration against MOllZOtl,
and whcn thc garrison of Eastern Aragon concentrated to
defend it, had fallen on Fraga and burnt the bridhre there-the
only crossing of the Cinca which was in French bands. Mina,
too, warned of the departure of the main body of the Srd Corps
for the South, had reassembled some of his levies, amI begull to
render the road from Saragossa to Pampeluna once more unsafe.
Suchet, therefore, on withdrawiJlg from Valencia, found plenty
of occupation awaiting him in Aragon. Villacampa was once
more chased into the wilds of the Sierra de Albaracin: and
several columns were detached in pursuit of Mina. This time
the ymmg partisan was unfortunate-he was caught between
onc of Suchet's detachments and a party sent ont by the govenlor
of Navll.rrc, and taken prisoner on March 31, with some scores of
his followers. His place, howevel', was taken ere long by his
uncle Espoz y Mina, who rallied the remnant of the guerrilleros
of North-Western Aragoll, and continued the struggle with all
energy as great, and a success far greuter, than that of his
nephew.
Meanwhile, the months of February and March had been
wasted, so far as the 3rd Corps was concerned, and it was not
till April that Suchet was ablc to take in hand the enterprise
which he himself had appro....ed, and to which the Emperor hnd
now givcn his consent-the siege of Lerida. A few weeks after
his return to Saragossa he receh·ed from Paris two imperial
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letters denouncing his late campaign as presumptuous, objectles~.
and altogether deserving of high condemnatioll 1•
While the Valencian e..xpeditioll had been in progress Marshal
Augereau had been trying his haud at the Catalan problems
which Verdier and St. Cyr had found so puzzling. His luck
had been bad-and his faults had been many-for of all the
commanders·in~chiefwho successively endeavoured to subjugate
the untameable principality he was decidedly the least capable.
When Gerona fell, the main body of his army was let loose for
operations in the open field, But VenHer's divisions, on whom
the burden of the siege 1V0rk had fallen, were in much too
dilapidated a condition for acth'c serdce 2. Leaving them to
recover their strength and gather up their convalescents, in
cantonments between .Figueras and Gerolla, Augereau moved
southwards in January, at the head of the troops of Souham
and Pino, whose two divisions still counted 12,000 bayonets
with the eagles, though they left behind them 5,000 sick in the
hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan.
The Marshal's main duty at this moment was to clear the
road from Figueras to Barcelona, which the Spanish fortress
of Gerona had so effectually blocked during the whole year 1809.
All further advances were suspended till this operation should
have been completed, by the Emperor's special orders. Duhesmc,
indeed, isolated in Barcelona with some 6,000 men, comrulmi·
cating with l''rance only by sea, and surrounded by a dis.
contented population, which was reduced to semi·star\·atioll by
the blockade kept up by the British fleet, was in a perilous
condition. There had been many who thought that if Blake,
ill October 1809, had marched against Barcelona instead of
trying to throw succours into Gerona, he. would have forced
Augereau to abandon the siege of the latter place. For
Duhesme would have been in such danger, since he was neither
strong enough to fight in the open 1101' to man efficiently the
immense circuit of tlle walls of Barcelona, that A~<J'Creau might
, Dated from Compiegne on April !laud April 20. See Corre8}JQmtallCIJ,
xx. 284 ami 21m.
2 In January, Verdier's French and \Vestpl,alian divisions coultl onl),
show 6,000 men in line and 71000 in hospital. Muster roll of Jan. 16 ill
the drchil>el NatirmalU'.
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probably have jud6red that it was better to save the capital of
Catalonia than to continue the inrerminable blockade of the
smaller town that was holding out so obstinately against him.
Be this as it may, Augereau set Souham's and Pino's columns
on the march early in January 1810, after having first executed
at their head a sort of battu£ of the somatenes at" the moun-
tnins around Gerona., as far as ll.ipol nnd CampredOll. His
progress \\'fLS a reign of rerrOI': he had issued on December 28th
a proclamation stating that all irregulars taken with arllls ill
their hands were to be treated as simple highwa)' robbers, and
hung without any form of trial 1. He was as good ns his word,
and all the prisoners taken by the flying columns of SOUhlllll
and Pino were suspended on a line of gallows erected on the
high-road between Gerona and Figueras. These atrocities
tUl'Iled the war in Catalonia into a struggle even more ferocious
than that of 1809, for the natives, very naturally, retaliated
upon every :French straggler that they caught, and the Spanish
regular officers had great difficulty in saving the lives even of
large bodies who had laid down their arms upon formal terms
of surrender.
Two roods lead from Gerona and the valley of the Ter to
Barcelona-that by Vieh and that by Hostalrich. They unite near
GrlUlollers, twenty miles outside Btucclontl. Augcrcau marched
with the Italian division of Pino by the second road, while he
sent Souham by the other. Bolh met with opposition: the
~mall castle of Hostalrich wa~ still held by the Spaniards-it
was the only fortified plat.-e ill central Catalonia which WM now
ill their hands, and commanded, though it did not actually block,
the main road to Barcelona. On arriving before it, the l\o£arshal
ordered Mazzuchelli's Italian brigade to form the siege, trusting
that the place would fall in a few days; but finding the resist·
ance more serious than he had expected, he finally continued
his march, with the remainder of the Italian division, towards
Granollers and Barcelona. He had ordered Duhesme to come
out to meet him at the former place, with as many of his troops
as he could spare from garrison duty.
1 '111e text of tllis bloodthirsty document ma)' be found ill Belmas, i. 42fl.
'nlere are details of its execution ill Barokllau!Stm, who mentions that
sCI'cral priests werc Ilmong the victims.
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Souham meanwhile, Oil the eastern road, had entered Vich on
January 11. He found that it had just been evacuated by the
main body of the Spanish Army of Catalonia, whose head
quarters had been maintained in that town all through the
later months of the siege of' Geroua. This force, still Ilumber-
ing about 7,000 men, was no longer under the command of its
old general. Blake had resigned at Christmastide, after a li\'ely
altercation with the Junta of Catalonia, who laid the blame
for the fall of Gerona on his shoulders, while he maintained that
they were to blame for not having ordered the generallev~e w
fIlr18se of the principality at an earlier date 1. The command
then passed in quick succession to the two senior general officers
of the Catalan army, first to the Marquis of Portago, and then,
after he had fallen ill, to General Garcia Coude, Goyernor of
Lerida. But these interim commanders-in-chief were replaced
in a few weeks by a younger and much more active leader,
Henry O'Donllell-the man who had conducted the second
convoy for Gerona, and had cut his way out of the place with
such splendid address and resolution. He had only just been
raised to the rank of Major·General, yet was now entrusted by
the Central Junta with the control of the entire army of
Catalonia. As he was setting to work to reorganize it, Sonham
arrived in front of his head quarters. Judging it unwise to
offer battle at the head of demoralized troops, O'Donne!1 eva-
cuated Vich, rLlld fell back to the mountains above it. Souham
followed him with an advanced guard as far as the pas~ called
the Col de Suspina, where the Spanial'd suddenly turned upon
the pursuing force, and hurled it back with loss upon the main
hod)' of the division (January H!, 1810). He refused, however,
to face Souhalll next day, und retreated towards Manresa; there~
upon the French general also turned back, thinking it profitless
to leave the Vich-Barcelona road, and to plunge into the hills
in pursuit of an evash'c enemy. He ended by making his way
across the mountains to join the Marshal.
Meanwhile, Augereau, with Pino's ltalian brigades, reached
Granollers, and came into touch with Duhesme's troops, just
in time to find that a disaster had preceded his arrival. 'fhe
Governor of Ban:elona, in obedience to the orders sent him, had
I See pp. 62,63 of this volulIIe.
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marched out on January 16 with three battalions and ~50
cuirassiers in order to meet the Marshal. He waited four days
at Granollers, and then left the brigade under the charge of
Colonel Guetry, and returned in pcrson to Barcelona, rCCfilJed
by rumours of a threatened attack from the side of Tarragona,
On the morning after his departure Gm!try's force, which
believed itself in complete security, wns suddenly surprised in
its camps by a detachment sent out by O'Donllell. That
enterprising officer had heard that Angereau was still twenty
miles awaJ', and that Guctry had scattered his men in the three
\'illagcs of Santa Perpetua, Mollet, and Grauollers, in order to
cover them from the bitter January weather. Accordingly, he
resolved to risk an attack on this unwary detachment. Two
brigades-about 4,000 men-under the Marquis of Campo
Verde, made a forced march across the mountains, and fell
upon the villages at dawn. The battalion of the 1ath in
Santa PerpetllB. was completely cut to pieces or captured-only
two men are said to have escaped. The 7th and the cuirussiers
at Mullet fared somewhat better, but were driven hnck to
Barcelona with heavy loss. Part of the third battalion, one of
the 5th Italian Line regiment, which was posted at Granollel'il,
escaped destruction by throwing itself into a fortified collvent,
and held out for two days, till it was saved by the approach of
Augereau along the high-road. Altogether, puhesme's division
was thinned by the loss of 1,000 men on January 21-22: Guetry
had been taken prisoner, with some 600 men more and bm
guns. The Spuniards disappeared the moment that Allgereall
came in sight, and rejoined O'Donnell in the hills.
Augercau entered Barcelona on the twenty.fourth, and at
once asserted his ilUthority by deposing Duhcsme from the
governorship and sending him home to France. They were old
enemies, and the general's friends regarded his disgrace as n
display of spite on the part of his superior 1. But as all the
Spanish narratj\'es describe the eighteen-months' diclatol'ilhip of
Duhesme as having been as much distinguished for private
\ Dull6Sme, or tlle friend writing under his name, gives Jlimself most
haudsome and unconvincing testimonials in the narrative printed ill 1823,
as part of the Jlinunru .ruT la Guer1'e d"&ptI.g1l8. TIley contrast
strangely with Arteche'e quotatiolls from DarceJonese local writers.
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rap:tcity as fol' public oppression, it is probable that the
Marshal's action was wholly justifiable. The Emperor, however,
refused to sanction the prosecntion of the general on the chalbTCs
laid agninst him, remarking thf\.t such proceedings would gkc
too much plcfl..'Jurc to the Catalans, 'i1 )' u\'uit bien autre chose it
fnife que de rejouir les Espagnols par cette reaction 1,'
Having concentrated Pino's and Souham's troops at Barcelona,
Augcrcnu would have proceeded to ndmncc Ilgainst the Catnlans,
and lay siege to Tarragonu, but for one fact~thc magazines of
the city were almost empty, Illld no food could be procured for
the army. lndeed, after a vcry few days it was necessary for
the Marshal to retrace his steps, in order to bring tip all
enormous convoy for the revictualling of the place, which was
being collected at Perpigllan and Figueras. All that he had
done by his lllarch was to open up the road, and to muzzle the
fortress of Hostalrich, which was still being blockaded by the
Italians. Accordingly, on l?ebruary 1 his two divisiolls marched
back each by the way that it had originally taken-Souham to
Vich, where he halted, Pino to Gerona, where the convoy began
presently to gather, escorted thither in detachments by a large
hody of reinforcements which had just come up from France.
:For the Emperor had strengthened the Army of Catalonia by
a division of troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, under
General Houyer, and by a Neapolitan brigade-some 8.000 men
in all. But the long train of carts and mules came in slowly,
and March began before Augereau was ready to move.
Meanwhile, his lieutenant Souham had been exposed to n
sudden and unexpected peril. O'Donnell had discovered that
the di\'isioll at Vich was completely isolated and did not count
much mOI"C than 5,000 sabres and bayonets. Having reorganized
his own field army at Moya, near Manrcsa, and brought it up to
a strength of 7,000 foot and 500 horse by calling a few troops
from '1'arragona, he directed the somatenes of Northern Catalonia
to muster on the other side of Vieh, so as to fall on Souham
from the rear. The indefatigable miquelete leaders Rovira and
Milans got together betwccn 3,000 and 4,000 men, despite of
all their previous losses and defeats. On February 19 these
lel'ics thrust in the pickets of the French division on the eastern
I Na.poleoll to Clarke, Compiegno, April 24, uno.
u2
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side, but SonhaIU did not see his danger till, on the following
morning, he found O'Douncll's rcgular troops pouring down into
the plain of Vieh ill three columns, and challenging him to a
battle in the open. Since the day of Valls the Cuwlan army
had never tried such a bold stroke.
The French general was greatly outnumbered-he had but
4,000 infantry and 1,QOO horse to oppose to O'Donncll's 7,500
regulars and the g,500 miqueletes. The action fell into two
separate parts-while Rovira and Milalls bickered with two
battulions left to gUUl'd the tOWll of Vich, Souho.m fought a
pitched battle against the Spanish main body with the eight
battalions alld two and a half rcgimcnts of ca\'alry 1 which con-
stituted the remainder of his force. It was a fierce and well-
contested fight: O'Donnell took the ofl'ensi \'c, and his men
displayed an unwonted vigour and initiative. Unhappily for
this enterprising general his small body of horsemen was utterly
unable to restrain or to cope with the superior French cavalry.
Twice the battle was turned by the charge of Souham's
squadrons: after the 6rst repulse O'Donnell rallied his beaten
right wing, threw in all his reserves, and tried to outflank the
shorter French line on both sides. The enemy was losing
heavily and showing signs of yielding, when the whole of his
cavalry made a second desperate charge on the Spanish right.
It was completely successful; O'Donnell's turning column,
composed of the Swiss regiments of Kayser 2 and Traxlel', was
broken, and the larger part of it captured. Thereupon, the
Spanish general, who had displayed undaunted courage through-
out the day, dud headed several charges in person, thought it
time to retire. He fell back on the mounwins, leaving behind
him 800 killed and wounded, und 1,000 prisoners. The French
I 1st Uger (three hatts.), 421ld Ligne (three bntts.), 93rd Ligna (onc
hatt.), nnd 7th Ligne (onc 1m.tt.). Meanwhile the other bRttaliOIl of the 7th
Ligne Jllld that of tlle 3rd Uger were holding back the miqueletes. The
eavalry were the NUl Dragoons, 3rd }'rovisionnl ChasseuT'll (soon afterwards
recllristenoo the 29th Chasseurs), lI11d half the Italian 'DragOOllS of
Napoleon.'
I This regiment had been formed on the t cadre' of the old Swi91
regiment of Deschard, by means of deserters from the German and Italian
troops of the French Army of Catalonia.
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had suffered at least 600 casualties 1, including SouMm himself,
desperately wounded in the head, and had been within an ace of
destruction: but for their superiority in cavalry, the day was
lost. ./"
On March 13, Augereau had at last collected his vast eonvoy
at Gerona-there were more than a thousand waggons laden
with Rour, besides pack-mules, caissons, carriages, and other
"ehides of all sorts. He marched in person to escort it, with
the Italians-who were now tmder Severoli, Pino having gone
home on leavc,-and the newly arrived German division of
Rouyer. Verdier was left behind-as in .January- -to defend
the Ampurdam from the incursions of the miqueletes of Rovira
and f\!ilans. l\.feanwhilc, Souham's di\'isioll, which had passed
inLo the lumds of Geneml Augercu.u, the Marshal's brother,
since its old chief had becn invulided to France, pursued a lille
of Illarch parallel to that of the main force. Moving from Vich
by the Col de Suspina nnd Manrcsa, it came dowll into the
valley of the Llobregat, on thc same day that Pino's and
Uouyer's troops reached it by the other route. The Marshal
and the main column had made their \l'a)' past Hostalrich,
which was found still unsubdued, and still blockaded by ttIaz-
zuchelli's brigade, which had been left opposite it in January.
These troops were ordered to join their di \'ision, a mixed detach-
ment under Colonel Dcvaux being left in their stead to watch
the castle, The Marshal then took up his residence in the
palace at Barcelona, and had himself proclaimed Governor of
Catalonia with great state, in consonance with the imperial
decree of February 8, which had taken the principality out of
the hands of' King Joseph, and made its administrator responsible
to Paris alone, and not to Madrid.
Augereau established himself permanently at Barcelona, and
proceeded during the next two months to act rather as a viceroy
than as a commander-in-chief. The conduct of milital'y opera-
tions he handed o\"er to his brother, to the unbounded disgust
of the other generals. In what proportions the responsibility
I Martiuieu's lists sliow 29 officers killed and wounded, which, at the
usual rate, presupposes about 000 or 700 casualtics. NlIllicr, Schepeler,
and Artechc all threo state the Frcnch loss lit 1,000 or 1,200-c\'itlelltly
too high.
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ful' the disustcrs which follo\\'ed "houltl 1Jc distributed between
the two Augereaus it is hard to say. But Napoleon, vcry
naturally and reasonably. placed it Oil the Marshal's shoulders,
and wrote that •Ce n'est point en restant clans les capitales
eloignees de l'armee que des generaux en chef peuvent acqueril'
de la gloire ott meriter mOll estime 1.' The force assembled 011
the Llobrcgat WllS IlOW Cl. very large onc, consisting of three
divisions, those of Augercau, Scvcroli, and ROllycr. It IlUlll-
bered nearly 20,000 mell, for along with the convoy there had
marched a mass of drafts for the old regiments of the 7th Corp~,
which brought their battalions up to flut strength 2.
There were only two rational plans of c:lrnpaign open to the
J<'rellch: the one was to march on 'l'arragonD. with D. siege-train,
and to complete the conqnest of Catnlonia by the capture of
its greatest fortress. The other W(lS to mask 'l'Ul'rtlgolln, alld
to strike across the principality westwal-u, in order to bret into
communication with Sue-het and the Army of Aragbn, by way of
Igualada, Cervera, and Lerida. If the two corps could meet,
NortheMl Catalonia would be comple'tely isolated from 'l'arra·
b'"Ona, '1'ortosa, and Valencia. It was this latter plan which
Angerean had been ordered to carry ont by his master. He
was directed to mal'ch 011 Lerida, and to join Suchet before that
pltwc. By Il. dispatch of Februul'Y 19 he had been informed
that 011 March 1 the Arm)· of Aragoll would have arrived
before Lel'ida, and would he forming its siege 3. This prophecy
was false: for Suchet, as we have St>€Il, had b'"Olle off on his
Valencian e.."i:pedition, and was at 'l'eruel on the appointed day.
It was impossible to direct from Pal'is a combined movement
depending on 'accurate timing for its sllccess. But Augereau
should have attempted to carry out the order sent him by his
master with proper zeal and dispatch. This he failed to do:
his own inclination was to strike 1\ hlow at Tarragona, and the
movements of his corps show that this was the operation which
he had determined to carry out. Instead of marching in pel'SOll
1 COrl"e1iP(J1Idaw:~, 16411. From COmpi~l;'lle, 24 April, 1310.
2 Sel'cl'oli's dh"isioll alone uumbered 6,900 foot anu 000 horse at the
moment.
S Napoleon to Clarkc, Feb. HI, from rari~. Cf. another dispatch of
Feb. 26, no. 16204 of the CorrtajKJndallce.
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with his main body, on Cenera and Lerida, he dirccted his
bl'Other to take his own and Severoli's divisions and to move by
Villafrancn on Reus, a large town twelve miles to the north·west
of 1'armgolla, aud suitable as a base of operations against that
city (March !!9). A battalion and a half was dropped at Villa.
frunca, to kt'ep open the conllllunicntions between Reus and
Barcelolla, while a brigade of Rouyer's newly arrived Germans,
under the ever.unlucky Schwartz-thc vnnquishcO of Druch and
Esparmguera I-was plael.-d as a sort of /lank.guard at :Manresa.
On March 27 a summons was sent in to Tarmgollu demanding
surrender. This was, of course, refused-the toWlI was full of
troops, for Henry O'Donncll had just strengthencd its garrison
by retiring into it himself, with the 6,000 mcn who represented
the remains of his field army.
The Spanish general, contemplating the position of affairs
with u wary eye, had convinced himself that he could stop
General Augereau's further movements by striking at his line of
communication with Barcelona. This he proceeded to do in the
most skilful and successful fashion. Before the enemy closed ill
upon Tarragona, he sent out a picked force under General Juan
Caro, with orders to attack Villafranca and l\Ianresa without
a moment's delay. This daring stroke was completely successful:
Caro stormed VilIafranca at dawn on March 30, and took or
captured the whole of the 800 men posted there. He was
wounded, and had to hand o\'er his command to eampo Verde,
who, after some preliminary skirmishing lasting for three days,
completed the little campaign by driving Schwartz out of
Manresa, after a heavy fight, on April 5, in which the German
brigade lost SO officers and 800 men z. The somatenes turned
out to hunt the routed force as it retired on Barcelona, and
inflicted lllallY further losses, so that Schwnrtz only brought
back u third of his brigade to the ::\1arshal.
The touch betwt.·cn the two divisions at Rew IUld the garrisoll
of 13arcclolln was thus cumpletely severed. i\loreover,Augcreau
I See vot i. pp. 309-11.
t The Lippe~Dilckcburgofficel" Ihrckhausen sa}"S in his diary that only
20 officers and 620 men were lost. But Martillien's lists sholv 30 officers
of the Nassau, ducal Saxon, and AlIhalt.Lippe regiments killed or wounded
at or near l\[anrcsa on the 2nd-5th of April.
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feared lest the next move of the raiding force might be an
attack on the isolated force under Colonel Devaux which was
blockading I-Iostalrich. He therefore sent out a brig with olle
of his aides-dc-camp on board, bearing orders to his brother
and Severoli to return at once to his head quarters with their
troops. Dy good fortune the mcsscnger reached his destination
without being intercepted by English cruisers, and the two
didsions started on their march back to Bar<:elona on April 1.
Only two days before, Severoli, more by luck than by skill, had
got for a moment into touch with the Army of Aragon. An
exploring column of two battalions under Colonel Villattel
which he had sent out westward to Falcet, in the direction
of the Ebro, met-entirely by chalice-a similar detachmcnt of
Musnier's division of the Srd Corps, which hu.d advanced to
:Mora. On interchanging news of their respecti\'e armies,
Villatte learnt from his collcngue that Suchet was at thUi
moment marching on Lerida, where, according to the Emperor's
instructions to .Marshal Augereau, he ought to have arrh-ed
more than a month before. Villntte brought back the informa-
tion to Severoli, but the latter could make no use of it while he
was under orders to retuMI without delay to Barcelona I. He
and Gelleral Augerenu accomplished their retreat ill three days,
much harassed all the way. not only by the somal:cncs of the
mountains but also by O'DOIlIlCll, who followed them with
It detachment of the garriSQll of Tamtgolla. They took SQll1C
small revenge on him, however, at ViIlnfrallca, where thcy tumcd
on the pUl'Suers and inflicted a sharp check 011 their advanced
guard, which was pressing in, with more courage than discretion,
on a force which outnumbered it by four to one. On April 9
the whole army was encamped outside the walls of Barcelona.
Counting the garrison, A\lgereall had now more than 20,000
men in hand, but, not contented with this concentration. he sent
orders back to the AmpUl'dam, ordering Vel·diet' to bring forward
as mallY troops ns po~sible to Gel'Ona, and from thence to push
forward down the high-road liS far as Grullollers, so as to succour
Devau.'{, if the Spaniards should show any intention of relieving
Hostah'ich.
The Marshal's next mo\'e lost him the favour of Napoleon,
I For details of Villattc's cxpedition see Vacani, iv, 140-1.
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nud lcd to his rcmoval ill di~gracc to Pm'is. On April 11 he
issued orders to Severoli to murch on Hostnlrich, und there to
take over the conduct of the siege from DevIlllx, while at the
same time he himself moved back to Geronu with his brother's
French division, and an immense train, consisting partly of the
empty carts of the convoy which he had brought south in
March, partly of confiscated propelty of all sorts from Barce-
lona I. Allbrereau's excuse for this retrograde movement, which
abandoned all Central Catalonia to the enemy. was that his
anny would have exhausted the magazines of Barcelona if he
had kept it concentrated for ten days more, and that he had
no other way of feeding it, since the activity of the somatenes
made the dispatch of foraging detachments utterly impossible.
Thc moral effect of the move was deplorable: after taking in
hand an offensivc movement against 'l.'lIrragonu, he had allowed
himself to be checked by an cnemy hopelcssly inferior in
numbers, had lost over 8,000 men in petty combats, and
then had retired to the base fmm which he had started in
January. Three months had been wasted, and nothing had
been gained save that the small castle of Hostnlrich WtlS IlOW
in a despernte condition for want of food, and must fall if not
spccd.il)' succoured. "Vhnt rendered the position of Augereau
the more shameful was that he had now in front of him only
a skeleton enemy. For O'Dollnell at this moment WlIS distracted
by the advance of Suchct uguinst Lel'ida, ulld hud been fon.oed
to draw off' towards the bONers of AI'UgOll two of the four
divisioll!> into which he had reorganized his little field army.
Facing Augcrcnu there was only Campo Verde's division of
regulars-not over 5,000 strong-and the band!> of the moun-
tains. It was against such nn enemy that the Marshal had
concentrated ~5,000 men-including Verdier'» force-between
HosWl'ich 1Il1d Geronu.
'111e food-problem, Oil which those who defend Augereall
lay all the stres.<; possible 2, was no doubt a very real onc.
I According to Spanis}1 atlCOIlIl!a this included much ill-gotten property
belonging to the :Marshal lIimself, and other ~uperior officeI'!!. Ferl"lll'
(see Artache, viii. 203) declares that Augereau carried olT all the furniture
of the Hoyal Palace.
2 For a defence of the Marshal on t11e8C lines, see Victoire8 et COllquelu,
voL xx. pp. 62-3.
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The feeding of Barcelona, with its garrison and its large ci\'il
population, by Illeans of convoys brought from France, was
no easy task. But it seems clear that with the large force
at his disposition-the 7th Corps was over 50,000 strong 1-
Allgerean could have organized convoy.guards sufficiently
powerful to defy the Spalliard~, without abandonhlg the offen-
sive position in front of Barcelolla, which was all·important to
him. He might have set aside 10,000 men for that purposc,
and still have kept a strong field army together. Had he don~
so,O'Donllell could not ha\·c dared to march with 8,000 men,
the pick of the Catalan army, to relieve Lerida, while his old
enemies were ma.c;scd, awaiting an impossible attack, a hundred
miles away. ~
Meanwhile, the one task which was completed by the 7th Corps
during the months of April and May wa." the rcductioll of
Hostalrich, The little castle was a place of strength, perched
high above the abandoned town to which it belonged. It was
garrisoned by two battalions, onc of Granadan regulars from
Reding's old division, the other of local Catalan Icvies2, under
Colonel Juliano Estrada, an officer of high spirit and com·
mendable obstinacy. '1'0 the fino'! summons made to him in
January by Augerciltl, he had replied that' Hostalrich was the
child of Gcrono., and would know how to cmulatc the conduct
of the mother-city.' Kor was this high-flown epigram belicd by
the after-conduct of the garrison. Hostalrich held out from
January 16 to May 12 without receiving either a convoy from
without or any reinforcements. Twice the local miqueletes
attempted to pass succours into the castle, but on each
occasion they were drivcn olt~ after having barely succeeded in
coulIllunicating with Estrada. Theh' convoys never got close
enough to cuter the gates. At lust, Oil Muy 12, the pro-
visions of the place were completely exhausted: Uwreupoll
Esll'o.da took in hand a scheme which was only tried by onc
other governor during the whole Peninsular "'ar-the I·rench·
mall Brennier at Ahneida in May 1811. He put every able-
bodied man of the garrison under arms at midnight, issued
1 About 56,000 in all, but 10,000 were in hospital or detached.
~ Due battillion of Iliberia (or 1st of Granada) and one tercio of levies
from the province of CerolLa : total strength about 1,200 bayonets,
1810] FALL 01" HOSTALlllCH 299
silently from the castle, and charged at the besiegCl's' lines,
with the illlculioll of cutting his way through to Cumpo
Verdc's hend quul'ters ill the mountains. Hc was fortunate
e!lough to picrL"C the Itnliun outposts at the first rush. Bul
two whole brigades were prcsellt1>' at his heels, his guides lost
their way alllong cliffs and ravines, and he was overtaken.
Turning back with his rearguard to fend off' the pursuers,
he was wounded and taken prisoner. Ten other officers and
some 300 soldiers shared his fate: the rest of the garrison
dispersed in the hills, and reached Vich ill small parties to the
number of 800 men. If only their gallant commander had
eSCAped with them, the exploit would have been an exact
parallel to the Almeida sortie of 1811.
The reduction of Hosmlrich and of a small fort on the
Isles of Las Medas near the mouth ot' the 'fer, were the last
achie\'ements of the Army of Catalonia while it was under the
command of Augerean. On April~ the EmperOl' had resolved
to remove him from his post, and had ordered Mnrslml Mac-
dOlll\ld, Dukc of 'l'arentum, to l'clic\'c him. In thc .~fol/i[eltr
it w!\s merely stated thut the elder l\Inrshal had been
fOI'ced b)' ill-health to resign his charge. But the real cnuses
of his displacement arc plainly stated ill Napoleon's letter to
the Minister of War. They were the blow whieh he had gh'ell
to the imperial pl'eStige by his retreat to Gerona, and his dis-
obedience in having faik'tl to march on Lerida in aid of Suchet.
It must be confessed t1mt the wruth of the Emperor was justili.
ably rOllsed. Its final manifestation took the slmpe of a minute
directing that when the l1IollitCUI' published the news of the
SUCf..'CSSe5 at Hostalrich tl.nd us Moons, the nallle of AUf:,rereau
was to be kept out of the paragraph, and only those of his
subordinates mentioned I.
While the lIew commander of the 7th Corps was on his way
from Italy to Perpigllan, and for sOllle time ufier his arrival 011
May 22, there was a f..'Olllpletc suspension of !lCtive operations.
None of the l?rcnch gcnerals in the principality could do more
than uwait ordcrs, and keep thc ncighbourhood of his callton~
mcnts sufe frolll the irrcpressiblc miqueletes, 'rhe whole iulcrcst
1 Sec (Jorrc']XJudlmcc, 16'111, NallOlcoll to Clarke, of -'llrH 24, ami
16000, same to same of May 23.
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of the French opcraliolls in North-Western Spain during this
period turns on thc movements of the Army of Amgon.
On returning from his futile Valencian expedition, Suchet had
found awaiting him at Saragossa orders to commence without
delay the siege of Lerida, and promising that Augereau .....ould
•contain' the Spanish army of Catalonia, and would ultimately
open up communication with him by way of Cervera or Mom-
blanch. In obedience to the imperial mandate, the commander
of the Srd Corps collected more than half his troops for the
expedition against Lerida. This concentration entailed the
abandonment of the rough coWltryof Southern Aragon to Villa-
ca.mpa and his hands; for having determined to leave only
Laval's division behind him to protect the ccntral parts ot"
the province, Suchet had to evacuate the region of Terucl,
Albaracin and MOlltalvan. !.avaI's two brigades remained in the
valley of theJiloca, between Saragossaalld Darocn, watching the
dclJouchcs from the mountains. The other two dh'isiolls of the
Army of Aragon were destined for the siege of Lcridu. :M:usnicr,
with one column, marching down from Caspe and AlcaJ1iz 1,
crossed the Ebro at Flix, and approached Lerida from thc south.
Habert, with his division, coming from the side of Saragossa,
made for the same goal by way of Alcubierre and Monzon. It
might seem a dangerous experiment to march the two isolated
columns across thc Spanish front, for a junction at a point so
remote from their respective startiug-poillts. Hut, for the
moment, there was no hostile force of any importance in their·
neighbourhood. Se\'eroli and Augereau being still at ll.eus,
when Musnier and Habert started on their way, O'Donnell could
spare no tmops for the relief of Lerida. It was not till they
had retired, and the Duke of Castiglione had withdrawn all his
forces to Hostalrich and Geronfl, that the Captain~Geneml found
himself free for an expedition to the West. In front of Musnier,
while he was marching on Lerida, thel"C were nothing but trifling
detachments scnt out for purposcs of observation by the Govemor
ofTortosa. In front of Habert there wcre only 2,000 men undcr
Colonel PerenD., throwlI out from Lerida to observc the open
I It was with a dctacllmcnt of this column that Scvcroli's f10nking party
lIJ}dcr Villntte got into t.:omlDuuic:ltioll 011 April 4, lIS uctailcd aool'c,
j,ago ZW.
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country between the Segre and the Cincll. This was the sole
fleld·force which remained from the old Spanish Army of Aragoll,
with the exception of the two dilapidated regiments that formed
the nucleus of Villacll.mpa's hand.
On April 10, Suchet IU'rived at l\!onzon with II brigade of
infantry, and the six compallies of artillery and four of engineers
which were destined for the siege of Lerida. On the thirteenth
he was before the walls of the place on the west bank of the
Segre, while on the next day Haberl appeared on the other
bank, driving before him Colonel Perena and his battalions. This
second French column had passed the Segre at Balaguer, from
which it had expelled the Spanish brigade. Perenu. having the
choice between returning inlo the mountains or strengthening
the garrison of Lcrida, had taken the latter alternative. On
the same day Musnier came up from the South, and joined the
army with the force that had started from Alcal1iz and had
crossed the Ehro at Flix. Suchet had now concentrated the
whole of the 15,000 men 1 whom he destined for the siege.
The town of Lcrida, then containing some 18,000 inhabitants,
lies in B vast treeless plain on the western bank of the broad and
rapid Segre. Its topography is peculiar: out of the dead level
of the plain rise two steep and isolated hills. Onc of these,
about 800 yards long by 400 broad, and rising 150 feet above
the surrounding flats, is crowlled by the eitadel of the town;
the other, somewlmt longer but rather narrower, is no other than
the hill about which Caesar and Afranius contended in the old
Civil Wars of Rome, whell Lerida was still Ilerda. It lies about
three-quarters of a mile from the first~named height. In 1810
its culminating summit was covered by a large work called Fort
Garden, and its southern Rnd lower end was protected by the
two small rcdoubts called San Fcrllando aud El Pilar. The
town occupies the flat ground between the citadel-height and
the river. It has no trunspontinc suburb, but only a strong
I For llis strength at this moment, sec the table which he gives in his
M&nuim, vol. i, Appendix 4. His tigul"ClI call1\ot :llwa)'s be trnsted: for
instance, purporting in tllis table to gil'e llis wllOle force, present at
Lerida or detached in Aragon, be omits the six squadrons of gendarmerie
which were guarding his rear [37 officers, 1,121 men] all/I the four
battalions of Ooo:tetlra de8 MQ'fltagnea, who were gnrri!!Olling JaCll, V{'Ilasque,
&c. [about 2,000 men].
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l€te·dlt~pollt on the other side of the Segre. The strength of
the plae(! lay in the fiLet that its whole eastern front was protected
by the river, its wllOle western front by the high-I)'iug citadel.
The comparativcl>' short southcrn front was undcr the guns of
Fort Gm'den, which t:olllllmnded ull the ground over which all
cncmy could approach this side of thc town. Thcre onl)' remained,
unprotccted by outcr works, the northern front., and this was
the point which a skilful cnemy would select itS his objccti\·c.
Another fact which much fa\'onred the defcnce was that the
besieger was fort-w. to makc "ery long lines of imestmcnt, since
he had to shut in not only the town, but the whole plateau on
which lie Fort Garden and its dependent works. Moreover, he
must keep a force beyond the Segre, to block thc tfde-dllrpolll,
and this force must be a large one, because the east was the
quarter from which succours sent from Catalonia must ccrtainly
appear. The garrison, 011 the other hand, wns quite adequate
to mall the works entrusted to it; the entry into the town of
Perena's Aragonese battalions had brought it up to a strength
of over 8,000 men. The artillery were the weak point~thcre
were only 550 trained mell to man over 100 pieces. The
Governor WitS Major-Gencral Garda Conde, who owed his pro-
motion to his brilliant ru::hievclllcn!s at Gcroll6. ill the prc(,'cding
September.
Suchet's 13,000 men were insufficient for a close and thorough
investment of such a large space as that covered by the.Lerida-
Gardcll fortifications. He was forced tolcavc ft considerable part
of its southern front watchetl by cavalry posts alone. Of his
total force:, Musnier, with six battalions and the greater part
of the cavalry-about 4,000 men in all, was beyond the river.
Three battalions blocked the Ute-du-pont, the rest formed a sort
of covering force, destined to keep off' the approach of enemies
from the side of Catalonia. On the hither side of the Segre the
three brigades of Habert, Buget, and Verges were encamped
facing the western and nortlHI'estern fronts of Lerida. They
counted only thirteen battalions, being weakcned by 1,200 men
who had been detached to garrison Monzon and }'I:aga. The
communication between Musnier's didsion and the rest of the
army was by a flying bridge thrown across the Segrc two miles
above the town; it was guarded by a redoubt. The artillery
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park was placed at the village of San Uufo, opposite the north-
western angle vf the toW1I, from whieh it is distant about' 2,500
Jards. It was evident from the first that this would be the
point of attack selected by the French engineers.
The army had barely taken up its position when, on April 19,
rUlllours were spread abroad that O'Donnell was on his way to
relieve Lerida, They must have been pure guesses, for the
Spanish general on that day was still at 'l'arragona and had
made no movement. They were, however, sufficiently persistent
la hlduce Suchet to take off' 1\1llsnier's covering corps,strengthened
by three other battalions, on II mission of exploration, almost as
far as Tarregn, on the Barcelona road, No Spanish force was
met, nor could ally information be c.'l:l:.ractcd from the inhabi-
tants. The absencc of the troops 011 the left bank of the Segrc
was soon dctedcd by Gm'cia Condc, who- to his great regret
three days later-sent messengers to inform O'Donnell that the
Freneh lines to the east of the city were nOI\' almost unoccupied,
The fiery O'Dollllell was already on his way when this news
renched him, The moment that he was sure that Augerenu
had left Barcelona and was retreating northward, he had resolved
to fly to the relief of Lerida with the two divisions of which he
could dispose. On the twentieth he marched from Tarragona
b}' Valls and Momblanch, with 7,000 regular infantry, 400 horse,
a single battery, and some 1,500 miqueletes. On the twenty-
third he had reached Juneda, tweh'e miles from Lerida, without
having seen a French picket or having been detected himself:
He intended to drive oft' the few battalions blocking the bridge-
head, and to open up commnnication with the besieged tOWIl
that same day. Unfortunately fol' him, Suchet and l\fllsnier had
ri!turned on the previous night from their expedition to 'l'arrega,
and were now lying at Alcoletge, three miles north of the bridge-
head, with se\'en battalions and 500 cllil'ftssiers,
Pushing briskly forward along the high-road, in a level tree-
less plateau, destitute of co\'er of any kind, the leading Spanish
division-that of Ioorrola-came into cont.aet about midday
with the small force guarding the bridge~head, which was now
in charge of Harispe, Suchet's chief-of-the-stafl". To the surprise
of the Spaniards, who had expected to see these three battalions
and h"o squadrons of hus:>ars rctit'C in haste, the FrCllch showed
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fight. Harilipe was aware that Musnier could come lip to his
aid within an hour, and WIlS ready for battle. His hussars
charged the lending regiment of lharrola's column, and threw it
into disorder, while his infantry formed up ill support. At this
moment the Spanish general received Ilews that Musnier was
moving in towards his flank; he therefore retired, to get the
SUppOlt of O'Dollllell, who was following him with the second
divisiOll. But at the ruined village of' Margalef, six miles from
Leridn, the column of Musnier came up with Ibarmla, and he
WIlS so hard pressed thnt he formed line, with 300 ('nvlllry on his
l'ight wing and his three guns on his left. The position was as
bEld a one as could be found for the Spanish division-a dead flat,
with no cover. l\Immier, on reaching the front, flung his cavalry,
500 cuirassiers of the 13th regiment, at the Spanish right wing.
The horsemen placed there broke, and fled without crossing
sabres, and the French charge fell on the flank battalion of the
infantry, which was caught while vainly trying to form square.
It was ridden down in a moment, and the horsemen then rolled
up the whole line, regiment after regim(,llt. A great part of
1OOrr01a'l; corps was captured, and O'Dollllell, who ctlmc on the
field with the dh'ision of Pin.'Z just as the disnster took place,
could do no more than retire in good order, covering the scattered
remnants of his front line. A Swiss battalion, which he told off
as his rearguard, was pierced by the cuirassiers and for the Illost
part captured. In this disastrous aflail' the Spa.niards lost 500
killed and wounded and several thousand prisoners I, as also fOil I'
flags and the half· battery belonging to Ibarrola's dil'ision, The
French, of whom the cavalry nlone were seriollsly ellgngt."'<1, are
1 SuclLet says that he took 0,600 prisoners, a figure tlUlt appears quite
impossible, as Schepeler rightly remarks (Hi. 649). Ibarrola's divisiou had
ouly 4,000 bayoucts, and of that of Piru only the one Swiss battaliou was
seriously eugaged. Moreover, Ibarrola's division was not absolute!)'
enenninated, for O'Dollnell On April 26 issued an order of the day, in
which he thanks the dil'ision for its courage, alld praises the battalions
which kept their ranks and re·formed behind those of l)ire~, 'returning
in good order to occupy tllc position (Junooa), from which they IlIul startl'tl
at dawn.' See the tlocullIcnt, printed ill Arteche's Appendix, no. 12 of
1'01. I'iii. I should doubt if 2,000 prisoncrs wcre not nearer tIle mark
than 6,600.
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said by Suchet to have had no more than ~3 killed nnn 82
wounded I.
It is clear that O'Donnell must take the blame for the ruin
that fell upon his little field army. He should not have been
caught with his two divisions marching with nn interval of four
milD; between them. Nor ought he to have been ignorant of
the return of Musnier's force, considering that hc had 400
cavalry, who should have been exploriIlg the whole coulltry~side
for miles around, instead of riding ill a mass along with
Ibarrola.'s infantry. The carelessness shown was unpardonable:
relying, apparently, on Garcia Conde's dispatch-now two days'
old-collccl'ning the weakness of the French beyond the Segre,
the Spanish general was caught moving as if for an unopposed
entry into Lerida, instead of in battle order. It may be added
that he would have done well to collect more men before
advancing against Suchet-8,OOO bayonets and sabres were too
small a force to tackle the main body of the S.·d Corps, el'en
if they were aided by a sortie from Lerida, as O'DonneIl had
intended. It would have been well to make some endeavour to
get troops from the Vnlencian army, whose ]2,000 men were
absolutely idle at the moment. It is true that Jose Caro and
the Valenciall Junta were very chary of sending their men out~
side their own border. But for such IL great am.ir as the relief
of Lcrida a brigade or two might have been ool'l'owoo. There
was a considerable V&lclleian force, at the moment, in the neigh-
bourhood of Alcaiiiz.
After the combat of i\1argaIef Suchet summoned LcridlL for
a second time, amI offered to allow the Governor to ~ee the
prisoners and gUllS which he had taken from O'Donncll. Gurcia
Conde verj' rightly answered that he relied on his own forces
alone, and should fight to the end. Accordingly, the regular
siee,"C began. The trenches were opened opposite the north front
of the tOWll 011 April ~9; several days of hemy rain hindered
the completion of the first parallel, but 011 May 7 the breaching
butteries werc ready and the bombardment begatl. The front
attacked-the Carmen and l\!agdalella bnstiolls-was weak: it
was not protected by any flanking fires, and hud neither a ditch
1 Figures llrobably correct. Martinicn's lists show onc officer killed and
two wouuded; of thc latter, oue WllS thc cal'alry gencrnl Hous..oard.
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nor n CO\'cl'cd way. It was bound to succumb before the very
heavy fire directed against it, unless the defence should succeed
in beating down the fire of the breaching batteries. The
Spaniards did their best, bringing up e\'ery gun that could be
mounted, and replacing each injured piece as it was disabled.
But the end was ob\'ious fl'om the first: the walls were not strong'
enough to resist the attack,
Meanwhile, Suchet madc two successive assaults on n part of
the defences very far distant from the main front of attack-the
two isolated redoubts which stood on the south end of the extra-
mural plateau, ofwhieh Fort Garden formed the main protection.
lIe wished to gain a footing on this high ground, both because
he could from thence molest the south front of the town, and
because he wished to prevent the Spaninrds from using the
plateau as a plo.ce of refuge after the fall of the city, which he
regarded as inevitable. The first attempt to take the works by
escalade, 011 the night of April ~3~9l4, was a disastrolls failure:
the ])ilar was occupied for a moment, but the attack on San
Fernando' failed, and the dominating tire from it drove the
stormers out of the smaller work, after they had held it for
a few hours,
The second escalade was lUore successful: it was carried out
011 the night of May l!t-1S, and elided ill the storming of both
works. Only a small part of their garrison succeeded in escaping
into Fort Garden: the besieged lost 300 men, the successful
assailants only 120. The greater part of the plateau was now
in the hands of the French.
On the next day, May 13, the engineers announced that the
two breaches in the north front ofthe town walls were practicable,
and that same evening Lerida was stormed. The breaches were
ca.rried with no great difficulty, but the garrison made a stubborn
resistance for some time, behind traverses and fortified houses ill
the rear of them. \Vhen these were carried, the city was at
SlIchct's mercy; but it was not at the city alone that he was
aiming-he wished to master the citadel also. During the last
siege of Lerida, that by the Duke of Orleans in 1707, the high-
lying castle had held out for many days after the town had been
lost, Suchet's way of securing his end was effective but brutal.
On the whole, it 'I'M the greatest atrocity perpctrntcd by allY
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combatant, E'rellch, Spanish, or English, during the whole
Peninsular War. When his troops had entered the streets, he
directed columns towards each gate, and having secured possession
of them all, so as to make escape into the open country impossible,
bade his troops push the whole Ilon-combatunt population of
Lerida up-hill into the citadel, where the beaten garrison was
already taking refuge. 'The soldiery,' as he writes, with evident
complacency and pride in his ingenuity, ' were set in a concentric
movement to push the inhabitants, along with the garrison,
towards the upper streets and the citadel, They were dislodged
by musketry fire from street after street, house after house, in
order to force them into the castle, That work was still firing,
and its discharges augmented the danger and the panic of the
civil popnlation, as they were thrust, along with the wreck of
the garrison, into the ditch and over the drawbridge. Pressed
011 by our soldiers, they hastily poured into the castle )'ard,
before the Governor had time to order that they should not be
allowed to cnter.' The castle being cmmmeu with some liftcell
thousand men, womcn, antI children, Suchet gave orders tu
bombard it with every available mortar and howit7..cr. 'Every
shell,' he writes, • that fell into the narrow spa<.'C containing this
multitude, fcll on serried masses of non-combatants no less than
of soldier}'. It had been calculated that the Governor and the
most determined officers would be influenced by the presence of
these women, children, old folk, und unarmed peasants. As
General Suchet had flattered himself would be the case, the
scheme had a prompt and decisive'cfl:ecl: On the 14th at mid-
day, Garda Conde, unable to stand the slaughter an}' longer,
hoisted the white flag.
It is difficult to see how the forcing of thousands of non-
combatants, by means of musketry fire, on to the front of the
enemy's line of defence, differs in any way from the device, not
unknown among African savages and Red ]ndians 1, ofattacking
under cover of captured women and children thrust in upon the
weapons of their fathers and husbands. The aet places that
polished writer and able administrator Louis-Gabl'iel Suehet on
the moral level of it king of Dahomey. He acknowledges that
the plan was deliberately thought out, and that scores of his
I Onc 01' two cascs can also be quoted from the European '-fiddle Ages.
X
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victims perished not in the subsequent bombardment, but by
being shot down by his own men while the crowd WIlS being
collected and hunted forward I, Historians hl1\'c denounced the
ntmcilies committed by the Fccnch rank und filent Turrogona or
Oporta, by the English runk and file at Badnjos or St, Sebastian,
but the cultured gcncrnl who worked out this most ell'cetivc
plan for the reduction of u. hostile citadel has llC\'er hud his
due meed of shame. Napicr's remark that, 'though It t01l'1}
taken by assault is considered the lawful prey of a licentious
soldiery, yet this remnant of barbarism does not warrant the
drh'ing of ullarmed and helpless people into a situation where
they must perish,' seems a sufficiently mild censure, when all
the circumstances are taken into account 2.
The total number of Spanish troops surrendered by Garcia.
Conde in the Citadel and Fort Garden, or captured by the
E'rcllch during the storm, amounted to over 1,000 mcn, of
whom about 800 were wounued lying in the hospital. It was
calculated that 1,200 or 1,500 more had perished during the
siege, and that about 500 of the ci \'il population had fallen
victims to Suchet:S barbarous device. The French losses during
the whole series of operations had been 1,100 killed and
wounded. The Spaniards declared that Garcia Conde had
betrayed Lerida, and ought never to haye surrelldeI'€d. But the
only ground for this accusation was that, after a short capthity,
he did homage to ]\:ing Joseph, and became an Afrmu:csado.
Though he had shown dash and courage at .Gcrollll., it is clear
that he lacked the firmness of governors SUcll as Mnriilnu Alvarez,
or Andrcs Hcrrasti. His defence of Lcridn had not becn par-
ticularly skilful nor particularly resolute: with over 8,000 men
within the walls he ought to have been able to hold out longer
against Suchet's 13,000. The most blameworthy part of his
arrangements was his neglect to retrench the breaches, and to
form a strong second line of temporary works behind them.
Alvarez, under similar conditions, and with a garrison far less
strong in comparison to the besieging army. held out fol' months
after his walls had been breached, simply because he treated
them only as all outer line of resistance, and was prepared to
tight on behind his hmer defences.
I Such et, M~m()irtl, i. pp. 147-3. ~ NRpier, ii. 322.
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After the fall of Leridu, Sllchet, h9Sillg received through
France the news that the whalf' ofAngerea.n's army was colleewl
in the neighbourhood of Hostnlrich and Gcrona, made up his
mind that he hnd better attempt nothing ambitious tlnt.il the
7th Corps was in a position to help him, But there wus a small
task close to his Imnd, which was well worth uiulcrtakiug ill U
moment of enforced leisure. Thi~ was the siege oflHequinClli'..8,
the only fortress left in Spanish hands all the eastern side of
Aragon. It was a small place, but not without its strategic im-
portance, for not only did it cover the junction of the Segre and
the Ebro, but it was the highest point open for nadgation on
the last-named river. Any onc holding :Mequinenza can use the
Ebl'o as a high-road, except in time.'> of drought, and this was
an advantage of no smn.ll impor.tance, since the country from
thence to the sell. chances lo be singularly destitute of ronds
of any kind. A few months lalcr, Suchet found the place
iuvaluable, as he ;'vas able to prepare his IJattering-train for the
siege ofl'orlosn within its walls, and then .to send all the heavy
material down-stream with the minimum of trouble. l\:Iequinenza
was a small place, consisthlg of a few hundred houses along the
rher bank enclosed by a weak and old-fashioned wall, but
dominated by a strong castle, which towers 500 feet above the
water at the end of a spur of the Sierra de Montellegre. The
garrison consisted of about 1,000 men,. under a.Colonel Carbon.
The very day after Lenda had fallen, Suchet sent a brigade to
in \'est Mcquincu7A: more troops followed after an interval. It
was clear that the taking of the town would after small difficult)':
but the castle was another matter. Its defences were independent
of those of the place below, and its site was so lofty and rocky
that it could not be battered from any ground accessible by
e:dsting roads. Indeed, it could only be appl·oached along the
crest of the Sierra, of which it forms the last lofty point. The
main interest of the siege of Mequinenza lies in the fact that, in
order to reduce the castle, the French engineers had to build
a road practicable for heavy guns in zig-zags up the side of the
Sierra. They had arrived in front of the place on May 15:
byJune 1 the road was completed: it was a. piece of hard work,
as in QrdertoutiIize the easiest possible slopes it had been made
no less than five miles long. But when the guns had once been
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got up on to the crest of the mountain, Mequillcllzn-town and
castle alike-was doomed. The town was stormed on June 5;
it might have been captured long before, but there was little
use in taking possession of it until the attack upon the castle
had been begun, Before the storm, Colonel Carbon had wisely
ordered all the large river craft in the place, eleven in number,
to run down-stream to Tortosn; he wall wellllware that Suchet
wanted to open up the navigation of the Ebro, and was resolved
that he should find 110 vessels ready for him, Two of the craft
run nshOI'C and were captured; thc other nine got off' dear.
'When the three batteries erected on the summit of the
Sierra opened on the castle, the walls began to crumble at once.
At the end of eight days its front towards the French trenches
was a mass of shapeless mins, Carbon then surrendered, with-
out waiting for an assault, which must undoubtedly have pro"ed
successful. There was nothing particularly obstinate, or, on
the other hand, plutic111al'ly discreditable, in thf> defence. The
castle was not a modern fortress; its sole strength had lain in
i1;$ inaccessible position; and when the French had climbed up
on to a level with it, nothing more could be donc.
Having mastered Lerida and Mequincn7.t1, and obtained a
firm footing in the phlill of 'Vestern Catalonia, Suchct had now
harder work before him, His first 1let.'Cssity was to clear the
countrj' behind him of the insurgents, who had swarmed down
from the hills to attack the troops left behind in Central
Aragon, while the main army had been concentrated before
Lerida. Villacampa had half destroyed a column of 350 men
at Arandija all the Xalon on 1\1ay 14, Catalan somatenes had
attacked the garrison of the valley of Vcnasquc, on the ,'er)'
frontier of France, Oil May 16, Valcllcian bands had bcsiegt.'C1
the custle of AlcRiliz for mall)' days, But all the encmics of
Suchct had to Ay, as SOOI1 as his main army became once more
free for field scnice. No attempt was made to oppose a. serious
resistance to his movable columns: the insurgents fled to right
and left: the most extraordinary proof of their demoralization
was that, on June 13, General i\:1ontmarie, at the head of one of
these columns, found the strong forl of Morella, within the
Valencian border, absolutely unoccupied, He seized and
garrisoned it, knowing that this place, which commands the
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mountain·r08.d from Aragon to Valencia, WM of immense
strategical importance.
When June came round, Suchct had once more mastered all
Aragon, and was free for work outside its borders. A march
against Valencia, 011 the one side, or against 'rorklsa and
Tarragonn on the other, was equally possible. But at this
moment Napoleon was set on proceeding r methodically '-in
Eastern Spain no less than in Portugal-and the ordcl'i> issued
to the Commander of the Srd Corps were, to proceed against
'l'ortosa, and cut oft' Valencia from Catalonia by its capture.
The longer and more difficult advance against Valencia itself
was relegated to it distant date; there must be no more fiascos
like that of February. Accordingly, 811chet was ordered to
follow up the capture of Lerida and Mequinenza by the reduc-
tion of Tortosa I. He was informed at the same time that
Macdonald, the new commander of the Army of Catalonia,
was ordered to attack 1'arragonfl. In this way, the restless
O'Donnell would find his hands full at home, and would not
be able to spare time or men for the relief of Tortosa. Only
from the Valellciall Arul)', which had always been badly led,
and managed with the most narrow particularism by Jose Caro
and his Junta, need Suchet expect any trouble.
But until Maooonald WM prepared to lead down his corps to
the neighbourhood of 1'arragona and the lower Ebro, Suchet
felt that his own enterprise must be held back. or at least con-
ducted with caution. And although Macdonald had received
his orders in !\fay, on taking m'er Augereau's post, it was some
time before he was able to execute them. June and July had
passed, and August had arrived, before he appeared in the
regions where Suchet had been told to expect him, and at last
placed himself in communication with the Army of Aragon.
This long delay was entirely due to the burden imposed upon
him by the necessities of Barcelona, with its large garrison and
its vast civil population. The provisions which Augereau had
introduced into the city in the early spring were exhausted, and
his successor was forced to replace them by escorting thither
two new convoys of great size in June and July. So active
were the rniqueletes that Macdonnld found himself obliged to
, Navoleon to Berthier, Oorrespond/met, Ma)· 29, 1810.
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take with him his French and his Italian division as escort all
each occasion. For a first-class convoy is a mst affair, stretch-
ing out tu long miles in a mountain country, and re<luiring to
be strongly guarded at every point of its unwieldy length. The
Emperor was bitterly disappointed at I\facdonald's delays: it
was hard to convince him that the problem of food-supply in
Catalonia was almost insoluble, and that neither Barcelona nor
the field army could be permanently fed by seizing the resources
of the valley of the Llobregat, or the Campo of Tarragona, and
making Will' support war in the regular st)'le. Catalonia had
never fed its whole population e,'en in time of peace, but had
largely depended Oil corn brought Ill' from Aragon 01' imported
by sea. But the British Mediterranean squadron now made the
transport of food to Barcelona by water impossible, while, till
the 3rd Corps und the 7th Corps should finally meet, it was
impossible to supply the latter from the Aragollesc base.
"'hile neither of the normal ways of procuring a regular
supply of provisions was practicable, nothing remained but
the weary task of escorting convoys from Perpignan and Figuerns
to Barcelona. This l\1acdonald accomplished thrice, in June,
July, and August: it was only after the third journey that he
left the storeshouses of Barcelona so thoroughly replenished
that he was able to think of further oncnsh'e operations, Rnd
to concert the long-delayed junction with Sllchet and the
Srd Corps. The Marshal in his autobiography confef;.<;C:'l that
he hated the task set him, and found it entirely ont of the
lines of his "experience. He began his career by repealing
Augereau's ha.nging edicts, and endetlvourcd to introduce more
humane methods of warfare. But his own men were out of hand,
and the Spaniards being as fierce as ever, his task was a \w)'
hard onc.
Meanwhile, Henry O'Dollllell was granted three months in
which to reorganize the Cntnlall HI'my, which had suffered sa
severely at l\Iargalef. His untiring energy enabled him to raise
his force by the cnd of .July to ~2,OOO men, organized in five
divisions, with which he fonned a doublc front, facing Suchet
on the west Elud MEI{·donald on the cast. One di\'isioll undcr
Cnmpo Verde lay llorthwnrd in the mountains, with head
quarters at Cardona, and detachments pushed forward as far as
1810) ENERGY OF HENRY· O'DONl\ELL 3]$
Urgel and Olot: its main task was to harass the French
garrison of the Ampurdam, and to threaten Macdollald's rear
every time that he moved forward towards Barcelona. A second
division lay facing that city, on the lower Llobregat, with
detachments at l\1ontserrnt and l\Ianresa, which kept up the
communications with Campo Verde and the North. Two more
divisions lay westward, in the direction of Falcct and Borja Blanca,
watching Suchet, and prepared to oppose any serious attempt on
his part to close in upon Tortosa. The fifth division, or reSCITe,
formed a central mass of troops, ready to reinforce either the
detachments which watched Suchet or those which wakhed
Macdonald; it lay south of Tarragona, at the Col de Alba. Thus
posted O'Donnell waited for further developments, and continued
to drill and exercise. his new levies, to dismiss inacti,'e and incom-
petent officers, to collect magazines, and to quarrel with the
local Junta. For this active and intelligent, if reckless and
high-handed, young officer was on even worse terms with the
Catalan authorities than his predecessor, Dlake. The main
cause of quarrel was that O'Donnell wished to strengthen his
regular troops, by drafting into the depleted cadres of Ueding's
and Cotlpigny's old battalions every recruit that he could catch.
He held that the French could only be bronght to a final
check by disciplined troops. The J uuta, on the other hand,
belie\'ed in guen·i1la warfare, and prefeJTed to call out from
time to time the miqueletes and somatenes, who drifted back
to their homes whenever a crisis was oyer. Both sides had
much to say for themselyes: the Catalans could point out
that the regular troops had been beaten times out of number,
while their own irregulars had achie\"ed mallY small successes,
and done the French much harm. O'Donnell, on the other
hand, was quite right in holding that guerrilla operations,
much as they might incommode the enelllY, would never deal
him a fatal blow or finish the war. He dreamed of recruit-
ing his llrmy up to a force of 50,000 men at some happy
future date, and of delivering a stroke with superior numbers
which shoulJ destroy the French holJ on Catalonia. l\1cnn~
while, much as they quarrelled, the Irish-Spanish h'Clleml
and the local Junta were iJoth too good halers of :Fruncc to
allow their disputes to prevent a vigorous resistance frolll
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being kept up in lhe principality. O'DOllllell carried his point
to the extent of persuading tile Junta to allow him to form
many of the c"cr-changing terclos of miqueletes into' legions,'
which ,,·ere to be kept permanently embodied I, and to count as
part of the regular army. Hence ctlme the large rise ill his
muster-rolls.
I To please the Cat:llans, who bated tbe idea of long .9fnice, the
enlistlllent ill Lhe Legions was made for two years only, and the men
W\lrl;l to be eHtitletl to tifteen days' leave during e:l.cb 11l11f-}'car of service.
SECTION XX: CHAPTER"
OI'.~HATIONS IN 'rH,,: SOUTH OF SI'A.lN IJVIUNG THfo:
SPBlNG AND SUi\BlIm OF lino
'fRF, situation which had been created by King JOSCph'5 rapid
conquest of the open country of Andalusia in January and Feb-
ruary 1810, and by his failure to capture Cadiz, was destined to
remain unchanged in any of its more important details for a full
year. Soult, with the three corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and
Mortier, was strong enough to hold the towns and plains, strong
enough also to blockade Cadiz and to spare expeditionary forces
at intervals for operations outside the limits of his own sphere
of command. From tiillC to time he sent the greater part: of
Mortier's corps against Estremadura, and the greater part of
Seoostiani'g corps against :.\:Iul'cia. But his 70,000 men were
not sufficient to pl'O\'ide an army for the permanent conquest of
either of these pro\·inccs. And every time that 10,000 or 15,000
sabres and bayonets were distracted to one of these raids, the
total of troops left behind to watch Cadiz, to guard Seville, and
to repress the interminable activity of the gtlerrilleros of the
mountains was found to he dangerously small. Ere long the
force that had marched out for external operations had to be
called back in haste, to ward off some peril to one or other of the
,'ital points of Andalusia.
SOlut himself remained for the greater part of his time at
Seville, occupied not only in keeping the movements of his three
L'Orps in unison-no easy task, for both Victor alld Sebastiani
had wills of their own, and even the placid Mortier occasionally
murmured-but in superintending the details of civil administro.-
tiOIl. It was very seldom that he marched out in person at the
head of his last reserl'es, to strengthen some weak point in his
line of offence or defence. During the next two years he was
quite as much the Viceroy as the Commander-in-Chief ill Allda·
lusill. Though the Emperor had refrained from naming that
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kingdom one of the' Militar)' Governments,' which he had
created by his decree of Feb. 15, 1810, yet Soult made himself
in fact, if not in name, flS independent as the governors of
Amgon or Nu \'firre or Cutnlollia. The wnd of common interests
Ilnd desires which had unitoo bim to King Joscph during the
winter of 1809-10 was SOOll broken. 'l1lC monarch at Madrid
soon discovered that his presence was not desired in Andalusill-
some good military reason could always be discovered which
made it impracticable that he should redsit Seville. Little or
no money was remitted to him from the South: rich as W/lS
SauIt's sphere of governance, it was always made to nppear that
the expenses of the sustenance of the I\flIlY and of the siege of
Cadiz were so great that no surplus remained for the central
go\'el'nment. When the King murmured, and appealed to Paris,
his brother usually supported the Marshal l ; it was Napoleon's
first maxim that war should maintain war, and he thought it of
far more importance that the army of Andalusia should p<'\y
for itself, than that the bankrupt exchequer at Madrid should
be rccruitc<P. As the months rolled 011, and Joseph gradually
realized the position, his hatred for the plausible Marshal became
as bittel' as it had been during their earlier quarrel in the summer
of 1809. He had good reason to be angry, for 50ult undoubtedly
sacrificed the interests of the King of Spain to those of the
Viceroy of Andalusia. He played a selfish gallw, though he had
always a good military excuse for any particular refusal to fall
in with the King's plans or to ohey his orders. It! 1810 his
conduct may be justified, but in 1811 and 181~ he undoubtedly
-as will be shown in chapters to come-ruined what small
chance there was of bringing the Peninsular '''al' to a successful
termination, b)' pursuing a policy which made the lllaintcnnnce
of the Fl'eneh authority in Andalusia its chief end, alld 110t the
general good of the imperial arms in Spain.
Soult's conduct at Oporto in the days of his invasion of
Portugal must never be forgotten when his doings in Anda-
lusia are discussed. He undoubted!y yearn~ after supreme
power, and though the lesson which he' had received after his
, Thongll not always. See the case oftlle revenue from the qUicksilvcr
mines, in Corres}XJlldtmce, UO. 17,OiG.
I Cf. ibid., July JO, to Soult.
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vain attempt to create himself killg of '~orthern Lusitania.'
had not been forgotten, his ambitions were as great as e,'er.
He suppressed his desire for the royal name, but gave himself
the reality of the royal power. He practically kept a court,
It ministry, and a revenue of hi:; own \ despite of all the angry
complaints of his immediate master at :Madrid. Secure in the
support of the Emperor, who reckoned him the' best military
head in Spain,' he ignored or disobeyed all such communication
from Joscph as did not suit his purpose. To a great extent he
ju:;tificd his policy by suC(;css: the plain-land of AnduJusia was
undouhtl.'tUy the pl~rt of the French holding in Spain where the
administration was most sucr:cssftll, and the occupation most
thorough. Sonlt 1I0t only built up, but kept together, an
Ajr1l11Ce8m[Q party among the local populatioll, which was
stronger nlld more eompact than in any other part of the Penin~
sulu. He cvcn sm...ceeded in raising 1\ Sill/ill pemltmcnt force of
SpanilSh auxilil\ries, whicli -waS decidedly morc trustworthy and
less gi\'ell to dcsertioll t1wn the regiments of tbe Stlllleclass whi('h
Kiug Joscph was perpetually creating ill Madrid-ollly to sec
them crumhle away under his hand. The Army of Andalusil~
was strengthened by two regiments of Chasscut8 l'~ Chcval, which
wcre attached to the 5th COl'pS 2, and some fl'CC companies of
infantry 3, which were used for garrison and blockhouse w·ork.
But it WI\S fl\.r more important that Soult succeeded in enlisting
mallY battalions of a sort of national guard, which he called
Escopetel'08 (fusilierf';); with them he kept the peaee of the larger
towns, such as Se\'illc, Cordovu, and JaclI, The very existence
of such a force, which Killg Joseph had vainly attempted to
esl'\blish in Madrid, was of evil omen for the patriotic cause in
Andalusia. On severnl occasions they fought well against thc
I There was despel'ate quarrclling with Madri(} II'hlilU Soult tried to get
hold of thc port-revenues-small as these Wlilrc, owing to the English
Olockadlil-and when he tried to nominate consuls all his own authority.
Scc I)ucassc's Crr'J'C'IprmaUnNJ du UQi Joseph, vol. \'iL I). 33i.
~ 3rd nml 4th ClmssCllrs 11 Cllcl'al, LoUt Ilre;;cllt nt AILucnl alld oUlcr
figllb! ill Estrcnmuu!"do in 1810--12, 'IlIey seem to Imvc gone to pieces 011
the evacuation of Andalusia in lhe autumn of 1812,
3 Cazadores de Jalilll, Frallcos do Montaila, &c. There was a company
of this sort in DadlljOl'; when it was taken ill 1812, 'I1le Spani8h govern-
mellt@hottlllil officers aftcr trial by court martial.
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gucrrilleros, when the latter attempted raids dangerously close
lo the great cities. For the Juramentado was well awo.re that
if the national cause were at last to triumph un evil fate would
await him, Having once committed himself to the French side,
he was forced to defend his own neck from the gallows.
SouIt's ch'il government was conduct.cd with a flU' greater
decency than that of Duhesme, Kellermann. and other noted
plunderers among the French govcmors. But it ill\'olved, never·
theless, a considerable amount of more or less open spoliation.
The Marshal's own hands were not quite clean: his collection of
the works of Murillo and Velasquez, the pride of Paris in after
years, represented blackmail on Andalusian church-corporations,
when it did not come from undisguised confiscation. Unless he
was much maligned by his own compatriots, no less than by the
Spaniards, hard cash as well as pictures did not comc amiss to
him l • But his exactions wcrc moderate comparcd with those of
some of his subordinates: though Mortier and Dessolles had
good reputations Schastiani had an infamous OIlC, and Perrcy-
mond, Godinot (who shot himself curly in 1812 when called
to face a commission of inquiry), and certain other generals
have "ery black marks against them. Still the machine of
governmcnt worked, if not without friction, at least with an
efficiency that contrasted favourably with the administration of
any other province of Spain save Suchet's domain of Aragon.
But it was only the valley of the Guadalquivir which lay
subdued beneath the feet of SouIt. Cadiz and the mountains had
yet to be dealt with, and, as the months went on, the difficulties
ofUle French Army of Andalusia bp-came more and more evident.
It was only by degrces that the French generals mUle to com-
prehcnd thc absolute impregnability of Cadiz, and the advantngc
that the possession of the island-city and the fleet depending 011
it gave to the Spaniards. In the first months of the siege Victor's
I Cf. Observations by his nide--t.lc-almp St. Chamllns, in his Memoirs,
pp. 200-5, as to th6 Marshal'sadministrntiOil. It may servc as llUIlXamp]o
of thc libcral way in whidl thc SUIKlrior officcrs wcre allowcd to draw in
mOlley, that Solllt gave Ilis ex-.'lide-de-almp 1,500 frailCl'! a month, wllen
he was commandiug iu the town ofCarmollll, besides his pay aud free food
alld quami'll. It is small wonder that he and other goveruors began, as
hc said, 'a trancher dll graud seigneur,' Cf. Artedlc, viii. 100, for
Spanisll "iews on Soult'g admillistration.
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engineers and artillerists had flattered themselves that something
might be done to molest the place, if not to reduce it to surrender,
by pushing batteries forward to the extreme front of the ground
in their possession all around the harbour. Within the first
weeks of his arrival in front of Cadiz, Victor made an attempt
to push forward his posts along the high-road which crosses the
broad salt-marshes of the Santi Petri. Dut the bogs and water-
channels were found impracticable, and the Spanish works in
front of the bridge of 7.11azo too strong to be at1:.lu:ked nlong
the lIarrow causeway. The French drew back to Chic1ann, which
heclune the head quarters of the left wing of the blockading
force, and where Ruffin';; division was permanently encamped.
It WAA then thought that something might be accomplished
further to the north, by working against the Arsenal of La.
Caracca, at the oue end of the Spanish line, or the projecting
castle of Puntales at the other, The struggle for the points of
\>antage from which Puntales could be battered formed the chief
point of interest during the early months of the siege. The
]<'rench, pushing down from the mainland 011 to the peninsula
of the Trocadero, began to erect works on the ground most
fi\Vourable for attacking the fort of Matagorda, which had once
more become the outermost bulwark of Cadiz.
There was a bitter fight over this work, which stands on the
tidal flats below the Trocadero, surronnded by mud for one half
of the day, and by water for the other, It will be remembererl
that Matagoroa had been blown up at the time of the first
arri"al of the l~rench before Cadiz. But after a few days of
reflection the English and Spanish engineer officers in command
of the defence grew llllCilSy as to the possibilities of mischief
which might follow from the seizure of the ruined fort by the
enemy. Their fears, as it afterwards turned out, were unneces-
sary. But they led to the reoccupation of Ma~gorda on
l"ebruary ~2 by a detachment of British artillery, supported by
a company of the 94th regiment. The front of the work facing
toward the mainland was hastily repaired, and heavy guns brought
over the harbour from Cadi~ were mounted on it. Moreover,
it was arranged that it should be supported by a Spanish ship-
of-the-line and some gunboats, a! far 118 the mud bunks per-
mitted.
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Victor took the re<Jccnpation of the fort as a challenge, :md
thought that the Allies must have good reasons for attaching
so much impOl'tance to it. Accordingly he Illultiplied his bat-
teries on the 'l'rocadero, till he had got forty guns mounted in
A. dominating position, with which to overwhelm the garrison
in their half:·ruinous stronghold. There Wll.S a long and fier<.'C
artillery contest, but the French had the advantage both in the
number of guns and in the concentric fire which they could P0lll'
upon the fort. The naval help promised to Matagol'da proved
of little assistance, partly owing to the impracticability of the
Illud /lIlts when the tide was out, partly bemuse the gunboats
could not endure the fire of the }'rcnch hcavy artillery. On
April 22 General Graham, who had arrived at Cndiz and taken
command of the British fon.:es over the bead of General Stewad,
ordered Matagorda to be evacuated, It was high time, for the
fort was shot to pieces, and 64 men out of a garrison of 140
had been killed or wounded I, The ellemy took possession of the
ruins, and r~built and rearmed the fort; they also re-established
the ruined forts of San Luis and Sau Jose, 011 the firm ground
facing l\fatagorda, to which they had not possessed a safe access
till the outer work in the mud had been captured. These were
the most advanced points toward Cadiz which the French could
hold, and here they mounted their heaviest guns, in the hope of
demolishing the Castle of Puntules on the other side of the water,
find of Illtlking the inner harbour useless for shippjng. Their
purpose IVll.S only partly accomplished: the ships, it is true, had
lo move cast or west, into the outer lmrbour or nearer to the
Caracca and the blade Lean, But Puntalcs was never seriously
injured, and maintained an intermittent artillery duel with
::\:Iatagorda acros:; the strait us long as the siege lasted. The
occasional bombs that fell beyond Puntales, in the direction of
the Cortadura, did 110t seriously incommode the garrisoll, and
ships could always pass the strait between the two forts at night
without appredable risk. Later on Soult caused mortars of
unprecedented dimensions to be cast in the arsenal of Seville, on
the designs presented to him by an artillery officer of the name
I There is a good account of the desperate life of the garrison of i\Iata-
gorda duriug tlle bombardment in the Bvellf/1.I1 Life oj'a Scotti8h &ldier, by
::lergcaut DonaldSOIl of the 04th,
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of VillantroJs. But even when these had been mounted on
Matagorda no great damage was done, one bomb only~as a
Spanish popular song recorded~ever touched Cadiz town, and
that only killed Il street dog.
After the fall of Matagorda, the next most notable event of
the spl'ing in front of Cadiz was a fearful hwrricane,lasting fmlll
the 6th to the 9th of March, which caused grave losses to the
vessels in the outer harbour. A south-wester from the Atlantic
drove three Spanish line-of·battle ships, one of which, the Con-
cepciOll, was a three-decker of 100 guns, and a Portuguese 74,
upon the coast about lluerto Santa Maria and Rota. The
French opened upon them with red-hot shot, and destroyed
them all, slaying a great part of the unfortunate crews, who had
no thought of resistance, and were only trying to escape to land,
where they were bound to become prisoners. More than thirty
merchant ships, mostly British, were destroyed by the same
storm. One was a transport containing a wing of the 4th regi-
ment, which was coming to reinforce the garrison of Cadiz.
Some 300 men from this unlucky vessel got ashore and were
captured by the French.
A month after the loss of Matagorda the outer harbour of
Cadiz again saw some exciting scenes, Moored beside the
Spanish fleet were a number of pontoons, old men-of-war from
which the masts and rigging l1ad been removed, and which were
used as prison-ships. On them there were still kept several
thousands of French prisoners, mostly the men captured with
Dnpont in 1808. It is astonishing that the Uegency had not
ordered their removal to some more remote spot the moment
that Victor's arm)' appeared in front of Cadiz. Overcrowded,
and often kept without sufficient food for days at a time, these
unhappy captives were in a deplorable position. The sight of
t1lt~ir fellow-countrymen in possession of the opposite coast drove
them to desperation, and they were prepared to take any risks
for a chance of escape. Haviug noted, dwing the hurricane of
March 6th-9th, that every vessel which broke loose from its
mooriuf,'5 had lx.>en cast by the set of the tide upon the coast
ill thc dirt..'Ction of Rota, the prisoners 011 the Caatilla, Oil
which nearly all the officers were confined, waited for the next
south-wester. When it came, on the night of the 15th-16th
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MaYI they rose upon their small guard of Spanish marines,
overpowered them, and then cut the cables of the pontoon,
committing themselves to the perils of the sea as well as to the
risk of being sunk by the neighbouring men-of·war. But it was
supposed that they had got adrift b.y accident, and they had
been carried by the tide almost to the opposite shore before it
was realized that an escape WOB on foot. Two gunboats sellt
to tow the CasfUla back met with resistance, the prisoners
firing 011 them with the muskets taken from their guard, and
throwing cold shol down upon the little vessels when their
crews tried to board. Just as they were beaten off, the pontoon
went ashore. The French garrisons of the neighbouring
batteries ran down to help their countrymen to escape; at
the same moment other gunboats, Spanish and English, came
up, and began firing on the crowd, who strove to swim or
scramble ashore. Some were killed, but over 600 got to land.
It is surprising that after this incident the Spaniards did not
take better care of the remaining pontoons, but ten days later
the prisoners on the Argollauta were able to repeat the trick of
their comrades. On this occasion the absconding vessel ran
ashore upon a mud-bank some hundreds of yards from the
shore of the Trocadero. The stranded vessel remained for
hours under the fire of the gunboats which pursued it, and a
large proportion of the men on board perished, for when the
troops on shore brought out boats to save the survivors, Illany
of them were sunk as they plied between the Argvnauta and
the land. Finally the pontoon was set on fire, and several
wounded Frenchmen are said to have been burnt alive. The
English seamen who were ellgaged in this distressing business
were heartily disgusted with their share in it l .
.[ After this the Uegencyat last ordered the removal of the rest
of the French pri!lOners from Cadiz. The few remaining officers
were sent to Majorca, and anerwards to England. Of the men
part were dispatdll..>d to the Canaries, part to the Balearic
Islands. But the islanders protested against the presence of so
I See the letter of Clmrk'!l Vaughan deploring the' beastly necessity of
firing into tile poor devils' quoted by Napier ill Ilis Appendix, \'01. it
11. 482. For 11 narrative by otle of 11,e escaping' Frencll officers 6ee the
MhnQiret of Colonel Chalbralld.
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many French in their midst, raised riots, and killed some of
the prisoners. Thereupon the B.egency ordered 7,000 of them
to be placed upon the desolate rock of Cabrera, where there were
no inhabitant'> and no sheltel' sa\'e one small ruined castle.
The wretched captives, without roofs or tents to co\';rthem,'and
supplied with food 0111y at uncertain intervals and in insufficient
quantity, died off like flies. On<::c, when storms hindered the
Ilrrival of the provision ships frolll Majorca, lllany scores
perished in a du.y of sheer starvation 1. The largea' half did not
survive to see the peace of 1814, and those who did were for
the most part mere wrecks of men, invalids fol' life. Even
allowing for the desperate stmits of the Splmish government,
which could not feed its own armies, the treatment of the
Cabrera prisoners was indefensible. They might at least have
been exchanged for some of the numerous Spanish garrisons
taken in 1810-11; but the Regency would not permit it, though
Henry O'Dol1nell had arranged with :Mucdonald a regular
cartel for prisoners in the neighbouring Catalonia. This is
one of the most miserable corners of the history of the
Peninsular '\Tar.
nut to returll to Andalusia. By the month of May the.
Regene)' at .Cadiz had l'eCO\'ered a certain confidence, in view
of the utter iuelTicllCY of Victor's attempt to molest their
city. From that month began a systematic attempt to organi1.e
into a single system all the forces that could be turned to
account against Soult. There were now in the Is]a some
18,000 Spanish troops, as well as 8,000 British alld Portuguese.
This was a larger garrison than was needed, now that the
defences had been put in order; ann it was possible to detach
small expeditionary corps to east IInd west, to stir lip tronble in
the coastIand of Andalusia, and serve as the nuclei round which
the insurgents of the mountains might gather. .For the insur-
rection in the remoter comers of the kingdom of Granada had
never died down, despite of all the efforts of Sebastiani to
quell it. The Regel1cy had now determined that an effort
I Nothing can be more distressing reading than the chronicles of the
Cabrera prisoners, Ducal', Guillemard, Gille and others. Actual call1li-
balism is said to have occuned during the longest of tile spells of fasting
caused by the non-arrival of provisions. [Seetjille, p. 240.]
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should be made to extend it westward-the Sierra de Honda
being quite as well suited for irregular operations as the
Alpujarras.. At the other cnd of' the line, too, there were
opportunities in the Condado de Niebla and the lands by the
mouth of the Guadiana, which the l;'t~nch had hardly touched:
trifling detachments of the 5th Corps at Moguer and Niebla
obser.ved rather than occupied that region. 11y means of the
large fleet always moored in Cadiz harbour, it was possible to
transfer troop;; to any point of the coast, for the French could
not guard every creek and fishing-village, and if UIl expedition
failed it had a fair chanee of eseaping by sea. Moreover any
force thrown ashore in the south had the option of retiring
into Gibraltar if hard pressed, just as any force sent to the
west might retire on Portugal.
In addition to the insurgents and the garrison of Cadiz there
were two regular armies whose energies might be turned against
Soult. The relics of Areizaga's unfortunate host, which had
tied into the kingdom of :Murcia, and had been rallied by
Blake, were now 12,000 strong, and since Suchet's expedition
against Valencia had failed, llnd thel'e was no danger from the
north, this force could be employed against Seoostialli and the
French corps in the kingdom of Granada. It was in a deplorable
condition, but was yet strong enough to render assistance to the
insurgents of the Alpujarras, by demonstrating 8J:,J'ilillst Granada,
and so forcing Sebastiani to keep his troops massed for a
regular campaign. \Vhenever the :French general was threatened
from the east, he hlld to abandon his smaller posts, lllld to
desist from hunting the gucrrilleros, who thus obtuined a free
hand.
'nie Regency could also couut to a ccrtaiu extent upon aid
from La Romana and the Army of Esteemadura. The Marquis
-it will be remembered-was now confronted in his own
province by Reynier and the 2nd Corps t, but he had thrust his
flanking division, under Ballasteros, into the mowltains of
North-Western Andll..1usia, where it had been contending with
Morlier's corps in the direction of Ararrena and Zalam ea, as
has already been recounted 2. This outlying division was in
I See pp. 213--14 Oftllis volume and p. 246.
• See pp. 215-16 ofthill volume.
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communication with Cnd ill, vill, Ayamonte and the lowcr
Gundiunn, and could nJWl\)'s compel Soult to detach troops
from Seville by descending into the plains. La Uomana
himself could, and occasionally did) provide further occupation
for the 5th Corps by modng other troops southward, 011 the
Seville high-road, when he was not too much engrossed by
Ue)'uier's demonstrations in his front.
Thus it Was possible to harass the :French troop.<; ill
Andalusia on all side~. Vlith the object of' securing some
sort of unity for their operations, the Regency made Blake
Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Cadiz as well as of those
in Mm·cia, declaring them part~ of a single' Army of the Centre.'
Albuquerque's separate charge had come to nn end when, after
many quarrels with the Cadil'. Junta, he resigned the post of
governor, and accepted that of Ambassador to the Court of
St. James's at the end of March. He died not long nfter his
nrrival in London, engaged to the last in a hot warfare of
pamphlets and manifestos with the Junta, whose monstrous
insinuations against his probity and patriotism are said to hnvc
driven him into the brain-fever which terlllillat~d his life. He
was a lIlan of lI11sullied honour and high personal courage, but
not a luck)' gcneml, though his last military action, the directioll
of the Army of Estremadura ou Cadiz, W!\So a soulld and meri-
torious piece of strategy. He nnd La 1l0manll. werc the ollly
Spl\uish officer;; with whom \Vellington was able to work ill
concert without perpetual friction, but t.he Briti8h Commander-
ill-Chief htld a grcllter respect for his ullic~1 hearts than for t.heir
heads as may be gathered from COIlSt/Wlt. l'eferellCCS in the
Wellil/gton Dispatches, as well as fmm t.hc confidential con-
versations of t.he Duke's later yelLr5 I.
nln~e arriyed in Cadiz on April 22, having turned over the
t,emporn.ry command of the i\'[urcian army to General Freire,
the ever-unlucky cavalry commander who had sen-oo under
Vencgas and Arei7..aga in the campaigns of AJmonacid and Deana.
He set himself to reorganize the various Estremaduran and other
troops ill Cadill into one division of horse and three divisions
of foot, which he numbered Vanguard, 2nd, and 4th of the Army
1 See lVelliug/(m Di8p1.1tchelt, v. p. 2!J2, &c., and Stanbope',s C'o/lt'er8atiolllt
lcith the Duke ot' lVellingtoll, l'P, 10 ami tJ.
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of the Ccntrc. The Murcian forces were distributed into the
ht, 3rd, and 5th infa.ntry divisions of the StUlIC tWill)', and two
small C8.vtllry divisions. This reorgauization of the regular
troops was followcd by systematic attempts to fostcl' the inSllr-
rt'ctioll to right and left of Seville. General Copons was sent to
A)'amonte, at thc mouth of the Guadialla, with 100 meIl, rolllld
whom he collected a miscellaneous assemblage of peasantry,
which often descended from the hills to wOI'ry the French
garrisons of Moguer and Niebla. When chased b)'stronger forces
detached from Mortier's corps, he would retire into l)ortugal.
When unmolested he joined hands with Ballasteros and the
Hanking division of the army of La Romana, or executed mi9s
of his own in the central plain of the kingdom of Sevilll!,
onct! chased, tllld sometimes dispersed, his bands were ncver
completely crushed, and kcpt \VestCI'll Andalusia, m' 'Sptlllish
Algarve,' us it was ctllled iu the old dlLYS when the boundaries
of Castile and Poltugal had ouly just b~Jl fixL>tl, in a state of
constant ferment.
The ui version which was prepared on the other flank by Blake
and the Uegenc)' was fal' more important. Their intention was
to wrest from the French the whole district of the Sierra de
llonda, the mountain region between Gibraltar and Malaga, and
so to thrust in a wedge between Victor and Sebastiani. There
was already the nucleus of' an insurrection in this quarlel'; soon
after King Joseph's triumphal progress from Xeres by llonda
and :\falaga to Granada, the first small bands had appeared.
They were headed by local chiefs, such as Decerra, Ruiz, Ilnd
Ortiz-better known as El Pastor-whose original followers
were a party of the smugglers who, in times of peace and war
alike, had been wont to ply a contraband trade with Gibraltar,
Tu March and April they were not strong enough to do more
lhnn molest the convoys passing from Malnga and Seville to the
French garrison of Ronda, But finding the enemy ill thcir
neighbourhood weak 1\I1d hclpless-the bulk of the 1st Corps
was before Cudiz, and thut of the 5th Corps was still wutching
L~ Uomaull on thc roads north of Seville-they multipliL>d
in numbers and extended their raids flU' afield. 'rhey asked fol'
aid both from the British Governor of Gibraltar and from the
Rcgencyat Cndiz, promising that, if thcy were bucked by regular
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troops, they would easily expel the French and master the whole
country-side. Already their activity had produced favourable
results, for Soult sent down from Seville Girard's division of the
.5th Corps, a detachment which left MorHer too weak for any
serious operations 011 the side of Estremadura, and Sebastiani
drew back from an expedition against Murcia, which might
otherwise have proved most prejudicial to the Spanish cause.
This mid deserves a word of notice : jll~t ufler Blake hu.d left
Murein for Cadiz, Sebastinlli (who had for the moment got the
better or the insurgents in the Alplljnrras) assembled at Baztl.•
ill the eastern extremity of the kingdom of Granada, the gl-ea.ter
part of the 4th Corps, and marched with 7,000 men on Lorea.
Freire, distrusting his troops, refused to fight, threw 4,000 men
into the impregnable harbour-fortress of Cartagena, and retired
with the rest of his army to Alicante, within the borders of
Valencia. Thus, the rich city of ::\1urcia, along with the whole of
the rest of its province, which had never seen the French before,
was exposed undefended to Sebastiani. He entered it all
April !lB, and commenced by fining the corporation 50,000
dollal'3 for not having received him with a royal salute and the
ringing of the bells of their churches. The rest of his behaviour
was ill keeping: he entered the cathedral while mass was in
progress, and interrupted the service to seize the plate and jewels.
He confiscated the money and other valuables in all the monas·
teries, hospitals, ami banks. He permitted his officel'll to black-
mail many rieh inhabitants, and his rank and file to plundc,'
hou5el and ~ho]Js. Two day~ after his entry he retraced his
footsteps, and retreated hn.stily toward::; Granada, leaving a ruined
city behind him I. The cause of his sudden departure was the
news that the insmgents of the Alpujarras, whom he had vainly
imagined that he had crushed., were beleaguering all his small
garrisons, and that :\falaga itself had been seized by a large band
of the Serranos, and held for a short space, though General
l'erreymond had afterwards succeeded in driving them out. But
the whole of the Alhama and llc;mda Sierras were up in arms, no
less than the more eastern hills where the rising had begun. It
would have been absmd for Sebastiani to proceed any further
I For strauge and scandalous details of Sebastiani's doings ill Murcia,
see Schepeler, iii. pp. 56G-7.
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with the off'cllsh·c campaign in Murein, when Southeru Andolusia
was being lost behind his back.
Throughout the month of May Girard and Sebn.~tiani, with
some small assistance from Dessolles, who spared a few battalions
from the kingdom of Cordo"t\, were actively engaged in
endeavouring to repress the mountaineers. The larger ballds
were dispersed, not without se\'ere fighting-Girard's men hlld
hot work at Albondonates on May 1, and at Gra7..alemaon May 3 1,
But just as the main roads had been roopened, and the blockade
of the French garrison of ROl1da raised, the whole situation was
changed by the landing at Algeciras of General Lacy, with
a division of 3,000 regulars sent from Cadiz by the Uegency
(June 19). His arrival raised the spirits at' the insurgents, and
they thronged in thousands to his aid, when he announced his
intention of marching against Ronda. Lacy" however, was both
il'l'esolute and high-handed-as he afterwards showed 011 a
larger stage when he became Captain-General of Catalonia.
On arriving before Uonda he judged the rocky stronghold too
formidable for him to meddle with, and turned aside to Grfl:l.a.-
lema, to the disgust of his followers. He then fell into a quanel
with the Scrranos, dismissed many of them-smugglcr~ und
others·-f'rom his camp, as unworthy to serve alongside of regular
soldiers, and even imprisoned some of the more turbulent chiefs.
At this moment Girard from the north and Sebastiani from the
CASt began to close in upon him. Uneasy at their approach,
Lacy fell back towards the coast, and after some insignificant
skimlishes re·embarked his fOl'ce at Estepona and .Marbella, from
whence he sailed round to Gibraltar and landed at the Lines of
San Hoque, under the walls ofthatfortress (July 1~)2. Almost
the only positive gain produced by his e.xpedition had 0ee1I the
oecupation of MUl'bcllll, where he left a gltrJ1son which main-
tained itself for a considerable timc. It was no doubt something
to have detained Giraro and Sebastiani in the remote mountain
I Martiniell's lists show that the 40th regiment of Girard'jl divisiou lost
four officers at AlbondOllllteaJ aud the 64th the same llumoor ut Gra7.aIClDl'
--so thc skirmi,IlICS mllst hllvc 00c1l fllirly vigorous.
2 'Illllt Lac)"s force was uut so elltirdy destroyed ,~'> Napicr implics
is ShOWll U)' the fact that mUll)' of the s<unc regimeuts could he utiliZt.>d for
the subsequent e"l)Cditiou to t]IC Condado de Niehla.
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of the south for a full month, when they were much needed by
Soult in other directions. Yet the evil re8ult'i of Lacy's timid
maureU\'re5 and hasty flight upon the morale of the insurgents
might have been sufficiently great to counterbalance these small
advantages, if the Sermnos had been less tough and resolute.
It is surprising to find that they did not lose courage, but kept
the rising afoot with undiminished energy, being apparently con-
firmed in their self-confidence by the poor show made by the
regular army, rather than disheartened at the ineffective succour
sent them from Cadit:. Despite of all the efforts of Soult's flying
columns, they could not be" entirely dispersed, though they were
hunted a hundred times from valley to valley. The power of
the viceroy of Andalusia stopped short at the foot-hills, though
his dragoons kept the plains in subjection, Every time that
Roncla and the other isolated garrisons in the mountains had to
be revictualled, the comoy had to fight its way to its destination
through swarms of 'sniping' insurgents 1.
The Regellcy htld not yet done with Lacy and hiscxpeditionary
force. Al1er they had lain for SOIllC timc under the walls of
Gibrultar, they were rc-embarked and taken back to Cadill, from
where a. short time after the.y were dispatched for a mid in the
Condado de Niebla. In this region, where Copons was already
in arms, the French forces, under Remond and the Duke of
Aremberg, were so weak that the Junta believed that Lacy's
division would easily clear the whole country-side of the enemy.
Its liberation would be most valuable, because Cadiz was wont
to draw both corn and cattle from the lands between the Rio
Tinto and Guadiana, and had felt bitterly the want of its
acc~stomed supplies since the wat" had been carried thither.
Lacy landed in the Bay of Huelva on August 25 with nearly
3,000 men. He had the good fortune to meet and to overcome
ill succe&lioll two small French coluilllls which marched against
hilll from Mogucr and from San Juan dcl Puerto. Thereupon
t.he Duke of Arcmbcrg-whosc whole force in this region was lCllS
than 1,500 men (two battalions of the 1031'£1 of the line and
the 27th Chasseul"s)-evacuated :".'iebla and fell back on Seville.
I l'or illustrative anecdotes of warfare in the Serrauia de Itonda, see
the autobiography of Rocca of the 2nd Hussars, WIIO was busy in this
l'egioll in the spring and summer of 1810.
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Copons, who had been told to join Lacy but had tailed to receive
his instmctiolls in time, pursued a separate French column Ilndel'
General Remand for some distance, bllt was soon stopped by the
news that a large force was moving against him, to repair this
check to the French arms. Lacy, mcanwhile, to thcsllrprise and
disgust of the inhabitants of the Condado, re-cmbarked 011
August 29 amI went back to Cadi1., profes:ling to regard the
purpose of hi~ cxpedition as completed. He hud this much
justification, that the new!! of his raid had induced Soult to send
out against him, at a most critical moment, the main body of
Gazan's division, which marched to Niebla, vainly sought the
expeditionary force, and returned to its base after wasting
a fortnight, But a larger garrison was now left in Westeru
Andalusia, Capons was hunted more vigorously than before, and
cruel reprisals were made on the inhabitants of l\'Ioguer and
Huelva, who had aided Lacy.
Feeble as it had been, Lacy's raid on the Condado had staved
oft' a serious danger to the Spanish Army of Estremadura, by
forcing Soult to detach Gazan against him, at a moment when
he was concentrating the 5th Corps tor a blow at La Homana,
and was ah-eady engaged in active opemtiOllsagainst the Marquis.
A complete chnnge had taken place ill the situation ill Estre·
madurll at the end of July, whcu Re)'niel', tlcting wlder orders
from Masscna I, hud marched northward from hi::! old base ut
Merida and Medellill, and crossed thc Tagu~ ut the ferry of
Alconetar above the broken bridge of Alcantara 2 (July 16).
This removal of the whole 1'lnd Corps to the north, followed (as
we have already seen) by the corresponding transference of Hill's
British force from Portalegre to the neighbourhood of Castello
Branco, had left La Uomalla at Badajoz with no enemy in front
of him, and had caused a complete rupture of communications
between the Frellch Army of Andalusia and the Army of Portugal,
who could for the future only hear of each other by the circuitous
route through Madrid, since that by Almnraz was closed.
1 See pp. 246-7 of this '"ohllne.
2 Not marked ill any contempornry map that I have seeu. It h, sitllBwd,
bowel"er, opposite the jllllction of the River Almonte with the TagllS,
about eigllteen miles above Alcantara., near the ancient ruined bridge of
)Iantible.
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Soult had now thrown Ilpon his hands, to his immense disgust,
the task of containing the whole of La Romana's force, which
Reynier had been keeping ill check from March till July.
Accordingly he called back from the Sierra de Ronda the clivi·
:;ion of Girard, wishing to reunite the whole 5th Corps for the
protection of the northern approaches to Seville. Hc was only
just in time, for La Romalla had scen his opportunity, and had
resolved to concentrate his arm,)' for a demonstration agai.nst
Andalusia, which seemed to ofl'e. great temptatious while
llothillg hut the solital'y division of Gazan stood between him
and Se\'ille, and that divisiol1, moreover, was weakened by the
detachments under Remand and Aremberg which lay ill the
Condado de Niebla. Accordingly the Marquis, leaving Charles
O'Donnell to watch lteynier on the Taglls, and another division
to guard Badajoz, marched with his cavalry and the infantry of
La Carrera 1 and BaUnsteros to invade Andalusia. He also told
Capons to come up to reinforce him with his levies from the
lower Guadiaml. Evcn without thc help of the latter, who never
succeeded in reaching him, he had 10,000 foot und 1,000 horse.
But Lt Uomalla was nlways uulucky when he fought: just as
he sturtcd, Girard had retlll'lled from Ro!l{h\ to Seville. On
hearing that the Army of Estremadul'a "'as on the move, Soult
pushed the llCW]~' returned division, strengthened by part of
GUi'..l1.11'S regiments and a brigade of cavalry, out towards the
passes of the :.\1orella. On August 11, Girard, with about 7,000
bayonets and ],200 sabres. encountered La HOlllnllEl. at Villa-
garcin, just outside the town of' L1erena. The Spaniards were
eager to tight, belie\,jng that they had only to deal with somc
fraction of GUi'..l1.n's division;' the Ilews of Gimrd's return from
Ronda had not yet reached them. They got involved in a severe
combat, were beaten, and were forced back to Zafrn and Almen-
drnlejo, with a loss of 600 mcn-triplc that of the Frcnch.
Soult thcn ~trcllgthclled Girard's COIUIOU, placed Mortier in
eomlllo.nd, Illld bade him plH;h for Badajoz. But just as thc
Duke of Tl'eviso was preparing to advance, the news of Lacy's
disembarkation at Mogner arrived. There were hUl'dly any
troops left in Seville, wherefore Soult hastily recalled from
I \V1Jic1J had jWlt rejoine<l him from the north, after the fall of G'iudad
IlQdrigo. See p. 253,
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Morlier such of Gazi1Il's regiments as were with him, A.lld nearly
all the cavalry, and sent them off against Lacy. Girard's divi-
sion retired from Zafra and took up a defensive position in the
passes covering Seville. Thus a dangerous crisis was avoided,
for if the whole 5th Corps had mll.loched all Bndajoz in August,
and had driven back La Uomana into Portugal, Wellington's
Rank ill the Alcmtejo would have bccn left exposed. There was
no longer II British division ~outh of the Tagus to support the
Spanish Army of Estremadura, since Hill had transferred himself
to Castello Branco in order to 'contain' Reynicr. Of regular
troops, indeed, 'Wellington had nothing left on the Alemtejo
frontier save Madden's brigade of Portuguese horse, and the two
infantry regiments of the same nation, who formed part of the
garrison of Elvas. Hence he was much troubled at La Romana's
tendency to take the offensive against Seville, and repeatedly
begged him to content himself with defensive operations, and
not to attract the notice of Soult. For the Duke of Dalmatia,
if left alone, had enough to occupy his attention in Andalusia.,
yet., ifpro,'oked, might nbandon some outlying part of his vice-
royalty, in order to concentrate a force which might crush the
Estrcmnducnn army, and then execute that diversion agaiust
Portuf,rul south of thc 'l'ugus which 'Vcllington so much dl-euded 1.
Yet despite the warning that he had received at the combut
of Villagarcia, nnd, despite of his ally's entreaties, La Romana
renewed in September the project that had cost him so dear in
August. Learning that the passes in front of Seville were on<.~
more weakly held by the French, he began to move his army
southward in detachments, till he had gathered a heavy force at
Guadalcanal and l\ionasterio. Attributing his misfortunes in
the last month to the weakness of his cavalry, he brought down
with him :Madden's .Portuguese horsemen, a weak brigade of 800
men 2, which Wellington had put at his disposition, not foreseeing
1 See Wellington, Dis/Hltcht8, vi. p. 343. • I am a little am:ious about
:\Iortier's movemeut into Estremadura, not Oil aL~ount of the progress he
co'1u make, but because I think that the Marquis de la Homana is inclined
to light a battle. !fwe could ollly aI'oid a disaster for some time, 1 hope
we may do some gO(H1 lit last.' Cf. also vi. pp. 348 lInd 303.
2 '!lle brigade oonsjstcd of three lJ(lu:ul.rons eacll of the litll alld 8tll
regill1cnt!l, amI two of the 3nl. Rerusford's report to \Ve.llil1Ktou l!llllakS of
their behaviour inlhe Jlighest terms. Sce Soria.J1U till. LUll, vo!. iii. pp. GO--i.
1810] MORTIER I:-IVADES ESTRE)IADURA 338
that its existence would add to the inclination which the Marquis
felt for offensive demonstrations. The inevitable result followed.
Disquieted by thc ac.:th·ity of the Estreml1duranarmy-its raiding
parties had already pressed as far as Santa OlalIa on the Seville
road, and Coustantiufl. 011 the CordOVfl. road-Soult ordered
Morliel' to concentrate the main body of the 5th Corps at
Ronquillo. and to attack the enemy. La. Romana gave back at
once, evacuating the passes, but his rearguard was overtaken at
:Fllente Cantos, behind .Monasterio,by the .French horse (Sept. 15).
His cavalry, under La Carrera 1, turned to bay to cover the
retreat, but was charged and scattered with heavy loss by Briche's
Chasseurs, who captured the battery that accompanied it, and
enveloped a large mass of the beaten horsemen, who would have
been forced to surrender if ~1adden's Portuguese, charging at
the right moment, and with great vigour, had not checked the
French advance, and given time for the routed brigades to save
themselves in the hills. Madden, though pursued by the :l"rench
resel'l'cs, made a steady and successful retreat, with small hiSS.
The Spaniards, however, left behind them six guns auc1 500
killed and wounde<1, while the French 10s9 had not exceeded 100.
l\lorticr then pursued La Romunfi to Zafra, and pushed his
advanced cavalry as far us FUCllW del Maestrc, only thirty miles
from Badlljoz. Thus the situation which "rellingtoll 1II0st
dreaded had come into existence once ~O'fl,ill: a considerable
French army was moving into central Estremooura, and threaten-
ing the Alemtejo frontier south of the Tagus, at a moment wl~en
every man of the Ang!o'POI'tugllCS€ field army was fully employed
in Beira by the advance of 3fassena. Hut again, as in August,
Mortier did not push his advantage, though La. Uomana actually
retired behind the 'l'agus to Montijo, after raising the garrison
of Badajoz to it<! full strength, and left the Duke of Treviso the
opportunity of laying siege either to that city, to Olivenza, or
even to Eh'as, if he should so please. But the governing fact in
all the operations of Soult and his lieutenants at this period was,
as we have already pointed out, that if auy great concentration
of the French for offensive purposes took place, it was only mooe
I Dissatisfied witll aU his cavalry officers, 1..8 Romllna had removed
La Carrera to tile command of the llOrsc, makiug over his old illfuntry
divisiou to Carl(lij 0' Espl.lua.
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by withdrawing the garrison troops from some one of the many
disturbed regions of Andalnsia. When the whole 5th Corps was
united, and had advanced to Zafra., ,Vcsl:ern Andalusia was
almost strip~d of troops. Indeed, at Seville itself, Soult had
nothing but his new Spanish levies, and the convalescents from
his central hospital, together with some detachments escorting
convoys which happened to be passing through the city, and had
been detained in order to add a few hundred bayonets to its
garrison. When, therefore,Copons began to ma.ke himself felt once
more in the Condado de ~iebla., and a second raiding e.'l:peditioll
from Cadiz landed at l-Iueh'a, Soult felt very uncomfortable.
His perturbation of mind was increased by news from the
East: Sebastiani at this moment had been molested by demon-
strations of the Spanish Army of Murcia against his flank.
Blake had returned in August from Cadiz to inspect the section
of his forces which he had left behind under I'nire, and which
he had not seen since April. He had pushed reconnaissances
to HuesC'ar in thc kingdom of Granada, had sent supplies to aid
thc insurgents of the Alpujarr£\..~, and was begillnillg to stir up
a new rUiiug on the side of Jaell. 'I'his provoked Sebastiani to
concentrate the large!' patt of the 4th Corps, and to march against
him with 8,000 men 1. :Blake ga\'e back before his enemy as far
as the neighbourhood of Mur<:ia, where he had prepared a forti.
fied position by inundating the Huerta, or suburban plain, which
is watered by many canals drawn from the river Segura, and by
stockading all the villages. l"ourleen thousand regulars, with
a powerful artillery, held the approaches, while a mass of armed
peasantry hung around Sebastiani's flanks. The French, how-
ever, only advanced as far as Lebrilla, twelve miles from Murcia,
and then halted (Aug, 28). Sebastiani, after reconnoitring
Bla.ke's line, thought it too powe;'ful to be meddled with, and
retired two days later towards his base, much harassed by the
IX'1l.'Jantry on his way. But during the three weeks that it took
for the French general to conccntrate his field-force, to march 011
t\'lurciu, and to returJl, all had b'One to wrack amI ruin behind
1 The 4th C(lrps was n(lW It little stronger than it had been in the
SI,ring, the 321111 regiment, 2,000 strong, having joined from Madrid.
But it was still short of its German dil'iaioll, wllieh no\\' lay in La Mancha,
but had never crossed the Sierra Morena.
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him. The insurgents of the Alpujarras had captured the
important seaport towns of Almunecar and Motril, and had
garrisoned their castles with the aid of English guns sent from
Gibraltar. The people of the Sierra de Alhama. had cut the
roads between Malaga and Granada, and 4,000 mountaineers
had attacked Granada itself; they were defeated outside its
gates by the garrison on Sept. 4, but were still hanging about
its vicinity.
The news of all these troubles had reached Soult while
Sebastiani was quite out of tOllch, lost to sight in the kingdom
of Murein. They undoubtedly had theil' paIt in inducing the
Marshal to recall Mortier and the 5th Corps from Estrernndurn.
Hc once more divided its two divisions, drawing back Gazan to
Seville to form his central reservc, whilc Girard watched the
passes as before. Meanwhile CoPOllll hud already been beaten
in the Colldado by the column of General Remond (Sept. 15),
und Scbustiani on his return cleared the neighbourhood of
Granada und Malaga of insurgents, and drove the untameable
bands of the Alpujarrns to take refuge in their mountains.
Motril and Almunccur were both recovered. Thus the storm
passed, as soon as the two French e.'(peditionary forces under
Mortier and Sebastiani returned once more to their lIsual
garrison-posts.
Only two more incidents remain to be chronicled in the
Andalusian campaign of lS]O. Campbell, the governor of
Gibraltar, had resolved-somewhat too late-to lend a small
detachment to aid the Gralladall insurgents. The plan which
he concerted with the Spanish governor of Ceuta was that
Lord Blayney with two British battalions from the Gibraltar
garrison-the Sflnd and 89th, and a Spanish regiment (Imperial
de Toledo) from Ceuta, 2,200 men in all, should be thrown on
shore at Fuengirola, twenty miles 011 the nearer side of 1\1alaga,
where there was a small French garrison and a depOt of stores,
which was 5Crving for a brigade then engaged in the siege of
MarbelJll, the town which hlld been garrisoned by Lacy in
June 1, and which was still holding out gallantly in October.
It was calculated that, on hearing of a descent at Fuengirolll,
Sebastiani would come with the larger part of the f:,rarrison
J See p. 328 of this chapter.
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of Malaga to relieve the fort. But the moment that he was
known to be nearing the expeditionary force, Lord Blayney
was to re-embark and to make a dash at Malaga itself, which
he could reach more swiftly by water than Sebastiani by land.
Secret partisans within the city were ready to take arms, and
the peasantry of the Sierra de Alhama were also enlisted in tbe
enterprise. The scheme seems liable to many criticisms-the
whole was at the mercy of the winds and waves of stormy
October: what would happen if the weather was too rough to
allow of rc-embarkation, or of CtlSy lunding at ::\falaga? And
if Malaga were captured for the Illomeut, for how long eould
9l,OOO regulars, backed by a mass of undisciplined insurgents,
hold it against the whole of Sebastiani's corps, which would be
hurled upon it at short notice? The expedition, 1).owever, was
not actually wrecked on either of these dangers, but ruined by
the folly of its chief. Lord Blayney landed successfully on
October 13, and laid siege to Fuengirola, which was held by
150 Poles under a Captain Milokosiewitz. Instead of making
the attack a mere demonstration, he brought some 19l-pounders
ashore, and set to work to batter the castle in all seriousness.
Finding its walls commencing to crumble, he held on for two
days, though, if he had reflected, he must have remembered that
the garrison of Malaga. might be with him at any moment.
He was busily preparing for an assault, when Sebastiani suddenly
fell upon him with 3,000 meu from the rear. Apparcntl~' the
English commander had neglected to keep up any watch 011
the side of the inland, and the peasantry had. failed to send
any intelligence of the fact that the French were on the mo':e.
The besiegers, taken entirely by surprise, and distracted also by
a sortie of the little garrison, were rolled down to the sea-shore
in confusion. Lord Blayney-a short-sighted man-rode in
among some French whom he mistook for Spaniards, and was
made prisoner in the most ignominious fashion. The Spanish
regiment got off with little loss: it had kept its ranks, and
forced its way to the boats after beating off an attack. The
8Qnd was partly on shipboard at the moment of the combat,
and the companies which were on shore saved themselves by
a steady rearguard action. nut the battalion of the 89th was
half destroyed, losing over 200 prisoners besides some forty
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killed. The utter incapacity of the British commander was
best shown by the fad that if he had but carried out the plall
on which he WM acting, he won Id certainly have captured
Malaga-for Sebastian had left only 800 men in the city when
he mal"Ched on Fuengirola, and, if the expeditionary force had
re-embarked twenty-four hours before the disaster. it would have
found the place practically undefended, and Sebaslialli a long
day's march away. and incapable of rl:ltuming in time to save it J.
The very last military event of the year 1810 on the Anda~
lusian side was a disaster far worse than that of Lord Blayney
-suffered by a general whose almost unbroken series of
defent!; from Medina de Rio Seco down to Belchite ought to
have taught him by this time the advantages of caution, and
the doubtful polic)' of risking a demoralized army in a fight
upon open growld. When Sebastiani retired from the kingdom
of Mureia in the first days of September, Blake had brought
buck his army to its old positions 011 the frontier of lhat realm.
Seven weeks later, finding the French line in front of him very
weak, he resolved to try a demonstration in force, or perhaps
even a serious stroke against the force of the enemy in Granada.
On November 2 he crossed the :Murcian border, with 8,000 foot
and 1,000 horse, and occupied Cullar.
On the next day he was at the gates of Haza, where there
were four battalions of the French force which covered Granada2•
Hut on the next morning General Milhaud rode up with a
powerful body of horsemen, thc greater part of his own division
of Drt\,"'Oons and the Polish Lancers from Sebastiani's corps·
cavalry, some 1,300 men in all. Though he had only ~OOO
infantry to back him, Milhaud determined to fight at once.
Blake's army invited an attack; it was advancing down the
high-road wiUI the cavalry deployed in front, onc division of
infantl'y supporting it, while a scc.:olld di"ision was SOIllC miles
I l.ord Hlayney, n humorous person S<J,'"C when t1ltl nl.osurditius of his
Oll'lI g-cUlll"1I1ship were in (IUestioll, wrote an interesting narrative of his
, FOl"cW Jouruey to Frauce; which contains oue of the best accounts of
the state of ]\Iadrid uuder King Joseph's government, as weU as some
c.:urious notes on the state of the English prisoners at Verdull in 1811-13.
2 From the 32ml :md ~8th Line, Hey's brigade of SebltStiani's corps.
'l'he 88th, ill Vicloiru et OOllqu&u, xx. 12i, amI Arleche is a miSllrillt.
That regiment was with Girard ill the Sierra J\Ioreua, 150 miles away.
Ol...., III Z
338 OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH [OC'f.
to the rear, on the hills which separate the plain of Bai'.a. from
the upland of the Sierra de Oris.. A rearguard of ~,OOO men
was fitiU at Cullar, ten miles from the scene of action. The
situation much resembled that of Suchet's combat of Margalef,
and led to the same results. For Milhaud's squadrons, charging
fiercely along and all each side of the road, completel)' routed
Blake's cavalry, and drO\'e it back on to the leading infantry
di ...i~ion, which broke, and was badly cut up before its remnants
could take shelter with the other division in reserve on the hill
behind. Blake gave the order for an instant retreat, and
:Milhaud could not follow far among the rocks and defiles.
But he had captured a battery of artillery and a thousand
prisoners, and killed or wounded some 500 men morc, in the
few minutes during which the engagement lasted. The French
cavalry lost no more than !200 men. The infantry had hardly
fired a shot. Blake, not being plll'slled, retired only 8.5 far as
the Venta de Dahlll on the other side of Cullar, and remained
on the Murcian border, cured for a time of his mania for taking
the offensive at the head of a demoralized army.
Thus epdcd the inconclusive campaign of 1810 in Andalllsia-
the French on the last day of the year held almost prcci~y the
same limit~ of territory that they had occupied on the 1st of
March. They had beaten the enemy in four or five considerable
actions, yet had gained nothing thereby. They were beginning
to understand that Cadiz was impregnable, and that the complete
subjection of the mountains of the South and East wa.~ a far
more serious task than had been at first supposed. Things
indeed had come to a deadlock, and Soult kept reporting to hi~
master that another 25,000 men would be required to enable him
to complete his task. Almost us many battalions belonging to
the 1st, 4th, and 5th Corps as would have made up that force
had been sent by the Emperor into Spain. They were intended
to join their regiments ill the end, but meanwhile they bad been
distracted into the 8th and 9th Corps, and were marching in
the direction of Portugal, when Soult wished to see them on the
Guadalquivir I. Very little of the mass.of reinforcements which
, The 8t11 Corps had in its rflllks the 4tll battalions of tlle following
regiments wllOse first tllroo b..,t1.alion!l were in the south of Spain, land
belongell to the ht, 4tll, or 6th corps-tlle 28th, 34th, and 75th. But
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had been poured into the Peninsula in the spring of 1810 had
come his way. While the whole battalions had been sent away
with Junot or Drouet, the dl,aftg ill smaller units had been
largely intercepted by the generals along the line of com-
munication. There were 4,000 of such reeruits detained in
New Castile alone, and formed into' provisional battalions' to
/:,rarrisoll Madrid and its neighbourhood. King Joscph Ulust
not be blamed too much for thus stopping them on their way;
he had been lelt with an utterly inadequate force, when the
Emperor turned off everything all to the direction of Portugal.
During the summer Ilnd autumn of 18]0 there were with him
only two l"rellch iufuutry regiments 1, the same number of light
canl.lry l-egiments 2, Lnhoussaye's weak division of dragoons 3, and
the German division of the 40th Corps less than 4,000 strong,
over Ilnd above his own guard and untrustworth~' 'juramentlldo'
battalions 4, The royal troops numbered nbout. 7,000 men, t.he
ot.her units, induding Soult.'s detained rlmft.s, about. ]2,000: with
them Joseph had to garrison Madrid, Avila, Segovia, Toledo, and
Almaraz, and hold down all New Castile and La Mancha-which
last province was described at the time ru; 'populated solely hy
beggurs and brigands " He had the dnty of maintaining the
~ole and vcry circui tons line of communication between Smut
and Massena, which, after Reynier went north in July, had to
be worked via Ahna..ar., He was frequently annoyed not only by
the Empecinado and other guer..iUeros, but by Villacampa, who
descended from higher Aragon into the Cuenca region, and by
Blake's cavahy, which often raided Lt. :l1ancha. But his great
the lJth Corps \I'as almost entirely oomposed of'4th battalions of the corps
of Victor, Sebastiani, and .l\Iortier, illclndillg tllOse of the 8UI, 24th, 46th,
iiith, 63rd, (14th, Oiith, 06th Liue, and 16tll and 2ith Uger, of tIle 1st
corps, and (lf tllC 17th UgCI', and 40th, 88th, looth aud 100rd Une of the
5th Cu'1}!!'
1 28tll aud 75th, the relllaining brigade of tile lBL DivisiolL of Hie 4Lh
<Jorps, which never joined Sebastiani in .o\..ndalnsia,
, 26th Chasseura and 3rd Dukh HUSSBI1l.
s 17th, 18th, 10th, lIud 27th Dragoons, onl)' two squadrons each-only
1,300 men•
• As n. sample (If thcir behaviour it lIlay be lIlelltioued tha.t the whole
guarllof UIC SOUUI gate of Toledo oncc marched off to join tIle insurgents,
oflll.:crs and all.
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fear was lest La Romana or Wellington should send troops
up the vast gap left between Reynier at Zarza and Coria
and l\lorlier in the Sierra l\forena; there was nothing but
LahouSSRye's dragoons and two infantr)' battalions in the whole
district about Almaraz and '1'alavera~ where such a blow would
have fallen. It was small wonder that he felt uncomfortable.
But military sources of disquietude formed only the smaller
halt' of lOng Joseph's troubles at this dll.te. His political
vexations, which engrossed a much larger portion of his time
nlld energy, lllust be dealt with elsewhere. They will be
relegated to the same chapter which treats of the new devclop-
ment of SplUlish politics consequent Oil the long-delaycd mceting
of the Cartes in the winter of 1810-11.
SECTION XXI
BUSSACO AND TORRES VEDHAS
CHAPTER I
i\IASSENA'S ADVANCE TO BUSSACO
A~~l'lm the fall of .Almcida Masscllu waited much louget·
than Wellington had anticiPAted. The reasons for his delay
were the usual ones that were always forthcoming when CL French
army had to advance in the Peninsula-want of transport and
penlll'y of supplies. The Marshal had just discovered that the
eountry-side in front of him had already been depopulated by
\Vellillglou's orders, and that the only inhabitants tlu\t were
to Ix! met would be the armed Ordcnuuza, who were already
shooting at his vedeltes and RUacking his foraging parties. He
was inclined to h-eat them as brigands; his Provost-mnrshaJ,
Colonel Puvctti, having been surprised and Cl\ptured along with
five gendarmes of his escort by the villagers of Nav/\ cl'Avel on
September 5, he mused the pla.ce to be bUM1ed, shot the one
or two male inhabitants who could be caught, and issued a
proclamation stating that no quarter would be given to comoo-
tants without uniforms. This pl"Ovoked two stiff letters from
Wellington I, who wrote to say that the Ordenanza were an
integral part of the Portuguese military forces, and that, if they
wore no uniforms, the Marshal should remember that mauy of
the revolutionary bands which he had commanded in the old
war of 1792-7 were no better equipped: 'vous devez vous
souvenir que vous-mcme vous ave;: Illlgmcntc la gloire dc I'armee
Fl"allliaisc ell commandunt des wldats qui n'avaient pM
d'uniforllle.' If Ordenanza were shot us ' brigands and highway
robbers' in obedielll:e to the proclamation of September 7, it
1 Wellington to i\lassella, Sept. !) aud Sept. 24.
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was certain that French stragglers and foragers would be knocked
all the head, and not taken prisoners, by the enraged peasantry.
At present the number of them sent in to the British head
quarters by the Portuguese irregulars proved that the laws of
war were being observed. Massena replied that Pavetti had
been ambushed by men who hid their arms, and ran in upon
him aud his escort while he was peaceably asking his way.
His letter then went oft' at a tangent, to discuss high politics,
and to declare that he InlS not the enemy of the Portuguese
but of the perfidious British government, &c., &c. Finally he
complained that the Argnnil ami Trancoso militia, whom he
had sent home after the fall of Almeida, had taken up arms
aguin; if caugllt, 'leur sort sera funeste' I. The lust statement
'Wellington denied; he said that the capitulation had been
allnulled by the French themselves, when they debauched the
24th regiment, and detained 600 of the militia to f01'1Il a
battalion of pioneers, but stated that as a matter of fact the
militia battalions had not been re-embodied. The French
continued to shoot the OrdenanZll, and the Ordenanza SOOIl
began to reply by torturing as well as hanging French stragglers;
Wellington forbade but eould not prevent retaliation.
In his dispatch to Berthier of September S 2, Massena explaillS
that the depopulation of the district in front of him, and the
fact that the Ordenanza had taken arms throughout the country.
side, have compelled him to make an enormous provision of
food for his army. Since tbe land has been swept bare, he mnst
collect fifteen or twenty days' ratiolls for the 6th and 8th Corps.
'Each day demonstl'll.tes the necessity of this more clearly, but
each day makes it more evident that we are not obtaining /l..'I
much as 0111' activity deserves. The small amotlllt of transport
available, and the destl'llctioll by the Spanish brigands of seveml
convoys of corn which were coming up from the pl'O\·jnec of
Valladolid, have occasioned delay in the accumulation of the
stores. An udditional vexation is that while it was reported
that we had captured 300,000 rations of biscuit in Almeida,
there turn out really to be only 120,000 rotiOllS.' But it wus
1 M~nn to "'ellillgtOIl, Sept. 14J ,from Fort COllcepcioIJ (Archil:U drt
Jfi"i~I~Ttl de Ill, GIJin'l'e).
2 III the d1'chivu dl1 Milli,t"e de la Gmrre, see Appeilui." to tllis voJ.
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the loss of draught-beasts that was the most serious trouble;
to his great regret l\Iassena had to cut down the artillery of
each division from twelve to eight guns, for want of horses, with
a similar redllction of the caissons. Every animal that could be
procured was given over to the train, yet it could not carry eVl'.D
the fifteen days' food which the Marshal considered the minimum
that he could afford to take with him. There was also a
deficiency in cartridges for the infantry, for whom 1,200,000
rounds were only procured by setting the artificers of the train
to make up as many as was possible from the powder captured
at Ciudad Rodrigo. Finally Massena explains that the losses
in the two late sieges, the necessity for garrisoning Almeida and
Rodrigo, and the effects of a sickly summer, have reduced the
two corps and the reserve cavalry under his hand to 4Q,000 or
45,000 men, so that he must incorporate Ueynier with his main
army, in order to get a sufficient force concentrated for the
invasion. 'When this has been done, he will have no force to
lea.ve behind to guard his communications. and Kellermunn and
Serras are too much occupied to spare 11 man for that purpose.
The Spaniards will press in between the army and Salamanca
the moment thAt the troops have entered the Portuguese moun-
tains. He will advance, therefore, on September 15, but onl.y
with grave apprehension for his rear, and he begs that at aU costs
a division of the 9th Corps should bc brought up to Salamanca.
He had been promised long ago that this should be done, but
no signs of Drouet.'s arrival were Jet visible.
Reynier accordingly was called up, at last, to join thc main
army; he left Zarz/l and Penamacor on the 10th of September,
crossed the Pass of Pcrnles. and on the 12th was At Alfayares,
with cavalry in front at Sabugo.l. Hill, always vigilant, per-
ceived Reynier's movement as soon as it. had taken place. On
the l~th his corps quitted Sarzedas, leaving nothing behind in
the Castello Dranco country save Lecor's Portuguese at Fnndiio,
who were ordered to follow, unless Reynier should send back
any detachments to the south side of the SielTa de Gat.a. Leith
started from the banks of the Zezere three days later, and on
the 20th the two divisions were drawing near to 'Wellington's
rear in the valley of the Mondego, Hill being at Espinhal that
day, and Leith (who had less distance to cover) a march further
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to the front, at Foz d'Arollce. Wellington's concentration on
thc Alva must obviousl), be complcted bcfure the French could
strike.
On September Vi, 1810, Ney and Junot broke up from the
encampments in front of Almeida, while Reynier drew in close
to the main body by marching up from Sabugal towards Guarda.
It was clear that the attack of the French was to be delivered
along the line of the Mondego, but whether by its southern
or its northern bank '" ellington could not yet be sure, though
he was under the impression that the former would be the
chosen route, since the chau88ee from Almeida by Celorico and
Ponte de Murcella is good for a Portuguese road, while the
mountain track by 'I'rancoso and Vizeu is abominable. Yet
one of the three columns of the French pointed from the first
towards the north bank: while Ney took his way by l''reixadas
and Alverca towards Celorico, Junot was reported to have
turned off from the main road at Valverde, and to be marching
by Pinhel westward or north-westward. 'Vhat Reynier would
do after reaching Guarda remained }'et to be seen.
The total force which Massena had drawn together for the
invasion was 65,000 I offic'Crs and men. He had left behind a
regiment of dragoons and fOUT battalions of infantry to take
cllre of Almeida Md Ciudad Rodrigo. In the latter place he
had also deposited his sief.I'C-train, with the eOllsidcrable body
of artillerymen belonging to it. Brennier and Cacault com-
manded at the two pllU.'Cs respectively, They had between them
some 3,500 men, a force which pereeptibly diminished the army
of invasion, yet was insufficient to do more than to hold the two
fortresses. Gardanne, with five squadrons of dragouns, was
to maintain touch between them. Not a man would be
available from the garrisons for service against Spanish or
Portuguese insurgents-indeed both Almeida and Rodrigo were
practically under blockade from the moment that the main
army went forward, and were destined to learn nothing of its
I For details see the Tables in the Appendix, All the troops left behind
have been rigidly deducted. 'The figures given by Fririon, 60,806, are
Ilot quite e~ll.Ct, sce Jlroof~ ill AJlIJendi~: he makes ~onJe troop~ enter
l'ortugalwhich were left as garrisons, and Oil the other ham} omits wllOle
battalions which marcbed, as if they lmd never e~isted,
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doings for many days. Wellington's cordolt of Ordenanza proved
perfectly efficient 1.
On the evening of the 15th the !nd Corps had reached
Guarda, from which it drove out a picket of the 16th Light
Dragoons, who retired towards the Mondego. The 6th Corps
hivouacked at Freixadas, having pushed back from it two
squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons and the German Hussars.
The 8th Corps, which had to come up from the Azava, passed
Almeida and slept beyond the Con. In its rear was Mont-
brun's reserve cavalry division, and behind this again the reserve
artillery of the whole army. This column, therefore, was by
far the longest and (owing to the amount of gUllS and caissons)
the most unwieldy of the three masses in which the French
were marching.
On the 16th Wellington hoped to see Massena's designs
unmn.sked. But it proved a day of continued doubt: Heynier
left Heudelet's division at Guarda, and moved on with Merle's
and the cavalry to Celorico. Here he met ~ey, who had marched
from FreL"{adas to Celorico, and had pushed his light cavalry
through it in advance. One body of horsemen took a hill
road high lip the side of the Serra. da. Estrclla, a.nd reaehed
Linhares, another followed the great clllWSsI:e as far as Cara-
piehil1n, and detached a squadron or two from that point to
seize the bridge of Foruos d'A1godres, over which passes the
bad sidN'Oad from Cclorico to Vizeu. 'Vas the enemy about
to turn aside on this path, or to pursue the more probable
poliey of continuing alollg the challsstc to Ponte de l\1urcella?
Nothing could >'et be deduced from JUllOt's movements: his
heavy column only reached Pinhel that day: from thence he
might either come down to CeIOl·ico (the most probable course),
or make a move towards Oporto, by the high-road Pil1hel-
Marialva-St. Jonn da Pesqueira, or (what seemed least likely)
follow the very bad mountaitH08.d from Pinhel by Povoa d'el
Rei to Trancoso and Vizeu. Meanwhile Wellington ordered
1 The troops left behind were the fifth battalion of the B2ndJ the
fourth 1Jattalions of the 15th and 86th, and a pl'o\'isional battalion of COIl-
\'lllescenfsJ or about 2JOOO infantry; a squadron of the 3rd Dragoons (167
men), the whole of the 10th Dl'lIgoons (718 ml,'u) under Gardllnne, awl
some 800 mell \Jclonging to the siege-train 1I1Id pnrk.
846 MASSENA'S AD\'Ai\CE TO BUSSACO [St:I''J', Ij
the continuation of the retreat of his army towards Ponte de
Murcella and the position behind the .Alva. The 1st, Srd, and
4th Divisions retired at their leisure along the great ChaI1$8~e, by
Sarago~-o. and Chamusca: the Light Division moved parallel to
them by the moulltain~road Gouvea-San Marlinho-San Romao,
The appearance of Ney's cavalry at Linhares on this track Illade
the Commander-in~Chief anxious to have it watched. since it
was possible that the 6th Corps might use it. The ca\'alry,
keeping the rear well guarded, lay this day at Pinhan~os all
the cltm/$8ee amI San Martinho on the hill-road. Head quarters
were at Ccn, on the latter line. The only troops now left north
of the MOlldego, on the route which Junot might possibly
follow from Pinhel, were aCew cavah'y-pickets, wherefore the Com-
mander-in-Chicf, conocivillg it just possible that the 8th Corps
might be intending to make a dash at Oporto, while the other
two kept him in check, sent urgent letters to Trant, the OffiCCl'
in charge of the militia of Northern Beira, und to Baecellar,
who lay at Oporto with the militia of the Entre-Douro-e-Minho,
to take precautions against this movement. Trant, from
Moimento de Beira, was to feel for Junot's front and flank:
Baccellar was to send out some picked battalions, undel'
J. Wilson, to the line of the Vouga, and to get into touch with
Trant on his left.
On the 17th Massena's intentions at last became clear to his
adversary. The canlry of the 6th Corps crossed the bridge
of Fomos. which it had seized on the previous night, and the
leading division of infantry followed it to Juncaes, on the
Mondego bank: nothing came along the cnuu/Jsee, all the French
columns turning off' it at Carapichina, and pursuing the cross-
road. Ne)"s rear was still at Celorico, to which place the whole
of the ~nd Corps 1l.1so came up that day. In the evening the
head of the cuI·a!r)· of the 6th Corps was near Mnngunldc, lllauy
miles along the rood north of the Mondego, It seemed probable
therefore, that a transference of the whole French army to the
right bank, over the bridge of Fomos, was about to take place.
This became almost cel,tain when the simultaneous news nl'l'ived
that ,Junot had marched that day from Pinhel not towards
Celorico, nor on the Oporto l'Oad (that by Marialva and St. .looo
da Pesqueira), but by the abominable cross-road by Povoa cl'el
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Rei to'rl'MCOSO. The 8th a.nd 6th Corps therefore were showing
a tendency to converge on Vizeu. If so, they must be aiming
at reaching Coimbra without touching Wellington's chosen
position of Ponte de Murcella, where he hnd hoped to fight.
This deduction once made, the British commander had to recast
his plans. 'The !nd and 6th Corps came to Celorico yesterday,'
he wrote to Leith that evening, 'and a part of them crossed
the :'I1ondego at Fornos. More have crossed this day, while no
part of the enemy's army has moved this way [i. e. along the
great c/w.,usee south of the rh·er]. It is generally understood
that their whole army is between the Domo and the ::\1ondego,
and that they are about to move on Coimbra. I shall have
troops in Coimbra to-morrow l .' All the divisions were ordered
back at once, so as to be read)' on the Lower Mondego to resist
the French, when they should appear from the diredion of
Vizeu. Qnly cavalry were left at Sampayo and Gouvea, to
watch the passage of the Mondego by the French army, and
to make certain that its rear (i. e. lleynier's corps) might not
be about to use the main clWflSSte, it move which was even yet
possible.
Masseua's resoh'e to use the route by the north bank of the
MOlldego surprised all British and some :French observers at the
time, and has been censured by most historical critics. He
left a good for a bad f(~ad: he imposed two extra mllJ'Ches on
his A-rmy at a moment when it was short of provisions. He
gA-ve Wellington ample time to call up Hill and Leith, and
to select fL new' position for battle to replace that of Ponte de
Murcella. The Bus.~ hillsides, where the clash was to come,
were as formidable as those behind the Aha. But these con-
siderations were less obvious to Masseua in 1810 than they
appear to the critic of 1007. It must first be remembered that
his maps were abominable: the actual case of plans used by
the staff of the Army of' Portugal is preserved 2: it is that
issued by LopeI': in ] 778, which in the remote!" parts of Portugal
I To COttOIl and to Leith, both dated Se}lt, ]7.
~ Fur lJ, most illterestilJK article 011 tllCSC mUllS,and nil tlmt they show,
see 1\11'. T. J. Amlrcw;l's artide'in tile 1'..'nglisll Hi"ftjT;OOJ Re!JiP,lo for 1901.
'Ille mall~, captured at Vittoria, arc now iu the Libral'Y of Qlleell'~College,
Belfast.
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not only offers a mere tra\'esty of the natural features, but
actually marks as existing roads that never had been made,
and omits others that were actually available. It shows, more·
over, no distinction between chaussees, cowltry roads, and mere
mule tracts. Places of considerable importance are mi!>placed
by several miles, e. g. Almeida is placed on the Coa instead of
two miles from it: Vizeu is much too far north, as is also Bussaco.
As far as this map goes, the physical difficulties in the way
of an ad\'al1ce north of the MOlldego look no greater than those
on the southern bank. But, it may be said, Massena should
have supplemented the use of the map by colleding oral in·
formation, and by sending reconllaissances in every direction.
He did so, so far as was in his power. But exploration far
afield was only possible with large bodies of men, since the
Ordenanza blockeP. every road to the isolated staff-officer, and
the only oral information which was forthcoming was defecth'e.
Massena asked for it from Aloma, Pamp]ona, and the other
Portuguese officers on his statt:-.....there were no less than eighteen
of them in all. They were absolutely ignomnt of their own
country,-a normal thing in the military men ot'the old Pm'tu-
guese army. Even Pamplona, whose estates lAy in the neigh-
bourhood of Coimbra, gave hopelessly erroneous infol'nlation
·about the rontes leading into that town. Bnt, from natural
amour propre they avoided confesshlg their ignorance, and, when
taken into council by Masseua, gave him copious but wholly
misleading details. They assured him that the roads Pillhel-
Truncoso-Vi;,·,cu and Foruos-Mnngualde-Vizell were no WOThC
than other lines of communication, alld that the great clWllB3~e
by Sampayo alld Punte de Mtu"Cclla was crossed by so many
torrents and climbed so many slopes that it was not preferable
to the routes north of the river. The news that a formidable
position behind the Ah'a had been entrenched had reached the
lrench head quarters; hence Massena had fair reasons for
taking the route that he selected, so far as strategy went. It
undoubtedly enabled him to turn the line of the Alva, :.\1ore-
over, on it lay a large town-Vizeu-from which it was hoped
that much food would be procured, for the invaders were still
ignorant of the thoroughness with which ""Vellington's plans for
devastating the country before them had been carried out. Even
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after Celorico and Guarda had been found empty of inhabitants,
they hardly believed that such a large place us Vizeu, a town
of 9,000 souls, would be deserted.
Massenu's mistake became evident to his soldiers on the first
day on which he ordered his columns to quit the 1l1ain~roads
and take to the by·paths. The infantry could still get forward,
but the artiller)' and waggon-train began to drag behind, to
lose horses, and to see vehicle after yehicle broken, disabled, or
abandoned. On the 18th the infantry of the 6th Corps got as
far as Mangualde on the north bank of the Mondego, but the
artillery was so much delayed in the defile after passing Juncaes
that it could not catch up the real' of the marching troops, and
had to be parked at night not many miles beyond the bridge of
Fornos. The 2nd Corps on reaching this spot fouud the road
blocked, and bivouacked with one division beyond the Mondego,
and one still in the rear of the bridge. But the troubles of
this column were nothing to those of the 8th Corps on the
miserable 1'000 from Pillhel to Vizeu. The journal ol" the cam·
mundant of the artillery of JUllot's first divh;ion, Colo!wl Nod,
may be quoted as giving a fair description of the marches of the
17th and 18th September:-
'After passing tile little town of Trancoso, with its battle-
mellted wall, all the country-ljidc is mountain and rock. There
is no road, only a stony narrow dangerous track, which the
artillery had all the pains ill the world to follow without
meeting accidents. It is all steep ups and downs. I had to
march with a 'party of gunners ahead of me, with picks aud
crowbars to enlarb"e the track. As eaeh arm only looked out
for itself, the artillery soon got left to the rear, and deserted by
the infantry ami cavalry. 'Ve only arrived at our halting-
places late at night, utterly done up. The guns were almost
always abandolll-d to themselves; we did not know what road
to follow, having no one to give w; information but a few
infantr.y stragglers, who had themselves lost their way. At
Iloon 011 the 18th I haltt..J. with my two batteries after two
hours of incessant nphiIJ, to find myself at the crest of a
mountain, with a precipitous descent before me, and beyond
that another ascent winding upwards, as far as the ~yc could
reach. 'Ve were so exhausted that it was useless to bro
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further tha.t day, but Oll the 19th, with a party of gunners
always working in front to enlarge the road, we moved over
hill and yale, completely Qut of touch with the army. I had
to ride Qut with four mounted men to hunt for allY trace of
it. At last, in a deserted village, we found an old peasant
who pointed Qut the road to Vizeu. Dut it was only on
the 20th that we got there.' Noel's batteries, it may be
remarked, were moving all the time between the infanboy,
which was aIIead, and the Grand Park which \I'as behind them,
with MOlltbrun's cavalry bringing up the rear. Yet they were
absolutely lost and had to shift for thcmseh'es without orders
or escort 1,
The Park fared C\'CIl worse; when ncsring Sotojal, on the
20th, it was unexpectedly beset by Colonel Trant, who had
come down from Moimenta with a brigade of his militia and
two squadrons of Portuguese regular cavalry. 'rhe Park was
escorted by one company of grenadiers, who marched at its
head, and a battalion of the Irish Legion, who were far to
the rear, while Montbrun's immense cavalry column was quite
out of sight. Trant had a great opportunity, for the long
file of "ehicles and guns, caught in a narrow road, was almost
helpless. But he failed to do all that was in his power; his
cavalry charged the company at the head of the column and
was repulsed. He then filed his battalions along the hillside,
opened fire on the horses and men of the train, and, descending
into their midst, captured and destroyed some caissons and took
some eighty prisoners. But when the escort-battalion came
hurrying up from the rear, his levies were stricken with panic
and hastily retired, though they were strong enough to have
held oft' the five hundred Irish, alld to have smashed 01'
rolled over the precipices the greater part of the guns and
waggons. Montbrun's cavalry did not get lip till all wa.~ o"er,
and would have been pelfectly useles.~ on the precipitous road,
even if they had arrived earlier. If Trl\nt's foray had becll
properly C&lTied Ollt, Massena might have lost his reserve
artillery and most of his provisions-a disaster which might
have forced him to turn back to Almeida. He desen'ed
such a punishment for having marched his all-important
I JUmoirC8ofCol. NotH, pp.l12-IJ.
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train on the extreme flank of his army, with an insufficient
escort'.
Though Junot's infantry divisions reached the deserted walls
of Vizen on Sept. 19th nnd there met the corps of Ney, the
divisional artillery did not arrive till next day, while the reserve
artillery, the trains and the heavy cavalry were struggling in
upon the !!lst and ~2nd by detachments, }~or ::\1ontbrun had
halted the gretlt convoy after Trant's attack, and parked it,
fearing that the Portuguese might come back in greater
numbers and give morc trouble. When he started it again,
on the !lIst, he took care to give it beUer marching arraTIJ:,re·
ments, and to attach cavalry escorts to each section. But
this caused much delay, !lnd meanwhile the 8th Corps waited
at Vh..eu 'marking time' aJld unable to move. E"en the 6th
Corps remained there two days, waiting while its glllH:arriageS
and cannons were being repaired; for the Fornos-Vizcu road,
though infinitely less rough than that which the 8th Corps and the
park had followed, was still bad enough to shake many vehicles
to pieces. The Intendant·General reported that nineteen
eaisllOns C<'trrying 2,900 rations of biscuit belonging to the 6th
Corps broke down and had to be bUMlt; the food was distri-
buted among the regiments as they passed, with much consequent
waste 2. All that Ne)' could do between the 18th of Sel,tember,
when he reached Vizeu, and the !21 st, was to push forward
an advanced guard to 'l'ondella, fifteen miles down the Vizeu-
Coimbra road, with an infanb)' di,"isiol1 in support at. Fail.
Meanwhile the 2nd Corps, following in the wake of the 6th,
had also made its way to Vi7.eu. The bulk of Ueynier's force
took the Fornos-I'\langl1alde-L'tgiosa route, as Ney's had done.
But an a(hanced guard of all arms descended the great clumssce
south of the river as far as 'l'aboa, driving in the pickets of
the English cavalry, alld then crossed the Mondego at the
bridge of Taboo, and fell into the real' of the rest of the corps
beyond Mangualde. This apparently was intended to keep
Wellington uncertain, as long as possible, as to whether part
I A Ji"cl)' account of this affair may be found ill Jl.IarbotJ ii. 378 j detail!!
may not be all trustworthy, but the general narrnth'e agrees with Trnnt'..
report, printed ill SorillllO ua I,u;\, \'01. vii, Allpelluix.
2 Report of Lambert, Jlltemlallt-Geneml, dated Vi1.Cll, Sept. 23.
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of the French arOlY was 1I0t intending, after ull, to follow the
chaussee and present itself before the position on the Alva 1.
But it was executed by so small a foree that the British general
WitS not for an hour deceived. 2. He WitS at this moment in a
cheerful frame of mind; Massena had made n mistake in
choosing his route, and was merely wasting time when time
was most precious. 'There are certainly many bad roads in
Portuga~' he wrote, 'but the enemy has taken decidedly the
worst in the whole kingdom' a; and again, 'I imagine that
Marshal Massena has been misinfonned, and has experienced
more difficulty in making his movement than he expected.
He has certainly selected one of the worst roads in Portugal
for his march \' Owing to the necessary delays of the enemy
Wellington was now in a position as strong as that on the
Al"a; his head quarters were at the convent of Bussaco, his
divisions, including Leith and Hill, so placed that they could
be concentrated on the Serra de Alcoba, right across the Vizeu-
Coimbra road, long before the French could descend from Vizeu.
• 'Ve have an excellent position here, in which I am strongly
tempted to give battle~,' he wrote 011 the e\'enillg of the £1st,
foreseeing six days ahead the probability of the enbragemeut
which was to make Bussaco famous. There was a road by
which his position might be turned, but it was doubtful
whether the enemy would discover it, and' I do not yet give
up hopes of discovering a remedy for that misfortune 6.'
MassenR, meanwhile, was chafing at his self-imposed delays,
and writing querulous letters from Vizeu to Berthier. 'The
gfand park and the baggage,' he wrote on the ~~nd, 'are still
in the rear, and will only get up to-morro\\'. It is impossible
to find worse roads than these; they bristle with rocks; the
guns and train have suffered severely, and I must wait for them.
I must leave them two days at Vizeu when they come ill, to rest
I 'Ve1lillgtOll to Lord Liverpool, from Lorvii,o, Sept. 20.
2 Indeed, all exploring party under Captain Somers Cocks, of the
16th Ligbt Dragoons, bad dogged the steps of the detachment, and counted
every battalion. See TomkinsOll's Diary, 1'1'.39-40.
I Wellington to Chflrles StUflrt, Sept. 18.
• Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Sept. 20.
~ Ibid., Sept. 20.
~ 'Vellington to 5iapletoll Cotton, Sept. 21.
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themselves, while I resume my march on Coimbra, where (as
I am informed) I shall find the Anglo-Portuguese concentrated.
Sir, all our marches are across a desert; not a soul to be seen
anywhere; everything is abandoned. The English push their
barbarit)' to the point of shooting the wretched inhabitant who
tries to remain in his village; t.he womell, th~ children, the aged,
ha\'c all decamped. ""Ve cannot find a guide anywhere. The
soldiers discover a few potatoes and other \'egetables; they are
satisfied, and bul'D for the moment when they shall meet the
enemy.' The plan of devastation was already beginning to
work; )'lassena had exhausted: seven of the thirteen days' pro-
visions which his army carried, and it was not with the potatoes
gleaned in the fields ofVizeu, or the ripe grapes of its vineyards,
that he could refill the empty store-waggons. He must push
on for Coimbra as fast as possible; this, no doubt, WllS why he
made up his mind to march on that place, not by des<:enlling
from Vizeu to Aveiro and entering the coast plain, but by
taking the direct road by Santa Comba Dao, Mortagoa, and
Bussaco. Even Lopez's faulty map shows the ridge of Bussaco
as a serious physical feature, but the Marshal does not seem
to have reflected for a moment that "VeIlington might choose
to defend it. The orders drawn up on September 24th for
the march on Coimbra presuppose an unobstructed progress 1.
Having met no active resistance as yet from the Anglo-
Portuguese army, Massena wrongly took it for granted
that he might count on the prolollgation of this good
fortune.
Before moving on from Vizeu the organization of the French
army was slightly modified. Junot's corps contained a number
of fourth battalions, belonging to regiments whose three senior
battalions were serving in the ~nd Corps. The two corps had
never met till both lay at Vizeu. Masscna then ordered the
fourth battalions of the 36th, 47th, 70th of the Line, and the
Qnd and 4th Leger to join their regiments in Reynier's corps;
this reduced the 8th Corps by ~,850 men; in return, however,
Reynier was ordered to make over to Junot two regiments of old
troops, the 15th and 86th of the line (each of three battalions)
I See the orders in the ..d.rchive~ dll Mini:tm de la Guerre.
""u. "' Aa
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making in all fl,251 bayonets. Thm; the two c..'Orps lI"ere
somewhat efJualized in quality, the 2nd receiving lh"e battaliolls
of recruits, while the 8th (in which there were too few veteralls)
got in return six battalions which had served in Spain since
the commencement of the war. The net result was to make
the 2nd Corps a little stronger (17,024 men) and the 8th
Corps a little weaker (15,904 men) 1.
On September 21st the advance of the Army of Portugal
was recommenced, though the train and heavy baggage was
not yet prepared to start, and some of its rear detachments
had not even reached Vizeu. ]Jut on that day the advanced
guard of the 6th Corps advanced from '.L'ondella, and found
in front of it some light cavalry and two Porlu,!,rtlese regiments
-the first hostile troops that the French had seen since the cam-
paign lx!gan. The whole of the 2nd and 6th Corps followed
behind, and bivouacked that night at Casal-de-Maria, Tondella,
Sabu~a and other villages on the steep downward road from
Vixeu to Coimbra. The 8th Corps still remained at Vizeu,
guarding the belated reserve artillery and train. On the 2~nd
the 2nd Corps, passing the 6th, which had hitherto taken the
lead, crossed the Criz and drove in the British outposts, who
retired on Mortagoa. But Ney and the 6th Corps remained
stationary, and the 8th did not even yet make a start.
These delays seem extraordinary, hut Massena was still pay-
ing for llis evil choice of roads; the infantry had to wait for
the guns, and the guns could only creep forward as the sappers
enlarged and improved the roads for them.
W"ellinbti:on, meanwhile, was recasting his di...positions at his
leisure. 'Vhen Masseua's march 011 Viz<::u had become t'Crtain,
the British Commander-ill-Chief thought at nrst that the enemy
would take the good cMussee Vizeu-Aveiro, so as to descend
into the coast-plain and attack Coimbra from the easiest side. He
therefore, on the 18th moved the 1st Division back from Ponte
de ~lurcel1a to Coimbra, where it was joined by a new bribl'Qde
from Lisbon, composed of the 1st battalions of the 7th and
1 It iij this illterchall~e of troo(>s which make!! all the figures of tlle
Army of l)ortugal 80 divergent. ],'ririon, for example, ignores it, as do
mO$t French $tatisticians. Dut see Massina's orders (14), and the' situa-
tion$' in the ArcMI!e$ of Sept. 14 and Sept. 27 respectively.
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79th, newly landed. A. Campbell's and Coleman's rortuguese
also moved to the sn.me point. The $rd and 4th Divisions
remfl,ined at Poute de J\.furcella in the entrenched position,
with the Light Division and Pack's Portugucse in front of them
at Vendn do Porco and Sampayo.
But on the j!Oth, when Ney's advanced guard began to eome
out from Vizeu on the Santa Comba Dao road, not on the
Aveiro road, ,"Vcllington dllK'Overed that it was on the mountain
of Bussaco, and not on the plain ill front uf Coimbl'll, that he
would uext meet the enemy. Accordingly Pack's Portuguese
and the Light l)i\·isioll forded the Mondego below Sampayo,
as did the light cavalry, ulId u detaining force was thus thrown
across the Vizcu-Coimbl'R rood. The Portuguese brigade took
post behind the Criz torrent, Cl'aufurd's men a little to the rear
at Mortagoa. At the same time the 1st Di... ision and the
troops attached to it moved out from Coimbra to Mealhada
on the Aveiro road, a point from which they could easily be
called up to the Bussaco position, if no French columns were
discovered coming down the A"eiro road, as now seemed probable.
This day, Leith's division, to Wellington's intense satisfaction,
arrived at San Mignel de Payares behind the Alva, and sojoined
the main body. Hill was reported to !:>ea day's march only to the
rear, at Foz d'Aronce. 'l'husthe whole of the Anglo-Portuguese
regular forces between Domo and Tagus were neatly concen-
trated. At the same time Trllnt was told to bring the militia
of Northern Beira down the Oporto-Coimbra road to Agneda
and Sardiio, and Baccellar was directed to support him with
Wilson's militia brigade, in case Massena should ha...e some
subsirliary operation against Opono in his mind.
On the 24th the first skirmish of the campaign took place. the
~nd Corps, advancing into the plain in front of Mortagoa, found
Pack's Portuguese facing them on the right, and Craufurd's
dh'ision on the left, with a screen of cavalry in front. They
pushed in the horsemen upon the infantry, but halted when
artillery opened upon them, and made no further advance. On
this day the belated 8th Corps, with the reserve cavalry, at last
started from Vizeu. Next morning Reynier pressed Oil in force
with two hea...y columns each formed by a division, and Craufurd
was ordered by Wellingtoll to retire, which he did with some
Aa2
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reluctance by alternate echelons of brigades1, The 95th and
4Srd had some sharp skirmishing with the French van. and made
a stand by the villnge ofMoura under the BUS8aCO heights, before
retiring up the high-road, and taking position upon the crest of
the great ridge 2, which they did at six o'clock in the evening.
'While the advanccd guards of Re.Y'1ier and Ney were driving
in Craufurd and Pack, the Anglo~Portuguese army was assem-
bling on "'ellington's chosen fighting-ground. Picton and Cole,
with the 31'd and 4th Divisions, had already taken up their
quarters on the llussaco ridge on the 21st, the first across the road
from San Antonio de Cantaro to Palheiros, the second across
the cllaU88~e, behind the spot to which the troops of Pack and
Crnnfuro were retiring. Leith, who had been brought over the
Mondego by the fords of Pefia Cam on the 2Srd, moved up Oil
to the southern tract of the Bussaco heights on the 24th, Hill,
who reached the line of the Alva 011 the 9l2nd, followed in
Leith's wake, and on the 25th was at Pcna Cova waiting for
orders to cross. The 1st Division with Campbell's and Coleman's
Portuguese alone were still absent, though not far off. They
had started from Mealhada, when it became clear that no French
force was coming by the A\'eim--Coimbra road, but on the night
of the ~5th were still some eight miles away, and did not get
into position between Cole and Picton till hetween nine and ten
o'clock on the moming of the ~6th.
Nevertheless, nearly 40,000 men, composed of the J..ight, Srd,
4th. 5th Divisions and their Portuguese auxiliaries, and of Hill
Oil their flank, only four miles "way, were concentrated all the
night of the 25th, when Reyniel"s vanguard deployed in front
of the heights. Before ten o'clock all the following morning
Spencer had arrived, and Hill was over the fords andeucnll1ped
along the rear slopes of the heights. There seems to be no truth
whatever in the nllegation that the British llrmy WIlS in II
1 According to Napier (Hi. 22-3) Craufurd risked his division somewhat
in their skirmish. But this criticism is not made b}' D'Urban. Leach, and
other cj'e-witnesscs.
t Thc Ligllt Di\'isioll lmd been first divided iuto brigades on Aug. 8,
whcn the 1st WllS constituted of the 43rd, four compallie3 of the 90th, and
the 1st ~adores, under BeckwitlL : the 2nd of the S211d, four comp....nies
of the 96th, and the 3rd Cayadores, under llarcla)·. See Atkinson'slisu;
of the Peninsular Army in the Eng. Hi,l. RelJ.
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somewhat dangerous IlOsitioll on the evening of the 25th, for
the Frcnch had only their Yallguard up, and there were less than
two hOUN of daylight left when Craufurd retired from Mours,
and Rcynier and Ney obtained their first yicw of the British
position. Before the cncmy could have collccted in strength
sufficicllt for an attnck, night would havc set ill.
NOTE O~ 'l'l-IE SITUATION ON SEPT. 25
Napier WllOll)' misrepresents the state of affairs in vol. Hi. pp. 22-3.
He writes as follows: : Defore J o'clock 40,000 French infantry were
embattled 00 the two points (thecballuieand the San Antooio de Calltaro
road), tlleir guns trying the raoge above, while the skirmishing clatter of
musketry arose from the dark wooded chasms below. Ne)', whose miHto.r)'
glmu.:e "'o.s sure, instantly perceived that the mount'lin, a orel,-t.ed not a
t.'lble Ollll,I;Oll\(1 hidll no great \'CSCn'Cl>, t1111t it was ullly half OI;l;upied,
and that tlLo allies were moviug with tlltl dioo1'l,ler usual on tlll~ taking of
unknown ground. He wished therefore to attack, but Massena was ten
miles to the rear, the officer seut to him waited two hours for an audieuce,
and tllen returned with orders to attend the Prince's arrival. Thus a
great oppurtunity was lost, for Spencer was not up, Leitll'g troops were
only pallsing the Mondego, and Hill was still behind the Alva..
&arcely 2.5,000 men were in Hlle, am1 with great intervals.'
Almost every statement here is incorrect. (1) The French did not
reach the grol11111 in frout of the heights till .5 o'clock: they were not up
at 3 p.m. [D'Urbn.II's J)illry: (At noon, the heads of the Frcnch infantry
COIUlllllS lJaving reached t11c lower falls leadiug frolll the i\lortagOll Valloy,
he pushed forward his cavalry alld began to skirmish with our pickets.
It not beiug Lord 'VeIling-ton's intention to 11isJlute this ground, but
rather U:l entice J\Iassena to follow and attack llim in his position of
llO<?co, the Light Division was grallually withdrawn, the 95th ami 4Jrd
cO\'eriug the retreat and HoslI's artillery playing upon t1le enemy's advance
from hill to hill, till at,) o'clock tlley were halted by the fire of the 43rd
before the village of Sulll. At about G the tiring ceased, and our M\'ancc
(heretofore at -'lour:\. and Sula) took up their grolllld (ns well ns Geueral
Cole's divisioll) Ul'0ll t1le heights of B0'i"l;o.') This diary, writ/ell Ilul18unw
1light, (~'llllIOt he wl'(lng UH to the dating of the huuJ'S. l)'Urhan "'1Ill riding
with Bcrcsford ut nrcllingtoll's side. NaJlicr was writing from memory
twellty years after.
(2) Key did not' Jlerceil'e the mountain only half occupied, and wisb to
attack,' ou the el'enillg of the 25th. His recollulIissance was made on the
morning of the 26th, and it was then that he expressed !Jis wish U:l attack,
when Wellington had el'ery man in line. This is conclusil'cly prOl'ed b~'
the following note of Ney to HeYllier, dated at 10.30 011 tlle !noming of
the 26th, from his adl"anl;cd posts, which lies in the I-rencll archives:-
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, Je re~oie al'installt, mOll cher genl1ral, votre lettre de cc jour. Je pense
qu'une grande partie (le l'armee rlllglo-portugaise a passe la unit sur la
crete des montaglles qui domineut la vallee de :Mourn. Depn!!! cc matill
l'euuemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diTifirCT ses colonnes priucipales
sur la route d'Oporto. Cependant il tient encore assez de monde ii. la
droite d\l pare, qui couvre le convent de Minimes appe16 Sako, et montre
tllle dOllzainede pieces d'artillerie. Le chemin de Coimbre passe tout preede
cc cou\"cnt. Si j'avais le oommandement j'attaquerais sallS hesiter un seul
inmnt. Mais je crois que vous lle pOllVel'i rieu oompromettrc en vous
echellonant sur la droite de l'ellnemi, et en pous:>ant ses 3\'ant.postes le
plue possible: car c'est \'eritablement par ce point qu'il faudrait le forcer
il faire sa retrllite.' \\'ll&t Ney lmd seen, and wrongly took for a general
movement of the English arll1)' tOll'RrdS its left, was Cole tnking ground
to tbe left on the arrival of Spencer, who came up between B !lnd 10 that
morning, just before Key was scribbling this basty 110te to Heyoier.
(3) The stretch of moutJtllin opposite Ney Ilnd Heynier 11'1\8 not ' crested'
but' table'- so mllch so that \\rellington took t\\·o s(jnRdrons of cm'all'}' up
to it, for (ISO ill the battle. The British geneml never took up 11 llOSitioll
where he Imd 110 spll<:c to hide his reserves.
(4) The time wheo Ney scut an officer to iIlassena to a.sk leave to attack
was tho morning of tile 26th, not the el'Clling of tile 25th. How coulcl
Ney Ilal'o hoped to get tile }Jcrmissioll to liglit and carry it out, when the
timc when hc reached i\'IOUTII was 5 o'dock, Rnd dusk fRUS at 6.30? 'nlC
mc~nger Imd twenty miles to ride, to Mortagon HIIII back. See .Fririou's
note ill his' Aperftu sur la Cnmpllgnc (le Portugnl ' in Victmrcll et Conqrdle<J,
.~xi. 320.
(5) Leith's troops, so far from beillg 'only passing tllC :i\lolldego' on
tile afternooll of t1Hl 25tll, hall llassed it 011 thll 23rd [Journal of Leitll
Hay, ai(!e-de-eaml' of LeiUl, i. 228]. On tlte nig1,t of tlte 22nd-23rd
\l'ellington wrote to Hill,' Leith's, Picton's,and Cole's divisions are now
ou tile Berm de BllsaCO' [Di8J)(Jtches, vi. 462]. Hill was not 'lJehilld tllo
Alm; but massed at tlle fords of Peiia. Cova, only foul' miles from the
battle-field. He crossed at daWlI Oil the 26t1J, but could Itave been in
action within two hours of tlle first shot, if the attack had been made Oil
t1)O 25t11.
(6) Wellington, inc1udiJlg Hill's division, had therefore 40,000 men,
1I0t 25,000. Bnt the latter Ilumber would have sufficed, for Ke)' and
Iteynier had only their advanced guards up, alld in the 1lOur and & half
before dusk coultl not have brought lip their whole corps by t11e IJad and
llarrQlV rood~ from he11iud. 'l1u~ Diary of the 6th Corps meutions that
ollly the vanguard dil'ision (I..oisou) bivouacked in frOllt of the heights.
The rcargllnrd WiIS as far back as llarril that night.
(1) The exacll1lomcnt of the arril'1I1 of tlte Britil;ll 1st DiI'isiol1 may be
gauged from t1(e fact that it passed Luzo, t11e village behind Bussaco, at
8 /I.m. 011 the 20th-Diary of Stotbert (3rd Foot Guards), p. 188, TIlere
is only tl"O miles from Lu~o to the position takeu up by the 1st Division.
SECTION XXI: CHAPTER II
THE BA'ITLE 010' BUSSACO
It' remains that we should describe the ground which
Wellington had chosen Oll the 21st, and on which he fought
with such splendid success upon the ~7th. The ridge which
takes its name from the convent of Bussaco is onc of the best·
marked positions in the whole Iberian Peninsula. A single
eontinuous line of heights covered with heather and furze, with
the dull~red and dull-grey granite cropping up here and there
through the soil, extends from the Mondc&J'Q on the right-
where it ends precipitously-to the main chain of the Scrra de
Aleoba on the left. The ridge is very irl-egulnr in its altitude;
the two loftiestse<:tiolls are one at a distance of two miles fmm
the :Mondego, and the other to the immediate right of the
convent enclosure, where the original obelisk commemorating
the battle was set up I. Between these two culminating summits
the ridge sinks down, and is at its lowest where the country-
road from San Antonio de Cantaro to Plllheiros passes over it.
There are three other points where it is crossed by lines of
communitation: two lie far to the east,not fiu from the Mondego,
where bad paths from San PanIc to llalmazes and from Carvalhal
to Casal exist. The third and most important is ill its left centre,
where (close to the cOl1vent)the chaussee from Celorico to Coimbra,
the main artery of the local road·system, passes the watershed. It
does so at a place which is by no means the least lofty point of
the ridge; but the line was obvious to the road-making engineer,
because a spur (the only one of any importance ill the heights)
here runs gradually down from the Serra into the lower ground.
1 There are two monuments: this simple weather-beaten obelisk 011 the
culminating heiglit where the ht UiI'isioll stood, a point where no fighting
took place, and the modern column lower down IInd close to the high.
rOlld, behind the spot whcre GraufUrll tought. Here the Portuguese to
this day maintain a gmall military Ilost, nut! hoist a flag to do honour lo
the viclory.
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To lead the c1Wfi,8$ee up the side of this spur, past the village
of Mourn., and so to the crest of the ridge on gentle slopes, was
clearl), better than to make it charge the main range. even at
a less lofty point. The convent lies just to the right of the
spot where the cllalUsee passes the sky-line, a few hundred yards
off the road. It was a simple, low quadrangle, with a small
chapel in its midst, standing in a fine wood of pine and oak,
surrounded by a ten-foot wall. The wood is sprinkled with
hennitages, picturesque little buildings hewn in the rock, where
those of the monks who chose practised the anchorite's life. The
outer wall of the wood and the tops of its trees nre just visible
on the sky-line of the main ridge: the convent is not, beillg
well down the reverse-slope. The point where the COllvent wood
tops the heights is the only section of them where trees arc seen
on the summit: the rest of the line is bare heath, with occa-
sional outbreaks of rock, falling in slopes of greater or lcs.scr
steepness towards the broken wooded foot-hills, where t.he French
lay. On part of the left ..<:entre there is ground which it is 110
exaggeration to describe as precipitous, to the front of the
highest piece of the ridge, below the old obelisk. The effect
of the whole line of heights is not dissimilar to, though on a
smaller scale than, the Malvern Hills. The highest point 011
the Serra is about 1,£00 feet above sea..level- but much less,
of course, above the upland below.
The position of Bussaco is fully nine miles long' from cnd to
end, from the steep hill above the Mondego to Cole's western
flank: this was a vast front for An army of 50,000 men to cover,
according to the ideas of 1810. There .....ere absolute gaps in the
line at more than one place, especially above Carvalho, where
about a mile separated Leith'!> left from his central brigade.
The defence of such a po!>it.ioll could only be risked because of
two facts: one was that c\'cry movcment of the cnemy on the
lower ground before the ridge could be accurately mude out from
above: he could Bot com.'cntrale in front of auy section of the
hdghts without being seen, His only chance of doing so would
ha\'c been to take advantage of the night; but cvcn if he had
drawn up for the attack before dawn-a thing almost impossible
1 '\'11ich makes astounding Fririoll's statement that it was only three-
quarters of a league long (p, 46),
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in the broken, ravine-cut, wooded bottoms-he could not havc
mo\'ed till filII dayligh~ because the face of the position presents
so many irregularities, such as small gullies and miniature
precipices, that columns climbing in the dark must undoubtedly
have got lost and broken up on the wild hill-side. Moreover,
there was II thick cordon of British pickets pushed forward
almost to the foot of the ridge, which would have given warning
by their fire and their preliminary resistance, if any advance had
been attempted in the grey dawn.
The second advllntabte of the Bussaco po~ition is that Oil its
le!t-t.:entre and right-centre the ridge hf\.!l a broad flat top, some
300 or 400 yards acros~, on which all Rl'1lI~ CI1Il move laterally
with euse to support any threatened point. It is so broud that
'Vellington even ventured to bring up a few squadrons of
dragoons to the summit, rightly urguing that a cavalry charge
would be of all things the most unexpected reception that nn
ellcmy who hud breasted. .such a hillside could meet at the end
of his climb. As a matter of fact, howe\'er, this section of the
heights was never attacked by the French. The right of
the po~itio!l is !lot flat-topped like the centre, but has Il. narrow
saddle-back, breaking into outcrops of rock at intervals: but
though h~ prompt motion from right to left, or left to right, i~
lIot possible on the crest., there is a rough country-path, good
for infantry amI available evcn for gUlis, a few hundred yards
dowl! the l'e\'erse side of the slope. AJOllg this troops could
be mo\'eJ with case, cntil'cly out of sight of the cnemy. It
proVl.-d useful for uith's division duriug the buttle. Wellington
calculated, thCl'efore, with perfect correctncss, that he could
count on getting un adequate force of defendcrs to uny portion
of hi~ loug line beforc the enemy could establish him~clf on the
summit. The extreme left, where Cole's division lay, was thc
hardest part of his line to reinforce, for want of good lateral
communication: it was also a good deal lower than Craufurd's
post; here, thereforc, Wellington had placed the main mass of
his reserves; the Gcrmall Legion, and two Portuguese brigades
were lying on his left·centre vcry close to the 4th Division, so
that they would be available at short notice, though they would
have a stiff climb if the French chose that &."Ction of the position
as their objective, and it had to be strengthened ill haste.
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The distribution of the army remains to be described. On
the extreme right, on the height of Nossa Senhora do Monte,
just overhanging the Moudego, was a battalion of the Lusi-
tanian Legion, with two guns. Next to them, on very high
ground, lay Hill's division, three British And two Portuguese
brigades J, with a battery on each flank. Then came a slight
dip in the ridge, where the road from San Paulo to Palmazes
crosses it: athwart this path lay Leith's newly constituted 5th
Division, consisting of three British and seven Portuguese
battalions. The British brigade lay on the right, then cumc
(after t\ long interval) two battalions of the Lusitanian Legion,
the only troops guarding two miles of very rough ground.
On Leith's extreme left, towards Pictou's right, was Spry's
Portuguese brigade, and three unattached battalions (8th Line
and 'l'homar militia). Beyond the 8th regiment, where the
watershed sinks again, and is crossed by the road from San.
Alltonio de Cantaro to Palheiros, l'icton's line began. On his
right, across the road, ,vas Arelltschildt's Portuguese battery,
supported by the 74th Dritish regiment, and Champlemond's
Portuguese brigade of three battalions. The 45th and 88th,
the two remaining battalions of the brigade of Mackinnon, were
placed to the left of the road, the former Oil the first spur to
the north of it, the latter nearly a mile to the left. Lightburlle's
brigade, and Thompsoll's British battery were a short distance
beyond the 88th, North of Picton's position the ridge rises
suddenly again to its loftiest lSection; along this almost
impregnable b'Tound, with its precipitous front, were ranged the
three British brigades of Spencer's 1st Division-the Guards
on the right, Blantyre's 011 the left, Pakenham's in the centre,
5,000 bayouets dominating the whole country'·side and the rest
of the position. North of them again, where the ridge falls
sharply along the back wall of the conyent wood, was Pack's
Portuguese brigade, reaching almost to the high-road. Along
the curve of the high~road itself, in column, was Coleman's
Portuguese brigade, and beside it A. Campbell's !}ortuguese, with
1 Arcbibald CaUlpbell's and Fouseca's brigades, forming HaUlilton's
Portuguese Division, which was attaclled to the British 2nd Division
throughout the war, and shared with it the triumphs of Albuera, Vittoria,
and St. Pierre,
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the German Legion be)'olld them on the Monte Novo ridge.
Colclllun, CumplJell, and the Germans were the muin reserve of
the army, and were in second line, for, fur to the front of them,
on a lower slope, along u curve of the cllau/Jsf:e, lay Crl1ufunl and
the Light Division, looking down on the villttge of Sula almost
III the bottom of the heights. Betwccn CmufLlrd (llld his next
neighbour to the right, Pack, was a curious feature of the field,
a long narrow ravine, with st~p grassy sides, terraced in some
places into dneyards '. This cleft, between Suln. on the left and
)ioura on the right, cuts deep up into the hillside, its head
almost reaching the crest of the walen;hed below the cOllvent.
]11 order to circumvent this precipitous gully, the cha1.WJee, after
passing through the "illage of Mours, takes a semi·circular
curve to the right, and goes round the head of the cleft. :For
half a mile or more it overhangs the steep declivities on its
right, while on its left at this point it is dominated by a pine
wood on the upper slopes, 50 that it forms more or less of a
defile. The gully is so narrow here that guns on Craufurd's
position had an easy range on the road, and enfiladed it most
effectively. The battery attached to the Light Division-that
of Ross-had been placed. in a sort of natural redoubt, formed
by a semi~circ1e of boulders with gaps between; some of the
guns bore on the village of Sula, on the lower slope below,
others across the ravine, to the high-road. They were almost
ill\'isible, among the great stones, to an enemy coming up the
hill or along the cliazmee. Craufurd had got a battalion of his
Cwradores (No. 3) in the village, low down the slope, with his
other Portuguese battalion Ilmi the 95th Rifles strung out on
the hillside above, to support the troops bclo"", them. His two
strong Line buttaliolls, the 43rd and 52nd, were lying fur above,
in the road, at the point where it has passed the head of the
gully in its curve, with a little fir wood behind them and
I This is the feature which Kapier, somewllat hyperbolical!y, describes
as 'a chasm so profound tbut the naked eye could hardly distillguish the
movemeut of troops ill the bottom, yet so narrow in parts that 12-
pounders could rangll acr06S (iii. 21).' It .Ioos /lot, as he snys,selJaratc the
Sllrrade BURSaeo from tl,e last ritlge ill front of it, that wl,icl, llte ~'rencl,
held, as it only lay in front of Crnufurd and Paek. l11ere is no cha@nI
between Spencer's, Pictan's, Leith'@, or Hill's position aud the }'renell
knolls.
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f\ small windmill in their front. The roud being cut through
the hillside here, they were screened R..'i they stood, but had only
to advance a few feet to reach the sky line, and to command the
slope stretching upwards from the village of Sula.
To the left real' of Craufurd's position, und forming the
north-western section of the English line lay Cole's 4th
Division, reaching almost to the vill~rres of Paradas and
Algeriz. Its Portuguese brigade (11th and fl3rd regiments)
was thrown forward on the left under CoIlins, its two English
brigades were at the head of the slope. The ground was
not high, but the slope W!lS vcry steep, and as a matter of fact
was never even threatened, much less attacked.
Sixty guns were distributed along the line of the Serra.
Rass's horse -artillery troop were with Craufurd, Bun's with
Clle; of the field-batteries Ln.wson's was with Pack, Thompson's
\vith Lightbnme, Rettberg's [K.G:L.] with Spencer, Cleeves'
[K.G.L.] with Coleman. There were also four Portuguese field-
batteries; Arclltschildt's was Oil the high-road with Picton,
Dieksoll's two batteries with Hill, Passos's with Colcman, along-
side of Cleeves' German guns. Counting their artillerymen, and
the two squadrons of the 4th Dragoons on the summit of the
plateau, 'Wellington had 52,000 men on the field. Of the rest
of his disposable army, the Portuguese cnvalry brigade (regi-
ments 1, 4, 7, 8; 1,400 sabres under Fane) and one British
regiment (13th Light Dragoons) were beyond the Mondego, far
to the south-east, watching the open country across the Alva as
far ns Foz Dao and Sobral. Their head quarters wercat Fo?: de
Alva. To defend the POlite de Murcella position against all)'
possible Ranking force the French might have detached,
W'cllington had left Le Cor's Portuguese, two regular regi-
ments (Nos. 12 and 13) and three battalions of the Beira
militia. All these troops were ten or twelve miles from the
nearest point nt which a shot was fired, in a different valley. amI
were alike unseeing and unseen. In a similar fashion, far out
to the west, on the other side of the watershed. in the low ground
by Mealhada, was the English cavalry, with the exception of the
one regiment at Foz de Alva alld two squadrons on the Com'ent
ridge.
UeYllier's corps, pushing the English rearguard before it,
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had arrived in front of the BllSSnco position on the afternoon of
September ~5th. When Ney's corps cnme up at dusk Reynier
edged away to the left, and established himself on the low hills
above the hamlet of San Antonio deCantaro, leaving the ground
about the high-road to the 6th Corps. The 8th and Montbrun's
cavalry were still some way behind, beyond Dam!. Jtfassena,
for reasons which it is hard to divine, had not come to the front,
though he must have heard the guns firiDg all through the after-
noon, and Imd been informed by Reyllier that the English were
standing at ha)' on the Bussaco ridge. He came no further to the
front than l\fortagoa on the 25th. Ney on the morn of the next
day was busy reconnoitring the position; he sent fomard
tiraillellr.t to push in Craufurd's outposts, and ventured as far
to the front as was possible. So well hidden was'Vellington's
line that the Marshal formed an entirely erroneous conception
of what was before him. At 10.50 in the morning he wrote
to Reynier to say that the whole English army seemed to be
moving to its left, apparently on the rood towards Oporto,
but that it had still a rearguard, with a dozen guns, in posi-
tion to the right of the park which co\'ers the COll\'ent.
Apparently Cole's division, taking ground to its left on Spencer's
arrival, and Craufurd on the chauasee was all that he had
made out. HC! had not discovCtL'<1 Leith and the 5th Division,
and could not, of course, know that Spencer was at this
moment arriving at the convent, and that Hill was across
the Mondeb"O at Perul Cova.
The Marshal added that if he had been in chief command
he should have attacked whatever was in front of him without
n moment's hesitation I. But things being M they were, he
thought that Reynier would risk nothing by pushing forward
on the English right, and thrusting back Wellington's out-
posts, for it WIIS desirable to make him retreat towards his
left. It is clear that Ney, if he had possessed a free ~nd,
would have brought on a battle, when he was only intending
to drive in a rC!8rguard. For by 10,50 on the 26th Wellington
had every man upon the field whom he intended to use in
the fight, and would have welcomed an assault, Of the :E'rench,
on the other hand, .TUllot's 8th Corps and the cavalry and
I See the letter quoted on page 3.58.
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artillery were still far away to the rear. They only came up
in rear of Ney on the night of the 26th-27th.
Massena, on receiving Ney's report, rode up to the frollt
at about two o'clock on the 26th-a late hour, but he is said to
have beeu employed in private matters at Mortagoll. 1, When he
had at last appeared, he pushed forward as near to the foot of
the British position as was safe, and reconnoitred it with care,
In the evening he drew up orders for attacking the Bussaeo
heights at their most ucces."iblc points-oJong the Chau.8See that
leads from .l\foura up to the convent, alld alollgthe country-road
from San Antonio de Cantaro to l}alheiros.
The Prince of Essling had no hesitation whatever about
risking a battle. He had never seen the English before, and
held concerning them the same views as the other French officers
who had no e.xperienee of Wellington's army. Some confused
generalization from the misfortunes of the Duke of York';,
troops in 1794-5 und 1799 determined the n.ction of nll the
marshals till they had made personal acquaintance with the
new enemy. The English were to be dealt with by drastic
frontal attacks pushed home with real vigour. It is curious, as
Napoleon remarked soon Ilfter 2, that Reynier, who had been
badly beaten by the English at Alexandria and :Maida, had
learnt no more than the others, and committed exactly the same
errors as his colleagues. He, who had experience of his arlver-
sari% Md Ney, who had not, adopted preciscly the snme tactics.
These, indeed, were indicated to them by Massena's order to
attack in columns, each at least a division strong, preceded by
a swarm of tirailleurs. There was no question of a general
advance all along the line; the two Corps-Commanders were
directed to choose each his point, and to break through the
British army at it, by force of mass and impact. Only two
sections of 'VelHngton's nine-mile position were to be touched,
there being a long gap between the objectives USSiglled to Ney
and to Reynier. But by throwing 13,000 or 14,000 men in
close order at each of the two short fronts selected, Massena
thought that he could penctrn.te the thin line of thc defenders.
1 See Marbot, ii. p. 384-if that Ih"e[y writer may be trusted.
~ See For's account ofhis interview with the Emperor in hiB Vie NiJilain,
p. 108.
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As none of the historians of the battle have thought it worth
while to give the Marshal's orders in detail, and many writers
have misconceived or mi5-stated them, it is necessary to state
them I. The attacks of the 2nd and 6th Corps were not to be
simultaneous; Reynier. having the easier ground before him,
was told to move first. He was to select the most accessible
stretch of the hillside in his frault and to climb it, with his
whole corps in one or two columuSt preceded by a skirmishing
line. Having gained the crest, and pierced the British line, he
WllS to re-fofm his men. and then drop down the reverse slope
of the heights on to the Coimbra road, along which he was
to press in the direction of the COllvent of Bussaco, toward the
renr of "Vellington's centre.
Ney was directed not to move till he should have learnt that
Reynier had crowned the heights; but when he should scc the ~nd
Corps on the crest, was to send forward two columns of a division
each against the British lert-eentre. One division was to follow
the chauss&, the other to mount the rough path up the spur Oil
which the village of SulSl. stands. ]loth columns, like those of
the 2nd Corps, were to be preceded by a thick line ofskirmishers.
They wcre to halt and rc·form whcn the crest of the English
position should be carried, and then to adapt their movements
to snit those of Re)'nier's corps.
Junot was to asscmble his two infantry divisions behind
Mourn, and to have them ready to reinforce either Ney or
Reynier as might be needed. His artillery was to be placed on
the knolls on each side of the chall88{~, so tu! to be ablc to hold
back the allied army if, all.cl' repulsing Ne)', it should attempt
a forward movement. Montbrun's cavalry and the reserve
!lrtillery were to be pla<.'Cd on either side of the cllaU8s~e behind
Junot's centre'.
The horsemcn were obviously useless, save that in the event of
"'ellingtou being defeated they could be sent forward in pursuit.
Nor were the guns much more serviceable: they could sweep
the lower parts of the slopes of Bussaco, but could not reach its
Cretolt with their fire. Indeed, the only I"rellch artillery used
I This unpuhlished document from the Archivt8 dll Minis/m de la
GlIeT~ seems to have escaped :.111 historians.
~ 'These orders are printed iu the Appendix.
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successfully on the next day were two battcrh.:s which Ncy's
columns of attack took with them along the cha'Ulaee, t\S far a.~
the elbow of road in front of Moura. These were in effective
range of Craufurd's and Pack's troops, since the latter were on
a level with them, and not on the highest crest of the British
position. Reynier's guns could just reach the summit of the
pass of San Antonio de Cantaro, but not so as to play upon it
with any good result.
It is suid that Junot and Reynier were in favour of trying the
frontal attack which Massena had dictated, as was also Laszowski,
the Polish general who commanded the engineers of the anny.
Fririon, the chief of the staff, and EbIe, commanding the
artillery, spoke against the policy of "taking the bull by the
horns.' Massena, according to Fririon, turned on the doubters
with the words' You come from the old Army of. the Uhine,
you like mtl.nreuvring; but it is the first time that Wellington
seems ready to give batlle, and I want to profit by the
opportunity I,' Ney, too, as we read with some surprise, is said
to have given the opinion that it would have been feasible to
assault the heights yesterday, but that now, when Wellington
had been given time to bring up his rescnes and settle his army
down into the most advantageous position, the policy of taking
the offensive had become doubtful. He therefore advised that the
army should turn aside and make a stroke at Oporto, which
would be found unprotected save by militia. Massenll, aecording
to his official biographer, announced' that the Emperor had
ordered him to march on Lisbon, not 011 Oporto. This was
cntirely correct: the capture of Lisbon 1V0uld end the whole
war, t1~t of Oporto would prolong it, and bring no decisive
result. Moreover. it was quite uncertain .whether 'Vellington
would not be able to pre\'cnt such a move. He has troops
echelloned as far. as the Vouga, and he could get to Oporto in
three marches, because he possesses the Oporto-CoimbradlUu.8,~ee,
while the French army, moving by worse roads, would require
five marches to reach it.' It is snggested that Ney's policy was
1 So Fririoll in his Cam]lagll~ de Ponugal, p. 47. But bis enemy Pelet
say~ (Vie. et Conq., xxi. p. 321) tbat Ney, like Ileynier, 'delllanda la
lI:ltaille a grauds cris.' Cf., ful' what it is worliJ, Marbot's tale,
ii.384.
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really to goad his superior into making the frontal attack at
Bussaco, by feigning to believe it dangerous and to counsel its
abandonment. For he thought that Massena would do precisely
the opposite of what he was advised, out of his personal dislike
for himself, and general distaste for having counsel thrust upon
him. If this was so, the Duke of Elchingen carried his point-
to the entire discomfiture both of himself and his commander-
in-chief I.
On the ~6th, after Masseua had retired to his head quarters
at l\:lortagoa, there was a little skirmishing on the English
right-centre, where Reynier's adwUlced guard drove the light
company of the 88th oft' some knolls at the foot of the
heights. opposite San Antonio de Cantara. Much ubout the
same time there was some bickering on Ney's front: the pickets
of Pack's 4th Calfadores and Craufurd's 95th were attacked, but
held their ground. The (."Outest was never very: serious and the
fire died down at dusk. That e\'ening the British army slept
in order of battle, 'each man with his nrelock in his grasp at
his post. There were no fires, and the death-like stillness that
reigned throughout the line was only interrupted by the
occasionAl challenge of an advanced sentry, or El. random shot
fin.'<i at some imaginary foe.' Below and ill front, all the
low hills behind Mount and San Antonio were bright with the
bivouac fires of the French, of which three bITeat masses could
be distinguished, marking the position of the 2nd, 6th, and
8th Corps~.
The dawn of the 27th was somcwhat mist)" but as soon as
the light wa., strong enough Re)'nier commenced his attack. He
had chosen for his objective, as was natural, the lowest point
of the ridge opposite him, the dip where the counlry-road from
San Antonio de Cantaro crosses the wm. His two divisions,
according to order, werc drawn up in two heavy columns pre-
ceded by 0. delisc swarm of t'irailleul'8. Heudelet's di \'ision 011
the left WM across the high-road, with the 31st LCger in front,
then the two regiments of Fay's brigade, the 70th and 17th
Leger, with the 47th in reserve. The whole made 15 battalions,
I All this is told at great length in Koch's Vie de MlU8titlll, vii. p. 102,
where the Council of 'Var is described with lIlall)' details.
~ Grattan's Adcellturt<l with tile 88t1" PI" 2B-!), and Leith lIay, i. ~31.
0 ....,.. '" H b
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or 8,000 men. Merlc's division had the right, amI was to attack
north of the rood: of its eleven battalions, making 6,500 men,
the 56th of the Line led, the 2nd Leger followed, the 4th Uger
brought up the rear. All the battalions were in serried column
with a front of onc company only, Ilnd in each regiment the
three, or four, battalions were originally drawn up one behind
the other. But the involuntary swerving of the attack soon
turned the two divisions into an irregular echelon of battaliou-
columns, the right in every case leading. And the roughness
of the hillside soon broke the ordered ranks of each column
into a great clump of men, so that to the British defenders
of the ridge the ussuult sccmed to be delivered by tl. striJlg of
small crowds crossing the hillside di8.0"'Oually. It is curious
that Reyllier placed no troops to his left of the road; a study
of his orders (as of those of MasseDa I) leads to a suspicion
that they had failed to discover Leith's division, and still more
Hill's, and imagined that the road was 011 the extreme right,
no~.in the right-centre, of the British position. Otherwise
Rcynier would havc taken somc precaution to guard himself
from a flank attack from Leith, to which he was deliberately
exposing his left <.'Olumn.
There were, as hus already been pointed out, several gaps in
the nine-mile British line. One was between the 8th regiment
of Fortuguese, on Leith's extreme left, and the rest of the 5th
Division, Another was between Pictol1's. troops at the pass
of San Antonio and his left wing-the 88th and Lightburne's
brigade. Between the 45th and the 88th there was three-
quarters of a mile of unoccupied ground, The first gap led to
no danger, the second caused for a moment a serious crisis.
Such was indeed almost bound to occur when a line so long was
held by such a small anny. But this morning there arose the
special danger that fog hid the first movements of the enemy
from the eye, if not from the Cllr.
Merle's division seems to have been the first of Ueynier's two
columns to move: at dawn, with the mist lying thick on the
hillside, it began to move up the steep slope some thrcc-<} uarters
1 i\Illss~na's orders for the hattle call I{e)'nier's attack one 011 'la
droite de l'arnlfEe cnuemie,' but it ""as really 011 the right-ccntre, Hill
and Leith extending for four miles south of tlle point assailed.
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of a mile to the right of the San Antonio-Palbeiros road. Here
its tirailleura came in contact with the light companies of the
74th, 88th, und 45th regiments, which were strung out along thc
front, and soon began to push this thin line up hill. Por some
reason undetermined~a trick of the mist, or ll. bend of the
hillside-the three French regiments all headed somewhat to
their left, so as to pass across the front of the 88th, and to
direct their advance precisely to the unoccupied piece of crest
between that regiment and the troops placed immediately
above the pass of San Antonio. Their proh'TesS was slow: the
t';raillcllr8 left mr behind thcm the clc\'l;~1l battalion-colulllns,
which were trampling through the dense matted heather which
here covers the hillside. Hearing the bicker of the skirmishing
far to his left, Picton took the ulllrm, und though he could see
nothing in the fog, detached first a wing of the 45th under
Major Gw}"nne, and then the two battalions of the 8th Portu-
guese, to fill the ulloecupicd space which intervened betwecn
him and the 88th. If he had suspected the strength of the
colmnn that was aiming at it he would have sent more. But
he Wtl.'l already distractL'<I. by the frontal attack of Heudclet's
vallb'llilrd along the high-road. A column of four battaliolls-
the 31st Uger-was pushing up the road, and driving in the
skirlllishehl of Champlcmond's Portuguese bri/:,1lulc. Just at
this moment the mist began to lift, and Arentschildt's guns
opened on the broad mass, and began to plough long lanes
through it. It stillll.dvBnced, but was sooiJ brought to a stand-
still by the fire of the British 74th and Portuguese ~lst, which
were drawn up in line to right and left, a little below the guns.
The 31st Leger tried to deploy, but with small success, each
section being swept away by the converging fire of the Anglo-
Portuguese musketry, as it strove to file out of the disordered
mu;;,<;. Neverthck'SS, the French regiment f,JUllantly held its
ground for some time, shifting gradually towards its right to
avoid the fire of the guus, and gaining a little of the hillside in
thll.t dirL'Ctioll with its first battalioll, while the other three
were tending to edge away from the road, and to break up into
a shapeless crowd 1.
I The M':moira of Lernonnicr Dclllfossc, a captain ill the 31st Uger, give
an excellent and clear account of its sufferings, see Pll. 69-70 of hiB work.
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Picton soon saw that there was no danger here, handed over
the command I\.t the Pass of San Antonio to Mackinnon, and
started oft'towards his left, where the firing was growing heavier
every minute, and the vast column of i\ferle's division, climbing
the hillside diuJ:,"OlluJly. had become visible through tIle mist.
It was fortunate that the attack of :M:erle was made vcr), s.low
by the steepness of the hillside and the heather that clung about
the soldiers' stumbling feet. For the leading regiment reached
the crest before there were any British troopii yet established on
the point at which it aimed. It was lurching over the ~ky*lil1e
on to the little plateau above, just as the defenders arrived-the
88th descending from the British left, the wing of the 45th and
the two battalions of the 8th Portuguese mming along the bill-
road from the right. If tJ1C French had been granted tell
minutes to rest from the fatigue of their long climb, and to
ieCO\'er their order, they might haye broken the British line.
Hut 'Wallace, the mmmander of the 88th, was one of Wellington's
best colonels, the ycry lllall fur the emergency. Seeing that the
French must be cha.rged at once, ere they had time to make
a front, he threw out three of his companies as skirmishers to
cover his flanks, called to the wing of the 45th to fall in on his
right, and charged diagonally IlCroSS the little plateau Oil to the
flank of the great disordered mns.~ before him. At the iiame
moment the 8th l'orlugue5Ct a little furtber along the hilltop,
deployed and opened a rolling fire, against the front of the
enemy, while Wellingtun himself, who had been called down
from his post of observation on the Convent height by the noise
of the fighting, came up with two of '1'hompson's guns, and
turned their fire upon the flank and rear of the climbing mass,
which was still surging up the hillside. ApparclItly at the
same instant the light companies of the 45th and 88th, which
had been engaged in the earlier skirmishing with the l~rench
tirailleurs, and had been driven far away to their right, were
rallied by Pieton in pcr.;Oll, and brought up Illong the plateau,
to the right of the 8th Portuguese. They drew up only sixt)"
yards from the flank of the leading French regiment, and opened
a rolling fire upon it.
At any other juncture llnd on any other ground, four
battalions would have been helpless against eleven. But Wal·
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lace had caught the psychological moment: the French S6th,
dead beat from its climb, and in hopeless disorder, was violentl)'
charged in flank by the Connaught Rangers and the wing of
the 45th, while it Wll.~ just gathering itself up to run in upon
the Portuguese battalions that lay in its front. The French
had no time to realize their position, or to mark the smallness
of the force opposed to them, when the blow fell. The four
battalions of the 36th wcre rolled down 'hill and to their left
by the blasting fire of Wal1u.ce's little forcl', followed by a
desperate bayonet charge. They were thrust sideways against
the 2nd lAger, which was just reaching the sky-line on their left,
and was begitlllillg to struggle in among some ['ocks which here
crown the crest of the heights. Then the whole mass gave way,
trampled down the 4th UgcI' in their rear. and rushed down the
slope. 'All was confusion nnd uproar, lillloke, fire, und bullets,
French officers and soldiers, drummers and drums, knocked
down in every direction; British, }'rench, and Portuguese mixed
together; while in the midst of nil was to be seen ""Vallace
fighting like his l!ncestor of old, and still calling to his soldiers
to .. press forward." He never slackened his fire while a French·
man was within his reach, and followed them down to the
edge of the hill, where he fonned his men in line waiting for
any order that he might receive, or any fresh body that might
attack him 1,' This was certainl}' one of the most timely and
gallant strokes made by a regimental commander during the
war, and the glor)' was all WalIace's own, fUj Pictoll vcry hand·
somelyowned. 'The Colonel of the 88th and !Hajor Gwynne
of the 45th arc entitled to the whole of the credit; he wrote to
'I\Tellington, •and [can claim no merit whatever in the executive
part of that brilliant exploit, which your Lordship has so highly
and so justly extolIed 2,'
The victorious British troops followed the enemy far down
the hillside, till they mmc undcl' the fire of Rcynicl"s artillery,
I Grattan's Adt¥1ll11re 'lCilh IM OQll11ulIght Ranger" p. 35.
2 Picum to '''cllilLgton, SlIppkmelltll7'JIIJitljHlld<eif, I'i. 11, G:j5. 1 do not
know whether Wallace really descended from tIle famous Sir 'Villiam,
but CrauCurd of the Light Division (as his descendant find biographer
lla;; Jlointed uut Lu me) c]uUlcl...1 to l1aI'e a cOlJuexion with till.! Knight
of EUerslie,
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and were warlled to retire to their former position. They thus
missed the last episode of Reynier's attack, which occurred along
the hillside just to the left of the point at which their collision
with Merle's battaliolls had taken place. The Commander of
the ~nd Corps, seeing his right column rolling down the slope,
while the 31st was melting away. and gradually giving ground
under the fire of the Anglo-Portuguese troops at the Pass of
San Antonio, hurried to Fay's brigade and started it up the hill
to the right of the 31st. }?oy had been told to support that
regiment, but had taken Reynier's orders to mean that he was
to follow up its advance whell it began to make heudway. His
Corps-Commander ca.nteroo up to him shouting angrily, 'Why
don't you start on the climb? You could get the troops. for-
ward if you choose, but you don't choose: Whereupon Foy
rode to the leading L'egiment of his brigade, the 17th ugcr,
put himself at it.s head, and began to ascend the heights, his
other regiment, the 70th, following in echelon on his left l'ear.
At this moment Merle's division was still visible, falling back
in great disorder some vmy to the right, and pursued by \Vallace
-ll, discouraging sight for the seven battalions that were about
to repeat its experiment. Fo)' chose as his objective the first
and lowest hilltop to the French right of the pass of San
Antonio, and took his string of columns, the right always lead-
ing, IIp towards it at such pace as was possible over the long
heather, and among the occasional patches of stones. The
troops which were in front of them here were those sections of
Picton's divisioll which were neither far away on the English
left with Wallace and Lightburnc, nor acti\'ely cngaged on the
road against the gIst Leger, viz. the right wing of the British
45th under Colonel Meade, and the Portuguese 8th of the Line
which had just been aiding in the repulse of l\ferle. These were
soon afterwllrds joined by onc battalion of the 9th Portuguese
from Chmnplemond's brigade, and the unattached battalion of
Thomar militia, which Picton sent up the hill. Yet this was
still far too small Ia force to resist Foy's seven battalions, unless
speedily supportl..>d.
Dut support in sufficient quantity WllS forthcoming. Geueral
Leith had receh'ed orders from Wellington to close in to Pic::ton's
right if he saw no hostile troops ill his own front. As it was
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clear that Reynier had kept no reserves or flanking det.achmenb
to the south of the higll-road, it was possible for the 5th Division
to move at once 1, 'Vhile the fog was still hanging thickly
along the crests of the Serra, Leith ordered a general move of
his brigades to the left, while Hill detached troops from the
southern end of tbe position to occupy the heights which the
5th Division was evacuating, This general move to the left
was carried out along the rough but serviceable country-road
which passes along the rear of the plateau, out of sight of the
French, At the moment when Foy's attack was beginning,
Leith had just rcached the Pass of San Antonio, with Spry's
Portuguese brigade at the head of his column, then the two
battalions of the Lusitanian legion, and lastly, Barnes's British
brigade, One of Dicksoll's Portub'llesc batteries was also with
him. He dropped the guns at the pass to aid Arentschildt's
battery, whose fire was beginning to slacken from want of
ammunition, and left Spry in their rear and the Legionary
battalions on the l..'Ountry-road hard by, while he brought up
llames's brigade to the front, and reported his arrival to Picton,
The latter said, it appears, that he was strong enough at the
Pass, but would be obliged if Leith would attend to the attack
which was being made at this moment on the height to its
immediate left 2. This movcment of Fay's 'I'M now hcl..'Oming
I Leith's nephew and aide-d~amp, Leith Hay, had explored all the
villages in this direction on thl! previous afternoon, wiUI a squadron of
Portuguese horse, see his Narralit'IJ, i. 3m.
, Picton llnd Leith each rather slur over the pnrt taken by the
otller in their parallel narratives of the crisis. Picton says that he
took command of Leith's troops: 'at this moment Major-General Leith's
aide-de-camp came Ull to report the arrival of that general and his
division, on which J rode from the post of San Antollio to the road of
communication, and directed tile leading regiment of the brigade to
proceed Without loss of time to the lea, as I had no occasion for
assistance. General Leith's brigade, in consequence, moved on and
arrived ill time to join the five companios of the 4lith and tho 8th l'ortu-
guese in repulsing the enemy's last attempt.' Leith, Oil the other hand,
spenks of haviug taken command of some of Picton's troops, as if the
latter had Dot been present, and s,"lys lIougllt oftlleir conversatiOIl. 'Major-
General Leith thereupon directed a mO\'ement of succession, ordering
Colonel Douglas with the ri/o\"ht battalion of the 8th Portuguese re support
the point attacked. He also directed tIle 9th Portuguese under ColoJle(
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dangerous: forcing his way to the summit under a. destructive
l1re, he had met on the edge of the plateau the three Portuguese
battalions and the wing of the British 45th, and had driven
them back-the 'l'homar militia broke and fled down the rear
declivity of the heights. and the 8th Portuguese, though they
did not tly. gave way and fell back in disorder. Just at this
moment Leith, with Barncs's three battalions, came up along
the eommunication-road at the back of the plateau. 'A heavy
fire of musketry,' writes Leith, 'was being kept up upon the
heights, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state
of things. But when the rock forming the high part of the
Scrm became visible, the enemy appeared to be in full possession
of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering, with his
hat off, while a continued fire was being kept up from thence,
and along the whole face of the slope of the Serra, in a diagonal
direction towards its bottom, by the cnemy ilSCcnding rapidly
in successive columns, formed for an attack upon a mass
of men belonging to the left battalion of the 8tJ't and the
9th Portnguese, who, having been severel). pressed, had given
way, and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and
disorder. 'I'he enemy had dispersed or driven oR' everything
opposed to him-was in possession of the rocky eminence of the
Serra.' A few of his tirailleurs were cven on the upper edge of
the rear slope.
Leith, realizing that there was still time to save the position
-for only the head of thc E'rench column had crowned the
rocky knoll,-dcploycd his leading battalion, the 9th, across the
summit nf the plateau, while sending 011 his second, the 88th, to
get between the enemy and the revel-se slope of the position.
This last move tunlOO out to he fruitless, for the rear face of
the knoll is so steep and so thickly <:ovcred with large boulders 1,
Sutton (belonging to Major-General l'ieton'lI dh'isiun) to mov<lllJl tu the
support of General J'icton's division; and again, 'He (General Leith)
ordered the Bth aud 9th Portuguese to support the point attacked, and
where the enemy were tll.St gaining ground.' K'lch general speaks as if
he had been ill command, aud I fear that encll is using undue reticence as
to the other's doings. See note at the end of this chapter.
l Napier calls it a 'prL'dpicc,' hut thi.q is 1I0t tllll ri/{IJt word. I foulld
tbat I could walk freely about Oil it, but no formed body of Il\ell could
hllve passed up Ule slope.
1810] REYNIER'S LOSSES 3i7
that the 88th was unable to climb it, and came back to fall ill
on the right of the 9th. But before it could get back, the senior
regiment had done its work. Leith had led it diagonally across
the plateau, so as to place it along the flank of the leading
battalions of Foy's column, of which the first was now ensconced
011 the summit of the heights, while the others were struggling
up to join it. The 9th opened with a volley at 100 yards, amI
then advanced firing, receiving hardly any return from the
enemy, who seemed entirely disconcerted by the appearance of
u. new force parallel with its flank. At twent)' yards from the
French, the 9th lowered its bayonets and prepared to charge,
L€ith riding at its head waving his plumed hat. Then the
enemy gave way. 'My heroic column,' writes Fo)', • mnch
diminished during the ascent, reached the summit of the plateau,
which was covered with hostile troops. Those on our left made
fl. flank movcment and smashed ns up by their battalion volleys;
meanwhile those on our front, co\'ered by some rocks, were
murdering us with impunit),. The head of my column fell
back to ih right, despite my eflorts; I could not get them to
deplo)" disorder set in, and the 17th and 70th raced down-
hill in headlong flight. The enemy pnrsned us half-way to the
foot of the heights, till he pulled up on coming under effective
fire from our artillery I.'
The battle wus now over on this side: Reynier had in reserve
only one regiment, the 47th of the Line. His other twenty-
two battalions had all been beaten to pieces; they had loot
over 2,000 men, including more thuu half their superior officcrs:
Merle commanding the 1st Division was wounded, his junior
brigadier Graindorge was killed; :Fo.v, commanding the first
brigade of the other di\'isioll, was wounded. Of the six colonel..
who had gone up the heights, those of the 31st LCger, 2nd lAger,
4th lAger, and 70th had been hit: of thc twenty-three battalion
commanders four wel"£: killed, sevell wounded. Of 421 omce~
in all who went into I\ctiOIl, llB-more than oue in four-had
been disabled. Of the 2,003 casualties, 850 men and fifteen officers
were prisoners ill the hands of the British. And these losses
1 Foy's diary, pp. 103-4, tallies exactly with Leith's narratil'c ill
Wellillg/oll Supplementary lJia/JII/cJINI, vi. (ji8, aud Cllmeron's letter ill
Napier, Appendix to \'01. vi.
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had been suftered without inflicting any corresponding loss upon
the defenders of the position: Picton's division had ~7 killed
and wounded; Leith's 160. The only regiments appreciably
diminished were the 45th, 88th, and Portuguese 8th-with 150,
134, and 113 casualties respectively. The only superior officers
hit were the Portuguese brigadier Champlemond, and a major
each in the 45th and 88th. Of the 81'0 und 5th Divisions only
six British and five Portuguese battalions had been engaged 1_
the superiority of force against them had been about two to one.
Yet Reynier complained in his dispatch to Masseua of being
crushed by 'a triple superiority of numbers'! AJ> a matter of
fact, it was the position that beat him, not the imagined numbers
of the allies. \Vellington could risk much in taking up a long
line, when he had a good road of commWlication along its real',
to shift troops from point to point, and when he could descry
every movement of the enemy half an hour before it began to
take effect.
The other half of the battle of Bussaco was an even shorter
business than Rcynier's struggle with Pictoll and Leith, but no
less bloody and decisive. Neye."<actly obeyed Massena's orders
to attack, with two divisions, the ground on each side of the
Coimbra cha1Us{'C, when he should sec the 2nd Corps lodged on
the crest beside the puss of San Antonio de Cuutaro. The many
reproaches heaped upon him, by critics who have not read his
orders, for attacking too late, and not at the same moment as
Reynier, are groundless: he was told to go forward only when
his colleague' sera maitre des hauteurs.' He mm·ed precisely
when the dispersing mists showed Merle's great column massed
011 the edge of the plateau. Of his three divisions he had, again
in cxact obedience to orders, placed Loison on the right, Mnr-
chand on the left, while l\lermet was ill reserve, behind Mourn.
The two fighting divisions were completely separated by the
I Viz. British: Mackinnon's l/00th, l/40tll, 74th, Barnes's 3/lst, 1/0th,
2/38th. Portuguese: CI18mplcmonu'R 9th Linc (2 blltta.) IInd 21st Line
(1 batt.), with the 8th from Leith's division (2 batta.). Spry's brigade
and the Lusitauian Legion from Leith were never under fire, and did not
1000 a man. Pictoll's left brigade (Lightburne) was never engaged, !;;lve
that tlle light companies of tlle 5th allll fi3rd, far down the slope, lost
eight and four llIeu respectively. The Thomar militi:1 bolted before
coming under fire.
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deep and steep ravine of which we have had occasion to speak.
The ground ill front of them WM very diffel'ent: Marchaud had
to advance, by rather gentle slopes, along the chaussee, which
curves up towards the convent of Bussaoo. Loison had to go
up a hillside of a very different sort, whose lower stretch, as far
as the village of Sula, is gentle, and much cut up by woods and
orchards, but whose upper half, beyond Sula, is extremely steep
und absolutely destitute of cover. There WliS no road here, only
n rough mule-track.
Loisou slluied a few minutes before Marchand: he had his
two brigades side by side, Simon's (six battalions) on the right,
Ferey's (also six battalion!» on the left. Both started from the
low ground in front of Suia, each with a strong chain oftirailkurs
covering an advance ill serried battalion columns; the 26th
l'egimcnt was the lending regiment in Simon's, the 66th in
Ferey's brigade. On leaving the bottom, and advancing among
the trees on the lower slope, both brigades fouud their tirailleurs
at oncc checked by u very strong skirmishing linc. Pack
had spread out the whole of the 4th Cas-adores on the hill:side
in front of his line battalions. Croufurd bad thrOlm out the
95th-more than 700 rifles~and the Srd ~'adores~600 rifles
more-into the enclosme.s in front of Sula. The 43rd and 52nd,
with the 1st Cayadores, were lying down in the hollow road at
the head of the steep slope above thnt villagc, completely
concealed from sight. Of formed troops, Loisoll could only sec
tlle 1st Division far above him on the left on the highest plateau
of the Serra, and Cole far away to his right all the lower hill-
sides towards Ptu'll.das. In order to press in the obstinate light
troops in front of him, Loison was compelled to push forward
whole battalions from his fighting-line: by a strenuous use of
these, the Cru;adores und Riflcs were evicted first from the lower
slopes, then from the village of Sula. Dut when the latter had
been captured, the French found themselves under a heavy fire
of artillery: noss's guns on the knoll above, between their
emhrasmes of rock, being carefully trained upon the exits of
the village, while Clceves' German battery joined in from its
position at the head of the ravine, and took Ferey in flank. It
was impossible to hult in Sula, nnd Loison ordered his brigadiers
to push forward the attack once more, taking !loss's ~uns and
&l0 THE BA'l"l'LE DE' BUSSACO [S~PT, 2j
the windmill near them as their objective. The slope was now.
much steeper, the British and Potiuguesc skirmishers had rallied
once more above Sula, and Craufurd had sent down the
Ist ~adores to feed the fighting-line. It was only with
a severe effort, and with much loss, that the French battalions
won their way up the culminating slope. Simou's front regiment,
the Wth of the Line. stuck to the mule-path up the hill from
Sula, in OllC dense llnd deep column, with the front of [I, compnn)'
only. amI (l depth of thn.'C battalions. Ferey'ii brigade, having
no track to follow, seems to have moved in a somewhat less
vicious formation along the slope further to the left, bordering
on the northern edge of the funnel-like ravine which fonned
the boundary of Craufuro's position. Both were in u. vcry
disordered condition, owing to the fierce conflict which they
had waged with the screen of Rifles and ~adores all up the
hillside.
Lying in the hollow rolld parallel with the hend of the ravine
were the two Line regiments of the Light Division, the 4Srd on
the right, the 5~nd on the left. They were very strong bat-
talions, despite their losses at the Coa, the one having 800 the
other 950 bayonets. In front of them, on the skyline by the
little windmill, to the right of Ross's f,'1lllS, Crauful-d had been
standing all through the earlier stages of the engagement,
watching the gradual progress of the French up the hillside.
He waited patiently till the enemy's two columns, a few hundred
yards apart, had reached the last steep of the hillside below
him. His recoiling skirmishers were at last thrnst in upon qim
-they passed, some to the flanks, some through the intervals
between the battalions and the gUllS, and the front was clear.
Then cnme the opportunity; the French, pulling themselves
together, were preparing to rush up the last twenty yards of the
ascent and to run in upon the guns, when Craufurd waved his
hat to the battalions lying in the road behind him, the appointed
signal for action, and (it is said) called to the men behind him
• Now 5::lnd, revenge the death of Sir John Moore,' The crest
was at once covered by the long red line, and the fronts of
the French brigades received such a volley at ten pa.ces as has
been seldom endured by any troops ill war. The whole of the
heads of their columns crumbled away in a mWlS of dead and
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dying. The centre and rear stood appalled for one moment;
then :Major Arbuthllot wheeled in three companies of the 5~nd
upon the right flank of Simon's leading regiment, while Lloj"d
ofthe43l'd did the same upon the extreme left, so as to produce
a semicircle of fire I. It was impossible to stand under it, and
the French broke and went hurtling down the hill, the wrecks
of the front battnlions carrying the rear ones awny with them.
So steep wa.q the slope on their left that some are said to have
lo~t their footing and to have rolled dO~'n to the bottom of the
ravine before they could stop. The Light Division followed as
far as Sula, and beyond, not stopping till Loison's people had
taken refuge in the wooded ground beyond that village, and
the French gUllS by Mourn had begun to play upon their
pursuers. The rush had carried away the whole of the enemy,
sa\'e one battalion upon l"erey's extreme left, which had moved
so far down in the slope of the ravine that it had become
separated from the rest. This solitary column, pressing forward,
came to the skyline not in front of Craufurd, but at the \'ery
head of the ravine, below Cleeves' battery. Here it was dealt
with by the leading unit of Colemall.s l>ortuguC!:lC brigade,
whicll was standing in line near the CltallS3ec. The 1st battalion
of the 19th regiment, under l\'1ajor l\IcBean, charged it and rolled
it back into the cleft, down whose bottom it hastily recoiled,
aud joined the rest of the flying division.
I A passage of Kllllier's account of the movements of the Light Dhi-
sioll (Hi. 27) hllS puzzled mallY readers. 'Eighteen hundred British
bayonets weot sparkling o\"er the brow of the hill. Yet ~o hardy were tJlt:!
leading French that el'ery man of the first scction raised his musket, aud
two officersalL\1 ten 80liliers (of the 52lHl) fell oofore t1lem. Not a French-
man had missed llis mark!' This passage looks as if the wIlole FreucIl
dh'isioo Jmd bceu c()l)ceived by Napier as moving ill a single column with
a front of only twelve meu. An eye-witues!, Sir John Dell, of tIle 52nd,
11'110 owned the copy of the book wllich J tlOW bn\'c before me, has writteu
llosh! iu the Imlrgin against the words. Of course the enemy was
ad,'ancing with each battalion in column of companies, with a front of
thirty at least. '\'hnt Nnpicr seems to ha\'e had in Ilis head was 811
anecdote told by hil:l brother George (AutobWgrapJJY, p, 143). < My company
met the "ery head of the ,French column, and immediately calling to my
lDClI to form column of scctiOlll:l, in order to give more force to our rush,
we dashed forward. 1 was in front of my men a yard or two, wllen a
Frenchman made a plunge at me with his bayouet, and at the same time
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'I'his made an end of Loison's two brigades as a serious attack.
ing force. They reeled back to their original position, under
cover of the 25th Ugcr, which Mcrmct scnt out to relieve
them. But later in the da;y they pushed some skirmishers
up the hill again, and bickered with Craufurd's outposts.
,,,ellington, seeing that the Light Division was fatigued, sent
the light companies of LOwe's German brigade and A. Camp-
bell's 6th Caoyadores, from the reserves, to take up the
skirmishing. It stood still about Sula, but the }?rench got a
few men into the villaf.,te, whom Crnufurd had to evict with
a company of the 43rd.
Loison lost, out of 6,500 men used in the attack, twenty-one
officers killed and forty-seven wounded, with some 1,200 men.
His senior brigadier, Simoll, wus wOllnded in the fw..'C, and taken
prisoner by a private of the 5flnd. The loss of the Light
Division was maryellously small-the Srd Cll)adores and the
95th, who had fought through the long skirmish up the hill,
had scventy~eight and forty~one casualties respectively, but the
4Srd and 5!2nd had the astounding record of only three mell
killed, and two officers and eighteen men wounded. McBean's
Portuguese battalion lost one officer and twenty-five men: the
Gennan light companies had nearly fifty casualties, but this
was later in the day. Altogether, Loison's attack was repelled
with a loss of only !200 men to the allies.
It only remains to tell of onc mOl-c section of the Dattlc of
Dussaco; it was entirely independent of the rest. When Ney
started Loison to his right of the deep ravine, he had sent
forward Mllrchand's division to his left of it. along the great
CM/lBBee. On turning the sweep of the road beyond Moura, the
leading brigade of this column (6th UgCI' and 69th Line, five
battalions) came under a terrible artillery fire from the three
batteries which Wellington had placed at the head of the ravine,
thoscofCleeves, Parros, and Lawson. They, nevertheless, pushed
along the road till they came level with a small pine wood on
their left, which was full of the !ikirmishers of Pack's Portuguese
I recejved tlle contents of his musket under my hip and fell. At ilie
same instant they fired upon my fmnt sCl:tion, con!li!ltillg of about lIiuu
men in the front rank, ail of whom fell, four dead, the rest wouuded.'
But tlJis does lIot imply tllat the French column was only tweh'e broad.
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brigade-the whole of the 4th Cn~ores had been sent down
into it from the height t\bovc. The fluuking fire of these light
tmops wns so galling that the French brigade-apparently
without orders and by an instinctive movement-swerved to its
left, and went up the hillside to turn the Cm;adorcs out of their
cover. After a sharp bickering they did so, and then emerging
from the wood on to the smooth slope of the height below the
convent wall, got into t\ dcspeml:e musketry duel with Pack's
four Line-battalions, who stood in front of them. 111Cy were
now in disorder, and their brigadier, Maucune, had been wounded.
But they made several attemlJts to storm the hillside, which
were all beaten back by the Portuguese musketry and the tire of
La.wson's artillery OD the right. The &,.'Colld brigade of Mar-
chand (that of l\furcognet) pushed as far along the road as the
preceding brigade had gone, but stopped when it came under
the fire of Cleevcs' and Parros's guns, to which that of ltoss's
(from acros,<; th~ ravine) was also added, when Loison\ attack
had been beaten off: Seeing that ~Iarchaud was making no
headway, that Loison had been routed, and that lleynier's corps
was out of action, Ney called back his column, which fell back
behind Moura. Maucune's brif,rade had suffered scyerely-it had
lost its brigadier, the colonel of the 6th Leger, and thirty-three
othcr officers with SOlTle 850 mcn. The rear brigade (l\farcognet's)
had suffered less-its casualty list. however, was fully 300 killed
and wounded. There had been a little skirmishing meanwhile
oppo~ite ,"Vellington's ccntre, for during the llmin at.tack Ncy hod
sent forward some voltigeur companies from his reserves to occupy
the line of skirmishers at the foot of the heights, which Spencer's
ht Division had tlm}wl! out. 'l11CSC two thin screens of light
troops paired oft' against each other, and contended all the
morning with some loss, but no appreciable advantage all either
side 1.
I Sprliuglill, Ney's aide-de-camp, gives all accoullt of his hcillg dctacllcd
with these voltigeurs, ou p. 450 of hia diary. He lost 142 men. It must
113ve been in contending with tlle&e companies that the Ist Division
(c.lcluding tlll~ Gcrman brigade, occupied elsewhere) got tlle HI) casulLHic8
returned by \Vellington, as also tlle 5/GO t1leir 24 casualties. l11e only
onc of the British battalions in this quarter which had an appreciable
uumber of meu hurl was tllC I/79tiJ. Its regimental history ss.ys tliat itil
light company l1'as almost cut off at the commencemeut of t1le day. 'l1Ie
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Massena still had it in his power to attack again, tor Mermet's
division of the 6th Corps, and the whole of Junot's 13,000
infantry Imd not yet ud\'lmced and had hardly lost a man. But
the result of Ney'sand Reynicr's efforts had been so disheartening
that the Marshal refused to waste more lives on what was clearly
a hopeless enterprise. He could now see 'Vellington's arm)"
eoncentrated on the two points tlmt had been attacked. Hill's
heavy column of 10,000 men had now lined the heights on
Leith's right: Cole had edged the 4th Division close in to
Craufurd's left, and Coleman and the Germans were visible in
the rear. If Massena had still 20,000 fresh infantry, the English
general had 8S,000 who had not yet come up into the fighting-
line. It was useless to persist. Accordingly, the skirmishing
along Ney's front was allowed to die down in the afternoon,
and the French divisions retired to their camps.
The total loss of Vve1lill!,rl-,on's army bud been ],25£ officers
and men, of whom 200 were killed, ],001 wounded, and fifty-one
missing. No officer over the rank of a major had been killed:
and the only senior officers wounded were the Portuguese
brigadier Chmnplcmoud and Colonel Barclay of thc 52n<1. Of
the casualties, 626 were in the ranks of the Dritish, 626 in those
of the Portuguese regiments-a strange coincidence in the losses
of the two allied armie!\. The }lortuguese line, indeed, had
done their fail' half of the fighting, us the return showed-in
no instance with discredit, in some with high merit. If the 8th
and 9th Portuguese had broken before l'oy's attack, it was
under severe stress, and when attacked by superior numbers.
On the other hand, Pack's brigade, Colcultlu's 19th, and the
Ctu;-adores of the Light Division won the highest praises from
their commanders, and had taken a most di!\tinguished part in
the victory_ Wellington now knew exactly how far they could
be trusted, and could estimate at last the real fighting value of
his army-ut lenst, for a defcnsi\'c battle in choscn fllld favour-
able ground. It would 00 another matter to calculate how tar
the allied host was capable of taking the offensive.
The totulloAA of the French, as shown by the return-which
capt3iu was taken prisoner-being the only British officer caJltured that
day-with si" lIlen, and there were over 40 other casualties. Stop{ord'~
hrigado lo~t two mcn-Lofll Blaut}'re's I!CI'Cll.
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was not quite L'Omplcte-prescnted to Mass~Ilo. 011 October 1,
was 4,498, of whom 522 were killed, g,61~ wounded, and 364
missing (i.e. prisoners). After his usual fashion he represented
it to the Emperor as being 'about 3,000 I: One genCl'al
(Graindorge), two colonels, and IlRy-two other officers had
been killed, four generals (Maucune, Fay, l\1erle, Simon) were
wounded-the lnst was o.lso a prisoner; five L'Olonc1s and
189 other officers were wounded. The 2nd Corps in all hOO
lost at least ~,043 officers and men, the 6th Corps at least
2,455 2• It may be remembered that of all the battles ill the
Peninsular W'ar this was the one in which the proportion of
officers to men hit on the French side was highest, one to
sixWen-thc uvernge being one to twenty-two in ordinary
engagements. 'l'he excessive proportion of casualties in the
commissioned ranks bears witness to a desperate attempt to
lead all the men to an impossible task, in which the officers
sacrificed themselves in the most splendid style.
Massella must not be too much blamed for his experiment.
He had still to ascertain the fighting value of 'Vellington's
army-and estimated it too low, because of the extreme prudence
which his adversary had hitherto displayed.. He was handicapped
by the impossibility of using his artillery effectively, and the
position in front of him was strong-even stronger than he
guessed, because of the road of communication along the rear
of the plateau-but not too strong to be forced, if the defenders
did not fight well. Moreover, it was immensely long-nine
miles from end to cnd, so that two blows delivered with a corps
I This too in ll. dispatch to Berthier dated Coimbrn, Oct. 4, three days
after the returns had boon plru::cd before him.
! For these returns, see Appendix,llO. xiii. 'Iber are cert:linly incom-
plete, omitting (I) losses of the Cln-alry of the 2nd Corps (where
MarUnieu's iuvaluable tables show that three officcrs were wounded), (2)
losses of the 8th Corps, which caught a few shells as it stood Oil the heights
by Moum and had (as agaill shown by Mnrtinicn's tnblcs) si" oflicersllit,
which must imply some llundrctl men. (3) Some casualties in tIle infantry
omitted in tIle returns, (or while the report accounts for 253 killed and
wounded officers, l\fartinien names 27.5. Deducting the cavalry and 8th
Corps losses mentioned above, there are still fifteen officers (and therefore
presumllbly 250 meu) too few gh'en in the reports sent in to MlISs(lnll ; e.g.
for the 2nd l..eger the reporl has eiglLteen ollicers hil, l\Iartiuien gil'eg
the names of twenty-two.
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each in the centre might have pien:ed the line before the enemy's
distant ~serVe& could get up, Favoured by the fOg-M we
have seen-Reynier actually won the heights for a moment,
though Ney never got near the crest. The mistake lay lIot so
much in making the trial as in under·rating the warlike efficiency
oftbe enemy. Strokes like Wallncc's chtllb"C with the 45th and
88th, or Craufurd's masterly advance with the 4Srd and 5~nd,
are beyond the common experiences of war. Massella put forty~
five battalions 1 into his fighting-tine-they wcre repulsed by
twenty-four, for that was the number of Anglo-Portuguese
battalions which engaged more than their light~compal)ies~.
This eould not have been foreseen, But the lesson was learnt.
Before the lines of Ton·cs Vedras, a fortnight lu.teI·, Masseua
refused to take any more risks of the kind, and the campaign
assumed a very difterent character, because the invader had
learnt to respect his enemy.
I Viz. ull Reynier's Corps, save the 47th, twenty-two battll.lions;
l\farcha.nd eleven battalions, Loison twelve battalions-total 26,000 men,
See Tables in Appendix.
t Viz. tbe brigades of Maekinnon and Champlemond ofthe 3rd Division:
the 1st. 9th, 38th, British, and the 8th Portuguese of Leitb, Craufurd's
five battalioWl, Pack's five battalions, three battalions of Coleman-total
14,000 men. Sec Tables in AJlpcndix.
(1) NOTE ON THE TOPOGRAPHY OF BUSSACO
I Silent two dal'S in April 1904 and two days ill April 1906 in going
very carefully over tile field-sal-e that of its nine-mile length I did not
investigate closely either Cole's position on the extreme north, or Hill's
on the extremc south, no fighting hlll"ing come near either of them. The
ground is so miJlutely described in the preceding chapter that only a few
additional points require Ilotice.
(1) '111C ravine which lay oob'cen Pack al)d Craufurd, and between
i\larchand and Loison, is a feature whicb no map can properly express,
and which no one who has not gone very carefully over the hillside can
fully picture to himself. It produces 1111 absolute want of continuity
between the two fights which went on to its right and left,
(2) The. Mondego is not \'isible from any point of the. line of heights
till Hill's position is rcaciled. It is sunk far below the level of tile
upland.
(3) The San AntoniD-Palheiros rond is a mcre country track, IJarely
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lleserl'ing tlm name of rond, though practicahle for :lrtillery alld vehicles.
111e challU« Moura-llussaco is a high-road of the first class, admirably
engineered. The paths across the Serra at Hill's end of it are WTetched
mule-tracks, not suitable for wheeled trJ,ffic. So is the track frOIll Sula
up the slope to CraUfllrd's standillg.place.
(4) The view from th(l summit of the Serra is very extensive, embracing
on the olle side all the slopes of the Estrella as far as Guarda, and Oil the
other the whole roast-plain of Coimbra as far as tlle .'lea. But in each
directioll there is so much wood and 1lill t1lat mauy roads and village>! are
masked. '111e French army, both in advance and retreat, was only inter-
mittently,'isihle. Hut enough eoulU 00 made out to determiuo its general
movements with fair precision. "'lIen it reached the foot-hills before tile
Serra every detail of its disposition could be followed by all Obserl'er 011
any part of the crest, !lave that oolow Sula woods in tlle bottOIll llide the
starting-point of Loison's dh·ision.
(5) h.l till! chalKll by tho Silk of thll chlJ.u/lfetl, just lJehind the sky-line of
t1le English positiou, the traveller will fiud a little llIuseum, including a
very line topographical mal', with the p0.!3ition of tllC allied troops, and
more especially of tIle Portuguese regiments, well marked. 'There are a
few errors ill tile placing of the British battalions, but llothing of couse-
quence. 11ul Freucll army is 0111y "aguely indicatcd. But the map is ~
credit to the PortUA"ucse engineer officers who compiled it.
(6) As I hlWC obseC"ed in the next chapter, the ground to the north,
along the Serrae de Alcoba and de Caramula, ie not so uniformly lofty, or
so forbidding in its aspect, as to cause the obserl'er to doubt whether
there can be all)' pass acrOl;S the watershcd ill that direction. lmleetl, tile
first idea tlmt strikes the mind on reaching the summit of tlll~'Serra, and
casting a glance round the wide landscape, is that it is surprising that any
officer in the }'11:nch army can have believed that the Caramula was.
absolutely impracticable. Moreover it is far less easily defensible than
the Hul;Saro ridge, because it is much more brokcu and full of cover. Tile
beauty of the Dussaco position is that, save 011 the Moura-Sula spurs, it
is entirely bare of corer on the side fncing eastward. The smooth, steep
~lope, with its furl6 and heather and its occasional out-crops of rock,
makes a splendid glacis. The rel'crse space would be a far worse position
to /lcfcllrI, agnillst an cllcmr coming from <.;oimbra !lnd t1\C cOlll!t-plaill,
becaUBe it is tllickly intersl~rsed with woods.
(7) With the possible exception of some of the I'yrenean fightillg-
grounds, llUSllaCO gives the most beautiful landscape of any of the British
battlefields of the Peninsula. Albuera is tame, Talal"era is only picturesque
at its northern end, Salamanca is rolling ground with uninteresting
plouglled fields, save where the two Ara!li1es crol' up in t1lcir isolated
ruggeduess. Fuentes d'Oiioro is a pretty hillside, sucll as one may see iu
3ny English count)', ith meadow below and rough pasture abo\·e. Vimiero
is tlappled ground, 'illl lWlI1)' treeg hut no comma,ulillg f~alllr~. Hut
t11e 10ftillCSS, tIle open breezy air, the far-reaching view over plain, wood,
ccQ
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moullwill, and lli~tnnt ~ell, frOn! the summit of the :HU!lSUCO Serrn is unique
in its beauty. It is small wonder that the modern Portuguese have turned
it into a lIealth~resort, or tllat the British colony at Oporto have fixed on
the culminating plateau as the best golf-course in tile Peninsula.
(2) NOTE ON THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE
OF BUSSACO
While tllCre is no !loint of tlislllLte concerning that IlJlrt of the Dllttle of
Unssaco in which Craufurd Pack, anll Coleman were engaged against the
6th Corps, there was bitter contro\'ersr 011 the exact details of the repulse
of Reynier's corps by Pictoll lInd Leith. PictOIl, and following him Ilia
subordinates of the 3rd Dh,isioll, thouglit that Leith's part in tlie action
was insignificllut. that he merely repulsed 1\ minor attack after the mnin
i1truggle was over. Leith lIlId his officers colIsiuered tIlUt they gu,,'e tIle
decisive blow, tllat Pictoll's line would have been broken aud the battle
perhaps lost, if narnes's brigade had not arrived at the critical moment
and I>lJ.ved tlle situlltion. All that Pietoll wou1l1 allow was tlmt Leith
<aided the wing of tIle 46th and the 8th Portuguese in repulsing the
enemy's last attempt.' Grattan, who wrote an admirable narrative of
the defeat of Morle's division by the 88th and the neighbouring troops,
denied that tIle 3rd Division was ever pressed, says that he never saw
Leith's men till the action wag over, and points out that Dames's brigade,
out of 1,000 baronets, lost but 47 men altogether, while the 46th
fCl(imellt alone lost thrice, ami the 88th more than twice, liS mally killl'ti
and wounded out of tlleir scant}· numbers (150 and 134 out of 560 and 079
respectively). Otller 3rd DiI'isioll officers suggest (see the letters in the
Appendix to Napier's sixth volume) that Leith fought only with a belated
body of French skirmishers, or with lIIen who had been cut off from tlle
main attacking column by the successful advauce of Wallace. On the
other IllInd Leith (sce his letter ill Wellington, Sup/Jk1mmlury DiJlptllcllu,
"01. "i, p. (78) speaks of coming on the grouud to find a large French
column crOl!sillg the Sena, and the Portuguese Bth and 9th broken, and
about to recoil down the rear slope, His aide-de-camp, Leith-Hay, and
Cameron of tlLe 9tJI bear him out.
Napier has failed to make the situation clear, from not seeing that
there were two completely separate attacks of the French, divided by
au appreciable i1ltervlll, He thinks tlHLt Fo}' was DU the Serra as &0011 as
Merle, aud calls his column (Hi. p. 25) (the French battaliolls which llad
first gained the crest,' while as 11 matter of n,ct they llad ouly started
after \Vallace's repulse of MerIe "'as 10llg over.
The real situation is made clear wllen UeYllier's and Heudclet's dis-
patehcs in tile .'rench ArcJlh'cs llnd "-or's diary llfe studied. From thCStl
it is clear that there were rroo occasions 011 which the .French got to the
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top of tho Sernl, the first tluring Merle's attack, the secOIul during ~'oy·s.
I 11ave lluoted Foy's narratil'e 011 p. 377 above; but it may be well to give
also bis 1I0te showillg the starting-time of llis column. 'Lu premiere
division (Mede) a grdvi la mOlltagne ell sejettant it tlroite. Mais apeille
les tetas arril'aient sur le plateau, (IU'attaqul!es tout a coup par des
trouJles immctlscment 81llHSrieurcs Cll llomllrC, frllicllCs et vigourl~uses,clles
Ollt etl! culbuUes en has de la montagne dans le plus grand (1esordre,
Mu brigadc g'lltait portoie Ill! pied de la montagne, devllnt soutenir le
;n o UgcI'. Au 1II1llll0llt tie I'echec de la ]rIl division j'ai filit halte un
moment pour ne pas etre Olltraine par les fuyards.' It was only at this
instant, when the fngitil'es frolll l\Ierle's attack were pouring p.'lSt him,
that lie got his orders from iteynier to attack, and started to climb the
~Iope, '11lere must, therefore, have been an interval of more tllllll half all
IlOur-possibly of all hour-hetween tile moment when \l'allao.:e thrust
MerIe off the plateau, aud that at wllich Foy crowned it, only to Le
lltt.'lCkctl al)(l OOlten hy tile newly arrived Leith. For it took a very loug
time for the Frellch 17tll and 70t11 to climb the slope, and they ouly reached
the top with difficulty, the skirmishers of the 8th and 9th Portuguese and
of Meatle's wiug of the ·15th having fought han! to keep them back,
Heynier's dispatc11 is equally clear as to his corps having made two
separate att....cks. He adds that some of Sarrut's lIlCll were rallicd in time
to l>upport Foy, a statement for which I fiUllno corroboration elsewhere,
Napier then has failed to grasl) the situation, when he makes tIle
French crowll the crest llho\'l~ the Im.'li; of Sail Autonio and the crest
0Pl)()Site 'Vallace, !)()() yards further lIortll, at t11e same moment. And
tile statement that J.eith's charge was directed agaillst the other flank
of the same mass that was beatell by the 88UI aut! 40th i.s altogether
erroneous.
Leith's Illlrrntive of the business, in short, fits in with the Frencb story,
lIlId must Le cOlJsidered correct. l'iCtOl1 Call1lOt be acquitted of deliberate
belittling of the part taken by his colleague in the actiol\. foy's attack,
though made hy ouly seven blltt.,IiOllS, while 1\/01'113 ImLl del'en, .....as the
lllore dangel'oll5 of the two, aut! was defeated by Leith alone, after the
small fr,l.ctiou of I'ictoll'g force ill front of it had ~n broken and thrust
back.
SECTION XXI: CHAPTER In
WELLINGTON'S RETREAT TO THE LINES OF TORRES
V~;nIlAS
THE dawn of September 28 brought small comfort to Massellll.
His desperate attacks of the preceding day had been repulsed
with such ease and such heavy loss, that neither he nor any of
his subordinates dreamed of I'cllcwing the attempt to force the
line of the Serl'il. Only three courses were open to him-to
retreat on Almeida, giving up the campaign as one too
ambitious for the strength of his army, or to change his
objceti,'c and strike oockwardsat Oporto,-ifLisbon were bc)'ond
his grasp,-or to endeavour to move \Vcllington out of his
position by turning his flank, sill(-'t': a frontal attack had proved
disastrous. The first course was advocated by more than OllC
adviser, but presented no attractions to the Marshal: he was
both obstinate and angry, amI did not dreum fol' tl. moment of
spoiling his military reputation by retreating tamely after a:
lost battle. The blow at Oporto was equally unattractive: he
had been told to drive the English out of Portugal, and to
capture Lisbon, not to make it mere lodgemcnt all thc Douro.
Moreover, as he had remarked to Ney before the battle, if he
marched on Oporto by the bad road via Vizeu, he might find
the British army once more in his front, when he drew nearer
lo the city, since the Coimbra-Oporto c!UllUJ8ee is both shorter
and better than the by-roads which he would have to follow.
There remained the third possibility-that of turning Welling-
ton out of the Bussaco position by flanking operations. The
country-side did not look "ery promising, but the attempt must
be made.
Early on the 28th the French cavah'Y was sent out in both
directions to explore the whole neighbourhood-a task which
Massena should have prescribed to it on the ~5th and Q6th,
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i1l5tead of keeping it massed in his rear. The reconnaissances
sent southward by Reynier's light cavalry brought no encour-
aging report: if the French army crossed the Mondego, it
would only run against Wellington's carefully prepared position
behind the Alva. Fane's cavalry were out in this direction,
and would give ample time of wl.U"ning to allow the allied army
to pass the fords of Pei'ia Cava and man the long series of
earthWOl"ks. Only a repetition of the Bussaco disaster could
follow from an attempt to take the offensive on this side. From
the north, however, Montbrun, who had ridden ont with some of
Sainte-Croix's dmgoolls, brought far more cheering news. This
indeed was the flank where, on the first principles of topograph)',
some hope of success might ha\"c been looked fOf. '1'0 anyone
standing either on the Dus.~aco heights or 011 the lower ridge in
front of them, and casting an eye over the dappled and uneven
countr,Y-side to the north, it seems incredible that there should
be no route whate\"er across the Serra de Caramula. Both the
seacoast-plain of Beira and the valley of the Oerins, the little
rivcr which drains thc plain of Morlagou, were thickly populated.
Was it likely that there would be no means of getting from the
onc to the other SR\'C by the chaua.see through Bussaco, or the
circuitous road far to the north, from Vi1.ell to Aveiro via.
Feramena and Hemfeita? The maps, it is true, showed no other
route: but every day that he rcmllined in Portugttl was proving
more clearly to the Marshal that his maps, Lopez and the rest,
were hopelessly inaccurate. The Serra de Caramula, though
rugged, is !lot onc continuous line of precipices, nor is it of any
great altitude. On first principles it was probable that there
might be one or more passages in this stretch of thirty miles,
though it was conceivable that there might be no road over
which artillery could travell,
There was, therefore, nothing astonishing in the fact that
Montbrun discovered that such a track exisi:.eU, !line miles north
of Bussaco, running from Mortagoa. by Aveleira and Doiah'o,
to Sardao in the valley of the Agueda, one of the affluents of
I All a matt~l' of fact, the lIIotlerll railway from Coimbm amI l'ampilhosa
to the upper i\1oudego does uot use the pass of Bussaco, but !toes nortb
of it, round the left flank of Wellington's position, by LllSO, fnJ' south of
lhe Roialvo road lo i\Iorlagoa.
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the Vouga. There was nothing particularly startling in the
discovery, nor did it imply any special perspicacit)' in the
discoverers, as many of the French narratives seek to imply.
A peasant captured in one of the deserted villages high up the
Oerins, and cross-questioned by Masseua's Portuguese aide-de-
camp Mascarenhas, who accompanied Sninte-Croix on his rC{.'Oll-
naissance, revealed the fact that this country-road existed. He
even, it is said, expressed to his compatriot his surprise that the
French had not taken it when first they arrived at Mortagoa,
since it was unguarded, while the whole allied army was lying
across the Bussaco clWII.t8ee. It wa~, he said, habitually used
by the ox-wa&,nons of the peasantry: it was not a good road,
but was a perfectly practicable one.
With this all-important news MOlltbrun and Suillte-Croix
returned to l\fasscna about midday. The I\'[al'shal at once
resolved to make an attempt to utilize the Boialvo road. There
was some danger in doing so, since it was possible that Weiling-
tOll might wait till the greater pltrt of the French army htU.l
retired from his front, and then descend npon the rearguard
and overwhelm it. Or, on the other hand, he might have made
preparations to hold the further end of the pass, so that whcn
the vanguard of thc invaders was nenring Boial\'o or Sardiio
they might find !!O,OOO men, withdrawn from the Bussaco
position in haste, lying across their path at some dangerous
turn of the road. ludeed, we may confidently assert that if in
1810 the British general 11Ild possessed the army that he owned
in 181S, Masseua would have had the same unpleasant experience
that befell Soult at Sorauren, \vhell he attempted a precisely
:;imilar manocu\'rC-R flunk march round the allied army on the
day after a lost battle.
But Massena was prepared to take risks, and the risk which
he was now accepting was a L'Ollsiderubly less perilous one than
that which he had incurred whell he chose to make a frontal
attack on the Bnssaco position on the preceding day. For
though flank marches across an enemy's front are justly depre-
cated by every militCLty authority, this was one c-xecuted at a
distance of nine or ten miles from the British line, and not in
a level country, 011 to which Wellington might easily descend
from his fastness, hut in a broken wooded upland, full of ridges
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on which the French might have formed up to fight if assailed.
If this fact did not remove the danger, it at any rate made it
infinitely less. If OIlC of the two possible contretemps should
happen-if Wellington should come down with a sudden rush
upon the rearguard-that force would have to fight a defensive
action on the ridges below Dussaco. till the main body could tUn!
back to help it. In that case there would follow a pitched
battle upon roUillg and ullcvcn ground, which did not favour
one side more than the other; and this, at any rate, would be
a more favourable situation for the French than that in which
they had foughton Sept. 27. If, on the other hand, '¥ellingtoll
should send a strong detachment to hold the western debauch
of the Boialvo road, nothing would be lost-if nothing would be
gained. It WllS improbable that there would be any position in
that quarter quite so strong ns the tremendous slope of the
Sel'ra de BuSS8.Co. The result of un attempt to force the defile
might be successful.
At an,Y rate Masscnl\ thought the experiment worth)' of a
lriaL Accordingly, on the llfternoon of the 28th, ostentatious
demonstrations were made against the front of the Dussaco posi-
tion, which led to a good deal ofobjceUess skirmishing I. Wel-
lington was not for a moment deceived. IndL'Cd, the idea that
another assault was impending was negatived by the fact that
both Reynier's and Ncy's men were seen to be throwing up
abatti8 1111d digging trenches on the Ranks of the two roads on
which they lay. These could only be meant for defensive use,
and presumably must be intended to help the l?rench rear-
guard to hold the ridges, if the Anglo-l>ortugucse army should
descend upon them. Late in the afternoon officers furnished
with good telescopes, and stationed on the highest point of the
Bu.ssaco Serra, reported that they (,'QuId detect columns ill move-
mcnt from the French rear in the direction of the nortlHl'est.
These were Sainte-Croix's cavalry and the baggage-trains of Ney
and Junot making their way to the rear, ill order to get into the
Mortagoa-Boialvo ro.'ld. At six o'clock, dusk havillg still not
come on, it was reported that Ne)"s infantry reserves were
certainly moving in the same direction. Only Loisoll's dh'ision
was still immovable on its old position oppo..c;ite Suln. At
1 The firing commenced soon after 12 nOOll. See Tomkinsoll, 11. 44.
394 RF:l'HEAT TO TORRES VEDRAS [8,n."
nightfall, therefore, the movement of the French was well ascer-
tained. It might mea.n merely a general retreat on l\Iortagoo
and an abandonment of the campaign I, but this was most
unlikely. :Far more probable was some march to turn the allied
Rank by the passes of the Serra de Caramula. Wellington him-
self had no doubt whatever that this WllS the enemy's intention.
As the dusk fell he stood for some time on the summit of the
Serra, watching the French columns receding in the distance.
He then rode back to his head quarters at the convent of BUSS8CO,
and dictated witbout dela)' 11. scl·ies of orders which set his whole
army in retreat for Coimbra and Lisbon. Before daylight the
position was deserted, onl)' a rearguard being left on it. He
does not seem to have thought for a moment of attacking. on the
following morning, the 2nd Corps and Loison's division, which
had been left in his front, nor of directing his right wing to
march on Sardao, which it could have reached 10llg before the
]!'rench arl'ived there. ~~rn:h of these courses was so obvious
that critics have lavished blame upon him for not adopting the
one or the other 2.
The e."<planatioIl of his conduct is neither that he failed to see
the two I1ltematives which were in his power, lIor t1mt he showed
(as several French writers maintain) an excessive timidity. Still
less is it possible to urge, as some have done, that he was ruined
by hh. OWIl IIcgk"Ct to occupy the Boialvo 1'000. He kne"' of
that pas.'S, had taken it into consideration, and in onc of his
dispatches speaks vaguely of a means which he was hoping to
discover to render it useless to the enemy:1. This remedy can-
not mcau, as somc ha\'c suppo5l..'<1, the moving thither of Trallt\
eorps of Portuguese militia. It is true that Wellington had
ordered this forcc to occupy Sal'dao some da,Ys before. Hut it
was neither large enough, nor composed of troops solid enough,
to resist, even in n l>tl'ong position, the ntta.ck of a sillgle French
brigade. Some other device lIlllst have been meant, though we
I 'lllis WIl8 imagiucd to be the case br some observers, who Ol'crratoo
l\Iassena's loss, aDd thought lie liad 10,000 casualties on the 27th.
1 See, for example, Fririou, pp, 65-6, 'Coreoo, ii. 164. Thiers,and e"en
Nllpier, Hi. 32-3.
3 .lJi8palch~, "i. ·t60. Hm!llc proposed to blast away seetioll8, so as to
make it impassable for wheel traffic, as he did with the Estr,u.lu NOI'at
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cannot determine what it may have been. The true key to
'Wellington's action is to remember the immense pains that he
had taken ill building the Lines of Torrcs Vedrns, und the elabo-
rate arrangements that had been made during the last few weeks
to complete the system for devastating Portugal in front of the
enemy. It was by these means, and not by fights in the open,
that he had from the first designed to defeat the invader.
BuSSU{'O had been an • uncovenanted mercy': if Massena chose
to run his head against that stone wall, it was worth while to
man it, and to pennit him to break himself against its granite
boulders. But such an operation as desCending into the plain
to attack the 2nd Corps on the 29th, or oltering battle in front
of Sardiio 011 that same day, wa;! not within the scope of
Wellington's intentions. If he had wished to engage in that
sort of fighting, he had already had ample opportunities to
attack sections of the French army during the last two months.
But to bret engaged with one corps in a rolling upland, and then
to have the other two converging on him while the fight was in
progress, he had nevel' intended-nor would he do so now. He
ga\'c his orders for the retreat of the arlllY on Coimbra actually
before the 'French had possession of their own end of the Boialvo
puss, und at a moment when a single night lllarch would have
sufficed to place Cole, Craufurd, and Spencer across the western
end of it, with ample time to choose a position before the enemy·
(:ould arrive in frollt. He explains his refusal to do so in his
• Memorandum of Operations in 1810' in the following terms:
• It would have been impossible to detach a corps from the army
to occupy the Scrl'tl. de Curamula allel' the action of the 27th.
That corps might have been hard pressed and obliged to retreat,
in which case it must have retreated upon Sardiio and the north
of Portugal. It could not have rejoined the army, llnd its
services would have been wanting in the fortified position
in front of Lisbon. It was therefore determined to rely upon
Colonel Trant alone to occupy the Sel'm de Caramula, as his
line of operations and retreat was to the northward. Nothing
could have been done, except by detaching a large corps, to
prevent the French from throwing a large force across the Carn-
fiula. When, therefore, they took that road, there was nothing
for it but to withdraw from Bussaco. And, after quitting
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BUSSllCO, there was no position that wc could take up with
advantage, in which wc could be certain that we could prevent
the enemy from getting to Lisbon before us, till we reached t!:J.e
fortified positions in front of that place 1,' As to the other
possibility, that of attacking the French rearguard below
BusMeo instead of endeavouring to stop its mnguard at Sardl10,
Wellington only observes that' they had at least l~,OOO or
14,000 more men than we had, and good as our position was,
theirs was equally good.' If he had fallen upon Reynier, the
latter (he thought) could have detained him long enough to
allow Ney and Junot to return, and so he would hl.WC found
himself committed to an offimsi"eaetion against superior numbers
on unfavourable I-,YTound.
These arguments llrc ullanswcmblc whell wc consider \Vc11ing-
ton's position. He might have succeeded ill checking Masscllll.
at lloialvo or Sardiio; but, if he did not, ruin would ensue, since
he might be cut oft' from the detached corps, and then would not
have men enough to hold the Lilies of Torn..'8 Vedru.s. He
might have crushed Reyniel' before he was succoured, but if he
failed to do so, and became involved in a general action, a disas-
trous defeat was possible. In short, considering what failure
would mcun-the loss of Lisbon, the re-embarkation of the al'my,
probably the end of the Peninsular War-he rightly hesitated to
take any risk whatever. At the sallle time, we may sllspect that
if the allied army of IBIO had been the army of 1813, Welling-
ton might very possibly ha\'c played a more enterprising game.
But the Portuguese still formed the larger half of his force, and
though he had ascertained by their behaviour on the !:!7th that
they were now mpablc of fighting steadily in f1 defensive action
011 favoumble ground, it was ne\'ertheless very doubtful whether
he could dare to risk them in a battle fought under different
conditions. One cheering example of the courage and discipline
of these newl)· organized rcgiments did not justify him in taking
it for granted that they could be trusted under all possible con·
ditions, as if they were veteran British troops.
On the dawn of Sept. 29, therefore. the two armies were
marching away from each other. On the Bussaco position
there remained only Craufurd's Light Division, strengthened by
I Di,patcl1u, vii, pp. 306-1
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Anson'il cavalry bligade, which was brought up behind the
Serra, to form the mounted section of the force which was tor
the ncxt tell days to act as thc rearguard of the allied army.
Opposite them only Reynier remained, and he had drawn far
back on to the Mortagoa road, where he stood in a defensive
position in the morning, but retired, brigade after brigade, ill
the afternoon. The main body of Wellington's army was
retiring in two columns: Hill, and Hamilton's Portuguese divi-
sion crossed the fords of Peila Cova and marched for Espinhnl
and Thomar. The force which had been left far out on the right
behind the Alvu-Flmc's cil.vnlryund Lccor's Portuguese militia-
joined Hill and accompanied him to Lisbon. This column was
absolutely unmolested by the enemy duriug the whole twelve
duys of the retreat to thc Lincs. The French did lIot so much
aB follow it with a cavalry patrol. The other and larger column,
formed of Spencer, Cole, Leith, and Picton, with Pack's,
Coleman's, and Alex. Campbell's Portuguese, marched for
Mealhada and Coimbra. Craufurd and Anson started twelve
hours later to bring up the rear. During the hours while the
Light Division was waiting its orders to start, some of its officers
explored the evacuated :French position, and found parked in an
enclosure 400 despemtely wounded soldiers, whom :MassClla had
abandoned to the mercy of the Portuguese peasantry. He had
used up all a\'ailable carts and mules to carry his wounded, but
had been forced to leavc the worst cases behind. They were
picked up and moved into the convent of Bussaco I; on what
became of them afterwards it is well llot to speculate. No
friendly column came that way again 2, and the Ordellllllza were
daily growing more exasperated at the conduct of the invading
army. The French were not only carrying out in an inter-
mittent fashion Masseull's edict of Sept. 4, directing that all men
with arms but without uniforms were to be shot at sigh~ but
burning every village that they passed, and murdering nearly
1 See Tomkinson, p, 44, and \'on Linsingen's Diarr, in Beamish, i. 292,
Fririon and the other French narrati\'es speak of the difficnlties of tran5-
porting the wounded, but do not melltion that any were aballdoned.
I Unless some of Reynier's rearguard cava1J'y mllY have looked in at
Bussaco ou the 30th, when Crnufurd had gone. This is possible. Trant's
Portuguese were back ill the place 011 Oct. 4.
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every peasant that they could hunt down, whether he W/l.<;
bearing arms or no 1.
. Meanwhile, on the ~9th and 30th of September, the French
army was executing its flank march, practicully unopposed,
though not unobserved. Sainte-Croix's division of dragoons was
at the head of the line of march: then came the iufantr)' of the
8th Corps, which had been put in the vanguard lx.'t:ilUSC it had
not suffered at DUSi;IlCO. Next rnme the reserve CIlvalry of
Montbrull, followed by the Grand Park and the massed baggaw:
of the 6th and Sth Corps. mixed with a convoy of over 3,000
wounded. Ney's troops brought lip the rcm' of the main column.
Reynier was a day's march to the rear; having l:lpent the ~th
opposite the Bussaco heights, he only reached Mortagoa that
evening. Saintc-Croix's cavalry on this same day had passed
the watershed and reached Avellalls de Cima, where they met
{l patrol of De Grey's dragoons, who had sent parties out in all
directions, from their head quarters at Mealhada in the coast~
plain. From this time onward the French advanced guard was
watched by the four regiments of Slade and De Grey, who were
directed to hold back its exploring cavalry, and not to permit
it to reach Coimbra an hour sooner than could be helped. There
wns also a clash 011 the alternoon of the 30th between part of
Sainte·Croix's dragoons and the Portuguese militia of Trant ill
front ofStmlAo. Trallt had been ordered to be at that place
1 This secms provcd by the' Table of Damages committed by the Freucll
Army in UUo-ll,' published by the Coimbra authorities in 1812, which
gi\'es the number of honses burnt llnd persons killed in each rural-deanery
(arcyprestado) of the hisllOpric of Coimhra, Omittiug tlle rural--deaneriCII
south of the Mondego, where the damages were mainly done during the
retreat of the french in March 1811, and taking only those north of the
riller, wllere no hOlitile colullIll aJlPeared after October 181O-the district
having been protecterl by Trant and 'Vilson during Massina's return
mnrch,-wc find the following statistics:-
Deanery of Mortagoa 108 IllllrdeI1l 19 rillages allll4i isolated
IJOuses burnt.
" Olivcirillha 102" 100 houses burnt.
"Arazooe 99" 124 "
" Coimbra city 14" i "
The figures fOr the deaneries 50Utll of i\Joudego (&lure, Arganil, Redillha,
l\Iiranda do Corvo, Sinde, Cea) are enorlllously higher. See ~riano da
Lu't, iii. 203.
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on September !!7: he only arrived there on the afternoon of the
~8th, not by his own fault, but because his superior officer
Baccellar, commanding the whole militia of the North, had
ordered him to move from Lamego to Sardiio by the cir-
cuitous road along the Douro, and then from Feira south-
ward, instead of taking the straight road across the mountains
north of Vizeu, where he might possibly have been stopped by
some outlying French detachment. Trant had at the moment
only a squadron of dragoons and four militia regiments with
him (Porto, Penafiel, Coirnbra., and a battalion of light com-
panies), and these, from hard marching, and from desertion, were
in all less than 3,000 strong. Knowing that he was expeeted to
hold the debouch of the Doialvo road against anything short of a
strong force, Trant made an attempt to stand his ground. But
his vanguard bolted at the first shot fired, and with the rest he
had to make a hurried retreat beyond the Vouga, leaving the
rond free to the French t. Sainte-Croix had already pushed in
I I cannot resist quoting here Trant'!> account of the engagement. He
Wall a mall of quaint humour, and the all too few letteJ'll from him to
General J. Wilson, which have come into my llands by the connes)' of
Wilson's reprC5entatil'e, Captain Dertram Chambers, H..N., inspire me
with regret that I ha\"e not his whole correspondence. '1 have once more
been putting my fellows to a trial-my CAllfadorc battalion did 1I0t do lIS
it ought, aDd llad ahout thirt)' killed, wounded, and prisoners, without
making scarcely all)" resistancc-a pleasant business. On the 30th I was
still at Agueda (Sardiio allll Aguetla are one village, properl)' speaking,
but dil'ided b)' a bridge), though I was aware that the French principal
force of CIl\·alry was at Ho)'slm, only a 1c.."lgIlC from Agueda, and J WII$
completel)' cut off from the arm)'. On that morning I had witlldrawll the
,infantry to the Vouga, hut placed my dragoons close to Agneda to obserl'e
the French, with the C~ores at a half-way distance 1.0 support them. I
put tllem in the most advantageous possible position, prote<:ted by a e10se
pine wood, through Wllich the French cavalry must pass. I had been
from Ulree in tlle morning till olle o'clock, making my arrallgemenUlJand
had just sat down to eat something, in a small village on the left of the
Vougn., when a dragoon clime flying to inform me that the }'reuch were
coming on with two columns of cavalry ill full speed. .My coffee was not
ready, and remained for the French to amuse themllelves with. I had
only time to get the Penafiel regiment o,'er the bridge wheu tJLC {<'tench
arrived-finl minutes sooner and I had been nabbed! I drew up in a good
position, bnt the French did not Crolill the "oug:!., and I returned to
Oliveirn without molestatiOll~bnt Hot without n damned false alarm and
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between him and the British cavalry, who now began to make a
slow retreat towards l\Jcnlhadn. At that place, early all the 30th,
Sladeand De Grey were joined by Ansou's eight squadrons, who
had come in at the tail of Craufurd's division after the rearguard
evacuated the Bussaco position. On this day the main L'Olumn
of the British infantry marched through Coimbl'a, leaving the
Light Division alone in the city. 'Wellington's head quarters that
night were at Condeixa six miles south of the Mondego. The
thrcccavalry brigades retired, bickering with the French advanced
guard all day, as far as Fornos. eight miles north of Coimbm.
l\Il\sscna's infantry, after emerging from the Boialvo pass, were
now pushing south, and bivouacked on the night of the 30th,
Ne)' and Junat's corps at Mealhada, Re)'nicr's at Barreiro, ten
miles behind the others. The biscuit which the French army
had taken with it from Almeida \\'as now almost exhausted, and
it was a great relicf to the troops to find, in the deserted villages
of thc plain of Coimbm, considerable qURntities of mai7,c amI
rice, with which they could eke out or replace the carefully
hoarded rations.
Meanwhile the city of Coimhra was full of distressing sccncs.
Though 'Vellington had ordered the whole population of Wes-
tern Beira to leaye their abodes as soon as the French reached
Vizeu, yet only the richest of the inhabitants of Coimbra had
depatted. The hulk had still held to their houses, and the
news of the victory of Bussaco had encouraged them to hope
that no evacuation would be necessary. The Portuguese govern-
panic 011 the part of tlae drngoolls "'ho were COI'cring my rear. 'nle)'
galloped through the infautry, and carried confusion and all the comforts
of hell to Oporto ! Lieutenant-Colonel' Bravoure Bombasto: who corn·
mallded the Cafadores, ordered his men to fire, but t1lought that enough
for his honour, as he instantly left them to shift for t11emsehes, and never
looked behind till lIe rlml:IICd Oporto. I put this fellow, with four of the
leading dragoons, into tl16 common dungeon of this place, and am about to
inflict some divisional punishment, for I daren't report SUCII conduct to
thc Marshal (Bcresford), who does 1I0t punish by hah'Cs! My regiments
of infantry-this is tIle brighter side of the picture-showed no agitation,
notwithstanding the attack on their nerves, The enemy's force, J now
ascertain, was 800 cavalry, two pieces, and two infantry regiments. The
cavalry alonc would 11ll"C done my business if they hall crossed tlle Vougn!
But tlley collwnted them~clvCR with t1ri\'ing in the dragoons alll) the
~dore battalion from Agueda. God bless you. N.T.'
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ment, though it had consented to carry out Wellington's scheme
of devastation, and had duly published proclamations command·
ing its execution, had taken no great pains to secure obedience
to it. The sacrifice, indeed, that was demanded of the citizens
of a ,..calthy town such as Coimbra was a very great one-fat
more bitter than that imposed 011 the peasantry, II'ho were told
at the same moment to evacuate their flimsy cottages. It was
bitterly resented, and, despite of'the proclamation, four·fifths of
the 40,000 inhabitants of Coimbra were still in their houses
when, on the night of the 9lBth-291h, arrived "rellingtoll's
dispatch stating that he was abandoning Bussaco, that the
French would be in the city by the 30th or on the Ist of October,
and that force would !,le used, if necessary. to expel people who
still clung to their dwellings. During the next twp days the
whole of the population of Coimbra was streaming out of the
place by the roMs to the south, or dropping dOlVlI the l\Iondego
in boats, to ship themselves for Lisbon at the little port of
Figueira. Even on the Ist of October, the day when the French
were reputed to be facing Fomos, only eight miles away, all had
not yet departed. Many of the poor, the infirm, and the reck-
less remained behind to the last possible moment, and only
started when the distant cannonade on the northern side showed
that the British outposts were being driven in. T"'enty mile.'i
of road were covered by the dense column of fugitives, headed
by those who had started on the 29th and brought up behind
by those who had waited till the IllSt moment. There was a
great want of wheeled COllveyances: the richer folks had gone
oft' with most of them, and others had been requisitioned for the
allied wounded. Hence, many could take off uothing but what
they could carry all thcir persons. An eye~witllcsS writes that he
saw the whole chall$s[-e covered with respectable families walking
on foot with bundles on their heads, while ill the abandoned
houses he noticed food of all sorts, table-lincn, shirts, and all
manner of other property, which was left behind in disorder
because it was too heavy to be carried 1, Another tells how
'the old llnd the infirm, no less than the young and robust,
carrying with them all their more valuable effects, covered the
fields as well as the road in every direction, and from time to
I Tomkinsoll, p. 47.
owu. "I Dd
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time the weary fugitives, unable to carry further the heavier
articles· that they had cndeavour~ to sa\'C, dropped them by
the wayside and struggled onward, bereft of the remnant of
their little property 1.' Forlunate1)' the weather for the first
eight. days after the evacuation of Coimbra was warm and dry,
80 that the unhappy multitude had nlmost reached Lisbon
before they began to suffer any inconvenience from the October
rams.
W'hilc this c..xodus was going on, Craufuro's Light Di,-ision
stood under anns on the northern side of the city, while the six
regiments of British horse, in the extreme rearguard, were bicker-
ing with Massena's squadrons in the plain toward Fomos. On this
day the Marshal had strcubrthened his "Rn with almost the whole
of his cavalry, having added to Sainte-Croix's division, which
had hitherto formed the advance, most of Montbrun's reserve of
dragoons, and Lamotte's light brigade from the 6th Corps.
This body of thirty-four squadrons WI;l.'l altogether too strong
for Stapleton Cotton's three brif,rades, who had to give way
whenever they were seriously pressed. Two miles outside
Coimbra the British horse was divided into two columns:
De Grey's heavy dragoons crossed the M:ondego at a ford
opposite Pereira, Slade and Anson's light dragoons and hussars
by another at Alciada, nearer to the city. At the same moment
the Light Division, when the enemy's horse came in sight,
retired through Coimbra, crossed the bridge, and pressed up the
ascent towards Condeixa, thrusting before them the rearguard
of belated fugitives who had ouly made up their minds to depart.
at the last possible moment. It is said that the block in front
of them was so great that Craufurd's regiments would have
been in a situation of some d!\Ilger, if they had been closely
followed by l!1'ench infantry, and forced to turn back to defend
themselves. But nothing more than a troop of dragoons
watched their passage of the bridge. and their retreat tu Cou-
deixa, and not a shot had to be fired.
It was otherwise with the cavalry column composed of Slade's
fLnd Ansou's brigades; they were closely followed by the bulk
of the French cava.lry, and had to turn at the ford to hold back
their eager pursuers. Two squadrons of the German Husstln;
I Lord Londonderry, ii. p. 12.
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and one of the 16th Light Dragoons charged in successio'n to
check the French vanguard, while a fire was kept up by a line
of dismounted skinnishers all along the ri ver bank. The hussars
lost four men killed, and two officers and thirteen men wounded,
besides six prisoners; the Hith, two wounded and one missing in
this skirmish. It could have been avoided, according to critics
011 the spot, if the brigade had retreated a little faster in the
previolls stage of its movement. But Sf.llplctOll Cotton, for-
getting the dangers of crossing such a defile as a narrow ford,
had been rather too leisurely in covering the last three miles,
considering that the French were so dose behind him 1, The
enemy's loss was insignificant 2.
That night the British rearguard lay at Soure and CQndeL'i.Q,
while head quarters und the rear of the main nnny were at
Uedinha. The French did not cross the l\:Iondego with more
than a few cavalry patrols, and made no attempt to incommode
the retreating column, Ill(Jl~d they were otherwise employed,
The entry of an aml)' into a deserted town is always accom·
panied by disorders: that of the army of Masseua into Coimbra
was an exaggerated example of the rule-and for good reasons,
The men had been living on bare rations for 1\ month, and
suddenly they found themselves iu a town of 40,000 souls, where
e\'ery door was open, every larder garnished, and every cellar
full, The very quays were littered with sacks of flour torn open,
and puneheons of rum stove in, for W'ellington's commissariat
offieers had been to the last moment engaged in breaking up
and casting into the river the remains of the mnga.;o;ine which
had been feeding the army at Dussaco. The houses 011 every
side were full of valuable goods, for most of the inhabitants had
only been able to curry o{l' their money und plate, and had left
all else behind them, The first division of the 8th Corps, the
earliest French troops to enter the place, consisted almost
entirely of newly-formed fourth battalions, composed of l..'On·
!SCripts, and ill disciplined, They broke their ranks and fell
I Sec Beamish's lfi6l.ory of tlll! King's GUIIIUlt l.egion, i. 203-4, and
Tomkin~on, p. 4(;.
I .De Grer's brigade, though it llad no regular fighting, lost five
IlrillOners nud oue trooper woundcd in this 9lImc retreat. 'l1\c lotallosg
t1f the cavalry that day was thhty-four R1CU.
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to plunder, ouly half-restrained by their olliccrs, Illany of whom
joined in the sport. A late comeI' from the 81tillery says that
he saw onc officer breaking open a door with a pickaxe, and
another placing a scntry at the door of lI. shop which he
wished to reserve for his OWl} personal pillage 1. There was
widespread drunkenness, some arson, and an enormous alllount
of mischic\'ous and wanton waste. It was afterwards said that
Junot's corps destroyed in twelve hours an amollnt of food that
would have sufficed to supply the whole army for three weeks.
It is at any rate certain that Coimbra was full of provisiom
when the French Rni\'cd, and that, when order was tardily
restored, only a few d1l.YS' consumption could be SCl'lIped together
to fill the empty waggons before the host marched on. MasseUR
raged against JUllot for not ha,'ing kept his men in hand, Jet,
if Portuguese narratives are to be truste<l, hc set us bad nn
example as an)' disorderly conscript, since he requisitioned for
himself out of the University buildings all the telescopes and
mathemnticul instruments, and distributed them among his
stafP. The pillage wus lLS wanton and objectk'SS as it Ivas
thorough; the tombs of the kings ill the church of Santa Cru7,
were broken open, the University Museum and labo'ratories
wrecked,llnd till the churches wantonly damaged and Jesl.ocmted,
There was no attempt to restore order, or to utilize the captured
propelty for the general good of the army, till the 6th Corps
marched in 011 the next day. Even these later COlllcrs, however,
could not be restrained from joining in the plunder. The Blob
of'soldiers threatened to shoot the commissary-generals Lambert
and LancuvilIe, when they begulI to put gW;lfds over the nearly-
emptied storehouses.
The state of his army Ol! the 1st and ~nd October sufficiently
cxplnins the conduct of MassenR ill refrniniug from the pursuit
1 Colollel Noi!l's SQ«lIellil'~ Nifitaire" I)P, 120-l.
~ The Authority for tllis statement is the I'ortugue~e renegade General
Pamplona, who sen'ed 011 tlle Marshal's &ff. See 11. HiS of hi~ Aperru
$ur Iu call1}/agllu du FrtwIlIJi8 en Portugal. Pamplona adds that Ney
refuseu to mke the present uf a hlTKe te1escolll', whiciJ i\lasst!l\:J. sent him
as a propitiatory gift, A less certain authorit)' says that the Marshal
caught in the :rtreet a plunderer with a barrel of butter, and another with
a chest of "'ax candles, and let them off punishment on conditiOIl that
they took them to his 011'11 quarters! :Soriano da 1.u;o;, iii. p, 198.
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of Wellington's rearguard.. But he was also somewhat puzzled
to determine the policy which he must now adopt. Down to
the last moment he had thought that 'Wellington would ha.ve
fought at Fornos, or some other such position, to defend Coimbl'a.
And even when Coimbra was evacuated, he had imagined that
he might find the ellemydrawn up to dispute the pRSSl$e of the
Mondego. But it was now clear that 'Ve1Iington Wa!l in full
retreat for Lisbon. Since the Marshal was still ignorant of the
existence of the lines of Torres Vedras, which II'tlS (lnly revealed
to him four days later, he was somewhat uncertain how to
interpret the conduct of his adversary. After the vigorous
stand that ,"Vellington had made at BusM.Co, it seemed dangerous
to argue that he- must now be in headlong flight for his ships,
and about to evacuate Portugal. Yet the rapidity of his retreat
seemed to argue some such purpose. Ought he, therefore, to be
pursued without Cl. moment's delay, in order that his emlmrkatioll
might be made difficult? 'l"his course, it is said, was advocated.
by Reynier, l\1ontbrun, Fririon, and the Portuguese renegade
d'Alorna. On the other IHUld, Ne)' and Jnllot both advised
a stay at Coimbra, to rest the army, collect provisions, and,
what was most important of all, to reopen communications with
Almcida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 9th Corps, which was now
due on the Spanish frontier. They pointed to the diminished
strength of the anny, which, having lost 4,600 men at Bussaco,
and 4,000 more by the hard marching and poor feeding of the
last month, was now reduced to some 5'7,000 men. The fighting-
power of Wellingtoll was fonnidable, as he had shown at Bussaco,
where many of the French officers persisted. iu believing that he
had shown numbers superior to their own-in which they erred.
A hasty advance, it was urged, might bring the im'aders in face
of a second Bussnco, where there was no chance of a turning
movement. 'Vould the l.."Ommnnder-in-chief wish to accept
another battle of' the same sort? It would be better to establish
a lIew base at Coimbra, to bring up the 9th Corps from the
rear, and anI)' to move on wllen the army. was thoroughly
reorganh:ed. Meanwhile a detachment might demonstrate
against Oporto, to distract ,"Vellington's attention I. This was
1 Fririoll, in his aCCllullt of theSll Ilebates (pp. 72-3), forgets that tile
exir;tence of tile Lines of Torres Vedras was still unknown both to MaSl;~lla
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the policy that Napoleon, two months after, declared that
Massena should have adopted. •Why,' he asked, 'did the
Prince of Essling, after his fltilure at Bus~co, pursue the march
on Lisbon, instead of taking up a position on the Mondego, and
restoring his communications with Almeida? I had not bur-
dened him with orders or instructions, and he could see that
the English were not cas)· to beat.' Masseua's advoCllte, FOJ.
replied that' if the Army of Portugal had been halted on the
Mondego, your Majesty would have said to the Prince, Why did
you not march on? The English lI'ould have re~embarked, if
they had been prcs!le<1.' To which Nllpoleou, with a broad
smile. answered, ' Very true; I probably should have said so 1:
The problem presented to the Marshal, indeed, was not an
easy one. If he remained at Coimbra, his enemies would delate
him to the Emperor for timidity; if he advanced, he might find
that he hOO undertaken a task too great for his strength. The
personal equation settled the difficulty: Massena was obstinate
and enterprising to the verge of temerity. He resoh'ed to go
on, at. the em'liest possible moment, in the hope of forcing
\Vellington to a battle 011 ground less faVOllrtlbJe than Bussa.co,
or of compelling him to embark without any general engage-
ment at all. Two days only were spent at Coimbra. On
October 3, Montbnm's cavalry, after: making a reconnaissance as
far as the sea and the port of Figueira, crossed the MOlldego to
Villa Nova de Aucos, while the 8th Corps, headed by Sainte-
Croix's dragoons, occupied Condeixa: one division of Ne)"s corps
followed them. The rest of the 6th Corps and Reynier made
ready to resume their advance,
A minor problem remained to be resolved. Should a large
garrison be left in Coimbra, and a nelv base for the a.rmy
established there? The Marshal bad shot into the convent of
Santa Clara 3,000 Bussaco wounded, and 1,000 sick men. There
wus UIl IlCCllltlUlation of lI't\ggOllS of the corps-trnins IlUti the
aud his subordinates. So does Delagra\'e (pp. !J3-4). But l'elet, Massella's
confidallt, is positive that they were first hean} of froln prisoners taken
at Pombal on Dct. G, two days after the advance llad reCOIIJIIll'IlCl....I.
l Foy'l; minutes of Ms comersatiou with the Emperor 011 No\', 22, !lent
by Ililll to MlISSClla, in hill h~ttcr of Dec. 4. Sce Appeudix to }o'oy',
Irit Militairt by Girod de L'Aiu, p. 340.
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Grand Park, which could push on no further, for want of draught
beasts, and all manner of other impedimenta. If the army
went on at full speed, in the hope of overtaking the English,
all this must be left behind. But if left unguarded, wounded
and all might become the victims of Trant's militia, which was
known to have retired no further than the Vouga. or even of the
OrocIlun1A of the hills. A strong garrison must be placed in
Coimbra to make it safe: rumour had it on October !it that
Taupin'B brigade and a regiment of dragoons were to be set to
guard the city I, But rumour was wrong: Massena, after some
. doubting, made up his mind that he could not spare e"cn 8,000
men. Every bayonet would be wanted if W'cllington once more
turned to bay. Accordingly he took the extraordinary' step of
telling oft' only a single company, 156 men, of the 44th Erptipage
de la Marine-a naval unit which had becn given him in order
that he might have a nucleus of sea-going people, in case he
succeeded in seizing the Portuguese arsenal at Lisbon. One
would have thought that such men would have been so valuable,
if only the enterprise had succeeded, that he would have chosen
rather a company of' ordinary infantry. These sailors, with two
or three humlred footsore or convalescent men, organized into
t\ couple of provisional companies, were all that the Marshal
placed at the disposition of Major Flandrin, to whom he gave
the high-sounding title of Govenlor of Coimbra. That officer
was told that every day would increase his force, as more
convalescents came out of hospital, and 3,500 muskets, belonging
to the sic};. and wounded, were left with him. The whole mass
of disabled men was concentrated in the convent of Santa Clam,
a vast building outside the trans-pontine suburb of Coimbra, on
the south side of the Mondego. The garrison was so weak that
it could do no more than keep a guard at each of the exits of the
town, which was destitute of walls, witll a post of thirty men,
all that could be spared, at Fornos, on the great north road facing
Oporio. To abandon his wounded to almost certain destruction
was a reckless act on the Marshal's part: probably he said to
I So Guingret, of the 6th Corps, who meutions that his own regiment
receil'cd notice that 110 garrison waa to be left, only jusL ill timc to cnable
it to pick up its sliA"htly wounded and footsore men, who would otherwise
have remained behind. (Memoi"I, p. 79.)
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himself that if he could but catch and beat the Anglo-Portuguese
army, a small disaster in his rear would be forgiven him.
Unlike Wellington, he was • takillg risks' I,
On October 4 the French army made its regular start from
Coimbra; the 6th Corps came out to Villa Pouca and Condeixa
on the Pombal road, the 2nd Corps to Vends. do Cego on the
Anciao road, which runs parallel with the other, ten miles to
the east, and joins it at Leiria. Montbrun's cavalry pushed
·in from Soure, to place itself in front of the 8th Corps, which
now moved on from Condcixn. as the hend of the main infantry
column. Its scouts that evening bickered in front of Pombo.l
with Anson's light cavalry, which was covering the retreat of
the allied army. The two days which the French had spent in
plundering Coimbra had allowed the Anglo.Portuguese infantry
to get a start which they never lost: they ne\'er saw the enemy
again during the rest of the retreat. That night Wellington's
head guarters were at Lciria, while Hill, unpursued by any
hostile force, was at Thomar. For the next six days the British
pursued a leisurely course towards the Lines, aloug the three
roads Thomar-Santarem-Villafranca, which was taken by Hill;
Alcob~a-Caldas-TorresVedras, which Wart taken by Picton;
and Leiria-Batnlha-Alemguer, which was taken by Spencer,
Leith, and Cole. It was along the last·named, the central,
road, that Craufurd's infantry and the three cavalry brigades
followed the main body, at the distance of a day's march.
Anson's light cavalry brought up the extreme rear, and was
almost the only unit which saw the enemy between the 4th
and the 10th of October 2• The rest of the allied army had
completely outmarched Massena. Its retreat was marked by
some disorders: the sight of rich monasteries like Alcobas'a and
I The best summiug lip of the MarslLal's resolve may be fOllnd in FOy'i
minute presented to Napoleon Oil Nov. 22: < Le prince ll'a pas pu se
r~sO\ldre it faire un fort dCtnchement 10rsqu'U del'ait li\'rer SOilS peu de
jours IIl1e bntaille decisive it uoe armee deja victorieuse et deux fois plus
nombreuse [I] que la none. Les dangers que couraient sas malades ont
alfligt! son cwur, rnais it a vell!il! que la cmillte de perdrc l'hOpital lJe
devait pas arreter la campagne.' (Foy's Vie J!i/itaire, Appendix, p, 348,)
~ 'I'hougl\ Slade's brigade had tile rearguard on the 7th, aud WlUl
ellg'''I{oo Oil the 8th also, Anson's only was ill toudl with the French Oil
the 4th-6th, and again Oil the 9th-1Otl\.
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Batalha, and large towns, like Thomar and Lciria, standing
empty, yet left full of all such propert)' as the inmates could
not easily carry off, proved as tempting to the British as the
sight of Coimbra had been to the French. There was much
drunkenness, much looting, n.nd some wanton mischief.
Wellington set himself to repress it by the strong hand. He
hung at Leiria two troopers of the 4th Dragoon Guards, who
were caught plundering a chapel, and a man of the 11tll
Portuguese infantry. Some of the regiments which were found
specially addicted to pillage were ordered to bivouac in the open
fields every night, and never to be quartel"Cd in a Yillage 1.
. Anson's brigade, alone among the allied troops, had an adven-
turolls career during the retreat to the Lines. It was always in
touch with 11 pursuillg force of immense strength, for Mll.%ella
had constituted a flying vanguard under Montbrun, whose orders
were to push the enemy at all costs, and to try to come up with
his infantry. This force l:OIlSistcd of Sainte.Croix's dragoons,
PielTe Soult's cavalry from the 2nd Corps, Lamotte's from the
6th Corps, one brigade (Ornano's) of the Reserve Cavalry, and
Taupin's iufantry from the 8th Corps. LtIllOtte's light horse
had the place of honour, and endured most of the hard knocks.
They had lively skirmishing with Anson's 1st German Hussars
and 16th Light Dragoons betwccll Pombal and Leiria Oll the
5th October. The Dritish brigade turned back twice, and drove
their pursuers back all to Taupin's infantry. but always suffered
when it had to resume its inevitable retreat. The French lost
eight killed, seventeen wounded (including five officers) and
twenty prisoners-the British fifty in all, including two officers
wounded, and one taken. This combat would not have been
wmih mentioning, but for tile fact that it was from prisoners
~pt\lred in it that Massena got his first news of the existence
of the Lines of Torres Vedras. Some of the troopers spoke
freely of < the Lines' as their point of destination, not guessing
that this was the first time that their captors had heard of them.
Hence the French generals learned that there were 110W fortifi·
I '11lii was tile case with I'ictoll's division. despite its splendid services
alld hcal'y loss at BUS8lLCO, only ten !la)'s back. Leith'B British brigade
and the Lusitallian Legion are also specillll)' upbraided for straggling.
See G<!lleral Ord<!rt faT ]8]0, pp. 173-4,
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cations in front of Lisbon: but they had, at' course, no know.
ledge of their extent or character, and only expected to find
some field· ....orks on which "" eUington would turn to 00>'. In
fact, M&$Sella was encouraged by the news, thinking that he was
liD\\' certain of the battle which he desired.
On the 7th Odober the French infantry was all concentrated
at Lciria, Rcynicr's corps having now rejoined the other two.
Montbrun'g cavalry spread out so far as Alcob~a-whose
monastery it sacked--{)n the coast-road, and :MuJiano on the
central road. Vedettes were sent out on the cross-road to Thomar
also, but could find no trace of an enemy in that dircd.ion. On
the night that followed l\.{assena received the disquieting in-
telligence that his deliberate taking of risks with regard to
Coimbra had already been punished. A mounted officer, who
had escaped, brought him news that his hospitals and their
guurd had been captured a.t a single blow by Trant's militia
that same afternoon.
That enterprising partisan, it will be remembered, had been
driven behind the Vouga by Sainte-Croix.'s dragoons on
September 30th. Since, however, none of the French turned
aside to molest him, and all marched across his front Oil the
Coimbra road, he was not forced to retire any further. And
having his orders from W'ellington to follow the enemy with
caution, and pick up his stragglers and marauders, he came
southward again when MassClla's rearguard entered Coimbra.
He had advanced to Mealhada when it was reported to him, on
thc 6th, that the rearguard of the French had left the city on
the preceding day. A few people who had returned from the
mountains to their homes, despite \Vellington's proclamation,
sent him assurances that the numbers of the garrison were
absolutel)' insignificant, and that of the wounded enormous,
Judging rightly that it would have a splendid moral effect to
capture Massena's hospitals, and the commencement of a base-
magazine which was being Formed at Coimbra, Trant resolved
to strike at once, If he had waited It little he (:ould lu\\'e got
help from J. 'Vilson and from Miller, who had descended into
the Celorico-Vizeu country, each with his brigade. They had
heen directed by Vvellillgton to cut the French communications
with Almeida, Imd had already carried out their orders.
lBW] TRANT CAPTURES COIMBRA 411
But'l'rant dreaded delay, thinking that MIlS&ena might send
back troops to Coimbra, when he found that Wellington was
retiring as far as Lisbon. Without waiting for his colleagues, he
marched at midday from Mealhada to FOI'nos on the 7th, and
had the good fortune to surprise and capture the insignificant
French post at that village: not a man escaped. He WM now
only eight miles from Coimbra, find was able to rush down into the
city ill the early afternoon before his arrival was known. He had
with him one weak squadron of regular dragoons, and six militia
batl:.aliolls, having bccn joined sil\(:c September 29th by nIl his
stragglers and some outlying units. The whole made about 4,000
men I. Formed in two columns, they charged into Coimbra by
its two northern entrances, sweeping away the small French
guards at the gates. The squadron of cavalry then galloped
along the street parallel with the river, and seized the bridge, thus
cutting off the communication between the French in the towu
and those at the convent of Santa Clam, where the wounded lay.
The small grand-guard, which the enemy kept inside the place,
took refuge in the bishop's palat:e, but WM forced to lay down
its arms at the end of an hour. The men at the coment,
joined by many of the convalescents, kept up a fire for a short
time, but surrendered at discretion, on Traut's promise to
protect them from the fury of his troops. He WM, unfortunately,
not entirely able to redeem his promise: the Coimbra local
regiment was so enraged at the state in which it found it...
native town that it mishandled some of the prisoners-eight are
Sllid to ha\'e been slain~. The total loss of the Portuguese
division was three killed and one officer and twenty-five men
wounded.
Wilson and Miller came up next day, and sweeping the roads
towards Condeixa and Pombal, picked up 300 more stragglers
and mamuders from the tail of Mas...ena's marching column.
Trant handed oyer Coimbra to them, and escorted his prisoners
to Oporto with his own division: there were 3,507 sick and
1 'nle brigade was not complete, the Feira hatt3lioll IHlving-somehow
or other·-got to Lisbon. But Porto, Penafiel, Climbra, lweiro, Maia,
llnd n. combined battn.lion oflight COffillauies were apparently present.
~ See Tnmt's dispatch to Beresford ill Soriano da Luz, "H, Appendix,
p. 221.
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wounded, of whom half could march, while the rest were taken
oft' in carts. Of able-bodied men not more than 400 soldiers were
taken: but some hundreds of commissariat and hospital employes
and men of thctrnin brought up the total6gures of the prisoners
to 4,500 men. Trant has been accused by some French writers I
of deliberately exposing his captives to the fury of the peasantry,
and parading the wounded ill an indecent fashion through the
streets of Oporto. But the handsome testimonial to his humanity
signed by a committee of French officers, which )lapier prints in
the Appendix no. 5 to his third volume, is enough to prove
that Trunt did his best for his prisoners, and tllUt t.he unfor·
tunate incident which occurred just after the surrender. must
not be laid to his account 2•
.Massena's army received the news of the fall of Coimbra
with indignation. It produced n. painful impression on
every mind; and while the rank and file murmured at the
Marshal's cruelty in abandoning their comrades to death-
for it was falsely reported that the Portuguese had massucred
them all-the officers blamed his blind improvidence, and
observed that a brigade might well have lx>en spared to
protect not only the hospitals but the invaluable base.depOt
behind them 3.
There was heavy skirmishing between the British rearguard
cavalry and Montbrun's advance, both on the 8th and 9th of
October. On the first of these days the horse-artillery troop
attached to AllSOll'S brigade was, by some extraordinary mistake,
left encamped out in frollt of the squadrons which were told oft·
as its escort, and was nearly surprised in Alcoentre by an
I As for example Delagrave, p. 107, and Fririon, p. 75.
t Trant delivered nearly 400 British aud Portuguese wounded, whom
Wdlington Ilad been oiJIigctl to leave oohintl at Coimbra, ll-'l lion-tram.·
portable.
I Sprunglin writes, under Oct. 7, in his Diary: ' Lorsque le sort dei!
malheureuJr.: aballdollll<Es a Coimbrc fut COIIIlU dans l'al'lllee, 011 InUMllUru
hautement contre le I'rillce d'Essling. On qllaliJ1a de coupable entete-
ment et de barbaric 8a conduite a Busneo et I'abandon des blesses it
Coimbre. 11 faut avouer que le marechal Ney, le general Reynier et le
due d'Abrautes ne firellt rien pour {aire cesser ces murmnre9. Des lors
l':mm!e perdit de S:l force, parce que le gellenll-ell-clJef n';l\'ail plus la
cOlltilluce de ses Boldsts.' Cf. Guingret, p. 79.
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irruption orSainte-Croix'sdragoolls in a storm of rain I, Sorners
Cocks's squadron or the 16th Light Dragoons charged just in
time to save the guns, and to jam the head of the enemy's
column, as it was crossing the bridge which leads into the village.
Alcoentre was held till dusk, when 'l'aupin's infantry came up,
and Anson's brigade retired, having lost only onc trooper
wOW1ded, while the French had sixteen disabled or taken,
From this day onward, the weather, which had been fine and
drJ since the army left Coimbra, broke up for the autumn rains,
and the last three days of the retreat to the Lincs were spent in
torrential downpour, This had the advantage of delaying the
.French; for while the British infantr)', who were two days ahead
of them, reached their destined position on the 9th (with the
exception of the Light Division and Pack's Portuguese), the
enemy was marching on flooded roads from the 8th to the 11th.
On the 9th there was continual bickering in the rain, from
Quinta da Torrc as far as Alemquer, between Lamotte's light
cavalry brigade, which had again replaced Sainte-Croix'sdragoons
at the head of the pu~uing eolulIlll, und Anson's two much·
enduring regiments, On this day the 1st Hussars of the King's
German Legion had the thick of the work: Linsingen's squadron
of that admirablc regimcnt, which formed the rear detachmcnt
of the whole army, turned back to charge 110 less than four times
ill fh·c miles, alld always with success. At dusk the .French
infantry got up, alld the allied eamlry retired on to Alemquer
after a fatiguing day of fighting, in which the hussars had lost
two killed, two officers and nille men wowlded, and seventeen
missing; the supporting regiment, the 16th Light Dragoons,
had onc killed, three wounded, and four missing, and the
Royals of Slade's brigade, who only got engaged in the late
c\'ening, onc wounded and four missing. Lamotlc's loss was
a little more-six killed, twenty-two wounded, and twenty-onc
prisoners 2, Three of his officers were hurt, one taken.
On the next day (Oct. 10) the whole of the British caval!'y
1 'Rather IL nell' style of war, to IJlace guns ill a village and the troops
protecting them a mile in tllC rear.'- Tomkillsoll, 1" SI.
Z Readers interested in cM·alry work should read Beamisll, i. 298-JOl,
al\(l TomkillllOll, .52-8, wllo have rulmirnhlc aCCOUllts of thi~ rearguard
lightiug.
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marched from Alemquer to within the Lines, distributing them-
sehes to the cantonments which hud been arranged for them.
But Cmufurd's and PlI.Ck's infantry, which had hitherto been
completely covered b>" the horsemen, did not follow their
example with quite sufficient promptitude, and got engaged
in an unnecessary skirmish. The Light Division. should have
withdrawn at noon, but Craufurd, believing the E'rcnch infantry
to be still far away, and despising the cavalry which hovered
around him, remained in Alemquer, intending to spend another
night in a dry cantollment, for the torrential rain which was
falling promised a fatiguing march to his men. At four o'clock
Taupin's infantry came up, and engaged the pickets of the Light
Division in a skirmish. Having been strictly forbidden by
Wellington to get entangled in a rearguard actioll, and remem-
bering perhaps his experience at the Coa, Crauful'd tardily and
unwillingly moved otr. But dusk coming on, his l..'Olumn missed
its road, and instead of retiring into thc section of thc LillCii
which it was destined to (}(.'cupy, between the Monte Agra\'a
and the valley of CaI8.ndl'iz, went too far to the west, and came
ill upon the position of the 1st Division in front of Sobral.
This would havc becn dangcrous if thc Frcnch had had any
infantry to the front, to take a<hantage of the ulloccupied gap
in the lines. But Montbrun's advanced guard had pressed lllore
than thirty miles in front of the main body of MassellR's army,
und this force contained nothing but cavulry, snve the siJlgle
brigade of Taupin-Iess than 3,000 men I. This force, such as
I Fm this rCll80n the dismal Ilictum of the situation dml1'l1 hy Napier
(Hi. 38-9) mllst he considered exaggeraWd. 'nle Prendl main ann)' WII!!
further off' than he imagines; it had not passed Alcoclltre. 'nle cal'alry
could ha>'1l doue Ilothing against the heights, ami TallJlill's brigade wouhl
Il:""e been crushed if it had endeal'Ollretl to enter the gall. But it nel'er
came within tell miles of tile exposed point on the loth and 11th, not
11lwing 1)l~'lSCll AlcllHplcr. The Light l)il'isiull tliari~ts (10 Ilot treat
seriously the position whicll Napier paints in 8uclJ gloomy colours, See
Leach, p, 172, and Simmons, p, 111. The Light Division countermarched
from Sobral tn Arrud/lllllfl reached their prol)Cr post long l)Cfore midnight.
There tIley picked up a detachmellt of 160 COllvalescents and recruits
from Lisbon, wllO had been waiting for them. Amoug these were
Harry Smith /lud Simm01ls, who llave 1\CC0llUts of the arri\'al of the division
<after dark; aud of its relief at finding large firC!.! already liglJted alld
provisiollS prepared 11)' the draft,
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it was, did not pass Alemquer that night-Craufurd, in his
retreat 011 Sobral, was followed by cavalry alone. It was not
till next morning, when .Montbrun sent out reconnaissances in
all directions, that he found himself in front of fortifications
drawn across every roud, alld gradually realized that he was in
front of the famous' Lines of Torres Vedras.'
It must not be supposed that Wellington's final arrangements
for the rcception of the army of Massena in front of Lisbon
were made at leisure, or at a moment when he had nothing to
distract him. Though the actual retreat of his army from
the position of BuS.'SllcO to the position of Torres Vooras was
conducted at an easy pace, and practically unmolested by lhe
enemy, yet the days during which it was being carried out were
a timc of political, though not of military, storm and stress.
E,·cr since the .French hud slarted from Almcida, and mud!::
their first advance into the mountains of lieira, Wellington had
been engaged in an endless and tiresome controversy with the
Portuguese lWgeucy. Though they had assented, long before,
to the scheme for devastating the country-side and bringing
Massena to a check only ill front of Lisbon, yet when the actual
illvasion bcgnIl, Hud the first hordes of fugitives wcre I'CportL-d
to be leaving their homes, and bunting their crops, and taking
to the mountains, several of the members of the lWbrency became
appalk-d at the awful sacl'ifices which they were calling upou
the nation to endure. The Principal SoU51~ put himself at the
head of' the movemcnt, and was supported by the Patriarch,
the Bishop of Oporto, so famous in 1808. Sousa brought before
the Regellcy proposals that Wellillgtoll should be forll1u11y
requested to try the chances of a pitched battle on the frontier,
before retiring on Coimbra or Lisbon. In addition, he wa~
alwaJs ;maintaining in primtc company that the people should
not be required ·to take in hnnd the scheme of devll.<.ta.tion and
wholesale emigration, till it was certain the allied army was
unable lo stop Masscna somewhere CMt of the Serl"n da Eslrella.
He also laid before the Regency documcnls intended to pro\'e
that the system of devastation was physically impossible, and
that it would prove incapable of stopping the advance of thc
French, owing to the difficulty that would be found in
penmnding the peasantry to destroy instead of' hiding their
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stores of food I. There was a. certain modicum of truth in this
last argument, and the French did succeed in living for a longer
time in the evacuated districts than Wellington had considered
possible. On the other hlind, the Principal was hopelessly
wrong in his contention that the French would sufter little
inconvenience. They were starved out of Portugal by
Wellington's device, even though it took longer to work out its
re~ults than he had calculated. There is no reason to suppose
that Sousa was in any way treacherously inclined: he and his
whole family stood or fell with the English alliance, and the
victory of the }~rench would mean ruin to them. But his
private and public utterances and those of his satellites had
a deplorable effect. In the mouth of the common people it
took the form of a widely-spread rumour thllt 'Wellington had
-refused to fight at all. and intended to re-embark the British
army. This did not lead to any wish to submit to Napoleon,
but to a desperate determinatioll to resist even if deserted.
Wellington's dispatches are full of a riot which took place Ul
Lisbon 011 September 7th, when the militia proposed to seize on
St. Julian's, the Citadel, and the Bugio forl because they were
informed that the English garrisons were about to e\Oacuate them
and put to sea 2. ''''hen 'Massena had already passed Coimbra,
Sousn was mad enough to propose, at the Regency bonrd, thal
the Portugucse troops should not retire within the Lines, but
remain outside and ofter battle in the open, even if the
British refused to stand by them. The nervous activity of
the government had been shown some three weeb before by
the sudden arrest and deportation of some fifty persons in
Lisbon, who were suspected, rightly or wrongly, of' Jacobinism,'
and had been accused of having secret communication with
D'Alorna. tLDd the ulher renegades in Massena's arllly. They
included a lbw oOit..ers, and 11 good mallY lawycn>, doclors,
merchants, and minor officials, as well as some dependants and
1 For Sousa's argumlllltls, see Sori3.1lo da LUll, iii. PI', la0-44. 111at
author thinks tIle Principal's arguments weighty, and sees no harm iu
the fact tbat lIe set them forth in public and private. Cf. Wellington,
DitpUichCl1, vi. 430.
~ See Welliugton to Charles Stuart, Sept. 9, anu to Lord Liverpool,
Sept. 13, 1810,·Dllp(ltche., vol. I'i. pp. 420-30.
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relatives of the exiles. The case against most of them was
so weak that 'Vellington protested against their ba.nishment,
holding that the alarm caused by tbe arrests would make the
people of Lisbon unreasonably suspicious, and give rise to
a belief in wide-spread plots. But despite his letter to the
Uegency all were shipped off to the Azores 1. Some wefe
ultimately allowed to go to England, others to Brazil, but the
Illajol'ity were l10t allowoo. to rctum to Portugal till 1816.
'All I ask from the Government,' wrote 'Vellington, on
October 6th, in the rni,l"t of the retreat, ' is tranquillity in the
town of Lisbon, and pmvisions for their own troops 2.' These
two simple requirements were precisely those which he did not
obtain. The cnpital of Portugal \\'nll kept disturbcd by
arbitrury arrests, by proclamations which often contained false
news, and sometimes pledged the Regency to measures which the
Commander-in-Chiefdisappfovoo, and by senseless embargoes laid
011 vehicles and commodities, which wcre ncver turned to usc 3.
At the same time the Portuguese troops were not fed, and
the tents which had been ordered fOl'ward to the positions
behind the lill!..'S nevcl' 8tnrtcd fwm the magazincs of Lisbon-t.
1Vellington's temper, tried to the uttermost by these
distractions, when his mind was entirely engrossed by military
problems, grew sharp and irritable at this time. He wcnt w ftu'
as to write to the Pl·ince Regent at Ilio de Janeiro, to declare
that either he Of Principal Sousa must leave the country. Hc
suggested that some post !\S ambus;;ador or speeiul envoy 8hould
he found for the man who troubled him so. The Patriarch, as
'a necessary evil,' he did not wish to displace, but only to
scare. Unfortunately. nil appeal to Brazil \l'ns hopeless, since
the Regent was entirely in the hands of the Principal's brother,
the Conde de Linhares. Much acrimonious correspondence,
dcla)'!..-tl by the \'I\st time which was consumed in getting lctters
I Sce Soriano (1:1 I,ll;!', iii. 00-9, for a list of them, and \Vellington's
l)i"Jl<JtclUJ<J, I·i. 4:.3.'3, for tile protest against the de!lortation; also ibid.
,528-9.
2 l)ilpatche" vi. 11. 4.93.
• Dilipafc/lea, vi. 62·1. '\VhclI they Iml'C got lllulcs 'HilI cnrriuges, hy
injudicious seizure, tJley do not emllloy thelll, but the animals and people
are kept st.'m·ing and shivering, w}lile Wt) still want llrovisions.'
• Ibid., I'Ll'. 506.
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to and from Uio, only led in the end to a pl'oposal from
Linhares that his brother should leave the Regency, if Charles
Slum, the British Ambll..~s/ldor, wa.~ 1l1~o withdrawn fmm i~
llnn if the 'Var~1\1inister, General Migucl Forjaz, \fhom
'Vellington considered a necessary person and the ablest man in
Portugal, should also be removed from his post 1, To this
proposal neither Wellington Ilor the British government would
con~nt, and ns it only mme in when Massenn.'s imasiOll had
already been foiled, and the French had retired into Spain,
the crisis was ovel', The Principal remained at the Council
Board, to talk Illud, impracticable and mischic\'OllS stllfl~ but to
do little positive hlU'lll. When the invasion was past 'Velling-
ton could afford to disregard him.
I See Soriano da Luz, iii. 1"142. For text of it hi8A~lIdix,vii. 178-9.
'ne answer was ouly written on Feb. ]]>] B] I, nnd only got to WellingtOll
ill A}Jril WllClI tile cTisi~ was llver.
SECTION XXI: CHAl'TER IV
THE LINES OF TOHllES VEDHAS
'YE have hitherto, when speakiug of \Vellillgtoll'S immense
scheme for fortifying the position on which he intended to
bring his enemy to [l sw.ndstill, l-clruillt..-d frolll entering into
the details of his plall. It is now time to describe it in full, and
to explain its design.
The character of the peninsula 011 which Lisbon stuud:i lends
itself sufficiently well to defence. At a first inspection the
country-side offers a rather chaotic expanse of mountain and
valley, whose general features are hard to seize from any onc
point. On further eXllmination it appears that the whole
square mass of land between the Atlantic and the 'l'agus
estuary is nothing more than a (:ontinuation of the ridge of
the &rea de Monte Junta, the mnill Dlolllltuiu-c1mill of Estrc-
madura. Dut from the backbone or central mass of the high-
hmd so many large spurs are thrown out to each side, and these
are themseh'CS 80 high and steep, that the whole peninsula
SI.'CUlS lIlorc like u. ganglion of mountains than tl well· marked
chain, The two chief joints or vertebrae in the backbone are
the Monte Agra~a above Sobral, and the Cabe}a de Monte·
chique six: miles south of it, and these form the central points
respcethcly of the first and second lines of defence whieh were
finally laid out. Besides the outer defences there was in
'Vcllington's scheme, from the very start, an inner ring of
works, eovcring only a smolt area 011 the sea-shore, at the
southernmost point of the peninsula, to the west of Lisbon,
This was merely intended tu cover an embarkation, if by allY
unforeseen diSWlter the Lines themselvcs should be pierced.
It remains to speak of the system of defences in detail. In
October 1809, Vlellington's plan had embraced no more than one
(;ontinUOllS line of wOI'ks from Alhandra on the Tagus to the
£c2
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mouth of the nio Sito Loul'enc;o on the Atlantic, with certain
n..'<1oubts and fortified camps thrown out in front, at Torres
Vedras, Monte Agr:u;a. and other points. These latter fortifi-
catiolls were not intended to be held in permanence; but it was
hoped that they might defer and hinder the enemy's nttack 011
the main line in thu rear. It was only the long delay in
Mas.c;Cua's advance, which gu-Yc Vlellillgton five or six months
all which he had not counted, that led to the ultimate strength-
cning of the scattered outer works. and their conversion into
11 continuous whole, capable of turning buck, instead of merely
detaining fot' a time, the invading army. Indeed, all across the
peninsula, designs that were slight, isolated, and provisional
when first drawn up, were in the end enlarged, and perfected
into wholly different structures. For the engineers, haying un-
limited labour nt their disposnl, and much more time than had
been promised them, could turn their attention, after the
essentinl works had been completed, to devising all manner of
additional improvements and securities for thc chosen position.
The constructioll of the Lines was cntrusted to Culonel
Fletcher, ~Tenington\commanding engineer, who had as his chief
assistant 'Major John .lones, the historian of the works, and ill
addition elcl'cu British officcrs of the Hoyal Engineers, two from
the King·s Germall Legion, and thn.'C from the Portuguese
regular l1rmy. '\Vellillgton himself, after making one 0.11-
embracing sur\'ey of the positions in l?letcher's company in
October 1809, and another in .February 1810,lcft all the rest to
his subordinate, and refrained from worrying him with matters of
detail, being satisfied tlmt his own intcntions hud been thoroughly
well grasped. The labour a\!ailable was, firstly, that of the
Lisbon militia regiments, who were brought up by alternate
pairs, und paid Ull cxtm 4d. tl day for their services 1; secondly,
that of hired ,'olunteers from the peasantry of the district, of
whom from 5,000 to 7,000 were generally in hand; they re-
ceived Is., afterwards la. Bd. a day:!; and lastly of a conscription
f!"Om the whole of southern Estl'emllduru, for u. circuit of forty
miles around. The forced Illbolll· was paid at the same rate as
• I Or two tlillleml l'ortugueEe money.
t Or six, and aOerwards tell, ",intern,. See Jonefl, lAne, rif T07l"t1l l'edlW,
p.77.
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that freely hired. On the whole, only about £100,000 was paid
out between ~ovembcr 1809 and Sept.ember 1810-50 that the
Lines of 'fon'CS Vedras may be considered one of the eheapest
investments in history, The militiamen and peasantry were
worked in gangs of some ],000 01' 1,500 men, eaeh ill
charge of an enginccl' officer, who hlld a few English and
Portuguese military artificers as his assistants: only ]50
such were available, so short were both armic; of trained
men. 'In some districts a subaltern officer of enginecrs
with a few English soldiers, utterly ignorant of the language,
directed and controlled the labour of 1,500 peasantry, many
of them compelled to work at (t disUlllt.'C of forty milcs from
their homes, while their lands lay neglected, Nevertheless,
during a )'ear of this forced labour not a single instance of in-
subordination or riot Q(:curred. The great quantity of work per-
formed should, in justice to the llortuguese, be ascribed more to
the regular habit of persevering labour in those employed than to
the efficiency of the L'OlItrol exercised over them I .... Indeed, it is
but a tribute of justice to the Portuguese of Estremadura to
state that, dnring many months of constant personal intercourse,
both private and public, the htbourillg cltlSSl.'S evel' showed
themseh'es respectful, industrious, docile, and obedient, while
the govcrning classes in every public transaction evinced mueh
intcllibJ'Cllce, patriotism, good $ellse, and probity. Secrecy with
respect to the extent and nature of the works W.(l.<; enjoined, amI
it is highly creditable to aU cOllcerned that hardly a vague
paragraph concerning the Lines found its way into the public
prinlq. The French invaders relllained ignonlnt of the nature
of ·the barrier rising against them, till they found our army
arrayed on it so as to stop their further advance 2.'
The total frontuge of the southern and stronger serics oflincs,
those which 'Vellington originally planned as his line of defence,
was twenty-two miles from sea to sea. The outer and northern
series of works, whieh Wag originally only a supplement ami
outer bulwark to the other, was longer, extcllding to tWilntJ-
nine miles, for it crosses the peninsula in a diagonal fashion and
not on the shortest possible line that could he drawn, Lastl)'.
I JQIlCS, p. 7!), ~ Itl., 11. 107.
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the small interior line round St. Julian's and Oyerns, which
was prepared os the embarking-place of the mmy in thee\'cnt of
defeat, has a circumference of about two miles. In all, therefore,
fifty-three miles of defcll(:es were planned-a. stupendous work,
far exceeding, when its cluborntc details arc studied, 1I11ylhing
that had been constructed in modern times in the way of field·
fortification.
It must be remembered that the character of the Lines in 110
way resembles that uf our own great Roman wall from 'f)'ne to
Solway, of the wall of China, 01" of any other long continuous
shetch of masonry. It is only on a few points that works of
an)' great length are to be found. The Lines are in essence a
series of closed cnrthwurks, dotted atollg the COlllll1tUldillg points
of Ule two ranges of hills which Wellington chose as his first
and second fronts of resistance. Some few of the earthworks
rose to the dignity of fortified camps, nnned with many scores
of gUlls. The majority of them were small redoubt.'!, constnlCted
lo hold three to six gnns and go.l·l·isons of two or tlu't'e llllllclrod
men only. But even the smallest of them were individually
formiclable from their structure: the normal ditch was 16 feet
wide and 12 feet deep, the parapets 8 to 14 feet thick, und
till were proper!}. fitted willl bunquettes. '\Then it is remem-
bered that they were well palisaded, and had outer hindrances
of abattis, c!uvau.r de frise, and troUS-de-lollp scattered in front,
it is denl' that they were forts rcquiriug a regular attack, lIot
mere lincs of trench ~l.Ild mOllnd. 'I'he stl'Cllgth of the whole
series was that they were placed in scientific fashion, so as to
cross fires over RU the ground 011 which all attacking force was
likely to present itself. No prneticnble point of assault could
be fonnel 011 which advancing colulIllls would not he cut up by
flanking fire for a very long distance, before they drew near to
their objL'Ctive. Immcnse pains had been taken to make the
more exposed sections of the country-side into oue Vllst glacis.
Mounds which might have given cover bad been removed to the
last stone, hollow roads filled up, houses pulled down, oli\'c-
groves and vineyards stnbbed np to the I"oots, so Ail to give R
perfectly smooth and featUl'eless Rscent lip to the line of redoubts.
Greatly to ,~rellington's credit (as may be illcidentLLUy re-
marked) compellSll.tioll WM paid 011 n liheml scn.le to nl1 owner:<
1810] THE WESTERN END U1" TH!: LINES 4!!S
of dwellings, mills, fruit-trees, &c., for the havoc made by these
neccssllry pieces of demolition. The result was a complete
clearance of cover. 'We have spared neither house, garden,
vineyard. olive-trees, 11'00(18, or private property of ally de-
scription,' wrote the officer in charge of the works to his chief at
the end of the preparations: 'the only blind to the tire of the
works now standing anywhere is that beautiful avenue of old
tro..'S in the pass of Torres VI.-xlrus. Thc Juiz da Fora and the
inhabitants pleaded with me so hard for the latest moment,
lest they might be cut down unnecessarily, that I have con-
sented to defer it till the day before the troops Jnllrch in. As
I have trustworthy Illen with 1l...'\CS in readiness on the spot,
there is no doubt of their being felled in time. The pine woods
on the Torres height~ urc already down, and formed into
abattis 1.'
lt was not necessary, or indeed possible, to slope into a
glacis the whole of the ground in front of each of the lines of
defences. Illlllany plal.-'Cs other methods of making it impassable
were used. At the north-western front of the first line, between
'l'orres Vecll'llS and the sea, for nearly six miles, a long marsh
bad been created; the river Zizundrc hau been dammed up,
and had filled the whole of the narrow bottom in which it
flows. 'It has overflowed its banks, and in a short time more
than half the valley has become so complete a bog that no
rcward call induce uny or the pcusa.ntry to pass oyer it 2,' wrote
the officer who had CIll'ried out the experiment. Nor was it
possible for the enemy to a.ttempt to drain the bog, for four~ re-
uoubts furnished with heavy guns, (Utd placed all dominating
points of the hillside, commanded the bottom so completely
that it was impossible for ally party to approach it with
safety. Yet the rcdoubt~ wcre out of the range of field-guns on
the slopes beyond the Zi1.l1ndrc; only guns of position could
have touched them, and Massena had none sueh with him. Two
1 Major Jones to <':01. j.'let.eller, thll chief cugiueer, then absent ou
a visit to 'Vcllillgtoll'S bead lJuartcr!l. ::le\! JOIlC5. fA,led rifTorrl:/I Vedra,.
1'- 187.
" JOlles, Li'lI:t, J" ~w.
• Aft.crwlInls, whl:lL i\1a&ICml. had :ll'l'i\'tld, iUl:l'l:a>;t.,,1 tu si ... leell I'ooouut.!
with sevent)"-tivc guns. Sec JOlles. p. Ha.
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similar inundAtions on a smaller scale had been caused aL the
other end of the Lines, by damming up the Alhandra and
Alverca streams. each of which spread out in a marsh a mile
broad, reaching to the foot of the heights above the TllguS, amI
could only be passed on the nnrrow paved high-road from
Santa-rem to Lisbon.
In other places a very different method of making the Lines
unapproachable had been adopted. Where the heights were
very steep, but not absolutely inaccessible-a dangerous thing to
the defence, for here' dead ground,' unsearchable by the cannon
of the redoubts abO\'Ct ITmst almost necessarily occur,-the slope
had been cut or blasted away in bunds, so as to make absolute
precipices on a small scale. At onc point above Alhalldra 1 this
was done Oll a front of full 2,000 yards. EI'CIl this was not the
last precaution taken: at several plttces ravinc~ ran deep into
the line, and up them columns, mOl-e or le~s under cover, might
possibly haye penetrated. Such ravines, therefore, were stuffed,
at cho;:;ell points, by a broad abaUis or entanglement, mainly
composed of olh'e~trees with all their chief boughs remaining,
dragged together and interlaced for a depth of many yards.
Such a structure could not be crawled through, nor could it be
hewn down \Tithout an infinite waste of time andlaboul'; nor, on
the other band, did it afford allY co\'er, since grape or musketry
could play perfccUy well through it. The chief of these trnps
was that laid across the long ravine above the villll.ge of Arrnda,
down the boUom of which flows one of the winter torrents
which fall eastward into the Tagus.
It was fortnnate that Portugal WI\S lL wcll.wooocd country:
there arc regions where it would be impossible to procure the
immense amount of timber that was lavished on the accessories
of the redoubts. All, as has been already mentioned, were
palisaded; many had ill addition abattis or entanglements
thrown up in front of them, some way down the hillside, so as
to detain the advancing enemy under fire as long as possible.
The works were divided into eight sections, the first line
I Jones, Lilre" p. Ji3. 'An extent of U!l\\'ards of 2,000 yards 011 the left
has been so cut and blasted along its summit as to give a continuous scarp,
c\'erywhere exceeding 10 feet in height, allll co\'ererl for its wholtllcngth by
both musketry and cannon.'
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composed of four, the second line of three, while the eighth
consisted of the inner retrenchment for purposes of embarkation,
at the extreme southern point of the peninsula. Of the outer
or secondary line the three sections were:
(1) A front of five miles from the Tagus at Alhftlldl1llllong
the crest of n steep but not vcry lofty ridge, as fnr as the great
ravine that overlooks the village of Arruda. This front was
elaborately fortified, as it blocks the great road, in the flat by
the waterside, which forms the eusiest approach to Lisboll from
the north. In the five miles there were ultimatel}' constructed
no less than ~3 redoubts with 96 guns. Two thousand yards of
hillside in onc place had been scarped into n precipice; a mile
by the side of the Tagus had been inundated. The one con-
siderable gap in the line, the ravine at the head of the valley of
Calandrix, had been choked by onc of the great ahaUu above
de;cribed. The redonbts re'1uired a blfil'rison of 6,000 men.
(2) The second section, from the ravine above Arruda to the
left of the steep Monte Agralfa, formed somewhat of a salient
angle: it had a front ill all of some fOUl' and a half miles, which
included the most lofty and defensible porl of the back-bone
range of the Lisbon peninsula. One of the four great pa"ed
roads entering the capital from the north, however, pusses over
the shoulder of thesc heights, and they were thcl'Cforc vcry
11cavily fortified from the flrst, the large redoubt for ],600 men
on the top of l\Ionte Agrap being onc of the original outer
works ordered for construction in \"ellington's earliest notes of
October 1809. There were ill all seven redoubts mounting 55
guns and requiring a gnrrison of 3,000 mcn 011 this fraction ot'
the lines.
(3) Quite different in character was the front of eight miles
from the left of Monte Agra~'a to the pass of Runa, overlooking
the upper valley of the Zil'.ttndre and the village of Sobml. The
fortification of this line had not entered into W"ellington's
original plan, and there were only two redoubts upon it when
Massena appeared before it in October 1810. Such defence as
there was consisted in the fact that the dominating Monte Agrat;&
redoubts overlooked it on the right, and that the two small
works just mcntiom:d commanded the main high-road from
Sobrul to CU~!l de Montechique, which goC'> through its centre.
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But there was a clear possibility that the enemy might make a
push up the valley and the high.road, by the village of Zibreira,
and this was indeed the most probable point of attack in the
whole fl9 miles of front for the enemy to select. When, at
the last moment, the British Commander-in-Chief determined to
hold the outer lines, and not merel}' to fall hack afb~l' ha\'illg
used them for ll. tempol1l.ry defcnce, he hud to cram this point
with troops, und to L-onstl'uet ncw' works upon it us quickly as
possiblc. Four divisions, therelore, more than 20,000 men.
were <.-oncentrated here. \Vellington's own head quarters were
established at the hamlet of Pero Negro, on the slope above the
high-road, and a very large redoubt was thrown up on the
Portello hill, above Zibrcira, with several smaller Olles further
to the right, to connect it with the :Monte Agr~ works,
Sobral, the village at the foot of the heights, was held as an
outpost, but abandoned when l\1assena pushed forward to thc
front, I\S it wu." too fur advanced to the north to be treated ms
un integral purt of the position. But the French, when thcy
hlld curl'ied Sobml with difficulty, looked at the main line
bchindit, und refused to attempt any further advatlt'e, The hill-
side was as formidable us the Hussaco heights fi'om which they had
only recently been repulsed: it was full of troops and growing
in strength e\'ery moment as the earthworks continued to arise,
(4) The fourth section of the Quter or northern front was that
fi'Oill the gorge of the Zi1.andre (or the pass of Rurw., as it is
sometimes called) to the sea. It was about twche miles long.
but of this SptlL'C six miles mId more was (;O\'cred by the im-
pu,ssnble bog formed by the obstructed Zi1Al.udre, lUld Itllother
mill' was formed b)· the formidable entrenched cump of Sail
Vinccnte, above the towu of Torres Vedras. the most complete
und self-sufficing of all the works in the peninsula. This strong-
hold la)' outside the main line, beyond the river, covering the
bridge and the paved chauS3ee from Leiria to Lisbon, the only
carriage-road Oil the western side of the Lines t. It was one of
I Hy uu ,astonishing blunder the CIImll of Tort'cs Vedras is Illa.ced by
Napier in his map (amI apparently in his text also) 8(Ju/h of the river
Zi:t.andrc, on the main line of lleig1lts, while in reality it was a great
fite-du-pollt cOl'ering the only pasr;agc from north to south Ol'er tIle stream
and its hogs.
1810] THE COUKTRY ABOUT TOIlRES VEDRAS 427
t.he cmlicst of the fortifications commellecd by Wellington's
engineers. having been started on November 8, ]809, and was
placed in sllch a conspicuous point, and planned on such a large
scale, that it attracted public attention more than any other
part of the works, and gave its llame to the whole in popular
parlance 1. The whole front on both sides of TorresVedras and
its great fort WAS so strong and inaccessible as to ofter little
temptation to the invader to select it as a point of serious
attack, all the more so because troops brought opposite to it.
would be completely cut off from any left in front of the
mstern lIud centrut part of the lincs. For the geography of the
pcninsuln at this point is peculiar: north of the gorge of the
Zizandrc the great hack-bone range, the Serra de Barrcgndo
and the Scrra de Monte Junta. extends for a distance of fiftccn
miles, without being crossed by a single road practicable for
horses, much less for wheeled ,'chicles. There arc nothing bllt
goat-tracks across the heights. If, therefore, any considerable
body of troops had been sent to observe or contain the westenl
section of the lines, it would hayc been separated by two days'
IlIllrch from the rest of the arlllY, Ilnd liable to be crushed, ere
~llccourl..'(l, by the defenders of Lisbon, who hnd good cross-ronds
across the penimmln, by whieh they could transfer thcmselvcs
from point to point nnder thc protection of thcir works. As a
mattcr of fact, nothing but flying parties of l~rench horse e"er
appeared in this direction. Masscna had not troops to spare
for any secondary attack, more especially for onc on such an
nnpromising part of the Lines. Wellington had foreseen thi~
when llC distributed his field Army behind the yarious sections
of the front: to support the garrisons of the tweh'e miles of
redoubts about TOITCS Vedras he only placed one division,
while there were three behind the eastem section, and more
than folU' in the partially entrcnchl.'(l central 1'ar12•
Passing 011 to the second line of dcfencc, frolll Quintella 011
the Tagus to the mouth of the Rio Silo I.ollren~"O on the
I Sce note to that effect in .rOllC~, 1'. 21.
, ·!l,e third division (Pictoll) only, behind Torres Vedrflll. Behind the
Alhamlra-Arruda section ....·ere tIle 2nd (Bill), Hamilton's Portuguese, and
the Light Division; in tlte central part the llIt, 4-th, 5th, Otlt Divisiolls alld
three lluatt:ll:hetl Portuguese brigade~ (Pack, Colcmall, am} AI. Campbell).
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Atlantic, we find three sections of defence, which, unlike those
of the outer line, were all completed by September ]810, and
had no central gap. (f) There was over a mile of impassable
inundation at the eastern end, between Quintella and Alverca.
Abo\'e the first-named village was an isolated hill, which was all
fortress, for no lcss thall ~ix ["C<lonbts had been plm:cd upon it,
to cnfiladc the high-road across thc immdntcd lowcr gnmnd.
Thcn came the Scrra tlc Senes, three miles of lofty nutl tlillieult
hills, which had been scarped into almost perfect inaccessibility.
In a sudden dip west of this range was the pass of Bucellas,
through which runs one of the three great high-roads that
enter Lisbon. It was easily defensible, as it lies between two
high and steep mountain-sides, and is only a couple of hundred
yards broad. Rcdoubts were placed so as to rake it from cnd
to end, alld to flank it on both sides. The chau8sl:e itself \l'1lS
blocked with successive abnttis, and the viaduct leading up to it
was mined.
(2) The second section of the inner line extended from the
pass of Bucellas to the Park of Mafra, a front of over six miles.
The eastern part of this was formed by the towering heights of
the CabC(f8. de Montechiquc, the most dominating mountain-
liummit in tile whole flCnilllillla, almost steep enough to defend
itself without fortification; but three redollbt.'i nevertheless had
been rearcd upon il~ sUlllmit. But fr01l1 the pass of 1\1ontcchique,
at the lell side of the summit, dowlI to iHafru the ground WIlS
less well marked. and here the cllall.~3f:e from Sobral and ZiIJrciru
crossed the range. i\'luch fortification, therefore, was lavished
on these four miles, along which there were nine strOllg redollbts,
connected with each other in the rear by a military road passing
along the southern crest of the heights. There was a second
and formidable ridge behind this line, where further dcfem:c
could be offered in the unlikcly event of the cnemy forcing his
way up the high-road.
(3) From :\fafra to the sea, nearly ten miles, there WIlS for the
most palt a well-marked line of heights protected in front by
thc ravine of the river of Slio Louren\'o, a deep, rugf,'cd, Ilnd in
many cases inuccessible cleft, only crossed by a siJlgle roml, that
from Torres Vcdras to l\,rafm. Nevertheless, six rcdoubts were
reared, to cover this, and the few other points where the ravine
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was passable. The eastern part of this section, that along the
wall of the Royal Park (Tll.pada) of 1\fafra, was its weakest
portion, and for two miles at this point the British engineers set
all their ingenuity to work. The outlying heights called the
Serra de Chypre, in front of the park, were covered by four
redoubts, and turned into a first defence. The wall of the
Tapada itself was loopholed and furnished with a banquette.
The important road which passes its foot was obstructed with
cuts, enfiladed by the artillery of several works, and stockaded
at more than one point. There was another group of redoubts
along the south end of the'rones Vedras road, at the village of
Morugueim; und finally Mafm town, ill the rear of all, WI\S
tumccl. into a defensive post by means of trenches and oorricadcs.
Altogether, what was by nature the weakest point in the
southern lines was made by art onc of the strongest. This too,
in spite of the fact that, being approachable only from Torres
Yedras, it was on the whole not a probable front on which to
expect an attack.
A mere mention must suffice for the eighth section of the
defensive works, the semicircle at St. Julian's and Oyeras
which WtlS intendetl to proted the embarkation of the arlll)'
if the worst should come. It was strongly cntrenchcd, and
could be hcld by a "cry fcw battalions, whilc the rest were
utilizing thc llUmerous and solid piers alongside of which the
fleet of transports was to be moored.
Having described the Lines, it remains that we should describe
the garrison set to guard them, detailing separately each elemcnt,
regular and il'l'egular. 'l.'he forces at the disposition of
\Vellington were materially inc~ased at the moment of his
arrival within the Lincs. On October 8 he found at his
disposition 1\ brigade of three hutlnliow; ncwly Ilrri\'cd at
Lisholl, tllc 1/5Otl1, 1/711;t, find 1/92nd, all old Corunna
regimcnts which had served in the \.yalehercn expedition, I\nd
wcre still nonc too hcnlthy from thcir long sojourn in the
deadly marshes of Zeeland. There had also landed about the
same time the 94th regiment, and the Brunswick Oels Light
Infantry, 1\ foreign battalion raised from the refugees who had
fought under the Duke of Brwlswick in tlie abortive North
German insurrection of 1809. Moreover, two battalions-thc
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2/JOth and 2/+4th-had just been sent to Lisbon from Cadiz,
where General Graham now thought that the British contingellt
was larger than was absolutely necessary. The lj4th and
Ij23rd came out a little later, and do not appeal' in the
fortnight)' 'b"Cnernl state' of the army till November 15. Thus
the arm)' WlIS swelled by nine battalions, or some 6,500 men I.
No cavalry, however, had arrived.
\Vellington used these new arrivals to form a new 6th Divisioll
of infantry, and to complete to full strength the 5th Division,
which had hitherto possessed only one British brigade. He
did not, however, keep the lately landed units together; acting
on the principle which he always followed, of mixing veteran
acclimatized battalions with new arrivals, he fanned the new
6th Division by adding Campbell's brigade, taken from Cole's
4th Division, to two Portuguese regiments the 8th 11l1d the
Lusitaniun Legion, both of which lw.d been hitherto attached
to the 5th Division, and had sen'ed with Leith at Bussaco.
In the 4th Division, Campbell's brigade .....as replaced by that of
l'akenham, taken from Spencer's Ist Division. while compensa-
tion was made to Spencer, by giving him the newly landed
lj50th, lj71st, and l/~nd, as a new brigade under Erskine.
The 5th Division under Leith got three more of the fresh
un-ivals, the lj4th, 2/3Oth, and 2/44th as its second brigade.
The 94th was ginm to Picton's second brigade,-which had
hitherto consisted of only 2! battalions,-to raise it to average
brigatle-~trel1gth. The Brunswick Ocb Jiigers, being u. light
corps, were partly divided up into separate companies and told
off to different brigades (as the 5/60th, a similar unit, had
already been), though the head quarters and six companies
joined Pakenham's brigade in the 4th Division. But when the
lfiSrd. the last of the reinforcements, came out, it also joined
Pakcllham, while the Brunswickers were transferred to the
Light Division-where they did not long abide 2.
Even after allowing for the trifling losses at Bussaco. the
British field army in Portugal was now far larger than it had
I About 6,800 raok aDd file, with 260 officers and :MO sergeants and
drummers, by mid-wioter return.
, For all these (:hanges see AtkillSQn's admirable' Composition of tit"
British Army in the Peninsula; printed in the EllSIiIf" Bi8tQri~'1J.lReview.
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ever been before, the gross total of troops in the Lines
amounting to 4fl,OOO men, of whom about 7,000 were sick or
detached, and 35,000 were present uuder arms. This figure
does not illdude the two battalions of marines who guarded
St. ,Tulinn's Ilud the lines aroulld it III the moulh of the Tugus.
Of Portuguese regulars, \'\'cllington hud now under his ham}
t.he 24,000 men who had fought at Bussaeo, plus the 1,400
cavalry under :Falle and the brigade under Bradford (nol\'
consisting of five battalions) l which had been guarding the
position behind the Ahll. Oil the day of the battle, togethel'
with the reserve artillery of Lisbon. The total made 21,500
men, of whom fl4,500 were with the colonrs and 8,000 sick in
hospital.
Of militia there were three brigades and foul' isolated units
more within the Lines-tile Southern Bcira brigade of Lecor,
three regiments 2, the Northern Estrcmadurll.n bt'il:,.rnde of
Mirandn, also three regiments 3, und the Lisbon local brigllde of
five regiments 4 with two stray units from the north 6, and two
from the south 6. The numbers of all tile regiments ran very
low, owing to the way in which they had been neglected and
under-fed by their government, since they were" called out nine
months before; many had died, and far more had deserted.
The thirteen corps did not between them supply more than
8,200 men present under arms, with 1,000 sick in hospital. In
addition there were S,flOO artillerymen improvised from the
mnks of the infantry militia or the OrdenflDl;a, making altogether
Ifl,400 troops of the' second line.'
As to the Ordenanlf/\ who had taken refuge in and about
Lisbon with their families, when the whole popUlation of south·
, TIle 12th and 13th line regiments and tIle 5th Ca"atloTes, not much
Ol'er 2,500 bayonets in all.
I Idallda, Castello Brnnco, COVilll'ii.O.
, Thomar, Lciria, SanLarem; the fourth battalion (TondelJu.) 11'33 in
!,'arrisoll at Pcnichc. lIS Wl\S also a considerable body of ilCp6t troop~ from
the line, Ill~lf-trained recruits, &e•
• 1,2,3, and.l of Lisbon, and Torres Vedras.
r. Feira and Vizeu, properly belongillg to Trant's corps, but somehow
separated from it.
• Setulml and Alcal,:er do SuI.
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western Beira and northern Estrcmadura retired within the
Lines, it is impossible to obtain any figures, save that they
supplied the bulk of the 3.000 volunteer mtillerymen just
IlIcntiollC..'<1 above, ulId that the picked men of the OrdCnl1119U of
the cupitul itself hu.d been organized into two baUalions of
•Atiradorcs Naciollales' of about 450 men each. The whole may
h,(wc amounted to any number from 20,000 up to 40,000 men,
of whom about two-thirds were armed with muskets, the rest,
those from the remoter districts, having still nothing better
than pikes. As most of them were scattered with their
families in the villages where they had taken refuge, or the
camps of huts which they had formed in sheltered situations,
they could hardly be considered to be in a sLite of llIobilimtion,
llnd certainly were of no use either for garrisoning forts 01' for
employment in the line of battle.
Lastly, in calculating the forces which Wellington accumulated
within the Lines, wc must mention the two Spanish divisions
from the Army of Estremndura. Hearing that all was quiet
for the moment on the frontier of Andalusia, the British
Commander had asked the Marquis of La Romana, whether, in
accordance with a promise made so long ago as July, he could
spare any troops to assist in the holding back of the main French
army of invasion. The Marquis, with a liberality of which the
Cadiz Regency would have disapproved, if its leuve hud beel!
Ilskcd, replied that he would bring up his two reserve divisions.
Leaving Ballasteros on the Andalusian border, and anothcr
division under Imas at Badajoz, in additioll to the garrison alld
Madden's l'ortuguese cavalry, he marched for Aldea Gallega alld
r~isboll with the troops of La Carrera 1 and Charles 0'Donne1l 2,
about 8,000 men. On October 25th he had arrived at the can-
tonments behind .Mafra, on the second line of defence, which
his ally had requested him to occupy. Wellington defended
the bringing up of these troops by the plea' that he did not
think himself justified ill not bringing into his positions all the
force which was at his disposal's. But it is doubtful whether the
1 Who bad now resigned the command of the cavalry, and gone back to
his old infantry division.
t The 'Vanguard' and 2nd Divisiou of his army.
• J)i5patchu, I'i. p. 544.
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ndval1~U'C of' getting 8,000 Spallish troops withill the Lines
justified the dnngcr inClll'l't..U in Estrcll1lUlmtt., when it WI\.<;
possible thnt Soult might scud out Mortier at any moment to
nttack the depleted army that covered the approach to Badajoz.
Napoleon thought that he should have done so, and when he
heard of the arrh'al of La ROlUall/t at Lisbon, wrote to
CCllsure thc Duke of Dalmatia in the fiercest strain 1. 'It was
11 shame and a scandal that be hOO retired to Seville: the 5th
Corps had orders to be always at La Romauo's heels, and to
prevent him from moving into Portugal, so that the news of
its return to Seville roused the Emperor'3 surprise and anger.'
Thel'e call be no doubt that Ntllloleon did well to be angry. The
balance of affairs ill Andalusia tended to stand at all equipoise
precisely because La Romalla's army 'I'M strong enough to keep
the 5th Corps employed. When 8,000 men had been with-
/lrawll by the Marqllifl to the Lisbon lines, Mortier was in
ft position to sweep all before him M far as the gates of
Badajoz, or to execute a raid iuto the Alemtejo if that course
seemed preferable. But Soult did not send his lieutenant on
this clTand on his own initiative, but waited till he received
direct ordcrs to do so from Paris. Dy that time it was too
late, tlnd neither the disaster of the GelXlr/t nor even the fall of
Badajoz Imd allY inAtlcncc on the course of c\'cnb; in Portugal.
i\[nssclla \\'llS fon.-ed to rctn*t before a single patrol from tlle
Anny of Andalusia had got into touch with his outposts. What
might havc happened if Soult had launched his blow at Badajoz
in October, and had appeared on the left bank of the Lower
Tagus in December, it is impossible to say. Probably
\Vellington would have found some means of averting disaster,
but it is unquestionable that his task of defence would have
been made far llIore difficult.
For the full realization of the meaning of the Lines of TOl"l-es
Vcdl'as there are two general facts which must be remembered.
Firstly, they were garrisoned by troops which formed 110 part
of the field army. 1Vcllington's sixty thollsand regulars were not
frittered away in the garrisoning of redoubts, but were held in
masses behind the lines, read)' to reinforce any threatened point.
and to deliver a pitched battle in the open, if the head of the
t (JorNMlJQndUllce, xxi. pp. 273, 2~5.
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French army were thrust through the defences at some weak
section. The generals of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, who so often built lines, and were so easily evicted from
them, suffered disaster because they drew out their armies in one
attenuated thread, and were therefore weak at evcl)' point, and
always inferior to the assuilllnt ut the place where he made his
assnult. Wcllillf,r!on's army was (with the exception of the Srd
Division at Torres Vcdras) gathered in two solid maSilcs, onc
facing Sobral, on the heights between Monte Agr~ and Runa,
the second and smaller behind Alhaudra. The one could reach
the other in half a day's march, for the roads behind and
parallel to the lines had been put in good repair.
The whole of this vast system of redoubts was to be held by
the troops of the second line, and by them only. There were
altogether some £0,000 men of the second line in the fortifica-
lions, composed of (1) the 8,000 (afterwards raised to 11,000)
militia infanlr}'. (2) Of about 800 Portuguese regular artillery,
aided by over 2,000 gunners picked from the militia and
Ordenan9s, trained by the regulars and incorporated with them.
(S) Of some 250 British artillery-men from the batteries which
had been lying in reserve at Lisbon. (4) Of picked companies
of the Lisbon Ordenan~a (atiradores) drilled into a state' of
discipline not much worse than that of the militia. (5) Of the
landing force of 2,000 British marines, partly from the fleet,
partly brought specio.1ly from England to garrison the proposed
lines of cmbarkation !It St. .Julian's. (6) Of the dcpt'its, COIl-
valescents and recruits of the cight Linc regimcnts of infantry
raised from Lisbon and Southern Estrcmadura-about ·~,OOO
strong.
In all, therefore, there were about 20,000 meu, mostly troops
of secondary quality, or 28,000 if the Spanish auxiliaries are
counted, ready to man the Lines, without a man being
withdrawn from the ranks of the field army. The outer
lines were calculated to require about 18,000 men for
the redoubts, the inner ones 14,000, but clearly both did
not require to be manned at once. If the outer line \vere
broken, the garrison·troops from the intact parts of it could
fall back on the second. Meanwhile the field army would be
engaging any Fr.ench columns that might have broken through,
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and there would be ample time to arrange for thc manning of
the second and stronger front. But it must be repeated once
morc that it was not on the passive defence of thc redoubts by
their garrisons that 'Vellington reckoned for success, but on the
fighting of the field army, who would tackle the columns of
attack that IlUd committed themselres to the llSSllult of the
section-whichever it might bc-that l\IlIsscna might select IlS
his objective. All criticism based on general principles con-
cerning the weakness of long extended lines falls to the grOlUld,
when it is remembered that Wellington had his army massed for
a pitched battle in and behind his defences, not strung out on
all interminable front.
The last point on which stress must be laid is that the most
cnreful arrangements for the transmission of orders and intelli-
b'Cnce from end to end of the Lines had been made. There were
fivc signal-stations, with semaphorcs worked by seamen on (1)
the redoubt No. 30 near the Atlantic, (!l) the great redoubt of
'fortes Vedras, (3) the Monte de Socorro above 'Vellington's
head quarters at Pero Negro, (4) the summit of the Monte
Ag~a, (5) thc hill behind Alhandra on the Tagus. After some
practice it was found that a message could be sent from one
cnd to the other ofthe ~9 miles in seven minutes, and from No. 3,
the head quarters semaphore, to either end of the Lines infour
minutes. There was a similar line uf four semuphorcs on the
second,or main,series ofdefences. Militl.lry rmu]s had been opened
behind both the fronts, so that troops could be moved along the
shortest possible line. On the other hand, it was fortunate that
there existed no cross-road from sea to sea outside the Lines,
which could be of any practical use to the invader. The onl)'
route of this sort, that from Alemquer by Sobral to RUlla, was
commanded for the whole length from Sobral to Runa by the
British heights, whose foot it hugs, while from Sobral to Alemquer
it is separated from the Lines by the steep and pathless ridge of
Galaria, across which nothing on wheels could pass. Never-
tlleless, here lay the invaders' best chance-corps placed all this
road, and screened by the ridge, could be moved fOr some diHl;nnce
to left 01' right unsecn from thc Lincs. The road, however, WflS
bad, rocky, find narrow: it is marked as the' Calgada Arru-
innda' or 'ruined road' in contemporary maps. The othcr
1" f 2
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p<'\ved road in this dil'ection, that fl"OlD Sobral to Al'l'uda and
Alhandra, passed through the line of b'TOund occupied by the
British at two points, and was under fire from the redoubts at
short range for the rest of its course: it was absolutely im-
practicable.
It only remains to be added that the navy had been utili7.ed
for auxiliary service: not only were its marines under orders to
man the St. Julian's lines, but its seamen had fitted Qut all the
gun-boats in the Lisbon arsenal. A flotilla of great strength
infested the Tagus estuary. and by the fire of its heavy guns
prevented the French from approaching tile shore, or endeavour-
ing to build boats at the mouths of its creeks. If allY attacks
Imd been made upon either of the extreme ends of the Lines, the
columns delivering them would have bcen unclc]' (ire from the
sea throughout their operntions. But, flS wc shall liCe, the French
never contemplated this: the one temptation which j\·lasscna
felt was to assault, far inland, the gap ill front ofSobraI between
the Monte Agrat;a and the Serra de Socorro. And there, as we
shall 1;Ce. at the critical moment. prudence got the better of
ambition, and the invader turned back foiled. The high-water
mark ofFrench conqucst in Europe was reached on the knoll by
Sobral on the wet aud gust)' 14th of October, 1810.
SECTION XXI: CHAPTER V
MASSE:\'A BEFORE THE LINES OJ<' TOlllll'.:S VEDRAS
0:-: the night of' October ID, when Cmufurd made his hasty
retreat to Sobral, and wcnt within the Lines, MontbrUlI had
his head quarters at Alemquer, where he kept Tnupin's infantry
brigade, and Lamotte's and Sainte-Croix's cavalry. Pierre
Soult\; light horse felt towards their left, in the direction of
the 'l'agus, llnd occupied Cal'l'egado, where they failed to find
any British outposts, Hill's corIJll IU1\'illg been withdrawn
behind the brook which enters the Tugus near Cl1sumhcim.
The ma,in body of the army was far to the rear, in one "ast
column: Ney's and Reyuier's corps lay that night in and about
Aloocntrc: JUllofs bi\·ouacked around the convent of Nossa
Senhora de Maxcira, a short distallee to the south of' Alcoentre.
All the troops were terribly fatigued by three days' movement
in torrential raill, and had lIO morc marchillg·powcr left ill
them.
It ww; only 011 the followillg Illoming (October 11) that
Montbrtlll t1iscovcl'cd thc Lincs. His cuvalry lllld bccn ordcl"'<!
to move forward on the two roads across which they lay.
l'ierl'e Soult therefore pushed for ViUafranca, on the high
road which skirts the Tagus; he found Hill's olltlying pickets
at Villaf'rallca, drove them out of the town, aud on passing
it callle in sight of the line of redoubts and scarped hillside
above Alhandra, which was manned by the Portuguese militia
and backed by Hill's liritish infantry. It was impossible to
advance further, so the brigadier, leaving all advanced post
in Villafrancu, drew back his three regiments to Castanheim,
and sent his report to MOlltbrUll.
'I'hat gcncml himself, with the main wely of his cavalry, hllll
followed the rough road from AlemquCl' to Lisbon. He drove
in some British dragoon pickets, and then urri"Cl:1 ill front of the
village of' Sobrlll, which he found occupied by the infantry
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outposts of Spenccr"i\ dil'isioll. He did not attempt to push
further that day, as his flanking reconnaissance had come in
sight of the sections of the Lines behind Arruda and behind
Zibreira, where redoubt:; and solid lines of infantry were visible.
Sohml it~elf wns clearly not held in fOI'ce, nor did it form
Ull integml part of the British position. But l\folltbrull fCiU'('(l
to attack it, when he hud only It single brigade of infantry
to the front, while man)' thousands of' British troops might
issue from the Lines to ol'crwhclm him if he committed himself
to a serious attack. The village on its knoll was left alone fo]'
the present, though it was tempting to contemplate the seiZUre
of a point which lay so fur forward-less than two miles frolll
the front of 'VcUinglon's chosen pusition. But Monlbnm
(:olltcnlctl llimsclf with ~l1tlillg hack wUI-d to j\fasscna that lie
had cOllie upon a continuous line of fortifications stretching
from the Tagus bank to some point westward, which was lIot
yet discO'·ered. For his furthest reconnaissances towards RUlla
and the Upper Zizandre had found the ellemy in front of them,
however fiu they pushed .
.Meanwhile 'Massena's tired infantry of the main bod), had
made hardly any movement: the 2nd and 6th Corp~ still 111)'
about Alcoentre. .J lIllot alonc witl\ the 8th Corps tulmnoo:1
as fill' !ts Moillho de Cubo, hn.lf WilY between Alcucntre !tll{]
Alemqucr. Thus "Vellington was given i\. whole da)' morc
to arrange his troops in their positions along the Lincs. On
this morning he was rather under the impression that the
J'rench attack would be directed upon Alhandl'i\. and Hill's
corps, which. he observed, would ~ a 'tough job, defended as
all the entrances of'the valleys are by redoubts, and the villages
by abattis1.' Moreover, the French' positively could not' get
guns up to attack the line west of Hill. since, in the existing
state of the weather, no canllOIl could leave the paved roads,
and the only path of tllat description leading from the Sobrnl
direction to the Tagus bank ran through Al'l'Uda, where
Crauful'd and the Light Div~sion were now comfortably in-
stalled. Considering it likel}'. therefore, that l\1asscna would
bring a heav}' attacking force, by circuitous roads from the rear,
to Villnfranca. in ol-del' to make n o:outa1 attack 011 Hill along
1 Dispatches, vi. 502, to Craufurd.
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thc high-road by the Tagus, "'ellillgton warned Cmufurd and
Spencer to be ready to move in eastward to the assistance of
the extreme right wing of the Lines. In the afternoon, how-
e\'cr, he discovered that the fon:e in front of Sobral (Montbrun)
seemed Illuch large]' than that in front of Alhllndra (pierre
Soult), uud ~holl'ed more signs of making wide-spreading fCCOU-
llnlSSllIlCC$. He therefore drew up tUl alternative scheme, by
which, in the event of an attack on Spencer's front at Zibreira,
Cole's lInd Campbell's (the new 6th) divisions were to support
the threatened point, and even Picton was to eome in from
the distant Tones Vedras 1. No French troops were reported
fmm this last dire<:tion, and De Grey's cavalry pickets from
Uamalhal (far outside the Lines) reported that not the smallest
party of the enemy's horse had been seen west of the Serm
de Barregudo or the Monte Junta2•
011 the 12th Monthrtlll mnde a movement which seemed
to justify WellillgWll'S nrst idca, that Hill was.to receive the
Frcnch attack. He moved Taupill's brigade, the only hostile
infantry which. had yet been sccn, southward from Alemquer
to VillaCranca on the Tagus. This was done, howe\'el', only
because the whole 8th Corps was coming up on this day from
:Uoinho de Cuba by Alemquer to Sobral, which it reached in
the afternoon, replacing TAupin's small force. Its arrival was
at once reported to Wellington, who saw that his second theory
of the intention of the enemy, not his first, had been coned,
lllld tl'fillsfcl'l"cd his main attention to the side of Sobrul. That
\'il1ngc, by some extraordinary blunder 011 the part of Sir Brent
Spen<:Cl", had been evacuated by the pickets of the 1st Division
during the night of the lUh-12th 3. They were put back
into it, by the special orders of the Commander-in-Chief, in
, Wellington to Spellcer, afternoon of Oct. 11, Di4p(JtcJlu, vi. 505.
~ Wellington to Craufurd, same day, Di8jXllcfU:8, vi. 50,:1,.
3 Wellingtoll to eLl>.!!. Stuart, IJii}HJ.lcflf!.l1, vi. 506. U'Urlmu'g irll'aluaUle
diary has the nute. 'Oct. 11: 'Tis difficnlt tu account for all this, which
must oo"exatious to the Commander-ill.Chief, who,aware ofthc importancc
of fllc Iwiglll~ in front of Sobml, must IHWC wished to keep them for tIle
present.... Oct. 12: In the morning tile enemy was 110 more to be seen,
and what we SllOUld nel·er have given up, we were fortunately permitted
to re-oecupy. nut at nightfall the l·'relleh, with about six battalions, re-
took t1\1~ height and town of Sobral.·
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the early morning, for ·Wellington wished to hold it as long
as was safe, on account of the fine view obtainable from
its kuoll over the routes from Alemquer by which the enemy
must approach. Hence, when JUllot's advanced guard came up
in the afternoon, there was tl (:ollision ut SObl'fi1. The troops of
Clause} finally SllCL'Celled ill expelling the British outposts, whicll
belonged to ErskhlC'S ami 1.O\\'c's brigade, from the village.
The casualties were few Oil both sides-nineteen men only \\'Cl'C
lost by the British 1, The retirillg pickets did not fall back into
the Lines, but clung to the other side of the ravine whicll
separates Sobral from the lower slopes of Monte Agra~a.
'.fhey were only 300 yards from the village.
'Vhile this skirmish was ill progress the main !xxIy of the
French were at last set in lllotion from Alcoclltre. The 6th
Corps ad,'anced this day (October 12) to Moinho de Cubo and
Otta; the 2nd Corps, taking a road more to the east, so as to
lean towards the 'l'agus, arrived at Cal1'egado. JUllot's corps
was encamped behind Sobral, Clause!'s division ha,"i.ng its ad-
vanced posts (Brigade Menard) in the village, while Solignac lay
two miles to the rear. The weather was still abominable, and all
thc mO\"Clllents were accomplished with great fatigue and delay.
On this afternoon the French army sll/lcred the loss of its
llIost brilliant aud cllcrgctic cavulry offi<:cr. Gcncml Sllinlc-
Croix, while c..'\plorillg the Tagus bank, north of ViIlefnuICll,
ill search of deserted boats, was cut in two b)' a cannon shot
from a British gunboat which was watching his cavalry from
the estuary. He was held to be the only officer, except Colonel
llelet, who had allY personal influence witli Masseua~, and as
that influence was always exerted on the side of daring action.
it is probable that the mall)' French diarists who deplor'C his
death are right ill considerilJl-( that it may have had SOllle
positive effect Oil the conduct of the clllllpaigll n.
1 Of the lJiUl~tcen casualties. ninc ltclont,'"Cd to the newly-landed 7lst,
four to the GenIlall Legion, six to tlle compally of the 5j6Oth attadlcd tu
~I'gkinc, See Hctul'll in Record Office,
t Sainte-Croix had been the Marshal's chief-of·the·staff duriug the
Wagram campaign, and 11"3.$ generally reputed to have been responSible for
~ome of the boldest nlO\'CS made by MassenR'S amlY during that period.
S '111at l?l'il'ion is correct in dating Sainte-Croix's death Oil the 12th, aud
Delagl'a.ve and otherilll'rollg in jllaciug it 011 the Juth, is ]lro\"ed bY:III
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On the night of the HHh-13th Wellington bad become
cOllvinced, and rightly, that the great mass of Junot's corps,
visible behind Sobral, constituted the main danger to his
position. He therefore drew in troops from his right, even
calling down fmm 'fOrTes Vedras JlictOll, in whose front 110
enelllY was yet dsible. :From Mon.te Agm~a to tbe Portcllo
nxloubts he put in line four British divisions-Spen(."cr, Colc,
l'icton, and Camphcll, along witlll'ack's independent Portuguese
brigade; this last was placed in the great redoubt on Monte
Agra~a> which dominated 80bral and all the lower hills. In
l'cscn'e were two more divisions-the 5th under Leith, and
a tempomry Portuguese division consisting of the brigades
of ColcmD.1l ,md Alcx. Campbcll, AItogcthel' 30,000 lllCll
werc cOII(."cnhatcd 011 this comparati\'cly short front of nbout
four miles, Ix<:;idcs the lllilitil\ lLnd artillery who gll.rl'isOlleJ the
minor forts 1. JUIlOt, whosc corps did not now lIlllster more
than ]2,000 mell, did wisely to refrain frOI1l making filly serious
attuck. He wus not, howevCf, wholly quiescent." I\ttClllptillg
to extend his troops more to the right, to the wcst of Sobral,
along the undulating ground in the direction of the Upper
Zizilndl1;, he got into touch with the outlying pickets of" Cole's
division, which stood bcyond those of Spenccr and Picton in the
British line. The first attack fell on the light companies
of the 7th l~usiliers and the newly-anivcd Drunswick Gels
battalion. When they \vere driven in, Cole fed his fightillg-
line with the light COIll!lRllics of Hcr\,cy's Date Collins's]
]Jortugucse brigade. :Finding his voltib"Curs outnumbered,
JUIIOt, ill a similar fashioll, sent lip Gratien's brigade from his
second division to reinforce his advance, Hence there ensued.
entry in D'Urlxl.Il's diary of Oct. }':', statillg that it had just been diSCO"ered
that tlle general killed in front of AIhandra was called Sainte-Croix.
Clearly tI1CU he was deall before the 16th.
, 1'01' Ilis disl)()Sitious for resistiug tlie 8llS~teU atlack see Di/;putc!le8, vi.
1111. liOi-O of Oct. 13. The line rUllllwg from right to left was (1) Pack's
}>ortuguese ill tlle greut redoubt facing Sobral, (2) lRt Dil'ision between
the rctloubt and Zibreirll, (3) }licton touc1lillg SIlenCer's left, (4) Cole
touching Picton's left, (5) Camllbell (new 6th Di"ision) on Cale's left,
reacllillg ro the l'ortello rcdoubts. Each of these divisions had oue brigade
ill resen·c, A scparate geueral rererl'e was fOl1ned by Leith bellind tlle
right, and Colemall's allll Ale.~. Camp1Jell's Portuguese behind the left,
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some sharp skirmishing, whiclt lasted several hours, till Cale
drew back his outpost line from the lower plateaux north of
SobraI to the foot of his fighting-position, on the heights
below the Portello l'edoubts. Junot had thus gained a mile
of ground, but not growld that was of any service to him for
t~ rcgulllr nttllck on the Lines, ginec it WllS merely pu!"t of the
roUjug upland that was dominated by 'Vcllington's main
position. The 4th Division lost twenty-five British and a much
larger number ot" Portuguese in this long bicker. Bervey the
Portuguese brigadier was wounded. The French casualties
were probably a little the larger 1,
Oil the same afternoon Reynier, with somewhat over a
battalion of infantry, made a detailed reconnaissance of Hill's
position in front of Alhandra. He pressed in dose enough
to dmw the fire of t.he nearer redoubts, but halted when he
had realized the strength of the line opposite him, and reported
to )-lassena that he considered the right wing of the allied
position hopelessly impracticable for an attack.
Next moming (October 14) the French Commander-in-Chief
came up in person from the rear. It is astonishlng that he had
made no earlier attempt to judge with his own eye of the
strength of Wellington's line of defence. He arrived at Sobml
ill time to witness a bitter skirmish, the most important of all
1 I find in the lIOte to Gachot's exccllcnt editions of Dclagru,'c's
Ollmpaglle de Portrlgul tliat the losses of the Frellch on this day were 16i
lOCO, those of tlle allies ]30. The last statement,olle sufficiently probable
ill itself, canllot 00 verified from any British source that I Ilavc found:
'VUlIillgtOll, allllexed to tlle document on page .5n of vol. vi of the
IJi8patcJW8, gives tlm loss of Cole's British brigades in detail-they amount
to twenty-fin:: IlIcn olll)'. But he does lIOt givc dctails of Hcrvcy's
l'onuguese, though IlC mentions t11at tIle brigadier was wounded, and
that the two regiments (Nos. 11 and 23 of the Line) distinguished theuI-
selves. '11ley may well have lost the 124 men mentioned by Gacbot, but
lllave no proofofit. Vere's usually accurate < Marches of the 4tll Division'
gil'es no figures for this day, 1101' does D'Urban'g J)iGly. "'ellillgtoll
remarks that < the attack of this day Oll General Cole's pickets near
Sohral was withOlllmucll efl'ecL' It is certain, however, tlilll the British
lost a little ground ill front of the IlCights. i\Jartinicn's wie des offiders
tuts et Metals, wllich I so often find of use, shows tilat Junot's corps 1000l
two ofiic~rs killed and se\'cn woumled. This, at the usual average, would
irnlJly 150-180 casualties.
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thc engagemcnts that took pbK'e during the crucial dil)'S of the
campaign of 1810. Spencer's outposts, a.<; hus hccn Itlrcmly
mentioned, had on the 12th retired ollly some 200 01' 300
yards from Sobral, and had taken up their position on the
other side of the nwine that divides that villagc from the lowcr
slopes of the Monte Agra~a. Across the high-road the main
picket, furnished by the 71st regiment, had throwll up n
balTIcade. JUIlOt cOllsidered this lodgement, so close to his
line, as a thing that ought not to be permitted. Accordingly
he brought up his artillery, which had only arrived from the
real' 011 the previous night, to the front of Sobml, and, 1I0:er
cll.ll11ollading the barricade for !l. short timcl sent ugllinst it the
mmpoglliell t!'elite of the 19th of the Line, supported by UtllCI'
troops of Mcnard's brigade. 'fhe first rush at' thc attack
carried the barricade and the line ot' stone walls on each side
of it. Dut the whole of the 11st was ready to sustain the
pickets, and with a fierce rush swept the assailants back across
the barricade, down the slope, and into the outer hOllses of
Sobral. I·'rom thence, of course, they bad to retire, as a whole
division was frouting them; but they resumed their old position
without being pursued.
Junot refused to rellew his attack, and l\!assena, who had
arrived while t.he likirmish was in pJ'Ogrcsil, did not direct him
to go fm'ward again. It was clcur that there wns a "cry strong
forL'C iu ti'Out of the Sth Corps, and that the rcdoubts "isible
along the Monte Agr~a 011 the one hand and the l'ortello heights
on the other were of the most formidabledescriptiou. Massclla's
senior aidc·de·camp and chief confidant, relet I, thus describes
the psychological situation: 'On arriving at Sobral, instead of
the" undulating accessible plateaux" that we had been told
to expect, we SllW steeply SCIll'ped mountains aull deep ravines,
a l'Oad-pmsnge onl)' !l. few paces bl'OJul, and 011 cuch side walls of
rock crowned with everything that could be accomplished ill
the WltY of field fortifications garnished with tlrtillery; thcn at
last it was plainly demonstrated to us that we could not attack
the Lines of Montechique with the 35,000 01' 36,000 men 11 that
1 For Ilis position aud characwr, see p. 209 of this l'olulIlO,
~ This figure is, of course, l~ ludicrous cxaggemtiotl. l\lassellll hail stiU
more thllll 50,000 men. EI'ell 011 Jail. 1, 18ll,aftcr suffering two month~
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still remained of the army. .For, even if we had forced some
point of the Lines, we should not have had enough men left to
seize and occupy Lisbon, , . . It was clear that we must
wait for reinforcements 1.' Another eye-witness, JUlIot's aide-
de-camp Delagrave, in his .ftfel1wiron the Campa'tglt of1810-11,
expresses the same \,iew in his single sentence, explaining t1111t
'the prilll;e, Sf.."Cing that the enemy was better pl'cpm'Ccl and
stroll,ger than had been believed, put an end to the comhllt, and
on each side the troops took up once more thcir original
positions 2: The loss~in this combat-insiA'l1ificant enough in
itself, but dccisivc in that it revealed to }[asscna the uselessness
of a further advance-was 67 on the British side, about 120 011
that of the French 3,
After putting a slop to the combat of Sobral, l\las$CIla rotle
away eastward, along the slopes of the lIplaud thl1t faL'CS the
Monte Agra~a, and as far lIS the knoll fucing Arrllda in the
front of the Light Di \,ision. Here he pressed so neal' the
British front that a single shot was fired at his escort from
, the redoubt No. UO to warn him to trespass no further, He
saluted the battery by lifting his hat to it, and went tip the
hill out of range 4. Some of his aides-de-camp continued the
more of lllltold tlrivation, the AmlY of l'orlugal was still 4<1,000 strong,
lllus sick aud wen detaelled,
1 l'elet's _-4.ppendice 8Ur la Guerre d'EsjXJ.gne, p. 323 of vo!. xxi of
Vieloin, et OQllquetel.
, Delagrave, p. 100.
3 Of the sixty--&lvcn British ca8lilllties, Ulirty-eight were in the 718t, tlU)
rest ill the lwighlJourillg brigades of the 1st Divisioll, Nod-who had
clmrge of the battery at SohrJ.l, estimates the Frellch loss at 120-vc:ry
probably the correct onc, lIS i\Iartinien's lists show OIlC officer killcd alld si:>.:
woullded,all ill Mcnard's brigade, Tbis should mCllIl 120-150 c;lsualtie,s.
Dclagrave gb'es the higller figure of 200 killed and wounded, probabl)' aH
ovcrlltatem/lut.
• MasllClla was dearly seen from the Bl'itish Lincs. LeitJl Hay, a stall'-
officer of the (jUl Division, 1lQtoo 'a crowd of oJlicers 011 horseback,
drolgOOlll> with 11.'(,] horses, aud all tlu~ cortege of a geulJral-iu-chicf'
(Nul"rotit'e, 1" 249), and saw the Marllltal dismount by the windmill abOI'c
Sohral. He W/Lq watching from Pack's redoubt, on the hill just oppositc,
through his telescopc, about 3,000 }'ards from the l'rcncll frollt. It is
JOIlCS who, on p, 40 of his Lifla of Torra Vlldrat, gives tllC anccdoh'
about the i\Iarsll3l's salute,
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exploration till they touched Reynier's vedettes near Villa-
frallen, but the Marshal himself returned to hi;:; head quarters
at Alcmqucr to think over the situatioll. There some sort
of n. council of war was held that same night: Junot, it is said,
urged the Chief to try the effet:t of ll. bold dash at the English
army url1lycd in front of SObl'U!. But he W/lS talked down hy
Ney and Reynicr, who argued that such an attack would be
iusa,ne, considering the weakness of their corps and the strength
of Wellington's fortifications. Without doubt they were right:
c\·en if i\fasscnll had brought his whole three corps to bear 011
Sobral, he had 10,000 men less than at Bussaco. and Wellington
] 0,000 men more, leaving the garrisons of the forts Qut of the
question. The allies had 30,000 bayonets concentrated on the
tlu'calenoo point, aml ('(lUId have hrought up Hill, Craufurd, and
Hamilton's allll L<: Cor's Portugucsc-20,OOO men more-from
t.he enst end of the Lines, the moment that it was clear that
ll.eynier was 110 longer in front of them. The position, owing to
the forts, was far stronger than Bussaco, and the French cavalry
would have been as useless Oil October 15 as it had been on
September 27. The report which Foy drew up for .Massenu
and presented to the Emperor gives the whole gist of the
matter: ~ The Marshal Prince of Essling has come to the
conclusion Umt he would compromise the army of His ::Mnjcflty
if he were to attnek in force lin~ so formidable, defended by
30,000 English and 30,000 Portuguese. aided by 50,000 armed
peasants 1.'
An open assault on the Sobral position was llQW, indeed, the
thing that the British most desired. Wellington wrote, with
his usual ironical moderatioll,'to his tnlsted lieutenant, Crnu-
rurd, that 'he thought his arrangements had now made the
position tolerably secure 2.' Among these last arrangement<;, it
may be remarked, was the drawing back of the 71st and the
light eompanies of the 1st Division from the barricades 011 the
near side of the ravine of SobraI. They were moved 11 fell'
IHlIldrcO yards to the rear, nearer to Zibreira. This was pro-
bably intended to encourage the :French to sally out from Sobral
up the road, where e\'crything was now in order to receive them.
1 See Foy's Vie MiJilairt, Appendix, p, 3,13.
• WcllinKf,on to Craufnrd, Disputc1u:s, vi. p. 517.
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Their advance was hourly expected; D'Urball, Bcrcsford's Chief
of the StaA-~ wrote gleefully on October 15, 'Each individual
division has now more than sufficient troops to occupy the space
allotted to it, and the overplus forms a first reserve for each
respectively. If the force thus posted beats the attacking
enemy, of which there CUll be little doubt, our telcgrophic COlll-
muni~tionswill bring down Craufurd from Arruda and Hill
from Alhandra on to their flank -and the affair will be complete.
There is much appearance that the enemy will attack this posi-
tion with his whole force-Alhandra is far too strong for him.
He callnot well retire, and it is hoped that his distress for pm-
visions will compel him to bring matters to a speedy decision 1:
But both the cautious Commander-in-Chief and the eager
head of the l'ortuguese Stafr were mistnken in estimating the
position, They had judged wrongly the character of Masscna,
and his psychological position of the moment. He would 1I0t
attack; indeed, after October 14 he ~m8 never 1.0 have had
th(~ lenst intention of doing so, The le.'>S01I of B1l8saco had not
been lost, and he was no longer prepared to assail, with a light
he.'lrt, the Anglo-1'ortuguese Army posted ready to receive him
ill a strong position, Probably the energetic statement of Ney
and ll.eynier that they dared not risk their men-that the troops
would be demoralized ifordered to advance for a second slaughter
-also had its effect on the Marshal. Dut xIassena was proud and
obstinate, und if he could not go fOl'wanl, he shmnk, for the
moment, from going back, On October 15 began the one phlL~e
of the campaign which the British, from general down to sub-
altern, had least expected. The French anny began to sholl'
signs of.intending to settle down in front of the Lines, as if for
a blockade. After a few more attempts to feel the front of the
Lines about Arruda and the valley of Calandriz, which were so
feeble that they did not even dri v'e ill Craufurd's outposts, the
enemy began to fortify the front of his position with neld-works,
and sent away the whole of Jlis cavalry to the rear-a sufficient
sign that his offensive power \\'IlS spent.
Massena's firstrll'eam of mlL~king the Lines hy llclosc blockadc
was absolutcly impmcticn.blc, considering lhe prescnt state of his
suplllies. The. t1'oopS were already Jiving on the glcallillbrs of
.' D'Urban's JQ\l1'Iwl, under Od, Hi.
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the hastily-evacuated vitlnges of the Lisbon Pellill~ula. which
could not In.~t them for long, and would not even have sufficed
for a week's consumption if 'Vellinbrton's decree; had been
properly carried ont. If he was to feed his army from the thin
resources left behind by the Portuguese, MassenR would soon
find it necessary to spread it far and wide ~ since, if he kept it
concentrated in front ofvVellington. it would soon go to pieces,
exposed in bivouacs to the November rains, and forced to draw
its nourishment by marauding from afar. It seems from the
instructions which he gave to Foyat the endof the second week
of his stay in front of Lisbon, that the Marshal actually COIl-
templated clinging to his present advanced position till he should
receive reinforcements. He hoped that the 9th Corps would
come up to his aid from Old Castile, and that Mortier and the
5th Corps would join him from Andalusia. Dut these were
mcre hypotheses: he was not in touch with either Drouct or
Mortier. Indeed, he had been cut off from all communication
with his colleague.'! since the day that he crosse<I the MOIllIego.
The 9th Carp!>, as a matter of fnet, was only at Vallndolid, and
showed no signs of moving on. Mortier had retired to the
mountains in front of Seville, after his successes over the army
of La Romana in September. Almeida was in a state of close
blockade by Silveira's detachments from beyond the Douro.
Ciudad Rodrigo was in hardly better case. being strictly watched
b)' ,rulian Sanchez and his mounted guerrilleros, so that uo one
could get to or from it without a very !>trong escort. Gardannc's
regiment of dragoons, left behind by Massena, was worn out in
thc cffort to keep open the roud between Rodrigo and Sala·
lllanca I. From the Army neither Almeida nor Rodrigo received
a word of IleW!; from the 18th of September to the 15th of
Nm'cmbel'. So effectually was the road closed) that rumours
were current of such divers characters as that Masseua had forced
the English to embark, and that he had been completely foiled,
and was marching back to Spain via Castello Branco. Paris
was hardly better informed: the only news that the Emperor
got was that dribbled out, four or fh'e weeks later, by the
I For the miseries and dangers of life in Rodrigo, sec the MmlloirsoftllC
Duchcssc O'Abrantcs. Her letter to Junot, intercepted hy Wellington,
tells the same tale: it is to be found in D'Urban's collectioii ofdocumcnts.
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English papers 1. Hence came ludicrous notices ill the ilfnnillmr,
of which the worst was OIlC published Oil November 28, which
stated that Coimbl'a had been occupied by l\fasscna without
a battle, that the army on October 1 had only 200 sick and 500
wounded since it had left Almeida, and that no general or
colonel had been killed or even hurt since the invasion began!
And this after twelve such officers had fallen at Bussaco. That
bn.ttlc, we may remark, was presented ultimately to French
readers w; <a demollstrntiOll executed by the brigudes of SimOll
Ilnd Graindorgc in order to mnsk the great flo.llk~march of the
Prince of Essling. But they had gone beyond their instructions,
and brought 011 a combat in which 200 men had been killed and
1,200 wounded.' Fririon, the historian of the campaign, amnot
restrain himself from adding, 'This is how history was written
at that time: it was by reports of this lying description that an
attempt was made to calm anxious families. Did no one reflect
tlmt, hy dCt.'eivillg them in this way, the government made
enemies of all those who trusted for a time in the exactitude
of the Bullet-ins, and lost their illusion soon after, when they
learnt the melancholy ends of their sons and their bl'Others ~?'
The dearth of news from the front was not Massena's own
fault. He had scut back several aides-de-camp to find their
way to Almeida, but all had either been captured by the
Oroenau9a or forced to turn back. The best knowll of these
was the yOllng MtlScurenhlls, olle of the Portuguese traitors on
th'<l Marshal's staff. He started f!"Om Coimbra Oll October 3,
with the Bussaeo dispatch, disguised as n. shcpl1crcl, but wa.~
detected by a band of Ordellan~a,and sent a prisoner to Lisbon.
The Regency had him tried by court-martial, and as he was
caught without a uniform, he was condemned as a spy as well as
it traitor, and executed by the garotte in December:l.
There was a perfect cordon of Portuguese militia and irregulars
round l\fa.ss6na's rear in October and November. J. 'Vilson had
come down to Espinhal, and had his outposts in Lciria; Trant
had returned to Coimbra. They were in tOllch, by means of the
Estl'ooa Nova and the garrison of Abrantes, with the Ordenan<fa
I See OQm$!)!.mdance, vol. rn. pp. 262, 280, 338, &C.
0' Sc<l Fririon, pp. 57-8.
'.l See aoo\'e, p. 2i7.
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of Castello Dronco, and a Spanish detachment of three battalions
under Cados D'Espana, which La Romana had sent to Villa
Velha, at the same time that he took his two divisions under
La Canera and Charles O'Donnell within the Lines. On the
side of the Atlantic the garrison of Peniche had sent out a force
of 300 men to Obidos, under Captain Fenwick, and these joined
hands with De Gray's cavalry at RamalhaJ, ill front of Torres
Vcdms, A few French parties which crosSt..>d the Monte Junta
to raid towards the sea t.'Oast were cut off either by Fenwick or
by the dragoons. But Massena never sent any serious detach-
ment in this direction,
For just one month (October 14-November 14) MassenR
maintained his position in front of the Lines, The 8th Corps
had thrown up some earthworks 011, and to the flanks of, the
hill of Sobral, thus assuming a defensive instead of an offensivc
position. The ~nd Corps went back to Cnrregado, but left
strong detachments in ViIlnfranca, By the dispositions of
October 16 the 6th Corps remained with its main body at OUa,
faJ' to the rear, and an advanced guard at Alemquer. Ney
was so placed that he could succour either of the other corps
if they were attacked, A brigade of Loison's dh'ision was
pushed forward to the hill opposite Arruda 1: in face of this
last Craufurd was adorning the front of his line with a luxury
of aoottis, entanglements, and pitfalls, which would have made
the hillside inaccessible to even the most alert and vigorous
person mm"ing ulone, Formed troops could !lot have got pt.LSt
the first two or three traps.
But the most significant part of Mussena's arrungements was
to be found in his ren.r: Montbrun's cavalry reserve went back
to Saularem; thither also went the reserve artillery on the 17th,
and the hospitals on the 20th of October. At the same time
each of the corps was directed to send to Santarem all smiths,
carpenters, and other artificers that could be found in its ranks,
They were told to report to General EbIe, the officer commanding
the artillery, who had received from the Marshal a special
mission-the construction of boats and pontoons sufficient to
bridge the TlI.o"US or the Zezere. For, if he were starved out
in Estremadura, M/iSsello. had it in his mind that he might find
I Ferey's brigade, wbich had already faced Craufurd at Bussaco.
Gg
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it convenient either to ems:; into the Alcmtcjo. or to fOf(..-c
a way across the ZC7.crc into the Castcllo Branco district, in the
hope of opening communication with Spain via Zarza and
Alcantara. MOlltbrun's cavalry explored northward and east-
ward, seeking for likely spots at which the Tagus might be
bridged, and on the other side reconnoitring the line of the
Zezere, to see how it was held. Not it boat could be found on
the greater river; at Chamusca a daring party of fifty men
swam its broad current, for a dash ut some barks which were
\'isiblc on the other side, but all were found to Ill.LVC had thcil'
bottoms carefully knocked out and to be filled with glllld.
Dejean. the officer who explored as far as Punhcte on the Zezere,
found all the bridges broken, and the garrison of Abrnntcs
watching the fords, with strollg detachments at Punhete and
Maltinchel.
EbIe found at Santarem that he had to create a pontoon
equipage with no materials at all to work from. There was
raw iron in the bars and balconies of houses, and raw timber
in their lIoors and rafters, but nothing else. His smiths
had to start on the weary tusk of forging saws and hUlllmers,
his carpenters had to tUnJ housebreakers-in the techniClll
sense-to obtain planks and joists. His task was hard, !lud
would clearly take many weeks before it could be properly
accomplished.
Meanwhile time was aU·important to MasseuR., for every day
the country between Santarem and the Lines grew barer and
yet more bare, as the foragers of the tbree French corps worked
their will upon it. The men were already going into hospital
by thousands, and dying there. Junot's conscript battalions,
unsheltered from the rain in their bleak bivouac above Sobml,
suffered most-Ney's and Reynier's mcn were (fol' the most part)
hOUSL'f1 if not fed. 'I'he Army, which had 65,000 men on leaving
Almcidu, und 55,000 uftcr the loss of Coimbra, had dwindled
down to 50,000 cffective subres and bnyonel~ by the month of
Novcmber l .
Wclliobrlon was already pondering ou thc possibility of taking
1 According to Fririo71, p. !:l8, the morning state of Nov. 1 showed oul)'
4(;,591 men effecth'e. But tlle figures of that ollicer are always a little
lower than what I have found in the ollicial documents.
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the oflensive. He had received hundn.'C1s of deserters during the
lust few weeks I, lmd knew by their means of the miserable con-
dition of the enemy-of the fact that the cavalr)' had nenrly all
been sent to 'the rear, and of the attempt that was being made
to create a bridge-equipage at Sanlarem 2. His dispatches of
October 27 and November :3 to Lord Liverpool treat at length
of the advantages and disadvall~a-es of assailing the French in
their present position:'l, He sets forth the strength of his 011'11
army-29.000 British troops present with the colours, aftcr
deducting sick and men detached, !l!4,OOO Portuguese effective,
and 5,000 of' La Romuna's Spaniards, making a total of 58,615.
He refuses to contemplate the use of the militia, infantry (J]"
artillery, in the field; considering theil' behaviour at Bussll.co
filld clscwhcrt', •I should deceive mysc1fif I could cxpect, or' YOllr
Lordship if I should state, that any advanta&'C would be derived
from their assistance in an offcnsive operation against the
cnemy.' On the other hand, he estimates Massena's fighthlg
force at 55,000 men-a slight miscalculation, for there were only
50,()OQ effective at this moment, and of these 4,000 cavalry and
olle brigade of infantry were at Santarem and other distant
places, from which they could 110t have been withdrawn for a
battle suddenly forced upon their main corps. MasseUR could
really III.I.\'e Pllt 110 1ll0l'e than 44,000 men in line within twenty-
four hours of UD alarm. ,"Vellington then proCLws to arglle
that he must make a frontal attack, for if he tlrcw It very large
forcc ont of the Lines, in order to assail the enemy's flank by a
wide encirclillgmarch, , the inevitable consequence ofattempting
such a manreuvre would be to open some onc or other of the
great roads to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy
would take immediate advantage to attain his object.' Accord-
ingly •we must carry their positions by main force, and in the
course of the operation I must draw the army out of their can-
tonmcnts, and expose men and horses to the inc1emencies of the
weathcr at this time of the )'eal'.' Moreover, if Massena were
dcfeated, it would cause Soult to eVtlCuate Granada, mise the
I TIle first morning note of D'Urban's diary in November is ul!arly
always' morl! dl!serters arrived.'
v See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispalchts, vi. 554.
S See especially the IUlIger disllatclJ of Nov, 3,011 W. ;';112-3 iLiJ,
Gg2
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siege of Cndiz, and come with 50,000 men to aid the army of
Portugal. < So if I should succeed in forcing Masscna's positions,
it would become a question whether I should be able to main-
tain my OWI1, in case the enemy should march another urmy into
this country.' BInke and the gul'l'ison of C[l(lii'" when freed from
Soult's prCSCIl{.'C, would certainly do nothing to help the general
causc of the Allies. They would neither come to Portugal, nor
be able to make a serious advance on Madrid, so as to draw oft'
Soult in that direction. He therefore concludes, that' When
I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my fU\'our,
and know that the position will be in favour of the enemy. I am
of opinion that I act in conformity with the intentions of His
Majesty's Government in waiting for the result of what is going
on,aud in incurring no extraordinary risk.' W"hatheca.lls'the
safe game' is tu keep on the strict defensive, hoping that the
enemy's distress fOl' provisions, llnd the operatiolls of the militill
in his rct\r, may cause him either to lllake a dcspemtc attack 011
the Lines-in which he will be repulsed with tl.wfulloss-or clse
to make such large detachments, to clear oft' the corps of Vfilson,
Tront, and the rest, that it will become easy and safe to attack
the remaining army in its present position.
Here, as whcn we considered the reasons which determined
Wellington to evacuate the Coimbra country at the end of Sep-
tember, we are bound to recognize that he adopted an attitude
of Cllution which he would not hllve us.'mmed in 1812 and 1813,
when llc had thoroughly proved his army. The temptations to
assnil Junot's isolzlted find advanced position Ilt Sobrlll were
enormous. The 8th Corps had been thrust forward into a re-
entering angle of the British lines, in which it could be attacked
from the left flank as wen as from the front. It was wasting
away daily from its privations, and had apparently not more
than 10,000 bayonets left-the cavalry ot' the corps (Sainte-
Croix's old division) had been sent off to Santarem, save onc
regiment. To sustain Junot the 6th Corps could eventually be
used, but only one brigade of it (that of Ferey) was in the first
line, and this depleted unit, which had been so thoroughly
routed at Bussaco, had its old enemy, Craufurd's Light Di vision,
in its front. Of the rest of the 6th Corps, one djvision was at
Alcmqller, elevcn miles behind Sobral, the other at Ottn, six
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miles behind Alemquer I. It would have taken the Olle four or
flre hours, the other nearly the whole of a short November day,
to a5SCmble and to come up. Ueynier could not quit Hill's
front without freeing the latter's two strong divisions for action.
i\'leauwhile 'Wellington had disposable, in Junot's immediate
front, the divisions of Spencer, Cole, Leith, uncI Alex. Campbell
[Pieton luul been sent b/lCk lo Turres Vedrml plus the POI·t.ll-
gllcse bl'igndcs of Pack, Colcmull, and A. CumpbcU, with La
!tomana's Spaniards also, if he should choose to employ thcm-
this, too, after leaving Crauf'urd to look after F'erc)', and Hill
to keep Reynier in check. It is impossible not to conclude that a
sudden fi'Ontal and Hank attack on Sobral with 30,000 men must
have cnveloped and crushed thc 8th Corps. Though its position
was good, its supports wcrc too far off; Ncy could llot have
l'Ome up to Junot.'s aid, before he was ovcrwhelmed. l\1assena was
uneasy about this possibility of disast.er, and had issued orders
all October 29 that if JUIlOt. and Ferey WCI'C at.tacked, t.hey were
to faIl baek on Alclllquer, while Ney was to bring up his I'e;crvcs
to that same placc, and Re)'llier to abundon his position in tront
of Alhandra and march on Alemquer also 2. But the weak point
of' thi" arrangement was, that if JUDot had been attacked at
dawn, both in front and flank, by an overwhelming force, he
could ne\'er have got back to Alemquer, and must have been
cut off' and battered to pieces close in the rear of SobmI. The
English frontal attack-Spencer, Leith, and rack-would have
st..'\rtcd at a distance of less than a mile from his position: Cole
und Campbell on the flank had only two miles to cover. Both
columns had I:l. down-hill march before thcm till the line of
rising ground about Sobl1ll was reached. How could the
8th Corps llll.vc got away? Even nn ordcrly retreat, with l\
fighting rcurgunnl, would ha\"c been impossible.
Blit if Junot'g 10,000 men had been destroyed behind Sobral,
Wellington would then havc been in the position to push in
between Ney and Reynier, whose columns would just ha\'e bccn
beginning to near Alemquer. He might easily have driven them
1 LoisOll, to whom fo'erey's brig-<lue belonged, had gone to tile rear with
Ilis other brigade.
1 '1be whole disllatch may be found ill Fririoll,llp. 96-7. That officer
quite saw tlle danger of the position: see his COlllllltmts 011 !'P. D9-I00.
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apart, and have forced them to retire on Santarem or some such
distant point, in order to complete their junction, Even had
they succeeded in joining, Massena would have had a demoralized
army of little over 30,000 men remaining. It is certain that he
must have refused to fight, and have started on a disastrous
retreat either by Castello Branco, or more likely by Thomar.
l~or the latter direction would have brought him to his base at
Almeida-the former would have taken him through an almost
uninhabited country, to n part of Spain, the lllid-l'llgus, wherc
no French army was I'Cady to receive or succour him.
It is impossible, therefore, to doubt that Wellington had a
great opportunity before him. Yet it is easy to see why he
refused to take it. A mere victory of' the second class-the
thrusting of Junot out of his positions, not followed by the
complete annihilation of the 8th Corps-would have done no
more for him than he himself stated in the abo\'e-quoted dispatch
of November S, If JUllot got away with the main body of his
troops, and joined Ne)' and Reynier, and if their united army
took up a defensive position at Santarem or elsewhere, Massena
might still hang on to Portugal, tilt Soult brought up to his aid
t.he whole Army of Andalusia, or great reinforcemellts arrived
frolll Castile. Any chanc~a fog, heavy min, tlle rashness 01'
stupidity of some subordinate-might prevent the complete and
instantaneons success of the attack on Sobral. These things
being taken into consideration, Wellington resolved to lie still
in the Lines, and to let the weapon of starvation play for some
time longer on the French. He expected them to retire within
a few days from sheer necessity, or else to de1i\·er the much
desired attack on his impregnable position.
l\1a.ssClla had found that the preparation of his bridge equip-
lI.ge at Sltlltarem would be a loug business. He knew that his
numbers were shrinking e\"ery day in the 1Il0stll.ppulling fashion,
not onl)' from deaths alld invaliding, but from desertion. Yet
he stood still for 0. fortnight longer than his atherStlr), had
expected, and meanwhile made a last desperate appeal for help
to the Emperor. He bad guessed that all his previous attempts
to communicate with Spain bad failed because his messengers
hud been sent without a sufficient escort, Ilnd had fallen by the
way. Accordingly, he told off a body of more than 500 mcn to
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bear his next letter, and gave the command of them to UIl officer
of well·known intelligence and resource-Foy, who had served
in all the three Portuguese campaigns, Junot's of 1808, Sonlt's
of 1809. and this last of his own. Moreover, it WIlS known that
~llpoleoll had confidenc:e in his ability, though he WM an old
Uepublicall, and had actually been onc of thc few who had
refused to sign the address which was drawn up to ask the First
Consul to declare himself Emperor in 1804. Foy was gi\'en
a whole battalion of infantry-the 4th of the 47th of the Line-
with 120 mounted men. He was told to avoid the main roads,
to cross the Zezere, pass north of Castello Branco, and to try to
tench Spain by way of Sabugal or Peno.macor. This was
obviously a difficult task, since the Ordenanya were known to
be abroad, e\'en iu this rtlJk,...-ed and deserted region. To cover
.Fay's start, Montbrun marched, with a brigade of dragoons and
a couple of buttaliolls of infantry, to make 0. demonstration
llgllinst Abmntcs, and dmw the ilttention of its garrison from
the upper ZC1.cre. Montbrun forced the passagc of the ri\,CI' at
Punhete, after Cl sharp skirmish, and established his \'anguard
on the further side. He thus attracted to himself all the forces
which Lobo, the governor of Abrantes, could spare outside
his walls. Meanwhile (OctObel' 31) Foy passed the Zezere higher
up, at an unguarded ford, and marched by Cardigos and Sobreira
Formosa along the Castello Brauco road. But he abandoned it
before reaching that town, and turned north, crossing the Serra
de Moradal by Fundiio and Belmonte. From thence he reached
Sabugal, and finally Ciudad Rodrigo on November 8. He had
been unmolested save by a body of OrdellalJ~a, who cut off some
of his strngglers. The passage of his t:OlUlJIll, whose sl.rellgth
wn..~ exaggcmted by rlllnO\ll', caused Carlos D'Espm'ia to bum
the bl'idgc of Villa Vclha, under the impression that Foy iutended
to scize it, and open up communication southward with Soult.
He and Lobo reported to Wellington that Foy and Montbrun
were the van of a great force, which was about to overrun and
occupy the Castello llranco country 1. But MassCna's messenger
had no other object than to reach Castile with as great rapidity
as possible, and without fighting.
I Wellington also, on Lobo's report, thongllt (Di.spatehu, vi. 604) that
Foy's alld Montbrun's object 111"1 been to seize the hridge of Villa Velha.
456 MASSENA BEFORE TORRES VEDRAS [No\'. 22
Arri\'cd at Rodrigo, Foy gnve over his escort to General
Gardanne, with orders to him to collect all the convalescents
of the Army of Portugal, and to draw out thc garrison of
Rodrigo and Almcida, if Dronet was no\\' in condition to take
charge of these fortresses. This should give him a force of
6,000 men, with which he was ordered to cut his way to join
the main army, to whom he was to bring a convoy of ammu-
nition, which was running desperately low at the front. How
badly Gardanne executed his charge we shall presently see.
Foy meanwhile, with a fresh dragoon escort, rode for Sala-
manca and Valladolid, at which last place he was disgusted to
find Dronet and the bulk of the 9th Corps, whom he had
expected to meet at Rodrigo 1. He met the general, and passed
on to him Massena's request that he would collect the whole
of his 16,000 men, and march on Almeida, and from thence
down the Mondego to Coimbra, after which he was to open up
communication with the main army by Leiria or Thomar.
Dronet, as~umillg some of the airs of a commander-in-chief,
did not show the eagerness to carry out these directions which
Foy had hoped to find.
From Val1adolid Foy rode straight through by post, bra\'ing
gucrrilla bands and swollen ri\'ers, through Burgos and llayonllc
to Paris, which he reached on the night of November 21. On
the next day he delivered his dispatches to the Emperor, and
was put through two hours of sharp cross-questioning by his
mn.ster. The notes of this conversa.tion, taken down the same
afternoon by the general, Ilre OIlC of thc most illtCl'estillg docu-
ments for the study of Nupo]con's psychology. Striding up und
down his study, pouring out strillg8 of queries, rapid judgemellts,
rebukes and laudatiolls, even llllceclotcs antI SC1'Cl.'<1S of political
philosophy, the Emperor presented II wonderful picture of rest-
less and far-reaching intellectual activity. E'oy put in his e.'l:cuses
and explanations in the gaps 'of thc Emperor's tirades. 'Why
the devil did Masscna thrust himself into that muddle ~ at
Bussaco ? Even in a plain cOlmtry columns do not break
through lines, unless they are supported by a superior artillery
fire.' 'And the disgrace at Coimbra, where hc has let his
1 Onl), part of Clapar&le's division had as yet evcu reached Salarnauca.
Foy to l\lassen3, Nov. 8, from Hodrigo. 1 echauffounie.
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hospitals be taken by 1,500 ragged rascals! To lose your
hospitals is as disgraceful as to lose your flags! In a regularl)'
organized country-Englalld, for cxample-MasseuR would havc
gonc to the scaffold for thnt job. The English arc full of
courage and honour: they defend themselves well. Massena
and Ney did not know them, but Reynier, whom they had
beaten twice or thrice [Ale."{andria and }Iaida1 ought to
know them! ,.ycllington has behaved like a clcver man: his
total desolation of the kingdom of Portugal is the result of
systematic measures splendidly concerted. I could not do that
myself, for aU my power. Why did not Mas..<;cnll, stop at
Coimbra, after Bussaco?' 'Beeause,' faltered l~oy, ':mpposing
he had done so, Your Majesty would have reproached him by
saying" If you had only pushed straight on Lisbon the "English
would have embarked.'" 'Very possible, indeed,' replied the
Emperor, breaking into a broad smile. ""'ell, I wanted to drive
them into the sea: I have failed. All right; then I will have a
regular campaign in Portugal, and use them up. I can wem'
them down in the nature of things, becuuse EnghUld cunllot
compete in mere numbers with me.' Then followed an excursus
into the characters of French generals-Junot. Ney, Soult
especially. Then a curious confession that he had made a
miscalculation in taking up the Spanish war: 'I thought the
system ensier to change than it has proved "in that country,
with its CllITupt minister, il~ feeble king, and its shameless,
dissolute (lueen. But for all that, I don't repellt of what I (lid;
I had to smfiSh up that nation: sooner or latcr the)' would
ha,·e done me a bad turn.'
Thcn comes the Emperor's conclusion upon the present state
of affairs. 'Masscna must take Abrantes-Elvas would be of
110 good to us. The only way to get Wellington to make a
forward move will be to force him to try to raise the siege
of Abrantes. As IOllg as Massena stays ill position opposite
Lisbon, nothing is lost; he is stillll terror to the English, und
keeps the offem;;ive. If he retreats, I fear great disaster fOl' him.
But why did he not take up some regular plan of operations ?
Thc very day after he reconnoitred the Lisbon lines, it was
clear that he would never attack them. I will send immediate
orders for the 5th Corps [Morticr] to invade thc Alemtejo.
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Will they be~obeyed? At that distance only those who choose
carry out my directions. lA hint at 5oult'5 selfish policy.]
I tremble lest i\fasSenl\ may call Dl'Ouct down to him, and then
get his communicntions cut again. By t:ommunications I meal!
sure points, at two or three marches distance, properly gUl'I'isOllt-o
and provisionoo, where COllVOYS can rest Rnd be safe. An army
without open communications loses heart and gets demoralized.
. . . All the hope of the English is in that army of Welling-
ton's! If we could destroy it. it would be a terrible blow to
them.'
The Emperor, pleased with Foy's intelligent explanations
of the situation, created him a general of division, and told
him to rest for a month, and then return to Portugal. He sent
for him to a.dministel' a second catechism on the 24th, and then
condescended to explain his view of the si tuatioll, and his Ol·dcrs
for the future. He quite approved of !\1flSsCna's rcsoh'c to
hold out in frollt of the Lines, and had already given Drouct
directions to assemble his corps at Almcida., and open up com-
munications with the Army of Portugal-in fact, the order to do
so had been sent off as early as November 3, and its bearer must
have crossed Foy somewhere on the road I. Soult had also been
ordered, two days before Massella's appeal came to hand, to
create a diversion in the direction of Spanish Estremadura 2.
He was now sent a sharp reproof for having done nothing, and
more especially for having allowed La Romana to slip away
with two divisions to Lisbon unmolested 3. But it seems clear
that no orders to concentrate his whole army and illYade the
Alcmtejo wcre sent him, and t.hese were the only measures that
could have helped Massena. Nar~)leon's obiter dictum that it.
would be no use to besiege and eapturc ElvflS shows a mis-
apprehension of the situation. A mere clcmollstmtion ill
Spanish Estremadura might call back Ln R011lRnll, but would
not help the Army of Portugal to any appreciablc cxtent. It
was not La Romana's 8,000 men who formed the strength
1 TIlis is the order in Corruf!Qndl.mrx, 17,007. It goes 011 to give Drouet
detailed orders as to wllat he should do <aussitot que lcs Anglais seront
rembarques. '
~ 1l1is llad lJeeu sent off lhe day before .Foy arrived, Nov. 20, it is CtJrre-
apIJndtmce,17,146. z OorreapondalU:e, 17,172, dated Nov. 28.
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of the defence of Lisbon. Wellington could have spared
them without harm, and, indeed, sent them away long before
Massena quitted Portugal.
It may be added that (as facts were to show ere long) the
lIlere sending up of Drouet to the front was 110t nearly
sufficient to put MllSSena in a. position to incommode Wellington,
more especially when the 9th Corps W&'i told to drop detnchments
at sholt intervals at every stllf,'C aftel' Almeida. By following
these orders, indeed, Drouet brought to the main army a mere
6,000 men on December 26, having left the rest ot' his corps
beyoud the Mondego. His arrival was of absolutely no use
to the Prince of Essling. The one thing which could have
saved Massena was the arrival, 110t of a small field force such
as Drouet or Mortiel' commanded, but of a large army, on
the I.ower Tfl::,otIS, and on its southern side. Such an army,
as the disposilion of the French troops in Spain then stood,
could, only have been produced if Soult had consented to
abandon Granada, raise the sit;"o-e of Cadiz, and march with
the greater part of the Anny of Andalusia into the Alemtejo,
masking Dadajoz and Elvas, and lea,·jug a dhision or two in
Seville to keep BJake and the Spanish troops from Cadiz in
check. Dut the Duke of Dalmatia could never be induced
to abandon two-thirds of his Andalusian viceroyalty, in order
to execute It movement whose results, if successful, would mainly
redound to the glory of Massena. Kothing short of a definitc
alld percmptory order from Paris would ha\'e made him call in
Victor and Sebastiani, and evacuate Eastern and Southern
Andalusia. Such an order the Emperor did not send. His
dispatch of Dec. 4 only orderro that a corps of 10,000 men
should advance to the Tagus in the direction of Villa Velha
and l\fontalvao, to communicate with Massena I. Soult under-
took illStead a blow at Badajoz, in January, with a force of
QO,OOO men, while leaving Cadiz still blockaded and Granada
still held. Napoleon, therefore, must take the blame of the final
failure of the ill\'asion of Portugal. As has been shown above,
{nJln his own words, he Wl.L'l conscious that he W/1.S too far from
the S<.'Cne of operation, and that mere ordinary directions to his
lieutenants might not be carried out with zeal. 'Je donnc
I Bertllier to Soult, Dec. 4, 1810.
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l'orore. L'exeeutera·t-on? De si loin obcit qui veut 1.' Dut
if this were so, it was surely necessary either that he should go
to Spain in person. or else-the more obvious alternative-that
he should appoint a real Commander· in-Chief in the Peninsula,
",ha should have authority to order all the other marshals and
generals to obey his directions, without malingering or appeals
to Paris. Napoleon hOO deliberately created a di vided authority
beyond the Pyrenees when he set up his military governments,
and instructed Suchct, Kellernllulll, and the other governors
to report directly to himself, and to pay no attention to com-
mands emanating from Madrid 2, King Joseph, as a central
source of, orders, had been reduccd to a nullity by this iIl-
conceived decree. E,'cn over the troops not included in the
new viceroyalties he had no practical authority. Not he and
his chief of the staff, but l\Iassena, ollght to have been entrusted
with a full and autocratic power of command O\'Cl' all the
armies of Spain, if a true unity of purpose was to be achieved.
This necessary arrangement the Emperor utterly refused to
carry out: lIe sent rebukes to Dt'Ouet for hesitating to obey the
orders of the Prince of Essling, and he jested Ilt the absurd
conduct of Ney and Junot in cQnducting themselves like imle-
pendent genemls 3. But these officers were in command of
hoops definitely allotted to the Army of Portugal. Over the
other genel'nIs of Spain he refused to allow Massena any
control, and he continued to send them his own ever-tardy
instt'Uctions, which had often ceased to be appropriate long
before the dispatch had reached its destination. If we seck
the reasons of this unwise persistence ill his old methods, we
find that they were two. The Ilrst was his secret, but only half-
disguised, intention to annex all the Spanish provinces north of
the Ebro to France, an insane resolve which led him to keep
Suchet and MacdonnId in Aragon and Catalonia, as well [IS
the governors of Navarre and Biscay. out of the control of any
central authority that he might set up in Spain. The second
was his jealousy of entrusting the vast army south of the Ebro,
1 Sec Roove, p, 4.58.
~ See pp. 201 alld 284 above.
, See the above-quoted conversation with Foy, in the latter's Vie MiJitl/irt,
p,lOO.
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far more than 250,000 men at the moment, to any siJlgle
COllllllauder. He remembered SOllIt's absurd stril'ings after
ropIty in Portugal; he knew that Ma.ssena, though the best
of wldiel's, WIlS false, selfish, and ambitious; and he refused
to hand over to either of them It full control over the whole
of the forces in the Peninsula. It wus even bettCI', in his
estimation, to leave King Joseph It shadow of power, than to
take the risk of giving over~ml1ch authority to one of the two
able, but not wholly trustworthy, marshals to whom he must
otherwise have entrusted it.
The war in Portugal, therefore, went 011 as a mere section
of the great contest in the Peninsula; the other 1111d less
importallt episodes were not made wholly subordinate to it.
And if this system continued \Vellinglon was free from any
real danger. He knew it himself; he studied diligently both
the political position and the details of' the emplacement of'
the imperial armies in the Peninsula. He was fortunate enough
to secure whole budgetJ; of l?rench dispatches captured by the
Ordentl.lI~al, Ilnd all that he re£ld confirmed him in his con~
elusion. 'I calculate,' he writes on October 27, 'tlUlt 11.
rcillfon:cment of 15,000 men would not now give the enemy
so good an army as they had at Bllssaco. He lost 2,000 killed
01' taken there: 'l'rant took 5,000 at Coimbra: above 1,000
prisoners have gone through this army: many have been killed
by the peasantry. They cannot have less than 4,000 sick', after
the march they have made, and the weather to which they are
exposed. The deserters tell us that almost everyone is sick.
From this statement you may judge of the diminutioll of their
lIumbers; and you will see that I have not much reason to
apprehend anything from [Dl'ouet's] "quinze bM/utI,' uatailloll$
which fought I\t Essling'" 3, and which CilIlllot be here before the
middle of ~ovelllbcr. I do not think I have much to appre-
heud even if Mortier is added to them. However, we shall see
I See for example those noted in J)j¥plllcll&, vi. 545, and a whole series
copied out ill D'[}rball's journal in October and November, HIlO.
2 A most 1II0(1(lSt estimate, for the returllll of sick for the Sl.'COnd half of
October ill n documellt at tho Archi~de lit GUIn'rt! give a toul of 10,807
mOll ill hOSllitill.
~ All allusion to a phrase in one of the captured dispatcllCf!,
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how tlwt will be... , All the accounts which I receive of the
distresses of the enemy for want of provisions would tend to Il.
belief that their army cannot remain long in the position ill
which it is placed, and it is astonishing that they have been
able to remain here so long as this I,' That they have succeeded
in staying even a fortnight in front of the Lines is, he adds,
entirely the fault of the Portuguese government, for not carrying
out thoroughly the work of devastation. nut, for the reasons
stated on an earlier page, 'Wellington was resolved not to take
the offensive, even against a foe whose ranks were beginning to
grow thin. Famine should do the work, and 110 lives should be
wasted.
There remained only onc danger: it was just possible that
Soult, c\'cn though Massena had not yet suffered any disaster
great enough to make the evacuation of Eastern Andalusia
impel'ath'e, might send :.\forticr and some additional divisions
of his other corps to Spanish Estremadura, and make a dash
at the Lower Tagus, l\fassena's boat-building at Santarem,
of which every deserter spoke, might be intended to give him
the materials for a bridge by which he might communicate
across the Lower Tagus with Soult. 'Wellington accordingly
resolved to keep a strict watch beyond the Tagus, and to have
a -flying force ready, which could hillder the construction of Il
bridge or a bl'idge head. With this objeet on November fl
he sent over the Tagus General Fane, with his 1,500 Portuguese
horse, a battalion of ~adores, and a few guns. All the North
Alemtejo Ordenanlja were called out to watch the river banks,
and to lend what small assistance they could to the cavalr,Y.
}'allc discovered the French dockyard at Santarem, and tried
to fire it with rockets on November 13. He failed, but the
mere appearance of his little force on the further bank of the
Tagus had some good effect, since it warned Masseua that an
attempt to pass the broad river would not be unopposed, and
therefore made him more chary of attempting it. Pane, being
in touch with Abrantes on his right hand and with Lisbon
011 his left, now formed, as it were, a section of the blockading
screen which was thrown round the whole French army.
'Vellington had miscalculated the time which the French could
1 Wellington to Liverpool, October 27, JlJ!. 54,'; am! 655 of 1'01. vi.
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afford to spend in fmut of the Lines, witllQut suffering actual
starvation, by about a fortnight. On No,-ember 10 MassCn8.
gave orders for the evacuation of his whole position, and a
general retreat on Santarcm, because it had become absolutely
impossible to stay any longer 011 the ground facing Zibreira and
Alhandra, unless the whole army was to perish. The report
from the 8th Corps may suffice to give in a few words the
condition of affairs, 'General Clausel wishes to observe that
during the daytime he cauDot count on any other troops save
those actually guarding the outpost line. The majority of the
men ftl'C absent on raids to the rear, to seck for maize and cattle.
The last detachment which came back to camp had been nine
days away. Generals and soldiers agree in stating that for
some time it has only been possible to collect a little corn with
C-."i:treme difficulty. For eight days the troops have been living
on polenta (boiled maize flour) alone, and of this they have
received only half a ration, DUl'ing the last four days the
1st Division 1m3 rct:eived only olle ration of med, which
amounted to six ounces of goat's-flcsh. If the corps had to
make a retreat, it would have to abandon its sick and wounded
for wallt of carts, which the intendant-generals will not furnish 1.'
The condition of the 2nd and 6th Corps was only so far better
that they had to send their foragers a less distance, when seeking
for the SCRnty store which could still be gleaned from the hidden
granaries of the Portuguese.
But M!L';sCnR had no intention of retiring on Spain whell
he began to issue orders for a general movement to the rear.
Profoundly sensible of the difficulties of a November retreat
through the mountains, trusting that he might block the
British army by maintaining a bold attitude in its front, and
still hoping that large reinforcements might reach him ere long
from Drouet and Mortier. he had resalved only to evacuate the
Lisbon peninsula, and to retire no further than to the Rat and
fertile lands between Santarem and the Zezcl'e. In the Plain of
Golegao, as it is sometimes called, he hoped to feed llis army for
many weeks more, for the region was still comparath'cJy full of
resources, since it had only been exploited as yet by the garrison
l Fririou's cQllliuelltial report to Masselll1, night of 8th-'Jtll of
November.
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of Santarem and the flying columns which had marched to the
Zezere. It was now his cherished hope that 'Vellington might
follow him into the plaillland, abandoning his defensive system,
aud consenting to give battle in the open. The English might
even be induced to attack the FrCllCh arm)' when it should have
taken up 11 new and a strong position. In somewhat rash
confidence the Marshal professed himself certain of the result,
c,'en with his depleted army of under 50,000 men, if 'Vcllington
would consent to fight. At the worst, if starved out again or
beaten in the field, he would retreat on Spain by Castel10
Branco, for which purpose he had sent up the greater part of
his boat-train from Santnrem to build a bridge over the Zezcl'c.
He had also pushed part of Loison's brigade of infanb')' across
that river at Punhete, and was holding with it a point suitable
for a tete-du-pont. A regiment of dragoons was attached to this
force: it skirmished not unfrequently with parties sent out to
recolllloitre from Almtntes, but with lIO seriolls result. For
General 1,000, the h'Uvernor, had no intention of coming out
with a large detachment, in order to push the French advanced
guard back ovcr thc river. He had been ordered to keep to the
defensive, and only sent out occasional reconnaissances to see
whether the enemy were still in position,
Loison's troops were now no longer the only large force which
had quitted the army in front of the Lines. Not only was
l\:!ontblUll, with the main body of the cavalry, watching the
road!! from the north, but six battalions of infantry had been
sent up from the 6th Corps on November 8 to occupy Torres
No\'as and Thomar, If Wellington had attacked the enemy
behind Sobral on any day after that date, he would have found
~ey shOl"t of fourteen battalions lout of the thirty·four which
formed his (:orps. There would have been only 10,000 infantry
reudy to support Junot in the direction of Alemquer. But this
fact, of course, was unknown to the English general, who had
ldready made up his mind not to take the oflellsive. If it had
cOllie to his knowledge, he might have attacked, even at the last
1 Viz. 30th (3 batts.) and GOU\ (3 batts.) of l\1archand's division at
'nlOmar and Torrcs Kovus, witl\ Loison's 66t1\ (3 batts.), 02nd (2 batts.),
and 20th (3 hatts.). It will be remembered that Ueynier was, at tlle
same time, mil<US the 4/'lit1\, sent as escort witb Foy to Ciudad Uodrigo.
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momcnt, with flll enormous prohnbility of inflicting on the enemy
not the mere repulse that he disliked to contemplate-on account
of its ulterior effects-but a crushing defeat, which might have
hurled them out of Portugal.
On November 10 Massenaordered thc hospitals of the 6th and
8th Corps at Alemquer, and of the 2nd Corps at Az..'lmbuja, to
be scnt ofi' to Suntarcm. At the same time the intendants of
the commissariat werc ordered to dircct to tllC rear the meagre
store of provisions which wns in their possession, louded all the
much depleted transport train which still survived. On the
13th t.he reserve parks and the artillery train at' each corps were
ordered to foUow. On thc 14th, at eight o'clock in the evening,
the infantry, many of whom lay in contact with the British lines,
acted on their marching directions. Ney's main body, which
was out of sight at' \Vellington. wus to move first; then JUHot
flnd Ferey's brigade, whose movement WIIS most perilous-for if
their departure were discovered while they were on the hither
side of the defile of Alemquer, they ran a great risk of being
cm'elopcd and destroyed. Reynier was to maintain his position
at Viliafranca and Carregado, until it was reported to him that
JUllot and his corps had passed Alemquer and reached Moinho
de Cuba. For if the 2nd Corps had gone oft· at an early hour,
and its departure had been discovered, Hill might have marched
from Alhandrt\ Oil Alemquel' quickly enough to intercept Junot
at t.hat point; and if JUIlOt were being pursued at the moment
by the troops from his immediate front, the whole 8t.h Corps
might have been cut off.
On the night of the 14th, when the movement wns commencing,
i\las.~clla was favoured with the greatest piece of luck which had
come to him since the explosion of Almcida. A fog began to
rise in the smaU hours, and had become dense by the early
moming. It caused some difficulty to the retiring troops, and
dragoons had to be placed at e\'ery cross road to point out the
right direction to the infantry columns 1. But it had the all-
important result of permitting the British outposts to see nothing
at dawn. The limit visible to them was less than 100 yards.
It was onI}' at ten o'clock in tlUl mOl1lillg of the 15th that t.he
misb were suddenly rolled up by an cast wind, und t.hat the
I DelagraveJ p. 123 and note.
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nearer outposts could see that the French sentinels in front of
them had disappeared. The first alarm was gh·cn by Campbell's
6th Division l . The news spread along the whole line from west
to east, and reached the Commander-ill-Chief, who ascended the
hill in frollt of Sobral a few minutes later~. The ingenuity of
the enemy in concealing his departure had been great. Ferey's
brigade, in front of Al'nJda, had erected a well-designed line of
dummy scntinch before the Light Division, which were not
discovered to be men of straw, topped with old shakos Ilnd
bound to poles, till the fog rolled off on the 15th 3.
Meanwhile the :Fccnch had accomplished the first stage of
their retreat absolutely unmolested. Ney had retreated as far
as Alcocntre; Junot had passed the defile of Alcmquer, and
passed through Moillho de Cubo to Aveira de Cima. RCyllier,
who had waited till Junot was in safety before he withdl'Cw at
eight in the moming, reached Cartaxo before the day ended.
The first and most difficult stage of the retreat had been finished
without a shot being fired. 'What would ha\'e happened had
the night of the 14th been clear and starry, and the moming
sun had shone out on the 15th, so that Junot would have been
detected as he was passing Alemquer, and Reynier would have
been visible still in line of battle behind Villafranca, the French
diarists of the campaign prefer not to contemplate. Yet they
mostly continued to speak of 'VeIlington as a mediocre general,
who had all the luck all his side.
On the night of the 15th the British Commallder-in~Chiefhad
to draw his deductions from the facts before him. Thrcc things
were possible: l\fa.ssena might havc been so thoroughly sbuved
out and broken ill spirit, that he might be intendillg to retire on
Spain, either via. Thomar and the M.ondego, or by his new bridge
Oil the Zezerc and the route of CastelIo Branco. 01' he might
be proposing to cross the Tagus by means of the boats and
pontoons still remaining at Santarem, to seek unwastcd fields in
the Alemtejo and a junction with Mortier. Or, again, he might
merely be abandoning a position that was no longer tenable, in
order to take up a new one-perhaps at Santarem, perhaps at
I Londonderry, ii. pp. 51-2.
~ His first dispatch, that to Craufurd, is dated at 10.20.
~ Sce Lca.ch'" Diary, p. liB.
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Tholllar, but very possibly at and about Abrnntes, whose siege
he might be contemplating 1.
On the whole 'Vcllington thought it probable that the last-
named plan was the onc which Massena intended to adopt. A
retreat on Spain would not only be difficult and dangerous, but
inconsistent with the Marshal's obstina.te and courageous temper.
lL WlIS much more likely that he would endcuvuur to hold out
ill Portugal, IUIII meanwhile to co\'cr his pm·tinl discomfiture by
a bold stroke, such ns the siege of Abrantes, which would still
give nu oftcnsive nil' to his movements. and would also throw on
the British army the responsibility of relieving the fortress.
Such a course, it will be remembered, was what Napoleon recom-
mended to Foy2. 'There is still a chance that the enemy may
tale up [Ind try to keep a position at Santarem,' wrote Wellington
to Faneon the night of the 15th, •endeavouring to keep his rear
opcn, and to get a communication with Ciudad llodrigo across
the Ze1.ere.' But he WIlS inclillcd to think thut Abmntes WIUS
i\1nssCJlll's goal. He thcrefore directed Fane to trau!;fer his
cavalry to the point opposite Ahrantes on the south bank of the
Tagus, and requested Carlos d'Espal1a to enter the place and
strengthen the garrison. He intended to pass over Hill's two
divisions to strengthen Fane, and for that purpose directed
Admiral Berkeley to prepare all the boats of the fleet to ferry
Hill across to Salvaterra, on the south bank of the Tagus, from
whence his force could join Faue, and either reinforce Abrantes,
by llleansof its bridge of boats, 01' join in the pUl"suitof Massena
if he were about (an unlikely chance) tu retire 011 Spain by wuy
of his bridge over the hezere 3 and CasteIIo Branco.
Meanwhile all was still uncertain, and it was 'Vellington's first
task to find out what roads the enemy had taken in his retreat.
He did not 011 the 15th ordcr his whole army to leal'e the Lines
ill headlong pursuit. Only Spencer, Craufurd, and Hill were
I Wcllillgton to Fane, Nov. IS: '111e enemy retreated last night. He
intends either to retire across the Zezere into Spain, or across the 'fagllS
into SIJaill, or across the Zez:ere to attack Abrantes. 'nlc last is possible,
as I last night received an account that 011 the !JUI the}' had a considerable
reinforcemcnt coming 011 the frontier al Bcira Alia.'
~ Sco 11. 457 aOO,'c.
, All from tile orders issllel1 at 10.30 in tIle morning' from the hill in
front of Sobral '. Di8pafchu, I'i. 623,
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directed to march that afternoon, The former, with a ca,"alry
regiment out in his front, occupied Sobral, and pushed its van-
guard forward to Alemquer by the high road. The second left
A«uda, climbed the low hills in front of him, where Fcrey had
been encamped for the last month, and felt his way to Alemquer,
by the bad road which his immediate adversary had taken
eighteen hours before. Hill followed the great chaussee along
the 'l'agus bank, by Villafranca and Castanheira, and reached
Cnrregado before dark. He was wamed to be ill readiness to
cross the river, by means of Admiral Derkeley's boats, at the
earliest possible moment, in case the French should have built
1~ bridf,>e nt. Sanml'Ctll to enable them to cross into the Alcmtcjo.1
The culvancing troops fOllnd the French romps, am] the villnges
where the more fortunate battalions had been qnartered um]cr
cover, in the most dreadful condition. 'The Alemquer road
was covered with horses, mules, and asses wbich had perished from
want of forage. We passed many French soldiers lying dead by
the road-side, whose appearance indicated that disease and want
of food had carried them off. Every house in every town or
village was thoroughly ransacked.' 2 • Alemquer had been entirely
sacked, the windows and doors torn down and burnt, as well as
most of the furniture; china, pier-glasses, alld chandeliers all
dashed to pieces with the objectless fury of savages. They had
left many miserable fellows behind, who were too ill to march;
these were, of course, put to death by the Portuguese whene\'er
we happened to miss finding them out. \:VC found se\'cral
peasants whom the French had 1ll111"(lered und left upon the
rood, and also seveml}'-'rcnch killed by the Portugucse, It wns
a dreadful sight to sce so many fine towns und villages Sflckcd,
Ilnd without a crclLture in them.'.1
On the 15th none of the enemy bad been seen Sfl"e the dead
lLnd the abandoned sick, The traces of their retreat, however,
showed that all had gone off by the roads towards Santarem.
On the 16th Wellington moved more troops out of the Lines, to
support Hill, Craufurd, and Spencer, in the event of the enemy
I All from tlle orders issued at 10,30 ill the morning' from the hill in
front of Sobral', Di~pfllches, vi. 623,
~ Lcat:ll's Journal, p. 179.
, George SimmOlLs's Journal, pp. 121-2.
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showing light. Sludc's horse followed Spem:cr, Pack's Portuguese
followed Craufuro; Picton, Leith, Cole, and Campbell were left
in the Lincs, which Wellington still disliked to leave wholly
unguarded while he was not yet certain of the ultimate inten-
tions of the French. The advanced guard picked up about 300
prisoners this day-partly marauders, partly debilitated men
who could not keep up with their regiments during a second
~tagc of Imrd lllllrching. Next day (Novemher 17) it was evident
that the enemy was being overtaken: Anson's cavalry brigade,
which had reached the front on the preceding night, cut up a
lllllllberofsmall parties of the :French rearguard-the 16th Light
Dl'fL!,"OOIlS alone captured two officers and 7'8 men, not stragglerJ,
but belated pickets and convoy guards. One of their exploits
was long remembered-Sergeant Daxter, with fhe men only,
cume on an infantry outpost of 50 men, who had stacked their
arlllS and were cooking. Bursting in upon them, he captured
un oAk'Cr und 4] men, though some of the Frenchmcn Imd brat
to thcir muskets and wounded onc of his troopers.1
On the afternoon of the 17th the enemy's rearguard was at
last discovered, drawn up on a heath outside the village of
Cartaxo. It consisted of one of Reynier's divisions, which
Craufurd was preparing to attack, when the Communder-in·Chief
came up, and refused him leave to begin the combat, because
neither Hill 1101' Spencer was within suppm-tillg distance of him.
Opinions differed lIS to whether 8n attack would have led to a
repulse by superior Humbers, or to the capture of the French
division, which had a bridge and a long cnuseway~a most
dangerous defile~in its rear 2, Probably Craufurd was not in
quite sufficient strength to be certain of' success: he had but six
strollg battalions 3, a battery, and the 16th Light Dragoons in
I r'or a full tle&:riptiun of tlH' tloings of the 16th 011 this day, sec
Tomkinson, pp. liD-GO.
~ Leach thinks, with William Napier (Hi, 41), tbat Wellington acted
wisely in refusing Craufurtllcave to attack (p. 180). Tomkiusoll, another
cye-witness, thinks that un opportunity I\'I\ll mis.<;ed (pp. 60,61).
, HII\<ing 1l0W recei\'(:d tlle Brunswick Oets JllgcfS, the LiglJt Dil'isiOfI
was six battalions strong, not its nsual five. Its strength about this time
was some 4,000 bayonets, )Ierle's division was about 5,000 strong: it
IJad tlwindled to 4,200 efl'ectives before December was ont. 'nlUs the
English and ~dore battalions averaged 6.50 men, tile Freucll450 only,
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his compauy. The enemy had the cleveu weak battalions of
Merle's division, and two regiments of cavalry: probably
1,000 bayonets and SOO sabres in all more than Craufurd
could command. But an attack made with vigour, when half
the French had begun to retire across the defile, might havc had
considerable results. i\ferle's division was, however, allowed to
retire ulIlIlolested in the evening, while the Light Division took
uJl fjUMLcril for the night at Carltlxo. Reynier drew back lhe
whole of his corps next morning to the cnvirons of Slllltal'em,
which he had been directed to defend, Meanwhile the
Bth Corps had reached Perncs with one division,und Alcanhedc
with the other and its cavalry: these were the points at which
Junot had been ordered to stay his retreat. The bulk of' the
6th COlPS was at Thomar, but Loison's division had been kept
in the neighbourhood of the Zezere 1, and part of Marchand's
infantry and Ney's corps-cavalry were at Caba~os. The retreat
was thus ended, for Massena was in possession of the llew
ground on which he intended to maintain himself for the winter,
and he was prepared to accept a dcfensi"e battle if Wellington
should push him any further. His left flank neal' the Tagus
(Reylliel"s corps) was oom.nced: his right flank (Jullol's corps)
much'refused.' Ney was forming the central reserve.
Unfortullately for himself the .British Commander-in-Chief
received, on the night of the 17th, confusing intelligence,
which led him to the false conclusion that the enemy was still
retiring, and was aiming either for Abrantes or for the borders of
Spain. This news \\'as sent by Fane. who from the other bunk
of the 'l'agus had observed French columns and convoys
marching eastward from Santarem towards the Zezcre 2, find
wrongly inferred that the main army was making for this
direction, and that only a rearguard hOO been left in Sanlarem.
He was also influenced by the fact, reported frolll AbranLes,
that :Massclla had cast a second bridge over the Zel',cre Ileal'
so that the strength wag llot verr lllleqllal. Hut only 2,500 of Craufllrd's
troops were British.
1 'J1\1~re its main body was now joined by Ferey's brigade, wbich 111111
beell detached for some weeks.
I Probably l<'erey's brigade marching to join Loisou and trains following
it, llnd certainly Heynier's trains which lie Ilad sent off towards Go1egao.
&e Di8putcJ~8, \·i, 029.
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PUllhetc, as if to give him a quicker chance of passing that
river. In consequence of this news, ·Wellington directed Hill
to CM&! the Tagus at Vulluda with his own division, Hamilton's
Portugucse, and the 13th Light Dragoons, in order to
strengthen Abrantcs if it were assailed, or to fall on the fhmk
of the French, if the)' were merely passing that fortress on their
retreat to Spain. Thus he deprived himself of 14,000 men 01)
the right bank of the Tagus, where alone troops were really
needed. To make up for Hill's absence, Leith's and Cole's
<1i visiulls Wt).·C Cll.lk.J. out of the Lincs, where thcy Imd rested
till this momcnt (18th NO\'cmhcr) I. But they wcrc two
marches off, and Wellington had for the moment in his front
line only Craufurd, Spencer, Pack's Portuguese, and Slade's and
Anson's cavalry, a force of some 16,000 men. Reynier was in
his immediate front at Santarem, with 13,000 men of all arms.
Jllllot's corps at A.lcanhede and Pernes was twelve miles away,
and about 11,000 strong: the greater part of his men could have
been brought up in half a day's march. Ney was too distant to
come LIp in less than 24 hours, and then onl), with half his
CUl'pS, as Loisoll and onc of Mltrchund's b,·igudes Wcl'c fur uwny.
Blit if Wellington had attacked Santarem on the 19th the
Duke of Elehingen would have appeared next morning.
Craufurd was as strongly convinced as his chief that there
was nothing in front of him but a rearguard on the night of
the 18th, and he even doubted whcther the last of the French
would lIot withdraw at midnight. It was this that induced him
to make the curious personal explorat.ion mentioned by Napier
(iii. 63) 2, when, followed by Il sillgle sergeant on]y, he pushed
1 riM Dwry of the Marches of the 4th Divisiolt, O}' its Assistant Quarter-
i\lnster, Charles Vere, ~ttles the date. For Leith's start on the S<1mc
morning, see Leith-Hay's N(lN"(ltit<t, i. p. 209.
I NalJier, hOWel"{lr, dates the General"s escap.1de wrongly. It took
llhce 011 the night of the lOtl1-19111, where it is duly related ill the diary
of George Simlllous (p. 117), and 1I0t on the 21st as Napier implies.
11l(1.I'c a Wi'Y of Delagrave's Campagne de Portugal, wlLich ollce belonged
to Kapier; he llaB writteu a sarcastic 1I0to on tho bottom of page 111,
commenting 011 the ridiculous account of the event wllich apIJ.CarclI in the
.'rench narratives. He adds that the sergCl.lllt's Ilame WIIS McCllrry, nnd
that' the sergeant had sense enough to hold his tougue, but Craufurd
slwke out, alld so drew the fire of the enemy's picket.'
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along the Cfiu5eway ill the small hours of the morning, NlIl into
the French picket, and escaped as if by mirnclc the volley that
was fired at him. The picket reported to Hc)'nier that they had
been seriously attacked, had killed three of their assailants, and
had heard the groans of wounded dragged away by the survi\'ors.
Craufurd and his sergeant retired, thoroughly convinced that
the causeway had not been evacuated.
It was undoubtedly fortunate for the British Commander-in-
Chief that his habitual caution prevented him from making
a serious attack on the force at Santarem, under the impression
that it was a mere rearguard, left behind to detain him while
the encmy's main body was pushing for Abrantes. ReYllier's
position was \'cry formidable. The town of Slluwrelll, sllrmunded
by an old mediaeval wall, stands on a lofty height above the
Tagus, with a narrow suburb-where the Freneh dockyard
had been established-along the lower edge of the hill. But
this was only the third and last line of the defensive position.
In front of it lay low alluvial ground, inundated by the rain
which had Ix!en falling during the last fortnight, and barely
passable save by the chall-ssf:e from Lisbon. The plain was cut
in two by the Hio Mayor, a deep muddy stream at this time
of the year, and to reach Santarem a narrow bridge over this
obstacle had to be passed. Just where the chau.ssf:e leaves the
marsh, to climb towa.rds the tOWII, was a long knoll, completely
cOllllllRnding the road: on this Reynier had placed a battery
with infantry supports. 'l11is force must be driven in by tile
British, and the only pro.cticable way to reach it was by forcing
a passage along the causeway, for the marsh between the road
and the Tagus turned out, when explored, to be practically
inaccessible to formed troops, though individuals might wade
through it in a few places. Behind the advanced French knoll
were the foot-hills of the lofty ridge on which Santarem lies.
The enemy were visible upon it, working hard at the con-
struction of a liue of abaft-is from the olive-trees which cover its
slopes. Dehind this, t1gain, was the town itself, hastily prepared
for defence.
On the morning of November 19th the Br'itish advanced
guard was on the eclge of the swampy plain; Cranfuro's Light
Division occupied the near cud of the long bridge over the Rio
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.Mayor, and skirmished with the l~rench outposts, who l'efuS(.-d
to retire from the further side. Spencer came up more to the
left, and further iuland, Pack's Portuguese reached the upper
course of the Uio Mayor. Neither Leith nor Cole had yet
arrived at the front, so that the force available for all atl:nck
was no more than 16,000 men, Neverthcless, Wellington, still
hoping that he had only a. rearguard in front of him, made
dispositions for a demonstration against the enemy's front, which
was to be turned into a real attack if he showed want of
strength. Craufurd was'directed to advance across the swamp
neal' the Ttlgus, if he found it practicable. Pack was to cross
the upper Rio Mayor, und turn the hostile right. Spencer \1'lIS
fOl'mcd at thc cntrance of the bridge and causeway, amI ordcrt..u
to charge up the cltall$$~e at the :Frcnch centre, and the battery
commanding the road, so soon as he should sec that the
flaIl king divisions were making good progress. Fortunately for
Wellington the attack was never deliyered: more rain during
the night had made the marsh so waterlogged that Craufurd,
who had crossed the Rio Mayor by a narl'OW wooden bridge
near Vnlle, came to a stund in the slush, though n few of hif:
skirmishers pushed far enough forward to engnge the enemy's
pickets 011 the other side. Pack's Portuguese on the left flank
got across the river with much difficulty, but their guns were
absolutely stuck in the mud far to the rear, anrl the brigadier
sent back word to Wellington that he should advance no
further without special orders. The lst Division had llot yet
hegLln to mO\'e. Therenpon the Commander-in-Chief called
hack both Crll.ufurd ll.nd Puck, nnd gave up his pllln. It
is dear that he hlU.I nourished some intention of attacking in
earnest, for he wrote to Hill that afternoon: < I did not attack
Santarem this moming, as the artillery of the left wing (Pack)
had lost its way, and I am rather glad that I did not attack, lIS
the enemy have there undoubtedly a very strong post, and wc
must endeavour to turn it. And if they [the main body] have
not retired across tlle Zezel'e or towards the Alva, they must be
too strong for us here.'
It is obviouf> that both 'VellillbJion's and Masscna's strategy
on the 18th and 19th November is exposed to criticism. Why
had the British Geueral only 16,000 men to the front on these
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duys, when he was risking 0. general action with the .French?
One of two courses must have been adopted by the cnemy:
either he must be marching hard for the Zezere, and intending
to retire into Spain, or he must be merely changing his ground,
and proposing to fight at Santarem, or in front of Abrantes, or
elsewhere. In either case it was strange tactics for W'ellington
to take the field with 16,000 men (deducting Hill on the othCJ'
side of the Tagus), while he left Leith and Cole two or three
Tlllll'ehes behind, and still kept the divisions of Picton, Campbdl,
and Le Cor, and the unattached Portuguese brigade of ColClllftn
and Alex. Campbell-20,OOO men-unmoved within the Lincs.
For if the enemy was tlying, there was no need to leave such
a force of regulars to guard positions which the French could not
be intending to attack. "Vhile if the other hypothesis was
correct, and Massena, with an army which Wellington still
reckoned at 50,OOq men, was in a fighting mood, and ready to
givc battle if he saw an ad,'antageous opportunity, it was still
more inexcusable to leave behind ~O,OOO men, who would be
wanted for the decisive sb'tlggle.
On the other hand, the French ~Iarshal WIIS taking a lenible
risk also. Supposing WellingtOlI had been leading his whole
force-deducting Hill-for u. resolute attack on the Sanmrem
positions, which was the most probable course for him to adopt,
he might have had not only the 16,000 men that he had
actually brought forward, but Leith and Cole with 1l,00Umorc,
and Pieton and the othel' 20,000 men left in the Lines, a force,
if the cavalry be thro\\'n in, of full 50,000 sabres and bayonets.
If WelJington had left Crauf'urd and Pack to block the marshy
southem exit from Santarem, which was as difficult for Reynier
as for his adversaries, he might have thrown 40,000 mcn into
the empty space of twelve miles between Reynier and Junot, have
driven away the latter's 11,000 men, and surrounded Rcynier's
13,000 ill Santarem, Ney could not have got up in time to
pre,'ent this. The Qnd Corps would either have had to surrender,
fol' it had hardly an)' food, or to cut its wa)' out with disastrous
losses 1.
l The emplacement of the Anglo-I'ortugucsc army is givcn as follows
by Beresford's Qunrter-Master-GeneraIJ D'Uroon, on the night of the 18th-
Wth J showing its complete dislocation;-
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Ueyllier saw this perfectly, and was in an agony of mind 011
the 18th and 19th. He wrote urgent appeals to Massena, for
permission to abandon Santarem on the former day, pointing
out that if his front was practically inaccessible, because of the
S"'(1111)5, his I'ight might be turned by the upper Rio Mayor,
where he hud ouly a single regimcnt in obscrvation, to facc what
might be an ovcrwhelming strength of British troops, who
might be preparing to cut in between him and JUllot. He sent
all his train, sick, and wounded to Golegao 1, and besought leave
to follow them. 'Vhen be received a peremptory reply, to the
effect that he was to hold Santarem to the last, he came to the
conclusion that he was to be sacrificed in order to allow the
other two corps to escape unmolested. When Pack advanced
on the 19th he sellt the repOl"t that he was turned by 10,000
Bl'itish troops~Puck had but 3,000 Portuguese-and that
Clatlscl with Jllnot's nearest di\'ision WllS too far off to succour
him. He prepared to suffer a disaster, and to die fightillg 2•
He ordered his troops to surround Santarem, in rear as well
as in front, with a double line of abattis, and continued to
strengthen and repair its old walls.
Nothing, therefore, could exceed Reyniel"s relief when Pack
lmd Crnufurd halted, and Spencer did not move at all, aftcl'
the firing had begun upon the 19U1. On the next morning
the British army was still stationary, Slwe that a. cavalry
rccollllaiS&Ult'C, pllshcil 1l00thward from Pnck's position Oil the
upper Rio Muyol', discovCI'Cd Junot's outposts in the direction
ot' Alcanhede and l'cmes, and reported to Wellington that the
enemy was in strength, with all arms, in this direction. Leith's
Light Division, Pack, and Slade's and Anson's cavalry-before
Santarem.
1st Dil'ision-Cartlxo.
2nd Divisioll-passillg the 'I':l/{lIS at Vallatla.
5th Diviaion-Alemquer.
4th DiI·ision-Sobral.
6th Di\'ision-HibaIJeim (in the Lines).
3rd Divisioll, and Coleman'sand Alex. Campbell's Portuguese-Torres
"edrns.
Le Cor's Di\'isiou-Alhandra (in the Lilies).
1 It was their march, visible from tllC other side of the Tagus, whicll
helped to rle<:eh·c l<'ane as to thc geneml mo\'cments of the French army.
2 See Delagral'c, 128--30, and Gachot's excellent notes tlIereOll.
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division came up this morning, raising the British force to
21,000 men, but this, as the Commander-in·Chief now saw, was
not sufficient to enable him to deal with two corps d'arm&, of
which onc was in an inaccessible position and now stockaded up
to the eyes. He halted, and sent, very tardily, orders (or Cole,
to join in haste, llnd for Campbcll's division to come up from tile
Lincs. But ellen thus he was too weak to strike. Hill was
now ut Allllcirim, half way to Abrantcs on the other side of the
Tagus. Fane had actually entered Abrantes, and sent news
that the enemy was making no forward movement from the
Zczerc. Thus at -last Wellington discovered that he must
ba\"c practically the whole :French army in his front. while his
own forces were in El state of terrible dispersion.
On the 21st he wrote a dispatch to Lord Liverpool which
shows that he had given up all intention of pushing Mnssena
further. 'Although the enemy have moved large bodies of
b'oops eastward from Santal'em, I have not heard that all)' large
body has crossed the Zezerc.... 'I'heir army bcing collected
between Sanmrem and thc Zczcre, they are in a situation to be
able to maintain themselves in their strong position till the
reinforcements, which I know are on the frontier, can join them.
For this reason, and because I am unwilling to expose to the
inclemellcies of the weather a larger body of troops than is
absolutely necessary to press upon the enemy's real', and to
support my advanced guard, I have kept in reserve a consider-
able proportion of the allied army-some of them still in their
cantonments in the Lincs, our fortified position. I havc ordered
General Hill to halt the head of his corps at Chamusca [on the
other side of the 'l'agus, fifteen miles south of Abrantes] till
the enemy's movements have been decided.... The rain, which
has been very heavy since the 15th, has so completely filled the
rivulets alld destroyed the roads, that I have hitherto found it
impossible to dislodge the cnemy from his position at Santarclll,
by mO\'Clllents through thc hills on his right flank. Possibly
the bad state of the roads has also been the cause of his
remaining at Santarem so long.... The enemy's army may be
reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient,
in the existing state of aflah-s in the Peninsula, to resume my
positions [the Lines]. But I do not believe that they have it
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in their power to bring such a force against us as to render the
contest l). I1ltltter of doubt 1.'
In a supplementary dispatch, dated the same day, 'Vcllington
adds: 'At first I thought the enemy were off, and I am not
quite certain yet that they are not going. . .. I am convinced
that there is no man in his senses, who has ever passed a winter
in Portugal, who would not recommend them to go llOW, rather
than to endeavour to maintain themselves upon the Ze7,ere
during the winter, or than attack our position, whatever may
be the strength of their reinforcements.'
There were, indeed, men ill the French camp who advised
i\[l1sscna. to continue his retreat, but he had no intention of
taking up a timid policy after braving 50 many passed dangers.
He had resolved to maintain himself between Santarem and the
Zezcrc, and to call down Drouet and other reinforcemellbl 2, in
the hope that, ere the winter was over, the Emperor might find
means to strengthen him to a force which, with the co-operation
of Soult from Andalusia, would enable him finally to resume
the offensive, and make a second and more formidable attack
upon the Lines. In adopting this resolve he was, though as
yet he knew it not, carr),jng out the instructions which the
Emperor was at this very moment (November 22) dictating to
Foy at llaris. But Wellington had !lot writtcn at nmdom
when he reminded Lord Liverpool of the terrors of a Portu-
guese winter, and in the end the Prince of Essling was forced
to begin on the Ist of March, with under 40,000 men of his
original force, the retreat which he might have commenced on
November 20 with over 50,000 3,
The scheme for starving out the French, which Wellington
had de\·ised early in 1810, and begun to execute in September,
was now transferred to il. different area. Massellil. had been
able to endure for a month in front of the Lisbon Lines: the
question now was 'whether he would 'be able to live so long
in the land between the Rio Mayor and the Zezere. Wellington
could not be sure of his data, in calculating the day when
exhaustion would once more compel the French to shift theil'
1 Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 26, uno.
! Notably the column of Gardanne, of wllich wc shall speak presently.
I Illcluuillg sick ill each case, and c.xcluding reinforcements received later.
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ground. It was only certain that the plain of Golegt10, and the
Thomar-Torres Novas country, had not been devastated by the
Portugue~e government even with the same energy that they
had displayed in the Lisbon Peninsula. And there, as the
British Commander-in-Chief complained, not half the necesMry
work had been done. Yet something had certainly been accom-
plished; the papulation had nearly all been withdrawn, the
mills destroyed, the corn buried or sent over the Tagus. Trust-
ing to these facts, and to the millS and frosts of the oncoming
winter, 'Wellington hoped that Mussclla would finully be roouC(,'(1
to a disnstrous retreat by sheer privation. • Though it is
certainly astonishing that the enemy ha\'e been able to remain
in this country so long, and it is an extraordinary instance of
what a French army can do 1.'
Resolved to take no further offensive action, and to let
famine do its work, ,"Vellington, 011 November ~4, gave orders
for the army to draw back and go into winter quarters, leaving
only Craufurd and Pack in touch with the enemy in front of
Santarem, and Spencer in support of them at Cartaxo. Of the
other divisions, Hill remained behind the Taglls at Charnus<:tl.
IUld Alrnciril.ll, with his own troops and Hamilton's Portuguese.
Pictoll and the 3rd Division retained their old post at Torres
Vedms, with Coleman and Alex. CampbeU's Portuguesc near
them. Cole remained at A:7..ambuja, in rear of Spencer. Leith
was sent back to Alcoentre, CampbeU's 6th Didsion was placed
at Alemquer, behind Leith. Le Cor's Portuguese stayed at
Alhandra, within the Lines.
'Theanny thus placed,'writes D'Urban, the Quarter-Master-
General, on this day, 'at once takes care of Abrantes (b)" means
of. Hill), observes the enemy at Santarem (with Craufurd aJld
Pack), has a division on the higher Rio Mayor road to turn
the enemy's right, if this become expedient (Leith's to wit), and
still .. appuis" itself on the Lines, its retreat into which is
sccmed by its cchelloned position. Mcans are reu.dy to pllSS
GCllcml Hill bl1Ck tu the right bank of the Tu.glls, with such
celerity, that his divisions can be counted upon for the order of
march or battle on this side of the I·ivcr as CCl'tllillly as if he
were already there 2.'
I Ditpatchu, vii. 59. ' D'Urban's Diary, under Nov. 24.
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Masscna, on the other hand, also remained nearly quiescent
for many days, the only important change which he made
in the cantonments of his army being that he moved in Clausel's
divisioll closer to Santarem, to fill the dangerous gap between
the ~lld and 8th Corps, which had existed on November 18.
On the ~~nd and ~rd he pushed forwarrl. against Pack's
Portuguese and Anson's light Cllvalry, a considerable force.
consisting of Clullsel's whole division and six squadrons from
the 8th Corps, and General Pierre Soult with two cavalry
regiments and three battalions from the !flnd Corps. After
some lively but bloodless skirmishing, the allied troops retired
behind the Rio Mayor, evacuating the village of Calal'es beyond
the stream, and drawing in their cavalry pickets, which hacl
hitherto held some ground on the further bank. Tbis affair
confirmed 'Vcllington ill his conclusion that IIcurly the whole
,Fl·cnch firmy was now conecntrated on the Sll.ntarcm-Pcrncs
line, and made him more reluctant than ever to take the
oftensive.
Meallwhile Montbrun's cavalry, supported by small detach·
ments from the infantry of ~ey's corps. had pressed somewhat
furthcr to the north. in order to occupy a broader tract of land
from which the army might feed itself, a task that grew harder
every day. From his Lead quarters at Ourem and frum CaLtu;os.
on the Thomar-Coimbra road, he continued to send out strong
reconnaissances in every direction. of which some occasionally
pushed as fur as Leiria on the road towards Coimbra, and
others scoured the left bank of the lower Zezere and the
Nabao. The limit of their c..xcursions was fixed by the fact
that Wilson's brigade of Portuguese militia still lay at
Espinhal, and, though it was reduced by desertion and sick-
Iless to 1.500 men, was reported to l\Iontbrull as a serious
force, with which he had bette~ 110t ITII..>ddle. 'l'rant's troops
at Coimbra~a weak militia division-were also estimated ut
much ovcr their real strength. It was not till later that sheer
starvation drove the French further afield. and revealed to
them the weakness of the cord(m of inferior troops which
hemmed them in upon the nortbern side.
The blockade of the French &nny, therefore, remained still
unbrokcn, and its communication with the north was as
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absolutely iotClTUpted in the end of November as in the
beginning of October. One attempt to break through the
screen of Portuguese irregulars had been made in November,
but of its failure Massena had lIS yet no knowledge. ''''hen
Foy rcached Rodrigo, on his way to Paris, he had ha.nded over
his escort of onc bnttnlion of infantry and 120 horsemen to
General Garoanne, who was ordered to strengthen them with
all the convalescents of the Army of Portugal, and with the
garrisons of Almeida and Rodrigo also, if these last had now
been relieved by troops of Drouel's 9th Corps. At the head of
6,000 men, as Msssena calculated, he could cut his way to join
the main army, escorting a great train of munitions, of which
both the artillery and the infantry at the front were lamentably
in need. Gardanllc could not gather in the Almeido. garrison,
as that place was still blockaded by Silvcim's Portuguese. Hut
with the two battalions from Rodrigo, added to Foy's late
escort, and a mass of convalescents, he had collected some
5,°9° men by November 20 1, the day on which hc marched
by the Sabugal-Be.lmonte-Fundiio route towards Punhete and
the lower Zezere. He was cursed with dreadful weather,
followed and harassed by all the Ordenanifa of the Castello
Dranco country, hampered by his heavy convoy, and much
troubled by the disorderly convalescents, who were largely
professional malingerers. But he got as far as Cardigos 011
the Sobl"cira-f'ormosa road, OIily fifteen miles from Punhete,
where Loison was awaiting him on the Zezere. Here he was
brought to a stand (November 9l7) by the flooded anti bridgelcss
stream of the Codes. No news had reached him from Massen8,
while he was assured by Portuguese deserters, who probably
were sent out to deceive him by the governor of' Abrantes, that
the Marshal had not only evacuated his position before the Lines,
but was retreating on Spain via the Mondego. They added
that Hill had just reached Abrantes with 10,000 men, alid
was about to march against him. Thereupon Gardanne
hastily turned back, reached Penamacor by forced marches on
I Belmas's figures (i. 137) givcn hcrc must be about correct, !Jot the 2,000
of Fririon, Ilnd Vletoirts et OonqulJ.es. For the two Rodrigo battalions were
],500 strong, foy's escort 600, and Gardanne took with him some of
his own dragoon regiment, beside the convalesccnts.
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November 29, amI from thence retired to RoJrigo, huving lost
400 men and 300 horses by disease and fatigue during his ill·
conducted expedition. If he had jJushed forward fifteen miles
fUl'ther on the ~th, he would have got into touch with LoisOll,
and reached Masseua's head quarters in safety. Wellington, not
without LOCa801l, professed himself unable to comprehend this
strange march and ooulltel"llllll"ch. • I do Hot exactly under-
stand this 1lI0Vcmellt 1,' t\lld 'if this Illarch WllS ordered by
superior authority, and was cOllnected with any other arrange-
ments, it had every appearance of, alld was attended by all the
cOIlSC<luences of, a precipitate and forced retreat ".'
Here, theu, wc leave Masseua and his army, calltoned ill the
space between the Rio Mayor and the Zezere, still destitute of
lIell'S from France, IUld st.ill entirely ignurant whether or liD any
endeavour WWi being llIade to relieve them. Of their furtber
doings during the three months that cnded Oil March 1, 1811,
II'C shall tell elscwhere. Suffice it to SIlY that, despite many
dangers and risks, "Vellington's scheme of starvation wag played
out to the end, and achieved complete success. Of the privation
and losse:; that the French suffered, and the atrocities that they
committed, of the difficulties of the 1l1'iti8h Commander-in-Chief
-with nil ob~tilltlte enelll.Y still in frollt uf hilll, u factiulls
1U,hrcncy alld a half-starved populatioll Lehind him ill Lisbon,
und a disquieting prospect that Soult might takc 11 hand in the
game-the fourth volume ofthis work will give full details.
I DiltIIlJ.IcfWlf, vii. p. 20, to Crallfurt.!.
2 lbid., p. 30) to Lort.! Liverpool.
O.UW. 11'
SECTION XXII
END OF THE YEAR 1810
CHAPTER 1
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH AND EAST
WHILE tracing the all-important Campaign of Portugal,
down to the deadlock in front of Santarem, which began about
the flOth of November. 1810, and was to endure till the 1st of
March in the succeeding year, wc have been obliged to leave
untouched events, civil and military, in many other PlLrts of the
Peninsula during the uutumn. Only the Andl11usian campaigns
have been carried down to November: in Northern Spain wc
have trneed the COIU'SC of affairs no further than September 1 :
in Eastern Spain no further than August 2, iUoreovcr, little
has been said of the general effect on the French occupation
caused by the dh'ision of supreme authority which Napoleon
sanctioned in the spring 3, or of the importance of the long-
deferred meeting of the Spanish Cortes, which assembled at
Cadiz in the autumn. With these points we must deal before
proceeding to narrate the campaigns of 1811.
The sl1t\'ey of the military operations, none of which were
particularly important, must precede the summary of the
political situation, with regard to King Joseph on the one
side and the Cartes on the other. For the acts of the King and
the Cortes had an influence extending far beyond the months
in which they began, and were, indeed, main factors ill the
Peninsular struggle for years to come. But the doings of the
armies in Galicia and Asturias on the one flank, in Catalonia
and Valencia on the other, can easily be dismissed in a few
pages: they were but preliminaries to the greater operations in
the spring of ]8]1.
,,ye may first turn to the north~wcst. When Massena
I Sce pp. 270-1. 2 See pp. 200--1 and 316-16. 'See pp. 312-14.
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plunged into Portugal in September 1810, and WlL<; lost to
the sight of his colleagues and subordinates for llearly three
months, the situation left behind him was as follows :-Leon and
Old Castille, as far as the Galician foot~hills and the Canta-
brian sierras, were held down by Serras and Kellermann with
SOllle l~,OOO men-a force none too great for the task that lay
before them, The latter general had charge of the provinces of
Vnlllldolid, Toro, and Palcllcia, ns onc of the' military govel'llol's'
recently appointed by the Emperor. Hc gave himself absurd
airs of independent authority, and took little more heed of
the orders of Masseua than of'those of King Joseph, for whom
he showed a supreme contempt. General Serras's troops were
more definitely part of thc Army of POltugal. They were in
charge of the provinces of Zamora, Leon, and Salamanca, thus
covering Kcllel'mann'$ government on the outer flank, and
taking care of the borders both of Gulieia Oll the Spanish and
of Tras-os-Monh.'S on the Portugucse side, To co\'cr this long
front Sel'ras had only eleven battalions 1, and two provisional
regiments of dragoons-some 9,000 men. Out of this force he
had to find garrisons for Astorga, Leon, Benevente, Zamora,
and se\'eral smaller places. Kellcrmann, who was intended to
sen'e as a reserve for Serras, as well as to guard the central
deptits at Valladolid, had only two regiments of dragoons (part
of his original division) nnd three infantry battalions, making
3,000 mcn in a11 2• Both of them were directed to keep ill close
touch with Bonnet, who, at the head of his old troops, the four
regiments which never came south of the Cantabrian hills till
the Salamanca campaign 3, kept a precarious hold on Central
and Eastern Asturias with 9,000 men.
There were also present in the circumscription of Serras's and
Kellermann's command the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo (two
battalions) and Gardaune's five squadrons of dragoons, which
I Viz.113th Line (2 batts.), 4th of the Vistula (2 hatts.), one battalioll
eadl of the 12th LegeI' and 32nd and .sOtl} Line, four 'provisional
battalions' (Nos. 2,4,5,7), and two pro"isional regiments of dragoons.
Total on Sept. 15,9,524 men, of whom 1,000 were cavalry.
1 '1'11'0 Swiss battalions, oue lIattalion of the Garde de Paris, ami tlte 5th
and lith dragoons. Total, 1,300 cavalry and 1,700 infantry.
, Lintl regiments (cndl of 4 batts.), Nos. 118, 119, 120, 122, and n
squadron of the 21st Chasseurs, 0,200 men.
d!
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MasscnA. I.ad left behind, in the min hope lImt thuy would
keep the line cloor between Almcid'l ano SnlamullCll. This forcc
added 2,500 men to the total of the French troops in Uon.
If the French were left rather weak in this direction, the
same was not the case in the region further cast. .From llurgos
to the Bidassoll. the country-side was full of troops in the latter
half of September, when the Arm)' of Portugal had gone west-
ward. In the Go\'crnmcnt of Bul'&"Os were the two infantry
divisions of the Young Guard, under Huguet and Dumoustier,
with their two cavalry regiments, making 11,464 sabres and
bayonets. I\tlllurrc WllS o<.:cupied by 8,733 men, Biscay by 8,085.
The little pJ'Ovillee of Santander wa.q held by lhrt>e provisional
battalions 3,500 strong. But this pCrtllallent garrison, lllukillg
over 31,000 men, was at the mOtllent supplemented by Drouet's
9th Corps, for whose arrival at the front Masseua had waited so
long and so vainly. On September 15 its commandel', its head
quarters, and Clapar6de's division, were at Vittoria: Couroux's
division and thc cavalry brigade of Fournier were echellolloo
between Vittoria and Bayollue. The whole corps mustered
oreI' 18,000 sabres and bayonets. Fifty thousand men, there-
fore, adding the permanent garrisons to the advancing corps of
Drollet, were between Bm'gos and Dayollne, and there were Jet
a fell' more troops to come forward from the inlet'ior of France,
fm' Caffarelli 'I'M bringing up llllother division, which bad the
official title of the' Division of )lescn'u of the Anll)' of Spain,'
and consisted of four provisional regiments of' infantry and two
cn\'alry regiments, with n sh'Cllgth of 8,000 men 1. It WtlS
ordered to be al llayonlle by October 20, llnd formed the
nucleus of the force which in the next year was styled the
, Army of the NOl'th "
Without cOlmting this last unit, which was only in process of
formation in September, Napoleon had between the Galician
frontier and Bayolllle 110 less thall 7~,OOO men 2. 'What had
1 See CorJ't,pondllllCe, xxi. 106. On Sept. 13, the date of the dispatclJ
creating Cnffllrelli's di\'isioll, one of its regiments WM forming at {.imoges,
another at Dlois, another at Bordeaux, the fourtll at Orleans.
I Viz. Kcllermalln, 3,000; Serras, 9,000; llOllnl't, 8,000; Young
Guard, It,600; Biscay, 8,000; Nnl'arre, 8,600; Santlllldcl', 3,500; mh
Corps, 10,000; Mnss<ina's Garrisons, 2,500.
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his elleUlil!S to oppose to this formidable bost, whose slrenbtth was
considerably greater than tbat of the force with which Massena
invaded Portugal? Of regularl), organized troops the number
of Spaniards and llortuguese opposed to them was absolutel)'
insignificant. Silvcira in the Tras-os':\lolltes had six regiments
of militia and oue nf the line-this Inst being the 24th, the
absconding' garrison or Allllcida. The whole made under 7,000
men, including an incomplete etwalr)' regiment. Mah)· in
Ga[icil~ had recruited up the depleted divisions which La
HOlllil.lIIl had left with him in the spring to a strength of
12,000 men, mostl), raw aJld untl'Ustwortlly; for the best
regiments had been destroyed at the siege of Astorga. The
remains of the army of Abturias, which had suffered so many
defeats at the hands of Bonnet during the spring and SlImmer,
consisted of about 6,000 meu, of whom hill(, under Barceutl Ilnd
Losada, were holding the western end of the province, behind
the Navia ri,·er, with head quarter.s at Castropol, while the rest
lurked in the higher \·alleys of the Cantabrian Sierra, rendering
Bonllet's communication with Serras in ]..eon insecure, and
sometimcs des(,'cmling to the coast, to make El. sudden attack
on one of the small garrisons which linked the French garrison
in Oviedo with that at Sanl:nndcr. Of these roving bands the
ehief lender was the adventurous POl'lier, the ~~(arfjue8ito),as the
Asturinlls cn,lled him, who won a welI·descrrro reputntioll for
his perseverance and never-failing courage. The 25,000 men
oC Silvcira, )lah)', and the .Asturian army were the only regular
troops opposed to the 75,000 French in Northern Spain. How
came it, then, that the enemy was held in check, and "e\'er
succeeded in pushing on to the support of )rt\S~na any foret!
8a\'e the two divisions of Dronet? The auswer is simple; the
French garrisons were fixed down to their positions partly
OC'Clluse of !\'apoleon's entire lack of nllval power, partly bcealt5C
of the unceasing activit)' of the guerrilleros, who were far morc
hllsy in 1810 than ut any preceding time, As to the first-
llallled cause, it lIllly be said that the 20,000 ]?l'cllch in Asturias,
Santander, and Biscuy were paralysed by the existence of a
small Anglo-Spanish squmlmn based on CorUllllll and I"eno!.
As long as this existed, e\'cry small port along the whole
, As being lIephew to the Marquis uf La Itomana.
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northern coast of Spain had to be garrisoned, under penalty
of a possible descent from the sea, which might cut the road
from Oviedo to San Sebastian at anyone of a hundred points,
and pro,"ide arms and stores for the guerrilla bands of toe
mountains. Many such expeditions were carried out with
more or less success in 1810. The first and most prosperous
oftbem took place in Jul)', when Porlier, putting his free corps
of some 1,000 men on transports, alld cOllvoyed by the British
commodore Mends, with a couple of frigates, came ashore near
the important harbour of Salltona, drove out the small garrison,
and then coasted along in the direction of Biscay, destroying
shore-batteries and capturing as many as 200 men at onc point
and another. or the peasantry of the coast, sollle enlisted in
Porlier's band, others took to the hills on their own account,
when they had been furnished with muskets from the ships. The
Marquesito repeated his raid in August, but this time stopped
on shore, and put himself at the head of the local insurgents,
who made so strong a head in the country about Pates and
the upper Pisuerga, that Serras marched against him with
almost the whole of his division l , llnd spent September ill
hunting him along the sides of the sierrus. But though aided
by troops lent by Bonne~ and by detnchments from BllI'gos,
the French general could never catch the adroit partisan, who,
when too hard pl'csscd, returned to the ccntralmOlll1tains of the
Asturias.
l)lcased wit.h the exploits of Porlict" the Cadiz Ucgeney
resolved to keep up the game, and sent up to Corunna Colonel
Renovales, the officer who had for so lOllg made head against
Suchet in the mountains of Aragon 2. He was authorized to
requisition a brigade from Mahy's aml)', and the more sea-
worthy ships from the arsenal of Ferrol. Applications for
naval assistance had also been made to the British Admiralty,
and Sir Home Popham came, with four frigates and a battalion
of marines, to assist in a systematic raid along the coasts of
Asturias and Biscay. The joint e..xpedition started from
Corunnll on October 14, with a landing force of 1,200 Spanish
and 800 British bayonets on board. On the 16th it drew in to
I See pp. 270-1. 2 See pp. 1(}-.1I.
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land neaT the important harbour of GijolJ, where Bonnet kept
a force of 700 men, who depended for their succour on the main
body of his division at Oviedo. But the French general
c11ancoo to be hunting PorHer further to the east, and had
left the Asturian capital almost illlgarrisoned. Hence, when
Porlicr unexpectedly appeared berme Gijoll on the inland side,
having eluded bis pursuer, and the ships threw the landing
fOrt:c ashore, the J<~rench battalion had to fly. Several ships,
both primteers and merchantmen, with a considerable amount
of military stores, fell into the hands of Parlier and Renovales.
This exploit drew down on them the whole French force in the
Astlll'ias, for Bollllct concentruted every mall and Illusket on
Gijon. Uut the Anglo-Spanish squadron, having thus drawn
him westward, sailed ill the opposite direction, and, after
threatening Santona, was about to touch at Vivero, when it was
scattered. by a hurricane from the Bay of lliSCt1y. A Spanish
frigate and brig, ilB English brig, and sevcraJ gunboats and tranS-
ports were dashed 011 the rocky coast, and lost with all hands.
This diSllster, which cost 800 lives, compelled Renovales to
return to Corunna (November 2). But the raid had not been
useless; it had compelled Bonnet to evacuate many posts,
distracted the gnrrisolls of Santallder and Biscuy, and evell
induced Cnffarelli to march down to the coast with his newly-
arrived division, the 'Reserve of the Army of Spain.'
Bel'ms, too, hnd drawn up the greater part of his scattered
division to the north-west, thus leaving the borders of Galicia
and the Tras-os-Montes hardly watched. This enabled Mahy
to send down troops into the plain of Lean, and to establish
somcthing like a blockade around Astorgll. But all the
opcrations of the CIlptllin-Gencrnl of Glllicia were feeble and
tcntative. He passed among his countrymen as an easy-going
man, destitute of cnergy or initiative '. Silveira, in the 'l'ras·
os-Montcs, a morc active but a more dangerous man to entrust
with troops, took advantage of Serms's absence to cross the
Douro, invest Almeida, and cut the communication between
that place and Ciudad Rodrigo 2.
Such wus the effect of thc sea-power, cven whcn it was usoo
sparingly and by unskilful hands. The mids along the northern
I Sce for this verdict both Al'teche :md l'orCIlO. 2 See p. 447.
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coast had kept Bonnct and the troops in Santauder ~llld Biscay
fully employed; they had distracted Serras, Caffarelli, ~\lld even
the garrisons of thc province of Bm'gos.. They had SIl\'OO ::\Iahy
and Silveira from attack, and had lighted up a bla7.e of ill-
f;urrectiOll ill the western hills of Cantabria which, thanks
to the energy of Pm'lier and his colleague Louga, was never
extinguished, ~
Meanwhile the mass of French troops between Burgos and
Pampeluna-the 9th Corps, the Young Guard Divisions, and
the garrison in Nayarrc-had been •contained' by an enemy of
a different sort. Here the influence of the British naval SUpl'(!-
lllac)' was little felt: it was due to the energy of Spaniards alone
thnt the 38,000 men unrler Drouet, Roguct lInd ])lllllollstier, find
Reille were/pre\'ented dUI'iug the months of September, October,
Rnd November from doing ilIlything to help Mass6na. Old
Castile, Na\'arre, and thc lands of the Upper Ebro, were kept in
a constant turmoil by It score of guerrillero chiefs, of whom
the elder Mina was the leading figurc. Wc 11Iwe already had
occasion to speak of the exploits of his relative, 'thc Student'
as he was ClI11ed, to distingnish him from his uncle, Rnd hR\'C
noted his final capture by Suchet 1. £'rRncisco Espoy y A.lina
had rallied the relics of his nephew's band, and began his long
career of raids and conntermarches in April 1810. His central
place of refuge was the rough country on the borders of Navllrre
and AragolJ, where he kept his main depot at the head of the
valley of Roncal; but he often ranged as far afield as Biscay
llnd the proviuees of Sorin. amI Burgos. Almost frolll bis first
IIppcal'flnce he oLtnincd n mastery over the other chiefs who
operoted 011 both .~idcs of the Upper Ebro, having WOIl his placc
by the summary process of seizing and shooting one Echeverriu,
•who,' as he writes, • was the terror of the villages of Nayarre,
which he oppressed and plundered in a thousand ways, till they
complained to me concerning him. [arrested him nt Estella Oil
June 13, IBIO,C1lused him to be shot with three of his principal
accomplices, and incorporated his band (600 foot and 200 horse)
with my 011'11 men ~.' Mina was the special enemy of Ueil1c,
, See p. 28(;.
, See i\Jina's &/nw/o de Im Vida, Jluulished in London, during his
cl<ilt·, in 1826
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then COllllllUlIllillg in Nuvarrc, but he also Httmctcd the attcu-
tion of Drouct, one 01' whose didsiolls was entirel)' absorbed in
hunting him during the autumn of 1810, This was the main
cause of the non-appearance of the 9th Corps at llodrigo and
SAlnllll\nca, when l\{assella was so anxiollsly awaiting its arrival.
Minl"S lot dtll'illg this period wus no enviable 01lC: he was beset
on all sides by flyillg columns, and was often fOl"Ced to bid his
band disperse I.l.lld lurk in smal1!)urties in the 1ll0ulltaim;, till the
encmy should III1\"c passed 011. SometimCli he was lurking, with
se\'en companions ollly, in SI, Cl1\"C or a gorge: at another hc
would be found with 3,000 men, attacking large convoys, or e\'en
surprising one of' the blockhouses with which the French tried
to cover his whole sphere of activity. The Regency, admiring
bis perseverance, gave him, in September, the title of' Colonel
and Commandant-General of all the Guerrillel'Os of Navurre.'
He asserts with pride, ill his lllemoil', that he was Ilt one and the
same time being hnntL·d by Dorsenllc, commanding at Burgos,
Heille from NlLvarre, Caflilrrclli alld his' division of Uesel'Ve of
the Army of Spain,' by D'Agoult, Governor of Pampeluna,
Hoguet, commanding the Young Guard, and Paris, one of
Suchct's brigadiers from the Army oC Aragoll, Yet 110ne of the
six generals, though they had 18,000 men marcbiug through
his special distriet, succeeded in catching him, 01' destrIJyillg auy
appreciable frllCtion of his bawl.
There is 110 exaggeration in this; his scn'iL'CS wCre invaluable
during the cllmpaign of Portugal, since he was wearing out It
French force of five times his own strength ill fruitless marches,
under winter rains, and over roads that had become all but
impassable. The archives of tlle French 'Var Office show lists
of officers by the dozen killed or wounded' clans une reconnais-
sance en )\anu'l'C,' or •dUllS une l'enL'Outl'e avec les bandes de
Mina,' or 'en combat prL'S de Pampclulle,' during the later
month!> of 1810. Wellington owed him no small gratitude, and
eX!lressed it to him in 1813, whcn he entrusted him with much
responsible work during the Campaign of the Pyrenees. The
suffering inflicted on the provinces of the Upper Ebro by Mina's
activity was of course terrible: the French destroyed every
,'illage that sheltered him or furnished him with recmits, and
were wont to shoot every prisoner from his band that they
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cuught, till he began to retaliate by corresponding or greater
uumbers of esecutions from the considerable number of prisoners
in his hands. In 181] this barbarous system was in full swing
on both sides, but it was put to an end by mutual agreement in
18]~. In addition to the woes that Navarre and its neighbours
suffered under the French martial law, and by the monstrous
requisitions imposed upon them to feed the mass of troops
forming the flying columns, they had also to maintain the
po.triotic bllmls. Miua declares that hc l.llwo.ys took rations for
his men, but amidecl levying money contributions on the
peasantry, depending on his booty, the rents of national and
ecclesiastical property, on which he laid hands, on fines inflicted
on 'bad Spaniards,' i. e. those who had done anything to help
his pursuers, and on • the custom-houses which I established upon
the very frontier of France; for I laid under contribution even
the French custom·house at hun, on the Didassoa, which engaged
to deliver, and actually paid to my delegates, 100 gold ounces
(about £S20) per month: By this strange secret agreement
private goods pussillg Trun and the other fmulier posts were
gUllmntcccl ugllinst capture in the district which Mina's bands
infestcrl 1.
Eastward of Mina's sphere of activity the guerrilleros were
more numerous but less powerful. Among the chief of them
was Juliall Sanchez, who, with a mounted band of SOO to 500
lancers-infantry would have been easily caught in the plain of
Lean-busied himself in cuttiJlg the communication between
Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo, Zamora, and ValIadolid, and was
KellernuUlIl's chief tormentor, He was in regular cOllllllunica-
tion with 'iVellingtoll, and sent him mallyeaplu!"t'<! dispatches
and useful piL'CCS of information. In Old Castile the priest
Geronimo Merino, generally known as •El Cl1I'a,' was the most
famous and most active among many leaders. It was his band,
aided by that of Tapia, also a cleric, which on July 10, 1810,
fought a most daring and desperate action at Almazan, near
Soria, with two :Prench battalions ofmarines, who were marching,
the one to join Massena the other to join Soult. It cost the
enemy no less than IS officers hors de combat, as the PllriS
I Mina's Breve Extructo, p. 39.
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archives show I, and over ~oo mcn, though thc guerrillcros were
finally beaten olT. ]n October he surprised and captured un
enormous convoy of corn and munitions of war, whose loss put
the }'rench garrison of Burgos in considerable straits for some
weeks. He waged with Dorsenne the same horrible contest of
retaliation in the shooting of prisoners which Mina was at the
same time carrying on with the generals in Navanoc. 'l'here
were many other bands ill Old Castile, those of Abril, Tenderin,
Saornil, Principe, and others, of whom some are accused by their
own colleagues of being mOlOC harmful to the countr)'-side than
to the French, from their reckless and miscellaneous plundering,
and their refusal tu combine for allY systematic action 2. Yet
e\'cn the worst of them contributed to distrnet the IlCti\'ity of
the !,'rellch gal'l'iSolls, and to retard the cOlTIlTIuniCtltion of dis-
patches and the march of isolated detachments. Under the
easy excuse that it was dangerous to move any small body of
men along the high-roads, the French commanders of every
small town or blockhouse detained for weeks, anq even months,
drafts on their wa), to the south or the west, with the result that
the number of recruits received at Madrid, Seville, or Salamanca
never bore an)' proper pl'Oportion to the total that had eroSlied
the Bidnssoa.
~OIthwanl from Old Castile, on the skil-ts of the mountains
of Salltandcr antI Biscay, the dominating personality among the
guerrilleros was Lougn, who afterwards rose to some distinction
as a commander of regular troops. His special task was the
cutting of the communications between Bm'gos and Bilbao, and
Bilbao and Santander; but he often co-operated with Porlier,
when that restless partisan made one of his descents from the
Asturian mountains, either on to the coast locgion or on the
southern skirts of the Cantabrian sierras.
On the whole, there were l)robabl)' never more than ~O,OOO
guel'lilleros in arms ut once, in the whole region between the
Sierm de GuudUrnUlll1 und the shOloc of the Bay of Biscay. They
never succeeded in bcnting any French force more thun two or
I M:rrtinicn's lists SllOW scvcn officcrs hit in the 44th Equipage de
Marino, which joined Massena iu the llext month, and six in the Batailloll
O'Espngne, whicll waS on its way to Cadiz.
1 Sce Arte<:he, ix, 24].
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Ull'l~e battalions strong, und were being coutinuaUy hunted f!'Olll
corner to corner. Yet, despite their weaklles,'l ill the open field,
their intestine quarrels, their frequent oppression of the counhT-
side, and their ferocity, they rcndcl'cd good service to Spain, and
incidentally to Great Britain and to all Enrope, hy pillllillg
down to the soil twice their own numbers of good French troops.
Anyone who has read the dispatches of the commandants of
Napoleon's' militar)' governments,' 01' the diaries of the officers
who sened in lleille's or Dorsenne's or Caffarclli's flying columns,
will recognize a remarkable likeness betweell the situation of
affairs ill Northcm Spaiu dming 1810 and 1811 and th/lt in
South Africa during ]900 and 1901. Lightly moving guerrilla
bands, unhampered by a base to defend or a train to weigh them
dO",Il, Ilnd well scn·ed as to intelligence by the l"Csidents of the
country-side, can paralyse the action of an infinitely lat·ger
number of regular troops.
In the north-east of Spain, where the Ft"CllCh were engaged
not with mere scattered bands of guerrillcros, but with two
regular armies, O'Donnell's Catalans and Caro's Valencians, the
fortune of war took nodecisi,·e turn during the autumn of 1810,
though olle dreadful bIoI\' to the Spallish Cl1usc-thc los!' of
Tortosn-Wlls to fall in the winter which followed.
We left Suchet in August 1810, established in his l1ewl)'-
conquered positions at Lerida and Mequinenzn, master of all the
plaillland of Aragon, as well as of a strip of ·Westem Catalonia,
and only waiting for the co-operation of Macdonald and the
7th Corps to recommence his operations I. That co-operation,
however, was long denied him. The Emperor's last /:,reneral
orders, which had reached Suchet in June, briefly prescribed to
bim that the conquest of the cit), and kingdom of Valencia was
his final object, but that he must first break the Spanish line hy
captUl'ing Tortosa, the great fo)"treAA of the Lower Ebro, UHf1
Tarmgonu, the maiu stronghold of Southern Clllalonill. 2. I.'or
both these lll.ttel· opel1ttiotls he WilS.to count 011 the aid of Mnc-
dOlmld unci the Army of Catalonia 3. Uclying 011 this SUppOl't,
Suchet, after less than a month had elapsed since the capture of
Mequinenza, had pushed his advanced gua.rd down the Ebro,
See pp. 3OO-!:l. 2 COrTe8pQ!ldance under Ma}' 2!J.
~ CorrtspulldtWt'6 um!er Sel't. Hi,
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till it was at the very gates of' 'l'm'tOffi, One detachment even
pnsscd the tOWll, and seized the ferry of Amposta, the only
passage of the Ebro near its mouth, attuall)' cutting the great
road from 'l'al'l"8.0uona to Valencia, and only leaving the bridge
of Tortosa itself Opell, for the linking of the operations of Caro
and O'Donnell, Meanwhile Suchet was preparing his siege-train
tll Mequinelll'J.l, and waiting fOl' a rise ill the Ebro, which would
COllllllClll'e to becomc navigable wi.lh the arrival of the autumn
rains, in order tu ship his guns dO\\'ll-strcam tu theil' destincd
goal. He was at the same time making the land route to TOl'tosa
passable, by l'epairiug the old military road from Caspe to Mora
and 'l'ivisa, which had been constructed during the wan; of the
Spanish Succession, but had long ago fallen into ruin,
Suchet was quite aware that by thrusting a comparatively
small force-he had only brought up U,OOO men-into the near
neighbourhood of Tortosa, he WItS l'isking the danb.-er of being
ntlackL'<lut once by the Army of Valencill from the wuth and
O'Donllcll's CatAlans frolll the nOI,th, But he trusted thtit Mnc-
dOllald and the 7th Corps would keep the latter-the more for-
midableenemy-employed, while he had a well-founded contempt
for the generalship of Caro, who had always proved himself the
most incompetent and timid of commanders. But Macdonald
<lITivoo late, having been forced to spend the wuole summer, as
Ims been alren.dy reluted 1, in his triple rcYictualling of Barcelonu,
and mcunwhile the Va1encian army Cllmc to the front, Its
leadillg division, under Bassecourt, threatened Morclla, Oil
Suehet's Hank, early in AUgllst, hoping to draw him away to
defend this outpost. But a single brigade under Monbnarie
sufticed to turn back the Valencian detachment, and Suchet
kept his positions. O'Donllell meanwhile, vainly hoping for
solid help from Caro, had joined the division of his army which
was kept at Falcet 2, and after threatening Suehet's head
quarters at. Mora on .Tuly 30, so as to distract his attention,
suddenly tUl'lIed aside llnd entered TOl'toSt.l with ~,500 men,
Culliug out all the troops available for ll. sortie, he issued from
the town on August 3, and beat lip the outposts of the division
under Laval, which wa.'l in obsermtion before his gates, But
though the Catalnns fought fiercel)', and drovc ill the Ill'st
'~~311. ~~~31a
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l,'rench line, they were not strong enough to push the enemy
away from Tortosa. O'Donnell should have brought a heavier
fim:e if he intended to accomplish his end. Shortly after he
returned tu Tllrmgona, whither he ww; called by the movements
of Mncdonald.
Some days later than he had covcnanted, Caro came up to
Villaros. on the coast-road from Valencia, and to San Mateo
on the parallel inland road, with his whole army, including the
force which Dassecourt had been commanding. It consisted of
no more than 10,000 ill-organized troops of the Line, who hQd
been joined by nearly as mall)' unregimented peasants in loose
guerrilla bands. The whole l11ass was far from being formidable,
1\5 Sllchct knew. 'Vhercforc the French gCllcral, clltting down
to the smallest possible fignTC the containing troops left before
Tortosa, and at his head quarters at Mora, marched with eleven
battalions and a cavalry regiment-only 6,000 men in all-to
meet the Valencians. He drove their advanced cavalry from
Vinaros, and advanced against their positions at Calig .and
Cervera del Maestre. Cam at once ordered a precipitate
retreat, nnd did not stop till he had placed thirty miles between
himself 1U1d the enemy. His obvious terror lmd dismay llt
the approach of the l'rcnch roused such (mger that he WilS
summoned to give up the commund by his own officers, und
obeyed without hesitation 1. He fled by sea to Majorca.
knowing, it is said, that he would have been torn to pieces
ifhe had shown his face before the populace at Valencia, O\'er
which he had exel"cised a sort of dictatorship for more than
a year. Suchet, unable to catch such an evasive enemy, and
regarding the routed army as a negligible quantity, retumcd
to Mora, where he received the news that the long-expeclt.'(!
i\'fuedonald wus at lllst n.bout to appear (August 20).
The Duke of Tarcntum hud thrown the third and last of his
great cOllvoys into Barcelona on the 18th of August, haviug
brought with him as its escort the French division of his army,
which was now commanded by Frerc 2, and the Italian didsiolls
1 for details see Arteche. ix. 267, Schepeler, iI'. 659-00, aud Suchct's
MbllQir/l8. vol. i. p. 193. The dictator's own brother. Geuer,d Juan Quo,
was one of tbose who deposed him.
I Vice Souharn. wounded at Vieh, and Angercau recalled.
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of Scvcl"Oli and Pignatelli. He had left behind him General
Bnl'nguay d'HilIien;, in the position which Rcille hlld been
wont to hold, as the defender of the Ampnrdam and 1\orthern
Catalonia as far as Hostalrich. Eighteen thousand men were
told off for this task, including all the German brigades; but
after garrisoning Gerona, Rosas, Figueras, and Hostnlrich,
d'Hilliers hnd no great field-force left, and fonnd full employ-
ment ill wanling oil' the raids of Manso, Rovirn, Ilnd the other
miqucletc lenders upon the communication between Gerona and
Perpignan. Nenrly 10,000 men had also been left in Barcelona,
including many sick, and the three divisions with which Mac-
donald marched to join Suchet did not exceed 16,000 sabres
11.]](1 bayonets, though the whole force of the 7th Corps was
rcckmH.'(l at over 50,000 num.
On August 13 Maooonald forced the Pass of Ordlll, after
some skirmishing with the somatenes, and entered the plain
of Tal'rngona. It WllS the news of his approach to the Catalan
capital which brought O'Donnell back in haste from '1'ortos11..
He concentrated the greater pnrt of his troops, on the hypo-
thesis that the 7th Corps might be intending to lay siege to the
place. He brought down Campoverde'sdivisioll from lhc 1I0l·th lo
join those of Ibnrrola., Sarsfield, and the BllrOn de El'l,)les, which
were already 011 the spot. It soon became known, however,
lo the Spaniards that Mnedonald cOllld not be bent on siege
operations, for he was bringing with him neither the heavy
artillery nor the enormous trnin of provisions that would be
required in such a case. He marched past Reus and Valls to
MombltUlch, skirmishing all the way with O'DOllnell's detach-
ments, and thence to Lerida, which he reached 011 August ~9.
There he found Suchet awaiting him for a conference. The
orders from Paris, on which both wcre acting, seemed to
prescribe that Tortosa alld Tarragona should both be attacked 1.
Dut the General and the Marshal agreed tha~ their joint
strength was not more than enough for OIlC siege at a time.
They ngrccd that the 3rd Corps should llmlertuke the leuguer
of Tortoi';H, Ilnd ' the containing' of the Vtlicneian army, while
the 7th should cover these operations by keeping O'DonnelI and
1 See Suchet'll Mblloirt8, i. HlG-7, and the 'dispatch from Napoleon's
Cormpolldam:tl of July 25, 1810.
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lhc Clllulans fhllyemployed. Suchct therefore drew his detach-
ments southward from Lcrida and the plains of the Scgre,
handing over all that had to Macdonald. .From this fertile
region alone could the :Marshat have fed his corps, Cclltrnl
Catalonia being barren, and so overrun by O'Donnell's detach-
ments that it was impossible to forage freely within its bounds.
Sllchet undertook to provide for his own corps during the
siege of TOl'tosa by bringing up stores from Saragossa and the
valley of the Ebro, Vill Meqllinclll'..n. Macdollald lent llilll,
meanwhile, the weakest of his tlll"ec divisions, 2,500 Neapo-
litans under Pigllatelli, who were to escort the siege-train for
Tortosa along the Ebro, when the autumn rains made the river
navigable from i\fequinen7.a to the sea.
While Suchet was moving southward and making ready for
the siege, the Duke of Tarentum established himself with hend
quarters at Cen'era on the Barcelona-Lerida road, and brigades
at Lerida, Agramunt, and Tarrega, all in the plain; he wus
ready to fall upon O'Dollllell's flank if the Caialans should
make any altempt to succour TOrtoSll, by marching fmm
Tal'l'figona along the roads parttllel to the sea coa."t. 'Mean-
while he Imd completely lost tOllch both with the !,'nrrison
of Barcelona and with Baraguay d'HiIliers in the Ampurdam.
This was the regular slate of' things during the Catalan war;
for if the French left detachments to guard a line of communi·
cation, they were invariably cut off by the enemy; while, if
they did not, the roads were blocked and no information crIme
through. So vigorous were the somtltelles at this moment, that
small parties moving from Tarrega to Cenera,-places only
twelve miles apart, and in the middle of the cantonments of
the 7th Corps,-were not unfrequently waylaid and destroyed.
i\facdonald, despite his well-known humanity, wus fon:ed to
burn villages, and shoot roodsicle assassins caught re<l-handed.
He lay in the position wllich he had taken up all September
4-6 for the greater part of that month and the sut:ceeding
October, concentrating at intervals a part of his forces for all
expedition into the hills, when the Catalans pl'CSSed him too
closely. At the commencement of his sojourn in the plains, he
sent Sevemli with an Italian brigade to collect provisions in the
valley of the ="'oguera Palleresa. This raid led to dreadful
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ravaging of the country.side, but Sevcroli returned with no
spoil and many wounded. He had pushed his advance as far
as Tatanl, skirmishing the whole way, and driving the soma-
tene.s before him, but could accomplish nothing save the burning
of poor villages evacuated by their inhabitants. A week later
other expeditious scoured the mountain sides eastward, with
little more ~ucecss 1,
:MCUllWhi1c, though Macdonald imagined that he W!lS not only
protecting Suchet's northern flank, but also attracting the
attention of O'Donnell to himself, the enterprising Spanish
general had contrived an unwelcome surprise for him. He
knew that he was not strong enough to fight the 7th Corps
in the open field, nor even to face Suchet by making another
attempt to relieve Tortosa-which place, for the moment, was
in no immediate danger. He therefore resolved to draw
Macdonllld from his present position, by a blow at the corncl'
of Catalonia wherc thc :French wcre weakest.
The Marshal considered that Baraguay d' Hilliers was per-
fectly safe in the northern region which he garrisoned, since 110
regular Spanish force was now in arms in that direction.
O'Dollnell resolved to lIudeceive him. Leaving the two divisions
of Obispo and El'oles to block the road from Macdonald's post
at Cervera to Darcelona, with orders to retire into Tarragona
if hard pressed, he ordered a third division, that of Campo-
Ycn1c, tu prepare fur n forct.'t1 march to the north. At the
Sllme time a force, consisting of the Dritish frih'tlte Cambrian
IUld the Spanish frigate Diana, convoying a few transports
with 500 men on board for disembarkation, sailed from Tarra-
gona, for a destination which was kept secret to the last
moment. 'l'he troops were under Doyle, the British com-
missioner in Catalonia; Captain Fane of the Cambrian was
senior naval officer.
O'Donnell's march was perilous: he had to pass close to the
front of the garrisons of Darcelona, Hostalrich, and Gerona,
through a most difficult and mountainous country, withont
giving any signs of his presence; for, if his movement were
discovered, Daraguay d'Hilliers might concentrate his scattered
brigades, and crnsh him by force of numbers. The march, how-
l For tlelails see \'acalli, iv. PI), 307-8.
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ever, was c1ll'l'ied out. with complete success, und Oil September 13
O'Donnell lay with 6,000 infalltry und 400 horse at Vidrel1l.s,
south of Gcrontl, while the llll\'ftl forc..'C was h(J\'cling 06'
Pll.Jamos, the IlCIll"Cst point on the coast. The rough region
between Gcrona and the sell. was at this moment occllpied b.y
half Uouyer'~ division of troops of the Confederation of the
Uhinc, under Schwartz-the ever-unlucky general whose name
was cOImected with the disasters of Bruch I and Manresa 2. He
had with him four weak battalions of the 5th (Allhalt-Lippe)
and 6th (Schwartzburg-Waldeck-Ueuss) regiments, and a
squadron of cuirassiers: a force which, owing to the sicklincss
of the nutumll season, did not amount to much 1U00'C than
],500 men in all. But he was so close to Gerona 3, where
lay Uouyer's other two regiments, and some }'rench tl'OOPS,
that he was not considered in aoy danger by his superiors,
Schwartz's main duty was to prevent any communication
between the somatenes of the inland and the cruisers which were
always passing up and down the coast. Provoked by a recent
raid at Dagul', on September ]0, where an English landing-
party had stormed one of his coast batteries, and captured
the gnrrison of 50 IllCll, Schwll.rtz had just strengthened uU
his post" along the shore. He had only 100 men at his hend
quarters at La Bis!)al; the rest were dispersed between Ragur,
San FeHu, llalamos, and the connecting post at Ctllonje, On
the mOl'llillg of the fourteenth he was stricken with horror
when his outposts informed him that they had been driven in by
Spanish infantry and. cavalry in overwhelming force. He sent
orders, too late, for his troops on the coast to concentrate, and
prepared to fall back 011 Geron3. with his whole force. But his
messenger had hardly gone when he was attacked by O'DonneU,
who drove him into the indefensible castle of La llispal, which
was conullalldcd by It Ileighbouring llill and the church tower
(If the villllge. After losillg: some men shot down from thcfie
points of vantage, Schwartz sllI't'endcrcd at nightfall, when the
Spaniards were preparing to storm his refuge. His defence
canllot ha\'e been very desperate, as he had lost only one officer
and fOUl' men killed, and thl'Ce officers and sixteen men wounded.
I See \'(11. i. p. 311. 7 See U,is vu]. I'. 295.
• Ouly ubuut eighteen mile.. dbrtaut.
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Hut Lhi8 W/18 only part of the diSllStcr which befell the German
brigade tlmt dt~y: by a. careful timing of the tlttl.lcks Doyle and
Fane stormed Palamas with the landiug.fon:c ut the S{lmc
moment that La Hispal was being attacked, while Colonel
l"leil'cs, with a detachment of 0'DOllnell's land troops, surprised
Sail Feliu, and Colonel Aldea with another cut ofl'the companies
at Calonjc. In all the Spaniards captured on that day onc
general, two colonels, fifty-six officers, alld 1,183 rank and file,
with seventeen guns. Schwal'tz's brigade was absolutely
destroyed; only a few stragglers rcachetl Gel'onn, ("Dill which
no help had bccn sent, because O'DOllllell had turned loose
all the somulencs of the region to demonstrate against the
place I.
Without waiting for Uouyer and Baraguay d'Hilliel's to
assemble their forces, O'Donnell departed from the scenc of
his exploits without delay. He himself. having received a
severe wound in the foot, embarked with the prisoners on
IXl/m:l I·'une'!; ships llnd relllmed to Tarmgonn. Cllmpoverde,
with the 1u1l(1-forc~ retil'Cd hastily pust Gcrona to the moulI-
tains of the north, retook Puyccrda, bcat up the outposts of the
Frcnch garrison of Montlouis 011 the frontier of Cerdagne, and
raised some contributions 011 the other side of the Pyrenees.
From thence he descended the Segre, and established himself
at Cardona and Calaf, fa.cing Macdonald's northern flank.
So thoroughly had the main body of the 7th Corps lost touch
with the troops left behind at Gerona and in the Ampurdam,
that t.he news of the disaster of La Bispal ollly reached
l\[acdollllld, via Frallec and Sunlgossa, 1I\0l'e than a fortnight
after it had happened. It alarmed him for the sufety of the
north, but did not suffice to draw him away from Suchet, Its
O'Donllcll had hoped. The ncws that the Spanish raiding
division had disappeared from the neighbourhood of Gerona
cncouraged him to remain in his present position, which a.lone
made the siege ot' Tortosa possible. Presentl)· he was informed
that a cOllsidcmble force had appeared in his own sphere of'
operations-this being the same di\'ision of CampOverde which
had done all the mischief in the north. He therefore marched
1 '111C hest narrative of Sdnvartll'S disaster mar be found ill the diary of
the Lippe-BUckcburg officer Barklmusell, onc of the (lrisollers, Pfl. 110-15.
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on Oelobe!' 18, with two French and two Italian brigade~, lo
attack this new enemy_ OD the next du)' he occupied SoISOllll.,
where the Junta of Upper Catalonia Jmd hitherto been sitting.
The place was found deserted by its inhabitants, and was
plundered; its great cathedral was burnt-:-either by accident
or design. On the twenty-first, however, when the Marshal
came in front of Cardooa, he found the town, the inaccessible
castle above it, and the neighbouring heights, maDned by Campo-
verde's di vision, strengthened by several thousand somatcllcs
of the district. The Italian general Eugenio marched straight
at the position, with Sulme's Fl"ench bl'igade in support,
despising his enemy. flnd 110t waiting for the Commander-in.
Chief and the resenes. He met with (\. sharp repulse, for the
Spaniards charged his colllln~s just as they drew near the crest,
and hurled them down with loss. Macdonald refused to throw
in all his troops. and contented himself with bringing off the
routed brigade. He then returned to Solsona and Cer\'era,
much harassed in his retreat by the somatenes. It is curious
that he did not press the combat further, us he had a larb'C
superiority of numbers over the Catalan di\'ision, and had not
lost mueh more than 100 men in the first clash I. But the
position was formidable, and the Marshal more than once in
this campaign showed himself a\'erse to taking risks. Perhaps.
also, he may have already made up his mind to return to the
east and abandon Suchet, since it was at about this time that
more disquieting information from Daragu8.Y d'Hilliers reached
him by way of Fnmce.
This new budget of troubles contained two main items. The
first was that the August supplic.~ thrown into Barcelona were
nearly exhausted, and that the town urgently reqtlircd re\'ictual~
ling. The second was that it was impossible to send on the
necessary convoys, because of the extreme activity of the soma·
tenes, and the inadequate number of troops left in Northern
Catalonia. One considerable train of waggons had been cap-
tured and destroyed near La Junquera. on the "ery frontier of
France, by the Baron de Eroles, who had now taken up the
1 )Jartinien's invaluable lists show only tllTee Italian and one French
officer hurt, Wllich agrees well enough with VaC3ni's estimate of 80 to 100
hOrJ de ct1mlJat.
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colllmand of the northern insurgents. Another Wlls standing
fast ut Gerona for want of sufficient escort, a. third had been
collected at Perpignan, but dared not start. So pressing Wlls
the need for the relief of Barcelona, that Macdonald made
up his mind that he must break up from his present cantonments
-even at the risk of making the siege of Tortosa impossible-
amI ttllllsfer himself to the north-east.
Accordingly, on November 4, he commenced fI. toilsome march
by way of Calar, Manresa, and Hostalrich to Gerona, where he
arrived in safety on the 10th. Campoverde followed him, for
SOllle way, by parallel paths along the mountains, but never
dared to strike, the strength of the 7th Corps when it marched in
n Illass being too great for him. It is probable tllat the l\Iarshal
would huve had more trouble if O'DonnelI had been in the field,
hut that enterprising gencrnl was not yet healed of the wound
which he had received at La Bbl)aJ. It had gangrened, and he
had been sent to Majorca by his physicians, who declared that
a complete cessation from military work was the only chance
of saving his life. The interim command was turned over in
November to the senior Lieutenant-General in CataloniJi.,
;\Iigucl Iranzo, R very poor substitute for the hard-fighting
Spanish-Irish !,fCneral.
i'lfacdonald, bal'ing joined BaragulLY d'Hilliers, hflll now an
imposing muss of troops under his hand. Moreover, he got
back the services of his old divisional generals Sonharn and
Pino, who arrived from sick leave, and took over charge of the
di\'isions lately in the cbarge of Frere and Severoli. A great
draft from France and Italy had rejoined ill their company.
The l\larshal was therefore able to collect the fractions of the
great COll\'oy destined for Barcelona, and to conduct it to that
tity after a slow llnd Cllutioll!s rnllrch on November 25. He
then clmnged the battalions in the garrison of BarccIOIlIl, IV here
he Icft both Pino and Souham, sent back to the Ampurdam
the troops he had borrowed from Baraguay d'HiIliers, as escort
fOk" the returning convoy, and marched for the second time
to join Suchet; moving by way of Momblanch, he got once
more into touch with the Army of Aragon at Falcet, near
Mom, on December 12.
Thus the campUlgn came back, at midwinter, to the same
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aspect that it had shown in the first days of September. It has
been the wonl of military critics to t.hrow the blame for the
lost three months on Mncdonnld l. Dut this seems unfair: it is
true that he was absent from the post which he had promised
to hold, for the protection of Suchet's rear, from November 4
to December 13. Hut why had so little been done to fOfll'ard
the siege of Tortosa dm·ing the time from September 4 to
NO\'cmber 4-two whole months-while the Marshal was ill
the covcnuntcd position, and acl.uully carryillg ont his promise
to contain the Cntahms, and leave Suchct'!;l Illlllds free for the
actual prosecution of the projected siege? The commander
of the Army of Aragoll had been given two of the best
campaigning months of the )'ear-September and October-
and had no encmy about him SEL\'C the ever-unlucky Valencian
army, the IOCllI somatenes of the Lower Ebro, and thc scaltcrul
bamls of ViIlucampa ill tllC Ilills of Upper AragclIl. It WIIS nnly
sixty miles from his husc at l\fcquinenza, where his siege-train
had been collected months before, to the walls of 'l'ortoSfl,
ilnd he had b,'ought up his field army before that place as
early as August. No doubt the country between Mequil1enuL
and Tortosa is rough, and its roads cxecrable, while wuter-
transport along the Ebro was rendered more difficult than usual
by a rather dry 3utmnn, which kept the river low. Dut twenty-
six heavy siege-guns were got clown to Xerla, only Lell miles
from 'l'ortosu, us cllrly tlS SepLember 5, (lurillg 11 lucky flood,
while l.L considerable numbcr more were pushed to the front
during the SELme month, by the land route, formed by Suchet's
new military road from Caspe to Mora. It seems, therefore,
that Suchet's inactivity in September and October can be
explained neither by laying blame 011 l\I8£donald, nor h)'
exaggerating the difficulties of transport. If, us he wrole
himself, 'Noll'e corps <1'armee se lrouvait enchalllc sur le bru;
Ehrc, SllW; pouvnil' agir, cl SOli chef n'avail d'espoil' que clans
l1l1e Cl'lIe d'can eL clans le secours des cirCOIlSlll.I1C~2,' he was
himself responsible for his failurc, either fmm o\'er-caution or
because he hacl undcrtaken it task beyond his means. The real
cause of his two months' delay was the vigorous action of the
1 See especiall}' Nal>ier, iii, mo.
2 SUr.llct, MtIllQh'eI;J i. 205,
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enemy. There was no dan::.rer from the disorganized Valencian
1.II'1ll)', which only made a feeble attempt on ~oveJllber !26-~7
to beat np the small force llm]el' Gelleml Musnier, which lay at
Uldcconn. to cover the blockade of TortOSll from the south;
the attack, led by llassecourt, was drh'en ofi-' with case, Thc
real opponents of Suchet were the irregular forces of the
CatalallS, and the A.ragonese insurgents in his rem', The former,
though fell' in numbers, since .Macdonald was attracting their
main attention, att..'lcked every convoy that tried to float down
the gorge of the Ebl'O, and :;Ollletillles with Sllccess, Oil the
15th of September they captnrcd n. whole battlllion of Pigna-
telli's ~eapolitans, which was acting as guard to some boats,
On other occasions they took or destroyed smaller or greater
portions ot' flotillas carrying gUllS or stores to Xerta, where the
siege park was being collected, But Villacampa's Arngonese
gave even greater trouble; fmlll his lail' in the Sierra de
Albaracin that cnterpl'ising partisan lllRde countless descents
UpOll Suchet's rear, Il.nll so molested the garriwns or Upper
Aragon, that the I-'rench general had. repeatedly to send btu;k
troops from his main body to clear the roods behind him,
Yillacampa was beaten whenever he tried to fight large bodies,
even though he was aided by a General Carbajal, whom the
Urgency had sent from Cadiz with money and arms, to stir
up a. general revolt in the 'l'erllel~Montalban region. The
Polish Geneml Chlopiski, detached in haste from the blockade
of'l'Ol'tosa, bmke the forces of CllrbajallllJ(l \'illacampa in two
successive engllgements at Ah·entoso, 011 the bonlers of Valencia
(October 31), lind Fnensnuta, near TCl'lIel (NovemtlCl' 11). The
insurrection died down, Vi1Iacampa retired into his mountains,
and Chlopiski returned to the main army. But only a few
days later Suchet had to cope with a new danger: l\Iacdonald
having taken himself oft' to Gerona, the C'lt.'llans were at last
able to detach regular troops to reinforce the somatenes of the
Lower Ebro. A brigade under General Gm·cia Nal'arro came
up to Falcet, opposite Mora, and fOl'med the nUclell\i of a
raiding force, which beset the whole left bank of the Ebro,
llml made its Ilavigotion l\lmost impossible. Suchct had to
detach against it sel'cn bllttn.lions unuel' Abbe 1l11£1 Habcrt.,
who attacked Navarro's entrcnchetl camp at Flllcct 011
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November 1~, and stormed it. The Spanish general, who
showed distinguished personal courage, and charged \'aliantly
at the head of his reserves, was taken prisoner with some
300 men. The somatenes fled to the hills again, alld the
regulars retired to Reus, near Tarragonn, where they were out
of Suchct's sphere of opcl1ltions. It wns just nfl:er this combl1.t
that the unfortunate Army of Valencia. Illade the useless diver-
sion of whieh we havc already spoken t. It, at least, kept
Suchet busy for a few days. By the time that it was over,
the greater part of the remaining siege-material was ready at
Xerta, the water-carriage down the Ebro having become easy
since Garcia Na.\'an·o's defeat. When, therefore, MacdOllald's
arrival at Momblan~h was reported at Suchet's head quarters,
Rnd an adequate covering-force was once more placed between
him and the Cnt.alan army in the direction of Tarl'llgonn, the
nctul1l1eaguer of TortoSfi could ut length begin. It lnstcd, short
though it was, till the New Year of 1811 had come, and must,
therefore, be described not here bnt in the fourth \·olume of this
work.
Thus six months had elapsed between the fall of Lerida and
the commencement of the next stage of the French advance in
Eastern Spain. If it is asked why the delay was so long, the
answer is easy: it was due not, as some have maintained, to
Suchet's slowness or lo Macdonuld's caution, hut solely to the
splendid activity displayed by Henry O'DonlleU, ll. generlll often
bcnten but never dismayed, and to the tellllcity of the ClltalallS,
who never ga\'c up hope, and were still to hold thcir 0'1'11, after
a hundred disasters, till the tide of success ill the Peninsula at
last turned. back in 1812-]3.
1 See previous P''8"c.
SECTION XXII: CHAPTER 1I
KING JOSEPH AND THE CORTES
1'1' only remains that we should deal shortly with the higher
politics of Spain during the last months of 1810-the troubles
01' King Joseph, and the complications caused by the meeting
of the Cortes at Cndiz.
Of the growing friction between the King nml the cOllmmndcrs
of the • military gmcrmnents' created by the Emperor in
February, we have already spoken 1, Joseph did well to be
angry when hi!! dispatches to Saragossa or Barcelona were
deliberately disregarded by his brother's special orders. But
things became worse, when he was not merely ignored, but
openly contemned. A few examples may suffice. In the
early summer a brigade sent out by Marshal Ney raided the
prO"ince of Avila, which was not included in any of the
military gOl'ernments, raised requisitions there, and-what was
~lill more ill8ulting-seiiled and cm'ried off the treasure in the
offices of thc civil intelldant-gclIcrnl of thc provinec 2, Joscph
wrote to Paris that' the Emperor cannot be desirous that his
own brother-however unworthy-should be openly humiliated
and insulted; that be asked for justice, and abstained from any
further comment' ;1. l\apoleon replied by placing A,'ila in the
block of provinces allotted to the Army of Portugal, and with-
drew it for the time from the King's authority. It was SOOIl
after that he created Kellermann's new' military government'
of Valladolid, thus taking another region from under the direct
authority of Joseph. Some months later Kellel'mann asserted
the complete independence of his viceroyalty, by causing the
I Scc pp, 201-2 and 310. i See p. 242.
~ Joscph to Napolcon, Ducasse's CQrrt8]Jfmdtl1lce du RIIi J(NJeph, "iL
2i8-9. The ElIII~ror gave Avila back to the KinK in Septembel', see
NaIl. OQrI-e8pondullce, xxi. 126.
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jtldges of the high-court of Old Castille, which sat at VaIladolid,
to take it new oath of allegiance to the Emperor of the French,
as if they had ceased to be subjects of the kingdom of Spain I.
Soult, too, continued, ns has been shown before, to cut oft'
all revenues which the King might have received from Anda-
lusia, and Joseph's financial position became even worse than
it had been in 1809 2,
The sumlllary of his complaints, containing it declaration
that he wished to surrender hili crown to the Empel'Ol', was
drawn lip as the autulllll dl'c\\' nenr ; it deserves It record; it is
absolutely TellSOllable, and eonfines itself to hard facts. •Since
Your Majesty withdraws Andalusia from my sphere ofcommand,
and orders that the revenues of that province should be
demted exclusively to military expenses, I have no choice left
but to throw up the game. In the actnal state of affairs ill
Spain the general who commancls each province is t\ king
therein. The wholc rc\'cnues of the province will ne\'er suffice
to keep him; for wlutt he clllls his" absolute IlCccssitics" have
nevC!' been forlllaIly stated, and lIS the revenues risc he augmenb
his" necessities." Hence it results that any province under
the command of a general is useless for my budget. From
Andalusia alone I hoped to get a certain surplus, after aU
milital'y expenses had been paid. But its command is given
over to a general who would never recognir.e my ~uthority ; and
with the commtmd, he gets the administrative ancl govemmental
rights. Thus I have been stripped of the only region which
could have given me a sufficient maintenance. I am l"L'tlucL'<1 to
Madrid [i.e. New Castile1 which yields 800,000 francs per
mensem, while the indispensable expenses of the central govern-
ment alllount to 4,000,000 francs per mensem. I have around
me the wrecks of what was once a great national administration,
with a guard, the depots and hospital of the army. a garrison,
a royal household, a ministry, a council of state, and the
refugees from the rebel provinces. Tbis state of affairs could
llot endure for two months longer, even if my honom, and the
consciousness of what is due to me, would allow me to l"ClllUill
I Sce Miot de Melito's Diary, Sept. 8, 1810.
~ Joseph to Napoleon, AUK, 23, 1810. Uucussc, vii. 321, and ilJitl.,
I', 332 or Sept. 12.
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in this humiliating position. Since the Arm)' of Andalusia has
been taken from me, what am I? 'l.'he manager of the hospitals
and magazines of Madrid, th~ head jailer of the centra! depot of .
prisoners!' .Toseph then swtes his conditions. If he is nl1oll'OO
(1) to ha\'e a real control over the whole army.; (2) to send
1mck to France officers, of whatever rank, notoriously guilty
of maladministration; (3) to reassure his Spanish partisans as
to rumours current concerning his own forced abdication and
the dismemberment of the monarchy; (4) to issue what procla-
mations he pleases to his subjects, without being placed under
a sort of censOl"Ship, he will retain his crown, and pledge him-
self lo l"lXhu.:c all Spaill, and' make the eauntry as profitable to
the interests of Fmllce as it is LlO\'( detrimental.' If not, he
must consider the question of retiring across the Pyrenees and
surrendering his crown I.
Napoleon could not give allY such promises, and for good
reasons: he rightly distrusted his brother's military ability,
and knew tllat-whate\"er was the title given to Joseph-men
like Soult or MllSsena would disregard his orders. Apparently
he considered that a conflict of iUlthoritie; in Spnin, such as had
been existing for the lnst six months, was at lcnst better than
the concentration of power in the hands of one indifferent
commander-in-chief'. It is doubtful whether he did not err
in his conclusion. Almost anything was better than the
existing anarchy, tempered by orders, six weeks late, from
Paris. Dut a second, and a more fatal, objection to grnnting
Joseph's conditions was that the' rumours current concerning ,the
dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy' were absolutely true.
~apoleon WllS at thill momcllt at the very height of his wild
crnze fOl' adding alien (U]d heterogeneous provinecs to the
French Empire, in the supposed interest of the Continental
System. It was in 1810 that he declared Holland and the
Valnis, Hamburg and Bremcn, Oldcnburg and Dalmatia,
integral parts of his dominions. And Northern Spain was
destilled to suffer the same fate. :Mina and Rovira, Eroles and
Manso, were to wake some Blaming to filld themselves French
subjects! On October 12 the Emperor wrote to Berthier:
'You will inform General Ca/farclli, in strict confidcnce, that
1 Joseplt to Napoleon, Aug. U, Dll<:asse, vii. 307.
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my intention is that Biscay shall be united to France. He
must not speak of this intention, but he must act with full
. knowledge of it. Make the same pl'i\'ll.te communication to
General Reillc l100ut Navarrc l.' Arngon, 01' III lellst the
portion of it Jlorth of the Ebro, and Catalonia were to suffer
the same fate. Already justice was administered there in the
Ilame of the Emperor, not in that of the King of Spain) and
a coinage was being struck at llarcelona which no longer hore
the name of 'Joseph Napoleon Killg of Spain and the Indies 2,'
The line of argument which Napoleon adopted with regard
to this proposed Illl1lexII,tioll is very curious, His dirL'Ctions to
his l"oreign Minister, Champagny, run as follows a: 'Herewith
I sClld you back the Spanish documents with six observations,
which are to serve as the base for negotiation. But it is
important that )'OU should broach the matter gently, You
must first state clearly what are my opinions Oil the Convention
of Dayollne [viz. that the Emperor regards his guarantee of the
integrity of Spain as out of date and cancelled]. Then speak
of Portugal" and na.... t of the CJ\pel1se that this country [Spain]
costs me. Then let the Spunish envoys have time to reflcet,
and only after an interval of somc dEt),g tcll thcm thllt [ must
ha\'e thc left bank of the Ebro, as an indemnity for the money
and all else that Spain has cost me down to this hour, I think
that, as in all negotiations, we must not show ourselves too
much in a hurry,' The mention of Portugal means that the
Emperor contemplated makillg his brother a present of the
Lusitanian realm, where Spain was hated only one degree less
than Fran(:e, as a compensation for Catalonia Imrl the rest. On
the Sllme morning that Mina found himself" Frenchman, all
I OQrrupolldum:e, xxi. p. 213.
:I For a 6peeimen, 500 the plate of coins iu \'01. ii, facing 11. HR
3 Napoleon to Cluunllagll)', Scpt. 9, IBIO.
I I cannot find anywhere allY IInthority for Napicr'l; strauge statement
(iii. p. 2(1) that it was Almenllra, ami not Napoleon, who started the idea
tlmt Portugal should be exchanged for t1\e .Ehro Province. The llearest
thing to it is tlmt ' ill. d'AlmenllTl\ declare formellement qu'ilue conscntc
aaucune cession de tcrritoire espagnol, que cette compensation [I'ortllgaI]
ne soit pas stipulee et garantie; mais comme il est dalls l'intention formelle
du roi de ne pas consentir a aucun demembremcnt, meme ave<: IIUC
compeusation plus avantag"ellse, HIl'allrait jamais ratilie Ull pareH trait.e.'
Ducasse, Corre8pondlHlCiJ, di. 100.
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the 01'dellall~a of the Beira hills were to discover that they
were Castilians! Mad disregard of national feeling could go no
further.
A letter to the French ambassador tlt Matlrid explained tlt
much greater length thc Emperor's reasons fo!' breaking the
oath that he had sworn to his brother at Bayonue, whcll he
!lamed him King of Spain. "When the promise was made, His
Majesty had supposed that he had rallied to his cause the
majority of the Spanish nation. This has prov,ed not to be
the case = the whole ~ple took arms, the new king had to fly
from 'Madrid, and was only restored by F'rench bayonets.
Sincc then he has hardly rallied a recruit to his cause; it is
not the King's own levies that have fought the rebels: it is the
400,000 French sent across the Pyrenees who have conquered
evel')' province. Therefore all these regions belong not to the
King, but to the Emperor, by plain right of conquest. He
intends, for this reason, to rcgunl the Trcnty of Bayolllle as
null; it has never been ratified by the Spanish nation. One
only chance remains to the King: let him prevail upon the
ncwly-assembled Cortes at Cadiz to acknowledge him as their
sovereign, and to break with England. If that cun be done,
the Emperor may revert to his first intentions, and ratify the
Treaty of Dayollnc, except that he must insist on a "rectification
offrontiers snfficient to give him certain indispensabl~ positions'"
-presumably San Sebastillll, Pampelulln, Figuems, Rosas, &c.1
Thc mcrc first rumour of his broth~r's il1t~ntions. tmnsmitted
by Almenara and the Duke of Santa-Fc, his ambassadors
ordinary and extraordinary at Paris, drove Joseph to despair.
'The Spanish nation,' he wrote 2, 'is morc compact in its opinions,
its prcjudices, its national ~gotism, than any other ~ple of
Europe. There are no Catholics and Protestants here, no new
and old Spaniards; and they will all suffer themseh'cs to be
hewn in pieces rather than allow the realm to be dismembered.
Wllat would the iuhabitants of the l:ounties round London say
if they were menaced with being declared no longer El1glisll ?
What would Provenlfals or Languedocians say if they were told
I Napoleon to LUorest, amUassador at :\ladrid, Nov. 7.
I Jose}lh to the Queen of Spaill, Oct. 12. Ducasse, OQrrctponJallce,
\·ii. 355.
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that they were to cease to be l,'rcnchmcn? My only chalK'e
here is to be authorized to announce that the promise that
Spain should not be dismembered will be kept. If that is
granted, and the generals who have misbehaved are recalled to
France, all may be repaired. If not. the only honourable course
for me is to retire into private life, as my conscience bids me,
and hOllour demands.' On November 18, alter having rL'CCivcd
more formal 11CWS of the Emperor's intentions from his envoys.
Joscph declared that the die was cast: he lVould return to his
castle of .Mortefontaine, or to any other provincial abode in
:France that he could afl:ord to purchase, as soon as his brother's
resolve was made public.
Yet the crisis never came to a head. The annexation of the
Ebro produces was never published, though private assumllces
of their impending fate were laid before the Spanish ministers
and the King. 'Vhat caused the Emperor to hesitate, when all
WIlS prepared? The al1SWCl' may be found ill llis disputch to
Laforcst on 1\ovembcr 7: 'I need hardly \I'm'l )'011,' he writes,
'that these insinuations (the ultimatum to the King) arc to be
made only on condition that the F1'Cllch army has entered
Lisbon, and that the English have taken to their ships.' And
again, 'The Emperor is acting in sincerit),: if in reality the
capture of Lisbon, and an offer from the cabinet of Madrid,
might possibly decide the rebels to treat, His Majesty might
consent, &c" &c.' It was tbe Lines of Toues Vedras which
saved King Joseph from alxlieation and Spain from dismembel'-
ment. The evacuation of Portugal by Wellingtoll was the
indispensable prclimilHll'y to the cal'ryillg out of the great
annexation scheme: its completion was deferred till the ominolls
silence of Masseua should be ended by a triumphant dispatch
proclaiming the capture of Lisbon, Since that dispatch never
came, Napoleon kept postponing his ultimatum. Then followed
the news, delivered at Paris by }i'oy on November 21, showing
that Massena had been brought to a standstill. Even then the
Emperor's plan was kept back, not abandoned. It was not till
the Arm)' of Portugal had recoiled in despair and disarray to
the banks of the Coa that Napoleon abandoned his cherished
scheme, and conseuted to treat with his brother on reasonable
terlllS. Dut Joseph's visit to Paris in the spring of 1811 and
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il~ cOHsequellccs belong to another chapter of this history.
It must suffice hcrc to point out that he spent all the winter of
1810-11 in it state of mental anguish, expecting every day to be
forced to publish his abdication 1, and, meanwhile, living a life
of shifts and worries~selling his last silver plate to feed his
courtiers 2, and exchanging un endless correspondence of remon·
strances and insinuations with Soult und the commanders of
the 'military governments' of the North 3, Even from the
military point of view he did not consider himself safe; the
Empecinado and other guerrillero chiefs carried their incursions
up to the "ery gates of Madrid; and La Mancha, from which,
by the Emperor's orders, much cavalry had been withdrawn
fOl,the benefit of Soult 4, WlIS frequently raided by delaehlllel\L~
from make's Army of Mureia. 'A ChllqllC instant du jour et de
la lluit,' wrote the unhappy sovereign, 'je suis expose 11 monter
;\ cheval pour defcndre mu vie contrc ies bandes exasperees
des insurges, qui entourellt Madrid; cette ville est aux avant-
postes ~,'
Meanwhile, the other govemment which claimed lo be the
legal representative of Spttnish Hutionality was even more tl'ul)'
'aux avant-postes,' The Cortes had assembled at Cadii'., where
the booming of the French cannon was perpetually heard, and
where an occasional shell from Villantroys' celebrated mortars
would plump harmlessly into the sand of the Peninsula 01'
the outskirts of the town itself, The Cortes had opened its
sessions 011 September Q4, though less than half its members
had assembled. The difficulty of collecting them had been
"ery great, since all had to arri ve by sea, and Illaily had to cOUle
from regions very remote, such ll.~ Asturias, Galicia, or Cata-
lonia. The ll.~selllbly could not be called satisfactory or rcpl'(''-
I Sce bis letters to his wife ill December 1810 and January 1011. about
his brother's' mauvaises dispositions a mon egard.·
2 He writ.es that at his most splcudid State Oauquets nothing but c!Jintl
is uow to 00 seell on his tal.fle,
S The question of the Consuls and Soult (mentioued in an earlier
chapter) crops up a,,<rain in Joseph to Bcrthier, Nov, 28.
i NallOleon to Berthier. Oct. 4, orders Digeon's brigade of LaiJoussaye's
(lrag-oons to cross the Sierra .MorClla, tllUs leaving the king ouly four
regiments of French ca\'a1l'y ill Ne"' Castile,
~ Ducasse, C(iTre.tp()IldulICt. ,'H, p. 361,
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sentative. The scheme drawn up for its electioll by the com-
mission that had sat in the preceding winter was com-
plicated. There was to be a deputy for every 50,000 souls
throughout Spain; but the form of selection was indirect:
the villages chose each one primary elector; the primary
electors met at the chief town of the district to choose a second
body of secolldal'y electors; the secondary electors chose a
final cOlllmittee for the whole pl"OvillcC (Junta provillcWl
elecloml) and these last, aided by the Governor, Archbishop,
and Intendant of the province, nominated the deputies, But
this complicated system could only work in the regions which
were in the hands of the patriots. OnI)' Valencia, Mm"cia,
Estremadura, the Dalearic Isles, and Galicia were wholl)' free
at the moment. III Catalonia the capital, Darcelona, and
large tracts of the country were occupied by the French. In
the Asturills three-quarters of the province were held down
by Bonnet. The two CfiStiles, Andalusia (c.,<ccpting Cadi~),
Biscay, Navarre, Lean, and Aragon were entirely or almost
entirely ill the hands of the enemy. The delegates supposed
to represent them were either chosen in hole-and-corner
meetings of insurgent juntas lurking in some remote fastness,
or-where e\'en this semblance of local election was not possible
-by nomination by the Regency, or in wholly casual assemblies
of the natives of those districts who chanced to be in Cadiz at
the time. The representatives of Madrid, for example, were
choscn in this fashion by the body of exilcs from that city
mceting in the spacious courtyard of a large public building l .
The result of this informal and irregular method of choice was
that mally pro\'inces purported to be represented by deputies
who had no real local influence therein, but had chanced to
commend themselves to the insurgent juntas, or to the persons
-in some cases a mere handful-who happened la have fled
from that particular region to Cadiz, It is said that the very
names, and much more lhe persons, of a good Illl\ny of the
deputies wcre absolul:cl)' unknown to thcir supposed constitucllts.
Most of all was this the case with the members of the Cortes
who were supposed to represent Spanish America. It bad
been decreed by the late Central Junta that the colonies formed
1 Aq{uelles, O(1/"teg de Cadiz. p. 100.
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all integral part of the Spanish monarchy, and were therefore
entitled to representation. But the modest Ilumber of twenty·
six membcl"S allotted to them were ek'Cbxl at Cadiz, by a com·
mittee of Americans nominated by the Regency from those who
happened to be resident in that town. Most of the deputies
were out of touch with the people beyond the seas, of whom
they were theoretically the delegates.
This fact was specially unfortunate when the first symptoms
of dif;Content and :-;edition in Buenos Ayre;, Mexico, and the
Caraccas had begun to show themselves. Though few realized
it as yet, the insurrection of Spanish America was just about
to break forth. 1)1e least foreseen of all the results of
Napoleon's aggressions in Old Spain was that the colonies, which
had been called upon to take their part in the national war
agllim.;t the Frcnch, and hud lx..-cll promisc..'<1 a sharc in the
administration of the empire, should accept the show of
freedom and equality that was offered in a serious spirit.
The Americaus demanded that they should no longer be treated
as subjects and tributaries of the mother country, but recognized
as possessing rights and interests of their OWIl, which must
be taken into consideration when the general governance of
the dominions of FerdinlllllJ VII was ill question. And these
rights and interests included not only a claim to such self·
government as other Spanish provinces possessed, but a demand
that their cOlllmercial and ecOllomic lleeds should no longer
be subordinated to the convenience of the mother country.
The colonies could not see "hy the monopoly of all their trade
should he left in the hands of the merchants of Old Spain.
They wished to traffic on their own account with Great Britain
and the United Stn.tcs. This claim WIIS one which no inhabitant
of Old Spain could view with equanimity. 'The monopoly of
South American commerce had always been believed to be the
most essential item in the greatness of the realm. It had been
preserved almost as strictly ill the eighteenth century as in the
seventeenth or sixteenth. The old Asiellto, which gave Great
Britain a minute share in that commerce, had been conceived
to be a humiliation and a disgrace to the king who granted it.
Spain had fought more than once to preserve the American
monopoly-it is only necessary to allude to the war of
OM.,.·. HI L I
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'Jenkins's Ear' to show what she was prepared to face in its
defence.
And now, whell the mother country was in such desperate
straits, the questions of American self-government and American
trade were raised in the crudest fonn. Great Britain had
provoked the distrust of her Spanish allies by many of her acts,
even when they were done in good faith and with no ulterior
molive. But the most irritating of all was the request, which
bad been already made more than Ollce in a tentative fashioll,
for a measure of free trade with South America. WeUington
had recommended that the point should not be pressed, when
Spain was in her extremity; but it was inevitable that since
nearly all British subjects, and nearly all Americans, were
desirous to see the old barriers removed, the question should
crop up again and again. The opening of the American trade
was the only return that Spain could make for the aid that
Great Britain had now been gh'ing her for more than two
)'ears of war. When Canning in 1809 wrote that' in questions
of commerce any proper occasion must be used to recommend
a more enlarged and liberal policy than has hitherto been acted
upon in Spain; it is easy to sec what was in his mind. The
ministers in power ill 1810 were mostly of the same opinion.
But to ask for free trade with America in the year when
Hidlllgo \\IllS making his first rising in Mexk'O, and the cabiklos
on the Rio de la Plata were quietly substituting municipal
self-go\'ernment for the ancient autocratic rule of theit· viceroys,
was to provoke acute suspicion. In 1806-7 Great Britain
had baeked Miranda and other colonial separatists, either with
the hope of getting a footing for herself in South America,
or at least with that of establishing republics which would
grunt her all the commercial privileges that sbe asked. The
suceessive Spanish governments of 1808-10 could never con-
vince themselves that the scheme had been cOml)letely dropped,
and mistook Bl'itish dcnmnds for open trlldc with America for
a desire to sever the disoontented oolonies from their mother
country. The most unpopular act of the Regency of 1810 WllS
their decree of May 7, issued, as all Spaniards held, in base
subservience to their allies, which had granted England and
. Portugal a certain limited right of exch.~llging their products
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with the colonies, on paying the heavy customs-due of ten and a.
half or fifteen and a half per cent.1 So great was the cry raised
against it in Cadiz that the Regency was cowardly enough to
caneel it on JUIlC 2:2, nndcr the pretext that it had not been
ratified in 11 session at which 0.11 its members WCI"C present!
But it was not the American question alone which lay as
a source of' danger before the newly-assembled Cortes, nor
was it the American deputies alone who misrepresented their
constituents. Speaking in general, it may be said that the
whole assembly sh,owed a disproportionate number of liberals,
when the relative numbers of the democratic and the conser-
\'o.th·c pmties throughout Spo.in were tnken into cOllsidemtioll,
'fhe eVCllts of the ncxt ten years were to show t1mt the Ser-.nle8,
as their opponents called them, were really in a mAjority in
the whole country-side and in many towns. If that had not
been so, Ferdinand VII could not have restored autocratic
govel1lment with such ease when the Peninsular 'Var was ovel',
Rcactionaries of the blackest dye, who would have liked to
l'cstOl'C the Inquisition, and would have put back the press into
the shackles which it had endmed before 1807, wcre probably
in a clear majority in the nation, The clerical interest was in
many ways the mainsta.y of the Wal· of Indepelldellce, and the
clergy, with "ery few exceptions, would gladly have gone back
to the system of the eighteenth century 2. The majority of
the old official class sympathized with them, and the peasantry
lI'el"C almost everywhere under their control. On the other
hand, the Liberals, if all shades of them were reckoned togetller,
Illld a dellr mujority in the Cortcs, both because the regions
whieh were properly represented in that assembly chanced to
be those in which they were most numerous, and because they
had secured a. disproportionate number of the seats belonging
to the lost provinces, which had been filled up by more or less
fictitious elections within the walls of Cadiz. That town itself'
was the least conservati"e place in Spain, and the refugees who
hud serred as electors because they happened to be on the
I For details see Schepeler, iii. p. 001. The goods must also be carried
in SIl.:lllish vessels, so the grant was not a very liberal one!
t Liberal clergy of the type of the journalist Dlanco-White (Leucadio
Dob1;u.lo) were rare exceptiolJ~.
t, I 2
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spol:t were not drawn from the bulk of the population-were
neither priests 1101' peasants,-but mainly came from those
sections of the upper lwd middle classes WhCI'C Jibeml opinions
hud mude more progress.
The Cortes on the whole was a democratic body: Spain, Oll
the whole, was reactionary. The number of those who hated
~apoleon because they regarded him as the enemy of the Church,
the jailer of the Pope, and the breaker-up at' old laws, was
much greater than that of those who hated him because he
was the embodiment of autocracy, and the foe of all free self-
government. Intense national pride was common to both
purties, and all could unite against El. foe whose aim was the
dismemberment of Spain. But the union wus made difficult
by the fact that men who had imbibed, more or less consciously,
some of the 'Principles of 1789' had to co-operate with men
who looked back on the regime of Philip II as a Golden Age.
'I can see no prospect of Liberty behind the crowd of priests
who everywhere stand foremost to take the lead of' our patriots.
I cannot look for any direct advantage from the feeling which
prompts the present resistance to Napoleon, as it arises chiefly
from an inveterate attachment to the religious system whence
our present degradation takes source, If the course of events
enables liS to attempt a political reform, it will be by grafting
the feeble shoots of Li1xlrty upon the stock of Catholicism, an
experiment whieh has hitherto, and must ever, prove abortive'
wrote a desponding Liberal l • How could the writer of such
words and his friends work cordially in company with sllch filllatics
as the Estremaduran deputy who, in one of the earlier sessions
of the Cortes, proposed the astonishing motion that, in spite
of all that had happened since 1807, 'the Inquisition remains
in full possession of its ancient authority, and can make free
use of all the powers which it has ever enjoyed in the past 2,'
There were others who objected to the use of the dallh.>erous
word' {''Ollslitution,' and even to the phrase !as !eyes de ESjJaJia,
as implying an authority independent of the Cl'own S.
1 Doblado's Letters, p. 392.
t Motion by onelo'rancisco MariaRiesco,deputyJ and formerly Inquisitor,
at Llerena in Estremadura, Arguelles's ha, Cor/ea de Cadix, p. 200.
~ See 001011', p. 620.
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Whell it is remembered that the form in which the Cortes
had been summoned was new and experimental, that the
elections had been-even according to that form-irregular,
that no single member was aceustomed to parliamentary usages,
that the parties represented in it held views of the most diver~
&fCut kinds, the wonder is not that the assembly displayed many
weaknesses, but that it did no worse. Observers of a pessimistic
fmme of mind had feared that it would break up altogether
after a few stormy sitting.>. 'It was too full,' wrote the
regent Lnrdizabal, 'of youths, nnd of men who yesterday wcre
mere achenturers, without any practice in command, knowledge
ot' business, or experience of the world. Whole provinces were
represented by deputies whom they had not chosen, and were
expected to conform to a constitution, and to accept sweeping
reforms, made by men to whom they had given no mandate,
faculty, or authority to take such changes into consideration.
For neither the Regency, nor even the King, had the legal right
to nlJminate dcputies: no onc could ehoose them save the
provinces or eities whieh were integral parts of the nation,
and no one could claim to represent a province save the men
to whom that same province had given powers, and instructions
to act in conformity with its wishes.'
This motley assembly, so many of whose members were of
doubtful legitimacy, held it<; opening session on September Q4,
1810. The meeting-place was not within the walls of Cadiz
itself, but in t.he large suburhan town of Ln hill, in the centre
of t.hc grCllt island of Lcon, which fOl'ms the outwOl·k of the
city. It was hoped that the six miles which sepllrated its
sitting-place from Cadiz would prevcnt interruption b)' popular
demonstrations, snch as had been so penlicious to the French
chamber during the Revolution. The Cortes had as their home
the large but bare theatre of San Fenlando, which had been
roughl), fitted up with benches and tribunes. After high mass
had been celebrated by the old Cardinal Bourbon, the onl), male
member of the royal family who was not in captivity 1, the
Regency deelared the session opened, and then withdrew, after
\ He 11'1\8 of tile same branch as tlle Countess of Chinchon, Godo}"e
Wife, being son of Luis, youngest child of Philip V, by a quasi-morganatic
marrillA"e with a lady of the llame of Vallabriga,
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II brief speech by the Senior Regent, the Bishop of Orcnsc, who
bade the n:;scmbly constitute itself in due form and elect its
president and secretaries.
This was done with no delay; the president choscn was a
Catalan, Ram6n Lazaro de DOll, while the two secretaries were
E\'aristo Perez de Castro and Mllllucl Lujall. Both of them
were well known to entertain Liberal opinions, and their choice
marked the predominance of their party in the Cartes. Sitting
lill lllirlnight W!l$ long past, the assembly passed six decrees
drawl! up by l\{tlI1oz TOl'refo, onc of tile few clerical deputies
who held Liberal views, and Mnnuel Lujan. By these the
Cartes declared itself in possession of supreme power ill the
State, but resolved that, of the three branches of authority-
the legislative, the executh'e, and the judicial-it intended to
take only the nrst-llamed under its own charge. handing Ol'er
the executive to the late Uegency, and the judicial to the
ordinary courts of law. The R<;"O'ClIcy should be responsible
to the Corlcs fol' !tU it'! acts of l\dl1linistmtioll, ulId liable to be
called to account. It was ordered to make all insront oath
of obedience to the assembly, 'recognizing the sovereignty of
the nation represented by the deputies of this general and
extraordinary Cortes.' This Castaiios and the other regents
did with an ill grace, all save the Bishop of Orellse, who
misliked the oath, contending that its terms spoke of the nation
as being sovereign in its own right, without consideration of
the King's indefeasible majesty I, He would 110t swear, and
so vacnteu his place. He did not lose much by his cnd)'
dismissl.ll, fOl' Oll October 28 the Cortes abruptly deposed his fOllr
collcagllcs-Ca.'ltafl.os. Lardi..-nbal, SfLllvoorn. illld Esc1\I1o-ll.1ld
replaced them by Et new Regency of three memhers, These were
Joaquim Blake, that most unlucky of generals; Admiral Cisgar,
then commanding the Carthagena squadron, who passed as an
able administrator; and an obscure naval captain, Pedro Agaz',
of whom little was known SM'e that he was American born, and
might, therefore, theoretically represent the colonies. The
I 'Qlie la nacion ern soherlina CQIl el rt!J, dc/!(Ie luego prestArfo el
juramento pedido. Pero si se entendia que la na.ciOll era soberana Iln cl
rey, Y sooorana de su mismo sooorano, Dunca se someterfa a tal doetrilla.'
See more of his argument in '[oreno, ii. 225.
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change in regents was decidedly for the worse as far as char-
acter and ability went. Apparently the Cortes were jealous of
an administration whose power was older thlln their own, and
had not originally been created by them. They wished to have
all executive more entirely dependent on themselves. Some
of the Liberals pretended that the old regents were plotting
to hold a sort of ' Pride's Purge' of the Cartes, and to restore
themselves to power. But of this no proof was ever given 1,
Considering the difficult times which they had passed through,
and their well-intentioned if rather feeble attempt to scn'c the
state, Castai'ios and his colleagues deserved a. better fate than
llrbitmry dismissnl, wilhout thanks, and with a tacit accllsatioh
of treason laid to their charge.
Between the time of the first assembly of the Cortes and the
change in the Hegency an infinite number of subjects had been
dealt with. The Liberal majotity, led by Agostin Argiielles,
had decreed liberty of' the Press in all political discussions, but
very illogically refused it for discussions on matters of religion.
They had abolished all feudal rights and privileges of nobility.
'11Jey passed a decree of amnesty for all rebels in America who
should lily down their arms, and propo~ many projects for
improving the position of the Colonies, few of which, unfortu-
nately, happened to bear any relation to the chief grievances
under which the South Americans conceived themselves to
be labouring. The insurrection still went on, and, though the
mother country was placed in such a desperate condition, troops
were actually withdrawn from the Murcian army to sail with
General Elio, who was directed to restore order at Buenos
Ayres and in the provinces of the Rio de la Illata. Discussions
continued, with much heat and a considerable amount of
eloquence, 011 many other points, during the em'ly days of the
JUlltn. The subjects of debate were generally constitut.ional,
occasionally financial, It was worthy to be observed that the
two topie,; 011 which all the deputies rallied together were the
question of opposition to the French, and the question of the
defence of their oIVn sovereign rights. Even the majority of
I Compare Torello's insinuation against the Regent Ludizabal (H. 213),
to whom he ascribes a definite plot, with Arteche's defeuce and eulogy of
the late HcgclJcy, ix. 109--11.
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the Seroiles would join with the Liberals whenever allY doubt
was raised with regard to the right of the Cortes to arrogate to
itself the title of Majesty or the attributes of supreme power.
When, for example, the Bishop of Orense refused to take the
oath of obedience, severnl elerients of most reactionary "jews
took part against him; and when It few weeks later the Marques
del }'alacio, Ilamed as It deputy-regent during the absence of
.Blakc, also displayed reluctance to swear to the same form
Oil similar grounds, he did not receive the report that he had
expected from the reactionaries. Indeed, he was put under
arrest for some time, without, as it seems, any attempt to
protect him being made by the Serviles. Like the Bishop
of Drense, he ended by swallowing his scruples and accepting
the prescribed formula 1.
A similar desire to assert its own absolute supremacy impelled
the Cortes to refuse to countenance two dynastic intrigues which
came from different quarters. The eldest daughter of Charles
IV, Carlotta, Princess of the Brazils and wife of the Regent
Joio of Portugal, was the nearest of kin to Ferdinand Vll who
had escaped Napoleon's claws in 1808. She was of opinion
that she had a good right to expect the ll.egency during her
brother's captivity at Valen~ay, and her agents .repeatedly
urged her claims, both during the days of the first Regency
Rnd after the Cortes had assembled. Sousa-Holstein, the
POltuguese ambassador, naturally lent them his aid, and she
had Spanish partisans, though few of them were persons of
good reputation. Yet, by constant persuasion and promises,
Carlottn's representativcs actually succeeded in inducing great
numbers of the deputics to pledge themselves to push her
interests. It is said that, at Due time or another, a full half
of the members bad given the intriguers encouragement. But
to do this, and to make a formal attempt to pass a decree
conferring the Regency on her, were very different things. When
overt action was urged by her agents, 01' their partisans ill
the Cortes, nothing came of the attempt. The assembly was
naturally unwilling to surrender its own sovereignty. and to
introduce a court and its intrigues into Cadiz. It must be
added that Joiio of l)ortugal had no liking for his wife's
I 'l'orcno, ii. lIP. 222-3.
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scheme, that 'VeUington saw its disndvantagcsl, llnd that the
great bulk of the Spaniards would ha\'c rcsented the whole
affair, as a Portuguese intrigue, if it had ever been laid before
the uation as a definite proposal.
The second dynastic scheme which was running its course
lit this time was engineered by another branch of the Spanish
royal house. The restless and unscrupulous Queen Caroline
of Sicily could 1I0t fOI'/:,'Ct that if Carlotl:.a of Portugal was the
nearest relative of the capth'e King, yet her husband E'erdimmd
was his nearest male kinsman, save the princes in Napoleon's
hands. She availed herself of this fact to urge that one of her
children would be a very suitable person to be entrusted with
power in Spain, and thought of her younget' SOli Pl'inee
Lcopold as II possible candidate for the Rcgcnc)'. But since
he had not the necessary reputation or age, the Queen soon
fell back upon her son-in-law Louis Philippe. Duke of Orleans,
the exiled son of the infamous Philippe Egalite. He had not
only a good military record for his services at Jemappes and
elsewhere in the early Belgian campaigns, but was universally
known as a man of ability. Unfortunately, he had fought on
the RepubliCllll side in 1792-a thing hard to forge~ and certain
to causc suspicion: and his ubility wns always displaycd for
purposes of self-interest, and savoured of unscrupulousness,
~e\'ertheless, Orleans had already made overtures to the old
Hegency in the spring of ]810, and had been promised by
them a command on the borders of Catalonia. They had failed
to keep the pledge, nlld he now appeared at Cadiz, and wished
to present himself before the Cortes and plead his cause. He
Look small profit thereby, for the assembly regarded him and
his relatives t\S suspicious persons, refused to givc him nn
lUluicllce whcn he prescnted himsclf before its doors, and politely
but firmly insisted that he should return to Sicily in a few
days-an ordcr which he was forced to obey. 'Whether it
was that he was a Frenchman, though a llolll'bon, or whether
it was that he had once been a Republican, though he had
ceased to be one, or whether it was that he was a prince of
I &e Wellington to Henry Wellcsley, Nov. 4, ]810 :-' Hthe Princess
of the Bral,ils be the pcrson al)pointed rcgCllt, the Court will be inllnnn.tcfl
with intriguers of all IlIltiollS, and attended hy other evils.'
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the royal house, and therefore distasteful to the newly-assembled
Cartes, who were secretly inclined to democratic views, the
majority viewed him with disfavour 1.' On October S he set
sail for Palermo.
At the end of 1810 we leave the Corlcs still indulging in
fiery constitutional debates, still bus)' in asserting its OWl!
supreme power, and curbing many attempts at self-assertion
ill the Ilew Regency which it had created. With the English
government it WtlS not 011 the best of terms: t.hough it decreed
the erection of tl statue to Gem'gc HI ll.'l the friend and deliverer
of Spain-a monument which (it lleed hardly be said) was never
erected-it was very slow to seek or follow the advice of the
allied power. It clamoured for subsidies, but refused the
opening of the South American trade-the only return that
could be given for them. Money in hard gold or silver Great
Britain could no longer supply-for the years 1810-11 were those
when the paper-issues of the Bank were our sole currency. cash
had almost disappeared, and could only be procured by ottering
six pounds or more in 1I0tes for five guineas. But the Spaniards
did not waut paper, but gifts or loans in gold or silver. They
got 110 more of the precious metals-Great Britain had none to
spare, and found it almost impossible even to procure dollars to
pay Wellington's army ill Pprtugal. All that was given after
1809 wns arms and munitions of war.
English oooel'\'crs in the Peninsula were not well pleased with
the first months of the rule of the Curtes. < 'l'he natural COllrse
of all popular assemblies,' wrote Wellington to his brother,
Henry Wellesley, now minister at Cndiz, <and of the Spanish
Cartes among others, is to adopt democratic principles, and to
vest all the powers of the State in their own body. This
assembly must take care that they do not fun in that tempting
course, as the wishes of the nation are decidedly for monarchy.
Inclination to any other form of government would immediately
deprive them of the confidence of the people, and they would
become a worse government, and more impotent, because
more numerous, than the old Central Junta.' A few weeks
later he doubted whether even a Regency under Carlotta of
1 Sec Galiano, quoted by ArtccllC, ix. 16.
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Portugal, with all its disadvantages, would not be better than
mere democracy I,
Vaughan, on the spot at Cadiz, gave quite a different view of
the situatioll, but onc equally unfavourable to the Cartes as
it governing power. < It is full of priests, who (united with the
Catalnlls) are for preserving the old routine. and adverse to every-
thing that can give energy and vigour to· the operation of
go,"emmcllt. }'analicism and personal interest dire<:t their
opinions. . . . Be assured that the Cortes is, as at present
constituted, anything but revolutionary or JacobinicnL ...
If there is not soon some new spirit infused into it, it will
1)€I."Omc an overgrown Junta, meddling with CVel"Y paltry detail
of police, and llcglcctiug the safety of the country~alld the
Regency will be content to reign (very badly) over Cadiz and
the hIll. 2.'
There was much truth in both these verdicts, though Vaughan
underrated the force of self-interest in driving a popular assembly
to claim all power for itself, while Wellington underrated the
dead-weight of clerical conservatism, which was the restraint
upun that tendency, Both were rJght in asserting that, what-
c\'er the Cortes might. be, the mtUlS of the nation had no wish to
set out on the path of Jacobinism, They both perceived the
danger that the Cortes might turn itself into a constitutional
dc~'\ting society, and at the same time prevent any really
efficient e.xccuthe from being established. Such was its actual
fate. Except that Spain now possessed a governing authority
which, with all its faults, had infinitely more pretension to
claim u legal Ilialldate frolll the people than any of its pl'e-
tk'CCSSOl"S, the situation was not b'TCatly chan&l'Cd. From the
military point of view, as we shall sce in the next volume, the
nspeet of the Peninsula was ill no degree improvcd. The same
blundcrs that had marked the udministmtioll of the old Pro-
\'incial Juntas, of the Supreme Central Jllntn, and of the first
llcgency, continued to exhibit themselves under the rule of the
Cortes.
l Wellington to Henry W'elle81ey, from Carta..'W, Nov. 21, 1810.
! Charles Vaughafl to Charles Stuart, 'Feb, 27,1811.
AP1>ENDICES
I
THE SPANISH l'OIlCES AT THE SIEGE
OF GERONA
The original garrison under the command of Alvare~ consisted of the
following uuits. TI16 fin;t column gives tile strength 011 May 0, the
second the lLUmbcr tltat remained 011 Dec. H, 1809, the day uf the sur-
render.
Regiment of Ultonia (tllree batts.)
" Doroon "
VolUlltari06 de Barcelona, 2nd baU.
1st battalion of thtl l\Iiqueletes of Vicll
1st & 2nd hatts. n Gerollll.
Squadron of &L11 Knrciso
Hegular Artiller}'
Men of t1\6 2nd batt. of the Miqueletes of GerOll3
drafted into the artillery
Sailors draned into Ule artiller)'
Sallpers
Total of tlIe original garrisou
Rein{t1rcemellts rccci~d Augutt 17 :
Miqllclete Imttation of Cervera
Draft fOl" the 1st battalion of Vich
Draft for 2nd " Gerona
&itljorcelllents brought in by Garciu Otmde M sept. I :
Regiment of Baza (2 batts.)
Ist and 2nd Jliqueletes of 'l'alarll
21111 .i\liqueletes of Vich •
Picked companies of Santa Fe:, Jlilreria, VOIUll-
tarios de Tnn-agona,
800
1,300
1,125
600
1,120
100
278
240
130
22
,'i,723
'00
300
100
1,368
000
300
180
3,6413
uo
380
378
250
388
50
140
100
00
10
2,008
320
200
'0
1,074
300
100
106
2,240
Adtll,lOQ irregulars of the' Crusade.' .Losses unknowlI.
Of n,371 men el1A"ajol'ed firflt ami last in fhe defence, only 4,248 survil"ed.
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Il
THE FRENCH FORCES AT THE SIEGE
OF GERONA
The followiug we"e the losses of the three divisions which (:Qlllluctet.l
tlll,l ~iege of Geruu:I during its first three months, down to Sept, 15,
1800 ;-
(1) Ih:ILU:'S Original Siege COl'J.lS:
StrengtJI tm Strength QI/
June 1. Sept. 15, LQl8eB.
RaJlk ", fiie. RWlk <% file.
846 48D 3,S7
730 324 406
400 205 285
684 44D 23,5"
"
"
"
Dil'illion Verdier :
f.'renc!l Brigade:
32ml Uger (one hatt.)
16th Line (one hatt.).
2nd
56th
771
Me/!.
9(;]
1,362
314
51
12
6<9 870
705 000
60' 700
34O OGO
491 '55
""
298
260 31
OffirerB,
U
36
1,009
1,440
832
300
1,619
1,310
1,313
"
"
"
"
"
German Brigade:
Wurthnrg (two balts,)
1st of Berg (two batts.)
2nd
Division l\lorio:
2nd Westphalians (two hatts.)
3rd .. " "
4th " " "
4th Light Infantry (one bat1.)
Division Leechi:
Velites of the Italian Guard
5th Italian Line (two batts.)
Ist Neapolitans (two hatts,)
2nu
461 50 411
820 280 640
765 172 593
1,1111 322 7D7
13,644 5,883 7,761
Of these 6,666 were retnnLed as sick or wounded, and 1,495 as dead
or missing. l)robably 300 were deserters.
The Artillery counted on the first date (June 1):
From the 7th corps
Siege-Train from France
The engineers and sappers were
'l1le cll.l'alry (28th ehnsselll'S, and fh'e sqnadrons of
Italian horse) .
110 3,408
Adding these figurcs to those of tile infantry tile total of the Siege Army
was 1i ,162 men,
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,Ifen.
I,n61i
"".597
2,406
GH
1,35f1
1,580
1,034
687
4g8
1,50'i
1,427
477
"
(2) The Co\"ering Anny, under ST. eVil- ill person, consisted Oil June 1
of the following troops ;
SWJlllI'a Dil'isioll ;
Brigade Be8sieres :
1st LCger (tlnea batt'!.)
3rd " (one batt.)
24th Dragoons (three squadrons)
Brigade Espert :
42nd Line (t1Jree batts.) .
67th " (OllC bait.)
"nw's Division:
Brigade i\Iazzuchelli :
1st Italian J~ger (three bntts.)
4th Italian Line
Brigade Fontanc :
2nd Italian Uger (three baUs.)
6th Italian Line "
7th lta!itlll >I (one Imtt.)
Cavalry Brigade J)alomhini (Italian Chasseurs and Dragoons,
sh:: squadrons)
C""OOT'S Division:
7th Line (two batts.)
03nl" (OIlC ball.)
3rt! Provisional Clms!lCuf'S
Total of the Covering Army 15,732
On Dec. 31 the Siege Army showed 6,3~3 illfantry,2,300 engiueers,
artilleryJ &c. The CO\'erillg Anny had still 11 ,666 men. But two
battalions and some drafts had joiued from France, so that the total los>
was more than tllat indicated by these figures.
III
DEL PARQUE'S ARMY IN THE TAMAMES-ALBA
DE TOR~IES CAMPAIGN, OC'I'.-NOV. 1809
MORNING STATE 01<' NOVEMBER 20
Vall~llard Divisioll, Major-Generall\Iartin fIe la Canoera: QlficerJi. ],fen.
·Principe (tllree hatts.), ·Saragossa (three hatts.), '"1st
of Catalonia, ·211d of Catalonia, '"Cerona, •Barbastro,
:Escolares de Leou, tVittoria, tMonfoTte de Lemos,
tVohmtarios de 1:\ i\Iuerte, one battery field artillery 3G3 7,050
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351 7,!lB5
1st Divisiull, i\lajor-Gullcral Fmflcisco Xal'ier Losada :
tGranadero$ Provinciales de Calicia (two batl!!,), .. Leon
(tl\'O hatts.), ·1st and 2nd of Aragon, ·Voluntarios
de la Corona (two hatts.), :::Regimento del Gencral,
tlst alia 2nd of La Uuion, :tHetmlzos (t\\'o l/atts.),
10rense, :tCompanll. de Cuar/Has Nacionales, one
battery field artillery
2nd Dh'i:ion, Major-General Contle de llelveder :
"He)' (1st and 2m! battB.), *Zamora (1st allll 21111 balts.),
~Sel'ille (1st and 2nd baUB.), ·Toledo (1st and 3r(1
halts.), *Hibernia (two batbl.), "Voluntarios de
Nal·arra, tsalltiago, :tLovera (t\\"o hatts.), oue battery
fieM artillery. 344 6,415
3rd Divisiull [AsturiansJ, Major-Geneml Francisco Ballasteros:
"Navarm (three hatts.), *])riJlces., (two batts.), tOviedo,
tCovadonga, :Villaviciosa, :tCalldas y Lllauoo, Cas-
trollOl, :Pravia, lCangas de Tineo, !Grado, :tJnfiesto,
:r:Lentl, oue IJattery field a.rtillery 368 9,623
5th Diriaioll [Leonese], Rrigndier-General Marquisde Castrofuerte. ;
tTiradores de Ciudad Rodrigo, 1211d of Ciudad Rodrigo,
;::Voluntarios de Fernando VII, tLeon, tLogroiio,
t'foro, tValladolid, one battery field artillery, 2,15 5,912
He:III-Quarlers' Guard; llatallon del Geuel'al , ,10 891
[~.B.-'Jbc 4th Dil'ision, Galicinll troops under Maily
ahout 7,000 strong, nnd the garrison of Ciudad
Hodrigo, 3,817 bayonets, were never brought up to
the front.]
Cal'alry Dil'ision, tile Prince of Allglona:
*.Boroon, 'SngUllto, tGrnmweros de Llerella
(With only 868 horses.)
.Reyna, *Provisional Regiment \, ~Cazadores de Ciudad
Hodrigo (incomplete units, lately reformed), with one
11Orse-artillerr batter}'
'l1le artillefJ'men and a few companies of llappers are
iucludetl in tlie divisional totals.
83 1,053
46 600
Total 1,8,10 3!J,435
From tl1ia total of 41,275 men there were to be deducted, on NOI'. 20,
sick 5,601, absent 1,073, detached (from the 5th DiI'ision) 1,219, so that
the total of efficiellts under arms was 32,822.
• Old line regiments. t Old militia regiments. ::: New levies.
I This Provisional regiment received the name of •2nd of Algarve' in
December,
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FRENCH LOSSES A1' TAMAMES, OCT. 18, 1809
2
3
o
2
1
2
3
1
14 37
The uet.'lile(l return of the losses of the 6th Corps at Tamames has not
been preserved. Marchand merely states that he lost 1,300 men. But
the subjoined list of losses of officers, taken from l\Iartinien's invaluable
tables, shows sufficiently well whicll wefe tlle units that were hard hit:-
ht Division: Killed. WOllnded. 2nd Division: Killed. Wounded.
Brigade l\Iaucune : Brigade Labassee :
{
6tll Uger . 1 G j 2l5th Uger
69th Ligne. 2 4 1 27th Ligne
Brigade Marcoguct; 59th Ligue
{
39th Lignc. 4 12 Cal'alry:
76th Ligne . 7 15 ] .5th Dr~ns
16th ChllSSCllrs
ttat-Major .
Total 18 killed, 65 wounded. 4 13
At tIle Il\'erage rate of 21 men hit ller officer, which prc\'uilecl dnring
the Peninsular War, this total of 73 officers ought to imply Il total loss of
about 1,533 men. But )farchand'g 1,300 is probably correct.
V
THE PARTITION OF THE ARMY OF' ESTREMADUUA
IN SEPTEMBER 1809
[l\'.B.-< bon ' is Spanish contraction for balalt61l,]
The way ill which the old army of Cuosu~ wag divided in SCl'tem1.M::r
1800 has never been worked out; nor Ims the composition of Arei?ngn's
army of La Jlanc1l1l, after it had been joine(l by tIle Estremaduran
reinforcements, ever been reconstructed. A search in the Madrid '\'ar
Office, in which I was assisted b)' the kindness of Captain I~igueras, has
produced the following two documents ;-
(1) A list of Albuquerque's anny without any figures of mrength &WC
tIle general total, as follows:
I Cuerpos que qnedaron eonstituendo el CuerJlo de .Ejercito de F...,tre-
madura, de 12,000 hombres. Oct. 1,1809.
• Reales Guardias Walonas (40 batallon). [Late in garrison at Batlajoz.]
:Osuua (2 batallones). [Late of Iglesias's Division.]
:::Velez Malaga (3 batalloues). ""
tVolulltarios Extrangeros (1 bOil). " "
t Provincial de Burgos" ""
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:Tiradores de Merida ,,[Late of Zayas's Divisiou.)
tl'rovincial de Truxillo" JJ "
Wdo tie Autequera. ,,(Late of Portago'll Dh·ision.]
tProvincial tie lladaj(Y>\" ""
1Lealea de Fernamlo VII (2 bOlle.). [Late in garrisou at Dadajoz.]
:Voluntarios de Plasencia (1 bOil) 1) "
!Vo!untarios de Zafra" ""
lVohmtariOs de La Serena " ""
Caballeria-Comandante General cl Brigadier Baron de Carondelet.
·Calatral'll, ·VillavicioSll, ·Voluntarios de Espaiia, tCazadorcs Perse-
guidores de Andalueia, tCazadores de Sevilla.
*Borbon, tCazadores de LlerellR and "'Sagunto have marched for
Ciudad Rodrigo under the Prince of Anglollll.
(2) A second document gives, as having marched under Eguia to join
the Army of the Centre in La ManclIa, tile following corps:
"Real Marina (10 y 2° ootallonet;). [Late of Basseconrt's Dil/isioll.]
'Africa (30 LOD), ""
"Mureia (10 y 20 bones). ""
"Rerua (1° bOO). ""
"2oud de Mallorca (10 bOil). [Late of 19lesias's Division.]
"Canu.bria (1°> 20, 30 boneo). [Late of Zayas's Division,]
'lladajoz (1°, 2° bOMO). [Late of POrWgo's Division.]
tProviucial de Toledo (1 bOO). " "
'Ca?.adores de Barbastro (I Jpn). [lAte of the Vanguard DiI·ision.]
'Voluntarios de Valencia (20 bOO). " "
:Tiradores de Estrenladura (1 bOO). " "
Provincial de Plasencia
Caballeria
'Rea.lcs Car.l.bineros, 'Hey, • Reyna, 'hlfa.nte, 'Pavia, 'Almau;(.3,
·to y 2" Usa.1"CS de Estremadura, lCaZlLdores de Madrid, tCll7MOrCS de
Toledo, tCarabineros y lanceros de Estremadura.
30 pieus de Arlilleria.
TIlis leaves uuaCCOUllted for, of Cuesla's old army, the following corps;
'20 de Voluntarios de Calalui'ia, ·Campo Mayor, :Cazad.ores de Valencia
y Albuljuerque, tCanarias, tl'rovincial de Guadix, 'lrlanda (twu batts.),
'Jaen, 4.30 de Scvilla, t2" de Voluntarios do Madrid, tVoluntarios de
la Corona, tProvincial de Siguema, GranadeTOS Provinciales.
Of these Jaen, Corona, Madrid, and the grenadiers certainly went WiUl
Eguia to la Mancba. Irlanda went to Del Parque at Ciudad Rodrigo,
20 de Cataluiia went to Cadiz to recruit. 'I11ere are left Campo Mayor,
Callarias, 30 de Sevilla, Provincial de Siguenza, l'rol'illcial de Guadix,
ClI43dores de Valencia y Albuquerque. Probably Uiey fOrmed the division
of 6,000 men which the Junta is said to h(1.\"e deducted from the army of
Estremadur& for its own protection, and to have withdralm to the borders
of Andalusia in September. At any rate we find in November Campo
, Old regular units. t Old militia units. : New levies.
owu'. III M m
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312 7,325
'07 4,927
778
-1,980 49,877
:\1flyor, Canll.rias, ani! Provincial de Glladix serving again in tile army
of Albuquerqlle. But I cannot be sure that some of the others did
not accompany Egllia (like Jaeu and Corona), though not mentioned in
the document 110. 2.
VI
AREIZAGA'S ARMY IN THE OCANA CAMPAIGN
No detailed <morning state' of this army has been preserved, but the
names and gross totall! of the divisions are OD record ill documents at
the Madrid "Tar Office. So far as 1 can make it out, the organization
of the army must have ileen nearly as follows:-
INFANTRY DIVISION
Vanguard Division, General .Jose Zayas: Office/'I. Men,
Voluntaries de Valencia, 2nd of Majorca, Provincial de
Plasencia, Voluntarios de Espaiia, Granaderos Pro-
villciales, Calltabria (seven batts.) . • . 210 a,iGS
1st Division, General L. Lacy:
Burgos, 1st of Espaiia, Provincial de Conlova, 1st of
Loxa, Alcala, 1st of Sel'ille, Provincial de Chinc11illa
(nine hatts.) . 328 7,'120
2nd Division, General Gasp.1.r Vigodet:
Corona, Ordenes Militares, 1st of Gundix, Ronda,
Alcazar, Ciudad Real (nine batts.) 238 6,797
3rd Division, General P. Giron:
1st alld 2nd Spallisb Guanls, 2nd of Cordova, Baileu,
PrO\'incial de Jaen, Provincial de Toledo (eight batts.) 200 5,034
4th Division, General .'rancisco Castejoll:
1st of l\lalaga, 6th of Seville, 2nd of Loxa, Bujalancc,
Cnzaflores de Velez Ma.lllgll, Xeres, 3rd of Cordo"'"
(eiglit batts.) . 236 6,161
6th Division, General T. Zerain:
Cazadores de Barbastro, 2nd of EspaIia, 2nd of Seville,
2nd of Madrid, Prol'incial de Granada, 3rd 'VaUoon
Guards (!>el'en batts.) 209 5,671
6th DiI'ision, Gencral N. Jaeomc:
Badajos, Provineial de Malaga, Tiradores de Estrema-
rlurn, .Tncn, Provincial de f.eija (?), 4th of Sel'ille(?),
Alpujarras (?) (nine hatts.?)
7th Division, Brigadier-General F. Copons:
Murcia, Reall\larina, Africa, Reyna (six hatts.) .
Troops not inclnded in any division :-Granaderos del
General, Compafia de Duen Orden, Companas Sueltas
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CAVALRY
6,766
1,000
GOO
Gcucral Total on,723
Commander! hy Generlll Manul:ll Freire.
1st Division, Brigadier-General Juan Beruuy:
IWy, Infante, Voluntados de Madrid, AlmaIlT.a, Carnbiueros
y Lanceros de F..stremadura
2nd Division, Brigadier Jose Rivas:
Cazadores de Toledo, Pavia, 1st and 2nd Hussars of Estre-
madura .
Srd Division, BrigaJier l\Iiguel March:
.i\Ionte..o:a, Reylla, Santiago, Principe, Cordova, Alcantara
4th Division, Colonel V. Osorio:
Cazadores {le Granada, Granaderos de FenJando VIl, Far_
ue:io, Lusitauia, Espaiia.
60 gUllS Witll artiller}'mell, about .
Sappers, &e., no figures gi\'en, perllllpFl.
'111e materials from Wllich tile above organization IlllS been reconstructed
are : (I) Rolls of Venegas'sarmy, before it was joined by.Eguia's reiuforce..
ments. (2) Roll of the reinforcements led by Eguia (printed in Appendix
Ko. V). (3) Gross totals of each division, without list of their component
b.1ttalions, Ilre5ervoo ill the Madrid War Office. (4.) A mOTlliug statu
of the army taken on Del;. 1: in tllis the divisious of l...acy and Zayas
are amalgamated, ano that of Jacome has disappeared, its wrecks ha\'ing
been distributed among the remaining six divisions. (5) The regimental
allnals in tlle Conde de Clonard's great history of the Spanish army_
Unfortunately this only serves for the regular regiments, there 1>eing no
record of the fates of the militia b.1tt.alions or the newly-raised volunteer
regimcnts. I am specially uncertain ILhout the (AwaIr)' ILnd the 6t11 Divi-
sion (Jaeome), which seems to have boon composcd of those Estremaduran
unit.'!whicll had not been organized as tbe 'Vanguard' and 17th Division.'
But it almost certainly had some Andalusian regiment.'! added. 1 mark
t1JClll witlt a (?).
•
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THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN ON JAN. 15, 1810
!"'tOM A DOCUMENT IN THE ARCHIVES NATIONAUX
AT PARIS
Pre,em UJlder
Arm,. D~ Sick. Prist»!- To/al.
O.§" tachea. m.
ccrs.
J[tn.
---
------ --
1st Com (MAIlSHAL
VICfQa) ;
1" DIVlSION (Ruffin) ,t
Almagro ,
9th U~r. 2-Uh Line,
90th lne (3 balls.
each) . . .
''''
4<,306 96 901 - 5,513
2nd DIVlSIO:S ,DartiCau) at
Daymiel,
16th U~r, 8th Line,
45th Llne, 51th Line
(2 balts. each) . 157 S.7·~~ 96' 1,893
"
8,110
3rd DIVISION (VilIatte) III
Membrilla:
!nth L~r, 63rd Line,
94th Inc, 9Mh Line
(3 batts. each) .
'"
6,12-\. 156 58' 3 7,087
LIGII"" C,WAtIl.Y BRIGADE
(BcaUffiont) at Villa-
nuevo. de 100 lnfalltes ,
2nd Hussars. bth Chas-
sellrs ., '76 2.H
"
23 l.l27
DIviSiOll ot" DRAGOOl<S
(Latour.!'>faubourg)
"El Moral :
1st;. 2nd, 4th, 9t11, 14th,
26th Dragoons .
"
2.16-'\. 633 76 6\ 3,""
ARTJI.LEllY AND Tu.IN • 33 1,74.7
'"
1... , 2,178
DrrAcII'IEN't'S '0 U"
march to join . • 1,019 - - - \,623
E1"AT-MAJOR 112
-
-
-
- 11'
--
-~-
---- --
--
Corp.s Total 762 21,88;1 1,678 3.7W 11' 29.180
--
~-- ---- -- --
2nd Co,,, (GEStIlAl.
H£lJPl:I,ET, vice SOUI.T)'
1" DI'<·I~IOY (l\Ierle)
"Tl\lavcl'8.:
2nd Uger, 36th Line,
4th Leger, 15th Line
G,!'!.'(8 baUs. each)" . 23\ b,118
'"
660 -
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Pruent under
Arlll8. D~ Sick. 1'rilOll- Total.
Off" tac1ud. m.
cen.
.'1[811.
--- ~- -- -- --
'0' DIVls[QJ.- (Hcudelet)at Talavera :
17th L~r. 47th. 70th.
86th ine (8 butts.
each), 31st Ugcr (4-
batls.) . . . . . 290 7.re.;
'"
970
-
8,472
LlllHT C.n·.u.R\· DIVISION
(Soult) ,
1st Hw;Sll.rs. i!2nd Chas-
seurs. 8tb Dragoolls.
Chasseurs Hanovriens 79 187 1'1 36 - 1,093
DIVISIOS ". DRAGOONS(Lnhoussa)-e) :
11th. 18th. 19th, 21th
Drab'OOns.
"
1.171 2W 66 8 1,5>l5
ARTILLER\", '1'11.11);. MID
ESGINEERS j; 66,~ 'I
"
- 79'
ETAT-MAJOII 79 -
- - -
79
-- --- -- ---- --
Corps Total 752 15,315 '69 1,726 8 18,8.'W
-- --- --
~-
-- --
,NI Co"~ (GENERAL
SUClIf:T) :
"I DIVISION (Laval) .1Montreal:
14th ann 44th Line, 2nd
of the Vistuln (2 batts.
each) ~d of the Vis-
tula a ent and nut
counted] . 11' +,171 28O '90
'"
5,348
2nd DIVISION (i\lllsnier) at
Alcaiiiz,
IIHh, ll5th. 121st Line
(~batls. each). Isl of
the Vistula (2 batts.)
""
6,910
'"
81' '67 8,165
',d DIVISION (H/lbcrt)
at Fraga:
5th Uger, 116th Line
(2 hatts. each), 117th
Liue (3 batts.). . . 136 4,193 , - 4,7.57
CAVALRY BRIGADE (Bous-
surd) :
4th Hussars. 13th Cul-
rassiers . 77 1,822 ", 44 - 2.172
AUTILLERY, THAII', ~D
ElIGT);"F:F:RS . 28 1,1'19 - 66 - 1,213
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2,3M
1,939
,",,219
6,143
,I,S:»
80
26,630
IO!!
I"
186
'16
1,177
86
916 1,819 700
187
''''
------
---
,1.,619
1,617
1,299
1,573
104
775 ill,S65
130
Prtl6fl~ ullder
II".;-A"-""O"__ II J>e.. Sick. Prison- 'i'D/al.Ojfi,. t«chtd. 8'1'8.
et"'. M61l.
::------;:----:-::-11-=GAJlIlSO)i hool'S at Tu-
deJa, Saragossa, Jaca•
.tc" including the 3rd of
the Vlstub and 3 bntts.
of Chasseurs des lIfon-
tagnes J3g
ET.IT-MAJOR 80
Corps Total
4th CoIIl'S (GEYEIlA.L
SUAST'ANI) :
1st Dn"'HJo,,":
SStb Line (3 batts.). .
[i!8th, 3~nd. 75th Line
left 8t Madrid). , .
i'nd DO'181011" (Laval) :
9 German baUs. (absent
at Segovia, Oil march
to Dayonne with tile
prisoners of Oeana) .
300 Dn'ISI01'l" (Werl€) at
Ocalla:
4th, 7th, 9th Poles (2
batts. eacll) ,
LJou'c CAVAI,ay BaIGAUl:
(Perreymond)at O<:aiia:
10th and 27th Chasscur8,
llnd Polish Lancers .
DIVJSION Ot· DaAooo:,'!<
(Milhaud) at Velez:
5th, 12th, 16th, !lOth,
21st Dragoons
A RTII..LF.RY,
ENOINl."'EIlS
E:r.A"I'~MA.JOR _
Corps Total '12 9,713 87U 2,077 288 13.360
(1\l.\asIIAI.5th COIlI'':!
Mo.lt'flt:II.) :
1st DIVISION (Gieard) at El
Moral:
34th, 40th, 64th, 88th
Line (3 batts. each)
2nd DI\'I8lON (Gal'.an) at El
Moral:
21st and 28th Leger,
l00th and l03rd Line
(3 butts. each)
201
'19
m 1,683
10
8,9.',1
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Prugnt unlkr
p,.;,,~A'f11li/. D. Sick. 1'otal,
01ft- tachtd. w,.M6n.
cerl.
----- ----
--
CllI'ALB.Y DIVlS1OY(l'darisy)
at Granatuela ,
loth HU5surs,ilstChas-
scurs. 13th aud 23nd
Dragoons. 'I 1,4·58 391 4ll 11 2,3.;2
AII'MLLE:RY A.'W TRAL~ • 17 741 50 135 3 9<,
PROVISIONAL R:F.IH~'E:;'f' of
il s;}lI1Idrons each of 13th
an eand Dragooul;, on
lUarch to join their corps 31
'"
- - - 58'
EUT-MAJon
"
-
- - - ,'.
----- ------ --Corps Total 603 16,009 881 ::1,001
"
21,178
-- --- ---- -- --
6th CoRI'S (MAII.'lHAI.
NEv) ,
1st DIVIS1W (Mllrchnnd)
at Ledesmn:
6UI Uger (2 batts,),
39th, 69th, 16th Line
(3 batts. each) . 1&' 5,908 31 !l43 I" 7,171
gnd Dll'lSlON (Mermet) at
Alba de Tonnes,
25th Uger (2 batts.),
!ntb and 59UI Liut::
(3 batls. each). 50th
Line (2 batts.) . 201 6,656 10 714 4 7.58.5
3l"d DIVISION (Loison) on
tJle march,
26th aud 82nd Line
(4- batts. eachteoot1l
LinrJ3batts.), gion
du idi aud L<:!gion
Hanovriennc (2 batt.<l.
each), 16th ~er,
33nd Ub-er (1 butt.
each), 2 provisional
batts.. • . . . . 302 1l,9t8 543 1,652 14!? 14,587
CAVAu'Y Dl\'1SIOY(Lorges):
3rd Hussars. 15th Cbas-
scurs, lStb, 2:;th
Dragoons 168 2,31,~ 00 132 , 2,616
ARTILLERY, TIIAlll, El'"-
GHO;EHS .
.'.
I,HO , 78 , 1.230
DII.AFnl. 011 the march Crom
Bayollne to Salamanca. 1.1il 5,636 ,\06 - - 6,298
ETAT-MuOR 79 - -
- -
79
-- --- ---- -- --
Corps Total 1,033 33,682 1,1[;6 3,.519
'"
39,5ii
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Pruml under
Arml. D,- Sid:. Prj,~ Total.Offi- roched. m.
cerl. .¥en.
--- ------
--
7th Co,~ (l\fARSll"AT.
AUG£KEAU) :
1st DIVISIOY (Souharn) at
Vlch:
1st Ltger al\d~nd Line
(3 baUs. each), 7th
Line (2 batts.), Srd
L.:!ger and 93rd Line
{I batt. cac~, 24th
Dragoons, 3 Pro-
2,ai1"isional Chusseurs. . 1(;9 5,213 391
"
8,463
"""
D"'1910N (Pino) .t
Massanet:
Italians, l,t aud 'od
Ltger, 4Ul, 5th, 6th
Line (2 batts. each),
7th Line (I bart.), and
2:J8 O,S'lG '01 2,400 9SDragoons of Napoleon 9,es7
Srd DIVISION (VerdiCt) at
Besalu, indudin~ the
remains of Morio sand
Lccchi's Ja~c di\'isions :
French-S2nd Uler,
2nd, 16th, 56th ine
(I batt. each); Nea·
£Jlirons-Ist and 2nd
ine (2 batts. each);
We!ltphalians - 2nd,
3rd, and 4th Line (2
batts. each), 1st and
2ndofBcrg,and Wiirz-
burg ~ batts. each),
and aluis. Ducal
Saxon, and La Tour
d'Auvergne (1 batt.
each), with 2nd Nca· 3'" 6,009 '50 7,190
""
politan Light Horse . 14,318
4th DIVISIOY (Duhesme)
at Barcelona,
French - 7th Line (i
batts.), 37th aud flQih
Line (1 batt. each),
2nd Swiss Jl batt.),
ChllSscurs es Mon·
tagues (1 batt.), 5th
Italian Line (i balts.),
Datail«>n..Dt~r~-
tal,and3rd rovisional
Cuirassicrs
-
210 S,971 33 2,056 87 8,381
HflAI). QUAIl'tERS GUARD
(I butt. French 67th) . 17 527 12
""
,
'20
ARTILLERY, TaAIl<, EN'
OI}<EERS .. 1.3-16
"
708 91 2,168
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PNHtUtt:nMr
A~. Do- Sick. Prilon-- TQtal.
OJfi- lacMd. m.c,,.,. Mlrl.
--- --
--
-~
--
Dx...."I'S marching from
Perpignall to Barcelona. Si • 1,608 - - - 1,610
DR"'Fn at Perpignnn, &c•.
'"
6.1i5
- - - 6,2.'>l
&T...T-31.....0R
'"
- - -
- 131
----- - --Corps Total 1.338 ~,I4.S 1,112 l5,i5O
'"
51,4-7i
-----
------
--5th CoRN (GDi1!'....... ,
JUNOT) :
1st DIVISION (Clausel) at
Burgos :
~nd Line (4 batb.).
14th, 19th. iSth. 28th.
:J.lth. 36Ul. 50th, 75th
10,.71Line (I balt. each) OIl 9,105 M. 890 -
,m! DIVlnos (Lagrange)
at Burgos :
66th Lme (.a. balts.1. 'lnd.
4th. 12th. 15th Ugtt,
I
3?nd,46th,asth,liISt.
12'md Lioo (. bott.
<ach) .
." ..... 668 JOI 91
10,3<1
3rd DIVlSIOS (Solignac) at
Burgos :
15th, 47th. jOth, "'U,
Line (2 halts. each).
Rl:giment lrlandaiS,
R~ent de Prus.se(l tu. each), . . "', G."" '>13 398 43 8,OHC......L.\· DIVUlO); (Ste.
Croix) :
3 pro\'isional bri~ of
2 ra;adrons e&cb from
16 lIgOOu regiments
'"
5,193 31
- - 5,4·i9
MTlLJ,t:IY, Tuu', E);-
.=u .
'"
1.61~ , GO - 1.110
Dl'l'AOurell'l'S forming gar_
rison of BurgOll , • •
"
'14 , ,,, ,
'"~nT-MUOll
"'
- - - - 88
----- --
-- -- --
COl')Xl Total 956 3!i!,rl39 1.821 2.183 '88 37,331
--
-
------
--
TotA~OPTIIERICan AlIMYC,,,. 6.651 18,~,31O 9,463 33,9J.a '1,180 2&l,w9
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TllOOPS NOT !'OHMING PAIn' 01" THE EIGHT
AR1lY COlll'S
Pruenlll.1jder
A_, I!.- Skit. Prilcm- Total.
OJi- taelled. m,
C81'R.
Men.
- -- ---- --(1) DIVlSlOY D£S$OU.ES
(Ikserve) in march for
Andalusia,
UUI Uger (10 batb;.),
4Srd, 51st, MUi Lille
8,125 960 10,611(3 batts_ each) .
""
1,277 60
(2) GOI".i:1I.10IE/<o'· 01' NA~
VAlIRE (DufOllr) :
Garrison entirely com-
posed ofdrafts,depOts,
177
''''''
19. OH 9,676and provisional units . -
(3) GovcaSlrEYT Of' B.~
CAY (VlI.lentin),
Ont! batt. each of 118th,
lI9th, 1000h Line, 3
rtgjm~mls d« murc/lf,
and 6' Batailll>W ala&-
liairu'
""
H,!H3 2,299 1,83~ - 19,405
(4) PRO\·ISCF..'I OF V ... LI....-
DOLlD Mm PALElfCIA
(Kellermunn) :
Kellermann's Division of
Drugoons,
'''',
6lh,
3,M310lh, IlUI 131 3,077 16" m
"2nd, 3rd, 4th Swiss Cl
batt. each), GlI.rde de
1,710Paris • . • . . . 60 1,690
- -
-
(5) PRO\-llICE Ot' SEOOVIA:
Laval's Gt:rman Division,
detached from the 4th
Co~. Nassau, Hesse,
B en, Holland (2
butts. lmch), Frank-
',rt (I batt.), ""d
Westphalian Chevaux~
Ugers, with French
detachments garrison-
ing Scgovia. . . . 0<" 4,203 1,130 3,311 .31 9,739
(6) MAIlRIIl ASD NEW
CAS'nu:,
1st DIVISIOS
"
"IIE 'th
CoIl.I'S'
28th. 30th, 72nd Line ,
(2 batts. each)
'"
4,123 90 1,710 35 6,083
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Prulmt UruUT
A_. 1>~ Sick. PrI.wn- 7iJtAd.
Offi- ta<;hed. w•.
C#Y,. .~tn.
--- --- --- --- ---C.\VA~RY BRIGAllE:
26th Chasseurs, 3,d
Dutch Hussars. <l 765 90S 50 32 1,()')(j
ARTILLERY, ES'GHIEERS,
THAII.
"
1..~7g
"
107
- 1,711
PlIOV1SIONAL BA'l"rALloS'~
newly a.rrived at Madrid 77 4,784, -
"
91 40,989
Ih.\'1..M,uoll AT MAllRID . 38 - - - - 38
Total in Madrid and New - --- --- --- --- ---
Caslile 330 11,144 381 1.00> 158 13,917
(7) SAS'TAS'llER (Bonnet): ----- --- --- --- --
118tb, 1I9UI, l2Oth,
H?!2nd Line (3 batts.
..cl» . . . 22' 6,839 - 64<l 9" 7,97g
(8) htl'EIIUL GUARD:
1st DlvUlOS' YOUXG GUARD
(Roguet) :
4 Regiments oflnfantry,
1st Provisional Regi-
6,42-t.
""
mCllt of Cavalry 190 76 - 6,989
lid DIVISION YOUlmGUARD
(Dumoustier) :
4R~jlllellts oflufaotry.
2n Provisional Regi-
6,9·l,; 386 148mentofCavalry ..
'"
-
7,701
,'" Provisional Regi-
ment of Cavalry 39
'"
-
- -
713
RTII,T.I:nY, TRAT;>.·, Es-
Gn'Et:lIs • . . 50 1,854- - - - 1,894-
'.'KI'-!t1AJOIt . 8 - - - - 8
-- ---
---
-- ---
-
'l'otallmperial GU8rd 504 15,897
"" ""
-
17,305
--
--- --- --- --- --
9) 'l'flOOPS ., BAYO}l'NE
"
0"" it and '0 tb,
march for Spain:
N"uchli.tel (l batt.),
Ma.rines (2 batts.), 00
squadrons of Gen-
darmes, Artillery,
357 12,939 'ISTl'lIin, Engilleers. .
"
-
13,061
(10) ARIII~IIC _GAIWE
"'I.'AIUlh: ., PORTUGAL(troops designated £0,
service, who have 00')'etmarched),afterwlll"ds
forming Drouefs 9th
Corps,
'"
10,I4-S - - - 16,41';
--
--- --- --- ---
-~
Grand Total 9,48010 281,6.50 16,287 44,254- 2,898 360."'"
A
(
Of whom 3.!2-l,996 are adually iJl Spalll. and of Ulese .!20~,051 are ' Present
under anns • with the colouh,
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VIII
MASSENA'S ARMY OF PORTUGAL
[SEPT.
ON SEPT. 15, 1810, JAN. 1, 1811, AND MARCH IS, 1811
From returns in the Arehives Nationaux at Paris.
2:-'1) conrs, General R.;Y"n:~.
lilt Division, G6llerall\h;~u; :
Brigade Sarrut :
2nd Uger (ht, 2nd, 3rU,4th
halts.) . . . . . .
36~t~.1116.(IS~, ~1Il1: 3~, .'W.l
Brigade Grailldorge :
4th Uger (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th
balts.). ....
DiI'isionrr.1 Total
2nd Division, General HEUDRLlJT:
Brigade Fay:
17thUger(lst,2nd,3rd batts.)
7Ot~t~~~ne .(ls.t, ~lId.' 3~i1, .4t~
Brigade Arnaud :
31~t;;~er ~h~, ~nd.' 3~, .~l.t~
47~~t~~ne.(IS~, ~ll(I: 3~d, .4t~
Divisional Total
On Sept. la, 011 Jan. I, On March
1010. 1811. 16, lall.
Oil'- ,veil,. Oil'- Men. Off'- Mffl.
"',. ar$. CiJriJ.
- --
- --
----
77 2,281 52 1,670
"
1,343
82 1,99i M 1,226 73 1,163
77 2,070 '8 1,31R 61 1,142
-
--
-
--
- --
230 6,M3 lM 4,214 188 3,648
'7 1,341
'"
908 3,1 876
71 2,387
'"
1,422 41 1,231
'7 1,711 44 1,641
"
1,620
76 2,387 6.1 1,461
"
I,Ml
-
-- - --
~
--
261 7,826 106 5,522 ]AA .'i,268
Caval~rigade,Generalp.SOULT:
1st ussars, 22nd Chasseurs,
8th Dragoons, I:Ianoveriall
808Chasscurs . . • • • 106 1,291 .2 1,04.8 .1
Artillery, Train, Engineers. 25 1,5M
""
1,251 • •
E.tat-i
'
l'1ajor 66 66 (j()
- -- - --
Groml Total of Corps 09' 17,02'! M. 12,035 ,,- il,724-,
*Notstated separatel)'. Ail the ArliUery of the Anny of Portugal is placed
under one head in the return of March 15, and not distributed to the t'Orps.
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01~ Sept. l.'i, O,l Jan. 1, Oil Nar'C/j
1810. 1811. 15,1811.
Qffi-IMen. Offi-I Offi~1 Men.
cer8. etr8. Mell. =,.
6TH CORPS, Marshal NEY.
1st Division, General M.... lIcn.... /'i1) :
Brigade i\faucune:
6th urer (1st, 2ml hatts.) • 42 1,436 29 1,008 33 I,Oll
6fith igne (1st, 2nd, 3rd
hatts. ) 56 1,661
"
1,198 42 1,058
Brig-.lde i\farcognct :
39th Ligne (Ist, 2nd, 3,d
hatts.). . 56 1,628
"
1,240 3' 1,150
76th Ligne (Ist, 2nd, 3,d
hatts.) 58 1,732 52 1,350
"'
1,247
- --
- -- -
--
Divisional Total 214 6,457 ID2 4,805 151 4,466
2nd Division, General MJ,:ltMt.'T:
Brigade Bardet:
2lith U$"cr (1st, 2nd hatts.) 37 1,678 39 1,363 37 1,275
27th L'K1l6 (ht, 211d, 3rd
l~'ltts.) .
"
1,827
"
I,MO 32 1,185
Urigalle Labassee:
50th Ligne (ht, 2nd, 3n!
hatts.) . . 65 2,056
"
I,Ml
"
1,431
ti9th Lignc (1st, 2nd, 3,d
batts.) . 60 1,834 60 1,556 42 1,430
- --
-
-- - --
Divisional Total 221 7,3fJ5 212 6,040 162 5,321
3rd Division, General LolSOS :
Brigade Simon:
2Gtll Ligne (5th, 6th, 7th
lIatts.)
"
1,561 46 989 4' 1,077
Legion du Midi . . . . . I' 046 17 303 I' 397
Ugion HanoyriclIlle (2 batts.) 20 1,129 IO 611 23 66.
BrjO"ade Ferey :
3'21111 Uger (2nd hatt.). • • 20 393 14 243 18 262
66th Ligno (4th, lith, 6th
42batl8.) . . . . . . . 6. 1,762 1,3.)3 44 1,316
82nd Ligne(4th and 6th batts.)' 40 1,196 25 733 36 801
~
--
- -~
- --
Divisional Total 230 6,587 103 4,2fJ2 '83 4,.551
Cavalry Brigade, Gen. w.)lO'rTF. :
483rd Hussars, 16th Chasseurs . 74 1,606 604 '1 039
~rtillery, Train, Engineers. 2. 1,403 34 1,73ti 2 • •
Etalr-i\Iajor .2 - 'i7 - 70 -
-
-- - -- - --
Grand total of Corps 868 23,448 716 17,476 817 15,177
I The 82nd had dcmched it,> 6th battalion. 5;5 stl'Ollg, to form part of the
garrison of Almeida.
• Some fractions of the general artillery reserve had been tl'8.nsfcrred to
the corps since Sept. 15, hence the rise in numbers.
54~ AI'PENDICES [SF-PT.
•
011 Sep(. 15, On Jan. I, On March
1810. 1811. 15,1811.
Qffi~1 ,lIell. Offi-I Offi-I Aft/I.
""..
CUll. Nen. ~rl/.
STn COltl'S, Genenl.lu1'i'ot, Duc
d'Abnmtes.
1st Division, Geneml Cr....UlI.:r,:
8rigndc Mcnard :
1mh l.igne th hAtt. ~ . . 10
""
18 278 t
""25th Ligne 41h halt. . 16 571 15 253 t 8
28th Ligne 4th Ntt.) .
"
44.2
"
324 t '00
;}.Itb Ligne (4th batt.) .
·
15 62.1 1.
"'"
t 30S
Brigllde Taupin :
I.lth Leger ~4th br.tt.~ 21 81'
"
... 18 001
46th Ligne 4th batt.
·
18 546 15 '59 t 2O"Z
75th Ligne (4th batt.)
· "
33' 16 233 t Iill
Bripde Godnd :
220d ~e(l!tJ 2nd, 3rd, 4th
battll. . . . . . . . 80 2,4.27 -. 1,648 7. I,GI7,
- --
- -- ~-
Di"isiollal Total 20.> 6,089 '85 3,8"22 SS 3,522
2nd Dh'isioD, General SoLlGSAC :
Bripde Gntien :
15th Li~e (bt, 2nd,
.'"batts.) . . . . 63 1,262 58 925 6' 006
86th L~e (In, 2nd,
.'"
"'tl&) . . 55 ',080 54 1,006
'"
982
Brigade Thomiera :
65th ~e (1st, 2nd, 3n:1, 4th
baits. • . • . . •. 82 2,G80 80 1,951 .. 1,500
Htigiment Irlalltlais. . • . 37 971
"
'25 21 462
Regiment de I'russe 29 957
"
'54 22 ...
- --
Divisional Total 266 6,1160 237 4,761 21' 4,310
Ca\'lI.lr)' Dj,·isionGen. Su. CAOIX:
ht, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th
Dragoons, two squadrons 0
Il6each . . 02 1,771 SO, n8 1,44
Artillery, Tl1I.in, Engineers. 17 !l64'
"
1,083' • •
Etat.-Major . 75 - 69 - 7. -
- --
- -- -
General Total of Corps 655 16,284 600 10,661 4l:l!J
"t By March U Ulcse silt batWions had got so weak that their cadres had
been scnt back to FrAnce, II.nd the remaining rank and tilewcrc being drafted
into the regiments of the ~nd Corps.
1 These regimenl8 had detached their 4th battalions, 516 II.nd 673 strong
respectively, to form the b'8rrison of Ciudad Rodtigo.
• Like the fith Corps, the 8th had received part of the General Park of
the army. Rnd absorbed il.
• About 17 officers and 160 men had been drafted into the garrisons of
Almeida and Rodrigo.
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On &pt. Hi, On JUII. 1, On .l(arch
IOW, WIl. 15,1811.
QIfi-1 Men. QUi- r Men. Offi-I jfelt.
cera. eers. ep.rt.
RESERVE OF CAVALRY,
Gener-...I MO:STOIW:S.
Brigade Lor<:et:
3rtl l and 6th Dragoons
· "
1,040 51 703 51 733
Brigade Gal'roi! :
IItll Dragoons:
·
27 634 28 557
'"
551
Brigade OrnallO:
5715th and 2,sth Dragoons
·
1,360 57 1,178 66 1,014
Horse Artillery. 6 ". 4 162 • •·
---- --
---
-----
Didsional Total 142 3,337 140 2,600 137 2,290
Artillery Reserve, Train, alld
Ellginecl"8 not attached 10
allY corps3. 54 2,311 42 1,516 127 5,720·
Gendarmerie. 6 171 7 100 6 210
Etat-Major or th. A=y and
officers not attached to 'fly
corps . 66 - 60 - 62 -
--
--
---- -- --
Total of the 11'11016 Army 2,47562,v75 2,105 «,488 1,96542,442
Non~-Oll Dec. 26 General Gardanne brougllt up to the front the
4/8Gth Line originally left at Ciudad ROOrigo, and some drafts, making
in all 1,393 men; these :lre counted in the figures of Jan. 1, 1811.
OH .Fell. 5 Geueral }'oy brought up ill a similar fasllion 1,862 conva-
lescents and drafts: these arc counted in the figures of l\lareh 15,1811.
The losses of t11e original 65,060 men who entered l'ortllgal werc there-
fore greater by 3,255 casualties than is shown in tllc table. Thc increase
in tlle number of some regimen!.'! (e. g. 47th Line and Ste. Croix's
Dragoons) between Jan. 1 and l\farcl\ 15 is thus explained. Of the
original 66,000 only 40,000 remained, not 44,000, on Mar<:b 15, 1811.
There is another < return' in the Archives NatiulIaux Oak..l Sep1. 27
where tho figures llNl slightly lower than those gil'en above, the total
running to 62,538 eff'ectives present instead of 61l,OW. '111e 2,500 men
deficient represent tile sick, stragglers, etc. between Sept. 15 and 8ept. 27.
TIle Secoml Corps for example returns 8W 'siek present' in addition to
i!.'! ]6,641 'effectives present.' The 62,538 represent therefore the e.lact
figllting-force at Bu.ssaco.
l The 3rd Drngoons left one squadron, 151 men, at Almeida.
• The lOth Dragoons, tile other regiments of this brigade. 118 slrollg.
had been left at Ciudad Rodrigo under General Gardanne.
• About 300 artillerymen left at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.
• This includes not only the original reserve artillery, park, &0" of the
army, but the whole of the artillery of the three corps, which is not
distributed among them in the return of March U. 1811.
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N.B.-No French return givCB Uta 44th Equipage de Marine, \\'hich
certainly marched with MBSSCIIIl. on Sept. 15. This jJaval battalion of
024 men sllould be added lo the total.
IX
BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBAT 01' THE COA,
JULY 24, 1810
Ki/led. Wounded. Nil/mug. To/al.
Officer'. Men. Offiarl. M",. Offic(m. .lfeJl.
Sta' 1 1
Ij43rd ]~oot 3 15 10 86 15 12!l
1/.52nd Foot 1 2 16 3 22
Ij95th Foot 1 11 8 65 1 53 129
'"
Portuguese
Ca<;adorcs 2 7 7 10
3rt! ditto 2 1 24 2 29
Cavalry - "t
HllSSarsJK.G. L.,
and 16th Light
Dragoons 1 3 2 7
-
Total
"
32 23 lOl 8' 33:J
The total in the text, as in Wellington's dispatch, is wrOllg because of
the omission of the 10 wounded of the 1/52nd wllO are inserted from the
regimental returns, 'VeUillgWn made out the total to 00 317.
X
WELLINGTON'S AR,'1Y AT BUSSACO, SEPT. 27, 1810
INFANTRY
1st Division, General SPf;"'1CJ:;H :
Stopford's Brigade: OJficerl. M",.
1st Coldstream Guards. 24 790
1ht Scots, l'usilier Guanls 26 791 1,084-1 company 5j6Oth Foot 2 51
Lord Blautyre's Hrig'ddc ;
24th fo'oot, 2nd batt. 30 ~l42nd " 23 39161st
" 1st" 36 648 1,616
1 company 5/6Oth Foot 3 47
LOwe's Brigade:
1st Line batt. 1{.G.L. 28
510 }2"' " " 31 4536th
" "
30 460 2,061
7th
" "
24 "28
Detachment Light Batts. K.G.L. • 6 90
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"
J)akenllam'll Bripde:
7t11 Fool, lsl ball.
7901 "
O.ffiur', Men,
W 843 ) 1 ~!)'138 886 ,1_
Tot..,l of 1st Division 327 6,726 7,053
- 1,317)20001
_ 1;373 J
-----
30G 10,371 10,6i7
H2G}
: 2,247
33
522
GI7)I G7'394 ,'-
42
4G' )
-«il 1,100
14S
1,234)1 "76'GO ,I
30
I
31
32
2ll
I
38
40
......
2nd Division, General HII,(,:
W. Ste.warl'll Brigade;
3rd Fool, 1st hatt.
31sl " 2nd"
48UI.. ..
OOth .. "
1 company 6/00th "oot
luglis'R Brig'.tde;
2mh io'ool
48th " l11l ha tt,
67th" "
1 company S/6Otb }<'ool
Catlin Crawfurd'8 (Wilson's) Brigade:
26th Foot, 21l(1 batt. ;j2
34th " " 3G
~!)t.h " " 27
1 comlWl.ny 6/00 Foot 2
Hamilton's I)ortugucsc Dh'ision nttD.ched to 2nd Di\'isioll :
Arehibald CamllOOIl's llrigade ;
4th Line Regirnellt(two batts.)
10th " " "
"'onseca'& Brigade:
2nd Line Regiment (two batti;.)
14th
Total of 2nd Dh·i.sioll
:3rd Divisioll, General Pwros :
Mackillllon's Brigade;
46tll }<'ool, Ist batt.
Hth" "
88th.. "
Lighthumc'8 Brigade:
5th Foot, 2ud batt. 31
B3rd" tnd " 43
OOUI " Gtll " (three companiell) 10
Cll1lnLl,hlllwllll'l! (vil.'e Harvey's) Portuguese Urig-olde:
9th Liue It\!gilll\!ul (two batla.)
21st " " (one batt.)
Total of 3m Divillioll 203 4,540 4,743
I In the Porlllgue5e regiments the oflicen; ate couoled ill ...1th the men.
0 ..... III X n
1,438)26431
1,405 '
[QC'/'.
Offi«r8. Men.
2!) 505
42 92
°1,25 44B w,lO!J
2 58
'"
785
40 1,00'I
27 493 2,449
4 50
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4th Dh'lsion, Mlijor-Generol Co/,F,:
Ale..'7. ('Al.rnpbeU's Brigade:
7th Foot, 2nd batt.
IItII J> 1st "
ti3rd " 2nd "
I company 5/GOth I~oot..
Kemmis'll Brigade:
27tll Foot, 3Id batt.
40tll " Iat "
97th "
I COIllII311Y 6/00th Foot.
Collius's Portuguese Brigade:
11th LillC (two halts.)
23rd
546
Total of 4th Dilillioll 211 7,189 7,400
35
'33130 StlS l,B7!J
29 41)7
1 134
'005 }2,ltlV1
580
1,646}28071
1,161 '
--
--f.I;J 7,2]] 7,305
5th Division, Ceneral L~:ITlI :
names's Brigade:
1st Foot, 3rd batt.
9tll " ] 8t "
3BlIJ" 2nd "
Spr}"s }'ortuguese Brigade:
3rd Line (two hatts.)
15th " "
'1'homar Militia (attached)
Lusiw.niau LegiOll (three hatts.), Baron Eoon ~.
8th Line (tll'O batts.), Colonel Donglns
'rotal of 6th Divisioll
60'1384 1,8!)('P
0,"
'0
12
Light Division, Brigadier..Genernl CpAvrupD :
Beckwitll's Brigade:
43rd Foot, 1st batt.
95th " ., (four compallics)
3rd l'ortuguese Ca)adores
Barolo.y's Brigade:
52nd Foot, 1st bstt. 29 9461
95th " " (four companies) 12 368 1,801 1
1st Portuguese Cafadores 546 __
Total of Light Division G3 3,694 3,787
I In the Portuguese regiments the officers are counled ill witll the men.
• Leith in his report (WeUington, Su.pplenulltary Di4patchu. vi. 636) gives
tbe above brigading. The Portuguese officillllist of troops present{given by
Soriono da Luz, iii) puts Eben os commanding an imperfect brigade. COll-
siating of the llth Line only, whUe the Lusitanian legion is given as a separate
force under Lieut.-Col. Grant.
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lndepelldeut Brigades of Portuguese Infantry:
1st Brigade, Brig•.:ocll. D. l'ack :
1st Line Regiment (two lJatt~.)
16t11 " " "
4th batt. C3)adores
5th Brigade, Brig.-Gcn.•'\. Camphell :
6th Line Regiment (two batt~.)
18th " " .,
Uth hatt. Capdores
Officel'lJ'. Mel/.
1,
089 11,130 2,769
.5.'>0
1,
317 11,38G 3,249
546
6th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Colcman :
7th Line Regiment (two batts.) 6151
19th " " " 1,124 2,345
2nd batt. C'~adores 40G
Total of Independent P01·tUgUese Brigades 6,363
CAVALRY
4th Dragoons (two squadrons) 15 195
ARTlLLERY
U" h {Horse 10 314
rths Field 37 663
K.GJ,..Fioltl 10 '0"
Portugllese . 'Boot
Towl Artillery
"
2,156 2,230
J~NGlNEERS
'"
19 43
\VAGGON TRAli\' 25 397 422
STAFF CORPS. 1 40 41
ca;NERld~ TOTAl,
Britia!l. Portuguese. 'j·ola/.
Infalltry 24,777 24.,649 49,32U
O\\'aIrr 210 210
Artillery 1,31>0 llllO 2,230
Engineers 43 43
Waggoll Train 422 422
Staff Corl'S . 41 41
Totlll vresellt at Bussaco 2U,843 25,429 62,272
, In the Portuguese regiments the officers are t:ounted in with Ule men.
, This figure includes two batteries not present. but detached with Leeor's
division beyond the Nundego. The totals can not be distinguished.
~ D ~
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- ?2,000 2,000
1,2ii)
1,0i8 2,811
450
N.B.-It may be convenient to give here tlle list of the units of
Wellingtoll's field army which were Tlot pre...~nt at the battle of Bussaeo;
these were;-
BmTISII C,\.\· ... I,IlV:
Dc Grey's Brigade: OjJicm;. j[ell.
3rd Dragoon GuardA JB :m'l 6204th Dragoons (tl\'O sqUl\drOJl~) 14 106
(Near Mealhada.)
Slatle's Brigade:
1st Drngoolls 2. 513 } 9G714tll Light Dragoons 17 411
Ausou's llrig-.me:
IOtll Light Dragoons 23 440 } 0021st Hussars, K.G.L. 19 420
(Both near Mealhada.)
fo'ane's Brigade:
13th LiKht Dragoons 2{l 'Ol '30
POllTUGUESB CA\'A1,n\' (under .'ane):
1st Regiment 422}
• " ~114'O7th " 223 ,,,
10t]1 " 354
(All beyond tllC A1va ill Ule direction ofChamusca, &c.)
LEOOK'S Portuguese Division:
Bradford's Brigade:
12th Line Regiment (two hatts.)
13th " " "
6th hatt. ~ores
Militia. Brigade:
Three regiments (Idanha, Castello Brnneo,
Covilh1io)
4,811
(At aud about Poute de MurceUa, aud lIehilld the Alva.)
In garrison at Lisbou, 88th Foot, 2nd Latt. !
In march for Lisbon, .58th "" GB 1,()8(1
At Raim, 1 comp. K.G. L.
Sick. 6,56{;
"On command' 2,220
Of the remaining I'ortuguese regiments Nos. 3 and 17 were at Elvas,
No, 20 at Cadiz, No. 22 at Abrantes, No. 24 had been t.'1ken prisoner at
Almeida. 'lbese are uot part of the field arm)'.
The toml of the fractions of the field ann)' 1I0t present at Dussaco was
9,100.
1810]
Xl
MASSENA'S ORDERS Fan BUSSACO
J{QUro., 26 7bre 1810.
Demain le 27 7bre rarmee attaquera tcs haukuTi; 11II aVllnt de .\fuura
occupees pilI' l'armee enuemie.
Le 2ul1 Corps attaquera la droite tie l'arnuEe ennemie: it tentera a cet
effet de coupeI' la ligne, en gravissant un des points de la montagne le plus
accessible. n}' arrivera par une ou deux co}onlles. en se failSllnt precedcr
par ties tirailleul'8. Vile fois arrive sur le 601Ilmet tlu point qu'it aum
Mcid€ tl'attaquer. il se formem en colonlle serree, et descentlro par la crete
lie la mOlltngnc sur le chemin tie Coimhrc. L,e point 011 iI tlevm s'arrCter
est le Couvent de Bl/uaCi}. 1I lIura soin de se former une reser\'e, pour
se soutenir au l>esoiu. Soli artillerie sera disposee de maniere if. pon,-oir
contrebattre eelle de l'ennemi, et it lul senir de point d'appui,
Le (lWQ Corps attaquera Var les deux ebemillS qui cOlltluisellt sur la
route de Coimhre; ulle de 6eS divisions formeI'a sa n:oserve, et SOli artillerie
sera lllacee par differente8 positions, ]IOUr pou\'oir le llOutellir au besoin.
:\f. le i\fllrCelllll Ney dlsposem ses deux eolonnes d'11ttllque de manicre
it doulIer quanti le General Hernier sera maitre des hauteurs, et qu'i1
marchera sur le Couvent de }JU8lacQ. Cc sera a M, le Mareehal Ney
it presser SOil attaque g'il voit que l'euuemi s'avanee pour f<iire Ul!
mou"ement sur le General Reyllier, ou pour faire UII llIouyemeut de
retI'aite(Iic).' M. le Mareehal est trop pinetre tie l'it-pI'opos de SOli 1lI0UVl;l-
ment llOUI' 4.u'on 10 1111 determine. 11 Ire fOl'a pI'ecL'der par !>Cs tiraillours.
Arrive sllr la Cl"ete do la montllgne il se meUrn en lllltaille pour "ensemble
tics mOllvcment!lulterlCllrs de l'arm6e.
Le gme Corps se J'lk"SembJem en al'1'icre de Mourll fc. 6 heurcs du llllltin.
11 y prendra position, et fera ties dispositions pour soutellir au besoiu les
corps d'armee attaquants, et pour marcher lui-meme al'ennemi.
SOil artillerie sera placee de maniere it arrCter l'ennemi g'il faisait Ull
1lI0UH!ment ell M'allt.
La r6;erve de Cavalerie sera 1'Iacee sur la route tie Coimhre, 611 al'ricI'e
d au centre du 8"'~ Corps.
Le i\Iareclml Prinoo d'.&sling: Slgnc 1\L"SS~NA.
CoJlie couforme : Le Gen. tie dh-isioll B. N, FI'irion,
rour SUII Excellence 1\1. le tlue d'Ahrantks.
I A strange phrase. How could the enemy 'advllnce in order to make
movement of retreat'?
550 APPENDICES
XII
LOSSES AT BUSSACO
ENGUSH AND PORTUGUBSE
[Ol.-'T,
Kilkd.
Offi- Mell.
=.
.It1iuillg.
Offi- Men.
ccra.
Talt)l.
,---------
ht DIVISIO:,\, (Speneer) :
Stopford's Brigade:
1st Coldstream Guards
1/3rd Guards i 2
Blllntre's Brigade:
24t I "'oot, 2nd Batt. I
42ud
" "
6' 6
GIst
"
1st"
Uiwe's BriKRde :
1st Line batt. K.G.L. 0 I • 92"d
" " "
I I G I ,
6th
" " "
I , 10
7th
" " "
, ,
Light COllll'auies . 11 3 I'
l'akenharn's n~de :
7th Foot, 1st tt. I I 22
'"i9th
" "
7 I 41 6 SO
-
-- - -- - -- --
lJil"isioual Lw;s I. .\ III 10 14\
2nd Drvlsros (I·TiII). No Losses whatever.
3rd DIVISION (Picton):
Mackinnoll's Bri~ade :
45th .Foot, Ist att. 0 22 4 IO!) 12 150
74th
"
1 6 1 21 2 31
38th
" "
1 3Q 8 .. 134
LiglrtburJlc's Hritde :
6th t'oot, 2mt tt. I , 8
GOtl\" 6th " 3 5 16 6 20'
ll:l'd
"
2nd
"
I •
,
Chamtemond'li l'ortugu~e
I rigude:
9tl\ Line (two hatts.) . 5 ,
"
2D
2lst " (one batt.) 2 13 , 67 8'
--
--
- --
Dil'isional Loss 7 80 2S 341 20 473
,1t1l DI\'I~IO:'I (Cole). No Losses whate\·er.
Oth DIVISION" (Leith) :
BarnL'S's llrigaole ;
lst Foot, 3nI batt. =_1
9th " 1st " (j 1 18 24
38th" 2nd " [, 1 17 23
, The greater part of the losses of this batlAlion were in the companies
attached to other brigades. but the total is inserted here.
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Killed. WQunded. Jfimllg. I
~~IMe'l. Offi·I Mtll • Offillfen• ITo/al./Jerl. cm. '11
Spry's Portuguese Brigade:
No losses whatever.3rd and 15th Line.
Lusit&nian Legion. No 1088e8 whatever.
Portuguese 8th Line;
tl\·o balls. 29 3 10'2
"
1014
-- I- -- --
I)jvisional Lo38 30 , 137
"
101
LJGIlT DIVlSlos (Cranfurd):
43nl Foot, 1st 1Jratt. 8 8
~2nd
" "
3 3 10 16
"'", " " "
32 n
1st. ~dOre8 , 2lJ 23
ani n I' 3 iO 80
-
--
- '--
IJjvisiollal Lose 24 • 14' I 117
I)ack's Portuguese 8rir1e :
1st Line (two batts. . . I 4 2 32 30
16th" " . I , 2 2. 2 :J3
4th Ca~Orell I
"
, 52 ..
Coleman'$ Portuguese
Brigade:
jth Line (two balts.) . 3 3
19tb ..
"
8 1 28 37
2nd Cat;adOrc8 . • 30 7
'":\. CampbeU's l)ortuguese
Bripde:
6th Line (two butts.) .
18th" "
6th C~Ofe$ 20 23
-- -- -
--
-- --
Total 3 30 10 101 10 2-14
AKTlI,I,P.IW:
British , •K.G.L.. 3 3
Portuguese . 1 ,
"-- -- - -- -- --Total 2 18 20
Gf.NEIlAI, STAll!' G
-- -- - -- - --Graml Total . 11 180 37
""
I 50 1252
[of whom British. • 00 3< 4/)7 I 30 626 I
"
Portuguese G 00 23 46' 20 626 I
I An extraordinary coincidence ill the total losses of the two nations!
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fRENCH WSSES AT BUSSACO
[OCT.
Killed
lir pri,f01IU,f. WQtwded. Tolll~.
Officm. Mffi. Officers. Men.
--- ---
21\"1) CORlJS.
1\h:nl,I-:'8 Division
Sarrut's Brigade;
2nd lAiger . , '1 I' 20'J 30036th Ligne 6 178 22 277 483
Graindorge's Brigade:
4th Uger. . 11 118
"
110 m
Artillery -
-
- 2 2
---
--- ---
Divisional Total 10 317 47 59' 1,041
Ih:lJDJ::u,.'T'8 Division;
FO}~II nrigade :
17th lAger 2 60 20 271 ~,'j3
70th Ligne ,
"
11 24' 317
Arnll.ul1's llrigndc;
31 st l.eger. 3 67 7 2H.l 260
47th Ligne - - 3 3 6
Artillery - - -
"
6
--- --- ---
Divisional '1'01111 11 181
"
j4t> !)i8
COlS :rroOI)S :
1 2
"
_ ngllll!el"ll. - -
Tl"l\in
-
I - - 1
---
--- ---
Grand Total 30 660
"
1,3;1,5 2,023
[Signed: RmlloT, Snldere, Oct. 1.]
'nli!: returJI from the Art;hiWIf du Mirlislere de 1« Gu.erre omits the Etat-
1\1:ljor, whicu had olle onicer killed and four wounded, aud tllO Cavalry,
\vhich, though iu reserve, had wme slight IOSl>es, for i\lartilliell's j.i8te du
Qfficicr6 shows that the 8th Dragoons and the 1st Hussars llau eacl! ono
officer wO\ludl..'(l, and that Pierre Soult, tIte geneml commanding tlw
hrigade, was also hit; probably tcn or a dor.en casualties IImong tllC
men are implied. But the casualties must have been I'ery few in the
mounted arm. Fririon, Ma.ssena's chief of the Staff, gays that the
ptisoners of the second corps came to Hi officers alld 34.0 rank and file,
many of them wounded. If so, the killed must have amounted to 15
officers and 211 men.
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KiUed. WQullded.
Offi~r8· .Men. Q{ficert. Men. Total.
--- ------
6TH CORPS. -
,\I"llcIIAKD'S Division:
Mauculle's Brigade:
70 12 281 3066th U$"er . 2
69th Llgull 2
"
18 416 4110
lIIarcognet's Brigade:
"
3 213 23639UI Ligna -
i6th Ligu6 - 7 3 83 93
---
--- ---
Divisional Total < HO 30 939 1]73
MHlUt:r'S Division:
Bardet's Brigade:
20 2326th l.iiger . - 3 -
27th Ligne . - - 1 - 1
Laoos..'ll!c's Hrig',ulc :
(60th, linth) no 10ssC5 - - - - -
--- --- ---
---
Divisional Total - 3 I 20 24
L<lI~o:."s Division:
Simon's Brigade:
6 37 1G 226 2Ba26th Ligne
I..egion du Midi. . I 32 , 273 311
Legion Hanovriellue < 26 , 182 217
Ferey's Brigade:
32nd Uger 2 13 3 ., 113
66th Ligne ,
"
I' 123 1.'>882nd Ligua 3 18 < 14.5 170
--- --- --- ---
Divisional Total 21 1<1 <7 1043 1262
E-r.\·r.M.\Jolt : - - 7 - 7
--- --- ------
Grund Total 2S 284 01 2,01i6 2456
No return from the Artillery, part of winch was engaged besule
:'>!oum, and must ha"1l llad a few casualties, like that of the 2nd Corps.
8TU CORPS. Junot's corps having OOeu in resell'c, we should uot lmvc
cxpoded to nud any casualties, but Martiniou's list.\! SllOW a fcll' offioors-
live ill all-hit, in the 28th and 86th Liglle, besides all aide-rl6-.eamp of
Clause1 wounded. 'nlis must mean that the corps caught 1I. few stray shells
when it WlIS IJrollgllt UII to cover the retreat of Ney's routed divisions. Tt
would be 1I. minimum to estimate the losses at sixty. Three of l\Iassenn's
IldjQintlf de rEtat-jfl/jQr, and an officer from the Graud Park, are also
mentioned as wounded in Martinien'g lists.
The total of tll6 French losses therefore must have been quite 4,6(N)
killct(, wounded, and missing. The return aCCOUllts for no prisoners from
the 6th Corps. Hut Geneml Simon was certainly CUI/lured, aud lie is l.Iot
likely to have been the efJk prisoner.
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WELUNGTON'S ARMY WITHL'l THE LINES OF
TORRES VEDRAS. MORNING STATE OF'
NOV. 1, 1810
CAVALR.V DIVlSIO~ (S't.lPI,lrr01< Con01'l'):
Do Grey's Brigade: 3rd Dragooll Guards and
4th Dragoons .
Slade's Brigade: 1st DI"db"OOIIS and 14th Light
Dragoons.
Ansou's Brig-m.!c; ] 6th Light Dr.lgOOllS autl
]st HuSSllrs K.G. L. .
Unbrigaded : 13th Lillht Dragoons
Total Cavalry
I. BIUTISH TROOPS (effective, without sick or detached)
Officers. ,1Ie7I, Trnal.
.si 763 aOoI
40 B", BOR
30 76f1 800
28 300 323
163 2,660 2,833
INJ"AN'fRY
1,6Z4 1,685
1,438 1,339
I,D36 2,lH3
1,561 1,681
--
6,558 6,fl48
1st Dll'bllQS (SPJ,;:'<lCER) :
Stopford's Brigade: 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Scots
Fusilier Guards, and onc company 5/GOth Foot. (;1
Camcron's Brigade: 2/24th, 2j42nd, 1/7Uth ]?oot,
and one company 5j60th . . 101
Erskinc's Brigade: l/5Otli, 1/718t, Ij92nd 1"oot,
and onc company Ji/GOth Foot . , . 108
l..owe's Brigade: 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th I,ille ba.ttAlioll
K.G.L., and a light company K.G.L. . 120
Divisional Total . 300
'''''
1,007 2,103
!l7 1,560 1,637
04 1,395 1,48!)
320 4,022 li,251DivisiOllal Total
2nd DIVISION (HILL) :
Colborne's Brigade: 1/3rd,2/31st, 2/48t", 2/66tll
Foot, and one comllllllY 6/6Otll .
HongMon's Brigade: 29UI, 1/48tiJ, 1/67th, ami
one compan)' 5/6Oth Voot .
Lumley's Brigade: 2/28th, 2/34tll, ~/3lJtJI, nnd
one company 6/6Oth :I<'oot
3rd DIVISlON (l'ICTON) :
Mackitlfion's Brigade: 1/43th, 1/74t11, 1/88lh Voot 117 1,M'\ 1,681
Colville's Brigade: 2/6th, 2/H3rd, 94th, and three
com)lallies 5/00th }1'oot 122 1,533 1,6.53
Dlvisioual Total . 239 3,007 3,336
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Qflicers. Men. Totaf.
,1lh 0lv1510N (COLI':) ;
Kemmis's Brigade; 2/27tll, 1/40th, tY7lh, ami uue
company of 5j60th Foot . lIB 2,454 2,672
I'akcnh:un's Brigade: l/7th, Ij6lst FooL, and
Brunswick-Octs JagCf'l'; 125 2,005 2,220
I)ivisionlll Total
5th Dn'lsloN (Ll':I1'Il);
Hay's Brigatl6: 3/lst, 1/0tll, i/38th Foot
I)unlop's Brigade: 2/30tl1, 2/44tll Foot
Dirisional TouII
243 4,54\l
HU 1,ti58
56 1,126
14!' 3,084
4,702
2,047
1,182
3,229
6lh DiVISION (A•.H. C,I)U'Dl':LL) :
Only one Brigade; 2(7th, l/lltll, 2/li3rd Foot, amI
olle oolllpauy 5/60lh Foot. 101
lJivisioual Total . 101
J.,WUT DII'I!UO:.' (CRAu.'unll):
I3e<:kwith's llrig;ule: 1/43rd, and companies of the
1st and 2nd UStll 66
2nd Brig-due: 1/5211d aut! CUlIllJauie8 of 1/05tiJ 52
Divisional Total 108
INfA.NTIW Ul'i.l,TTACIU:O TO A~Y DIVISIO~:
2/58th, 2/88th Foot, and one company K.G.L.
1,8U 1,048
--],847 1,948
1,427 1,483
1,230 1,282
2,657 2,765
874
Geueml Total of 11Ifautry 1,(11) 27,588 20,2Q7
~I!JTISI~ AItTlI.LJo;It\' (Horse) 18
"'"
;)')')
" "
(Foot) 48 797 845
K,G.L. AItTlu~:nv 10 328 347
Total Artiller)' AA 1,42!l 1,614
t;I'iGI1i".:~HS 24 1. 43
THAI:" 24 306 422
STAFf' CORi'S 3
"
40
TOUL E.'I'.;CTII'1o: STIlIo::,,(;rll 0.' rill> BlIITISII TIlOOPS
0:< No\". 1,1810 :
CAVAI,H\'
lNI'A1i"TIl'l
AnTII,M:R.Y
OTJU:H CoHPS
153 2,{I8Q
1,6W 27,.588
85 1,429
ril 4.'i4
2,833
29,207
1,614
""Grand'roml 1,008 32,16J 34,069
'ne army llad at the same time !),213 men in hospital, and 2,028 mCll
detaclled, wlJO are uot counted in the above total.
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N.ll.-Wellington, as it will be noted 011 page 45], says that he bad only
2'J,OOO DritislL sab~es and bayonets ready to take the offensive at this date.
This appears to be an uuder-estimate; but it must be remembered tllat
he (according to llis custom) only counts fauk and tile, omitting otliceN.
Mon'Ovor, Ule two battalions nut IJrigaded, 2j68th and 2j88th, forming the
garrison of tllO Lisbon forts, tllC gunriers (about 200) in the fort.~, awl
the Train (as non-eombatant) aro also omitted in llis calculation, so that
:l9,OOO is not far out.
11. PORTIJGUES"~ TROOPS (effective, without !lick or det'lChed)
~'RO.\l A ReTuns 01' OC'!". 29, 1810
2,0a;)
1,961
2,53.5
llf!4
1,213
Offieel'8
<\. Mell
Preullt.
2,207
2,414
2,163
2,407
2,442
2,H16
1st llr%-ade (Pack): 1st and 16th Line, 4th C~adol'es
2nd Brignde ' (fonseca): 2nd and 14th Liue
3rd Brigwlc" (Spry); 3rd 111111 15t11 Line.
4th Brigade J (Ard. Campbell): 4th and 1001 Lille
6th Brigade (A, Campbell): 6tllalld 18th Line and 6th Ca~ores
6th Brigade (Coleman): 7th and 19th 'Line, and 2nd ~ores.
ith Brigade 3 (Baron Ehen); atli Line, 1st and 2nd Lusitllnian
Legion,
SUI Brigade' (Sutton, 1'it:6 Chaml'lemomJ): 9tiJ auo 21st Line
9th Brigadll" (CoIliUJ:!, vicll Harvey); 11 th and 23rt! Line.
1st l1ud 3rd ~dores, attached to Li,l\'ht Division
12th Line', attached to Lecor's Militia. Division
Total Regular Infantry 22,64i'i
RlWULAR c:.:,WALRY (FANt:'S DIVlSIOS);
1st, 4th, 7th, 10th Regiments .
Il.EGUUR ARTII.l,Y.RY (9 batteries).
1,193
701
Total Regulal'l! uf all Arms 24,639
N.R-The Portuguese regulars had, ol'er alld a"OI'C these 24,63'J offit:ers
alld men present with tlle colours, 3,011 men sick ano detached.
1 These tv.o brigade:>, forming Hamilton's division, were always acting
with Hill's British Division.
1 Forming part of Leith's 5th Division,
• Fonning part of Alex. Campbell's 6th Division,
, Fonning part of Picton's 3rd Division.
• Jlonning part of Cole's 4-th Division.
• This regiment. wiU, Ull; 13th Line, formed Bradford's brigade of Leeor's
Portugue5C division, But the 13th was absent, in garrison at Abrantes.
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iGI
2,88G
2,616
1,907
2,231
601
Officers 4' Men
MU.JTU Mm EmlOlJI!:m OMJW1i"u,p : Prt8e1lf.
(I) Lecor's Division (Alhalldra Forts): Reginnmts of Santarem,
Idnnlm, Castcl.Io Braneo, Covi1111io, rmd Feira. [12th Line,
counteOIlOO\'c, WIIS also attaclled] I
(2) At Buce1la.s Forts: Regiments of Lisbon (Termo), Thofilllr,
'('orres Vedras
(3) In the :Forts facing Sobral : Atiradores Nacionaes (embodied
OrtlcualU;a), 2 IJatts.
(4) In 'J'OlTCS Vcdras Forts; Uegiments 'If Lisbon (E.), Lisbon
(W.), Setubal, AI~er fl0 Sui
(5) At Mafm fo'om: Regiment of ViZCll
Militia Artillery [composed of cadres from the regular artillery
filled with Voluuteers from the Militia and embodied
Ol'den3nf?l] .
Total Militia, &c. . 1l,092
The Militia and emboilicd OrdcDllllr;a had, over and nbol'c tllC-"C 11,092
officers and men present with the colours, 1,267 sick and detached.
Dt:.POr TROOPS :
Tile depOts of the Line and Militia contained, on Oct. 29,
G,470 more or less trained recruits, who had not yet joined
their corpa, but all did 8() before Dec. l,and 530 sick, I hM'e
OlL page434 reckoned tlleamount of these availalJle Oil Oct. 15
at 3,000 mOD. Besides theso 6,470 mon thero was at l'oniclu"
outside the lines and in MlISIlCna'll rear, a general depot of
recruits, containing several thousand men who were not yet
trained. Of these no account, of course, i.s taken here.
Ill. SPANISH TROOPS WITHIN THE LINES
VASGUARO DIVISIOS OF TIlE ARMY Ol' ESTltEMAI>UlIA (LA CARRF.II.A) :
Principe (2 batts.), 1st 31ld 2nd of Catalonia (1 batt. eacll),
Vittoria (1 batt.)-about 2,500
[N.D.-One battalion of Principe, and Volunteers of Gerona,
lIelougiug to this division, remained behind at UadajO'I.,]
2nd DJVISION (CIIAlII,~ O'DONNIlliL) ;
Zamol'lt (2 b.'ltts.), Hey (2 b.'ltts.), TolCflo (2 batts,), Hibernin
(2 batts.), Princesa (2 baWl.), 2nd of Seville (1 batt.}-about 5,500
[N.B.-l'emando VJJ, Voluntarios de Navarra, and Tiradores
de Castilla, belonging to this division, remained helLind in
EstremaduTa, at Badajoz and elsewl1ere.]
Total . 8,000
, The 5th ~dores, which had formed part of Bmdford's brigade and
Leeor's dil'ision, was in October and November outside the lines, on the
south side of the Tagus. obserVing Santarem, and under the orders of t11e
Cavalr)'-General Fane.
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111ese numbers are probably a little overstated; Oil :Feb. 1 the whole
Vanguard, including tle battalions left bellind, had only 2,G37 effectives,
and the whole 2nd Divisioll,'illc1udiug the four battalions left in Estre-
madura, only 5,108. It is proltable that the wast.'lge of the Spanish troops
when iu~idl;\ tlll;\ Line~ was 1I0t laI'Ke, and that Oil Nov. 1 the Ivhole of 1':1
Romana's ~j;,:tccn battalions did not make i ,000 men.
TOTAl. OF REGULAR TIWOI'~ IN 'I'm: LINIS~
BlllTISlI
POIlTUOUESr. •
SPANISH
Total
;W,OM)
24,03!J
8,000
GG,500
Add l)ortuguese Militia lmd embodied Ordenall<ra, 11,092 strong, and
the total of organi~ed troops in the Lines makes 77,Goo.
XV
THE llRlTISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY
IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1810
ROYAL HORS"; AltTII,I.I:RY.
Two troops served in the Bussaco campaign, viz. ;_.
A Troop, Captaill I-I. D. floss, which had arrived in j)ortugal ill July
1809. [Present designatiou, <A Battery,' R.n.A.]
I Troop, Captain R. Bull, which had arrh'ed ill August ]800,
[present dl;lSiguatioll,' I &twry; R.H.A.]
Therl;\ was also preseDt in Lisbon tho skeleton of D Troop, Captain
G. Lefehure. [Present desigllation, < V Battery; R.H.A.] But tilis unit
had suffered from perils of the f1cn: a tranSJlOrl carrying part of its officers
aud men lad been driveu ailtlOre on hetand; and the portion whidl
arrived in Mareh Ja1O, being incomplete and almost horseless, was not
scnt to the front. It lent some men to the other two R.lI.A. batteries:
the rest were employed in the Lisbon forts.
To match the list of the Artillery units ill Wellington's arlllY which tJJe
law Colonel F. A. \Vliiuyates was so good ail to cOJllpile for me for tlte
year 1809, allll which forms Appendix XI of my 8eC()nd volume, I hal'l;\
compilCl1, witil tile illl'aluable aid of Major JOIIll H. Lcslie, It.A., who is
responsihle for all the Britisl] section, tile following apllendh to 11OI'C]'
the yC'lLr 1810.
ROYAl, l<~OOT AIITILU:RY
'
•
Two ba.tteries served in the Bussaco campaigll, vi"t.:-
, The companies of Ule battalions R.A. were not Ilumbered in lIlIO. but
only designated by their captains' names. The nllmbers here gh·en. for
purposes of easier identification, are those given to U'l;lSe companies \I'hen
numeration wa.., introduced about 18112.
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tilh Compall)', 7th battalion, Captain G. 1'110011'50n, which had arrived
in March 1809. [Present designation, 1Bth Hatter)', Rl<'.A.)
itll Company, alll battalion, Captain It. Lawson, wllich had arrived
ill September 1808. (present llesignntion, Bitll natter)', R.F.A.)
There were also present in tIle Pellinsnla, hnt not in the Hllssaco
campaign :-
1st Company, 4th battalion, Captain .I. Hawker [now 721)11 Company,
!l.G.A.].
10th COmpan}', 8th battalioll, Captaill P. l\leadows [all extinct unit].
Uotb of wldch arrived at Lisbon in October J81O, and waited ill the
Torres "~Ir-<lS Lilies for tlte rlltiring army, having come too lalll for llJe
field opcl"',ltions, Also
IlltCompony, Btll battalion, Bt.-Major A. BrC(lin [no\\' 27th Battery,
IU'.A,.).
2nd Company, 1st battalion, 2nd Captain H. llaynes [now 2nd .B.."\ttery,
R.F.A.]'
10th Company, 5th battalioll, Captai.n F. Glubb [noli" 48th Compan)',
n.G.A.].
All of which had arrh·ed ill IB08-!). But llayncs's battery had not ulken
tlle field sin<:e 1'ala.vera, nud Bredill's anti Glubb's [both illl'OlIIplcte) llau
nnt gone to the front in 1800 or in 1810. 'nleY had all lain within the
Lines sill<:e the winter of 1800-10.
In addition there were fi\'e batteries with Graham's force at Cadiz.
6th Company, 6th battalion. Captain H. OlVen [no\l· GOtl1 Company,
n.G.A.].
6th Company, !)t!l battalion, Call1.ain P. J. HuglJes [all extinct unit].
6th Compall}', lOth battalion, Captaill W. Itoberts [now 631'1.1 Company,
RC.A.].
4th Company,lOtII bnttn.lion. Capt"\in It H. Birch I [llOW 2]st Com)lally,
R.G.A.]. .
5th Company, 10th battalion, Captain W. H. Shenley [now 11th
Company, R.G.A.]'
2no Company, Captain C. \·Oll Rettberg [arrived August 1600).
4tll Company, Captain A. Clool'es [arrived August 1808).
Both present at Bussuco. 1n the 1809 campaign the)" had been com-
manded respectively by Vaptaills A. 'lielillg alld H. L. Heise.
l'OIlTUGVt:St; AHTII,I,H!t\".
The Portuguese Artillery force consisted of fonr regimCllls of aboLlt
1,200 men each, from whicll batteries were formed from time to time for
field service, or garrison service indifferently.
In the Bussaco campaign there took part the followiug units, whicb were
present at the battle :-
, Captllin Birch commanded this company from June UIlO to July 18U.
vice Captain Alcx. Diekson, employed with the Portuguese llmly.
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1st Regiment, t\\·o batteries under Major Alex. Dickson, both of
6-pounders, viz. those of Captaio Pedro de Rozierres aod Captain Joio da
Cunha Prelo.
2nd Hegiment, two batterie8 under Major V. vou Arelltschildt, viz.
thOlle of Capt.,in Joflo I)orfirio (la. Silvll. and Captain ,Iacinto 1'. M. Frcire,
hot11 of 3-pounders.
4th Regiment,oue batter)' eommanded by Captain Antonio de Sonsa
I'assos (G-poullders).
There were also at the front, but not engaged at Bussaco, two more
batteries, which were with Lecor's division behind tIle Alva, on tile Ponte
i\Iurcella position-viz. ooe (If 9-P<Junders, captainless till Oct. I,
WllCll it came under the command of Captain Wilhelln BrauD, :Uld one
of 3-pounders. The former joined Dicksou's dil'ision on Sept. 28; the
latter joined Arentschildt'l! (1ivl~ion.
Two more field batteries joined the ann)' at the Lines after its retrent :
that of Captain Francisco Cypriano Pinto (G-pounders) was allotted to
Dicksou's division; tile other (no captain, 9-pounders) joined
Arentschildt's eommand.
The rest of the Artillery at Lisbon was utilized as garrisou-artillery for
the Lines, receh'ing into its mnks an immense llroportioll of Imlf-lmined
volunteers from the )IilitiB Bnd Ordenaw;n, so that the whole can hllnlly hc
cOllsidereclas forming part of the regular army. I ha'·c reckoncd it into
tile militia foree in the preceding table. TIle districts served by this
artillery, the commanders of the districts, and the number of effective men
in each were on No\'. 15, 1810 :~
l\1ilitia-
Regula.rs. \'oluntoors, Total.
258 182 440
218 847 1,065
150 300 450
ISO 248 396
233 30.5 ./i38
Alllllndra Forts-Major In'-Ill C. Pinto
Bucellas Forts-Colonel Romao de Arriada.
Monte AgTaf:l. Forts-Major J. J. da Cruz
Torres Vedras Forts-Captain F. J. V. Barreiros
Mafra Forts-Major Caelano 1'. Xavier .
I,oon 1,882 2,891
Addi.ng these to the 701 men of the nine field batteries we get 3,592 in
all, Of wllOm 1,710 were regulllr.'l,
'fhe officer in command of the whole Portuguese artillery lI'as
Marechal de Campo J. A, da Roza. Colonel nomao de Arriadacommanded
the 1st Regiment.
TIle 4th Regiment of the Portuguese artillery, that of the OP<Jrto
tlistrict, furnished (lllly one battery (that (If Captaiu Passos) to the army
of Welliugtoll, tlle rest of it being either serving with Silveira's army in
the nortll, or with Trallt, or doing garrison duty at OP<Jrto. This
regiment had also coutributed to the lost garrisou of Almeida.
'nle 3rd Regiment supplied uo meu to the field army or tile garrison of
the Torres Vedms Lincs, being absorbed in garrisoning Abrantes, ElvllS,
Campo Mayor, and the other places on tile frontier south of tile Tagu~.
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AllSOll, Geor~e, cavalry general, 011
retreat to '1 urre!i Vedrd.S, 402-13;
pursues the French to &mtarcm,
469.
Ara~ella, combat of, 21.5.
Aragoll, Sucllet's collquest of, 11-
14,282; later insurrection ill, 600.
Aranjuez, Areizaga's operatiollS
round, 87-9.
Arce, Antonio, general, cOlllmands
in Asturia~ 217 j deposed,218.
Arei:mga., t.:arlo;;, A''eneral, com-
mands army in La ManciJa,73,84 ;
his advance on Aranjuez, 8.5-7;
defeated by Soult at Oeaiia, \)1-6 j
defeated at Sierra Morena, 128-32;
superseded uy Blake, 151.
ArguCllcs,AgOlltin, Lihemlleader ill
the Cortes, 515.
Astorga, fortmg, 164, ~20; !!iegc
of, 223-6.
Asturias, Bonllet in, 217-20 i ex-
ploits of Porlier in, 48.5.
Augereau, Pierre }o'raJl~ois (;harles,
Marshal, due de Castiglioue,super-
sedcs St. Cl'r, 18; at sicgll of
Gerona, 53; Ilis proclamations, 54 ;
his harsll treatment of garrison of
Gerona, 60 j marches Oil Barcelona,
282, 288, 200; created militarl'
gxwerllor of Catalonia, 200; eheck~
!;ld befor!;l 'l'arl'agoua, 295; super·
5eded by MacdowlLu, 299.
Augereau, ,Tellll", gencml, brother
of above, unskilful operations of, .
295,297.
A\'ila, Ney's bigll-haudcd doings at,
202, .505.
Bawt!lal', Malluel, gelleral, com·
muUlIs northern prol'iuces of
Portugal, 176, 346, 300.
Badajoz, fortres.;l, 165 j' threatened
by Mortier, 151,213.
llagur (Catalonia), captured uy
British landing-force, 498.
llallasterOl3, lo'r.illcisco, serl'llS lUJdcl'
Del l'arque, 80, 98-0; surprises
[\fortier's cavalry, 215; defllllted
00(I....... III
Abrautes, Duke of, iJ« J Ullot.
Abralltes, Laure, Duchess oJ~ her
lett.e1'8,447.
Abrantcs,fortrcss of, 189; i\Ia.'lScna's
designs against, 445 j views of
Napoleon on, 457.
I\gar, captain Pedro, made olle of
the Spanish Regency, 518.
Agueda river, Craufurd's operations
ou the, 230-8.
Alba de 'formes, IJattle of, 99-100.
Albllquerque, Duke of, comnulIlI.ls
,hOly ofEstremadura, 84,!)i ; his
march Oil Cadiz, ]36-8 ; governor
of Cadiz, 149 ; goes as ambassador
to London and dies, 325.
Alcala la l{eaI, com1xl.t of, MO,
Ah:afiill, operatiolJsaruuliIl, 300,30.5.
Alcocntre, skirmish Ilt, 413.
AlemfJucr, combat of, 418.
AlIlandra, the )KlSitioll at, 42.5; Hill
at, 427.
Almaraz, operations around, 97.
Almat.an, combat of, 490.
Almcida, frontier fortress of Portu-
gal, 188; siege of, 267, 271-5;
blockaded by Silveirn, 447.
Almellara, Jos~ HervlIS, l\larqui3 of,
Spanish envo)' at Paris, 50-B9.
Alorna, general, Marquis of, Portu·
guese adviser of MassbJa, 163; at
Ahut\ida, 274-6, 348.
Alplljarras, illSUrrediulIs' ill the,
1.50, 324-7.
Ah'a, river, '\'ellingtoll's IlOi3itiOll
on tlle, 190,~.
Alvare-..:, Marinuo de Castro, gover·
llor of GeronR, 22-7,30-6, 47-67;
resigns command, 60; his impri.
sown!:Jllt allll death, 60-6.
AlIlIi!rica, revolt of the ::lp:mish
Colonies in, .513; tlu':dr deputies
atCmli:6, 104, 612-14.
Andalugin, conqucst of, by the
J.'rencll, 114 ; spring- and summer
campaign in, 315-40 j Soull's
government of,316-18.
An~lona, I'riuce of, commnnds
Ga1ician cal'alry, 75, 78,
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at Zalamca ami Ar-d.lfCU3, 215;
later operatiolls of, 324, 331.
BaragullY il'Hillicr!l, Aollillc, gene-
ral, commands French foreel!' ill
N(lrlh Catalonia, 49.5, 497.
Barba del Puerco, skirmish of, 236.
Barcelona, the French ill, 14,16 ;
cOllsl'irncy in, 2,1; Mal;uouald'lI
care cOllccrtlillg,312,4ll:J,494, 501.
.Bnrcena, colonel, surprise!" I..COIl,
271; commandsin theAsturias,485.
Barquilla, combat of, 255.
Darreiros,major, Portuguese officer,
betrays Almeida, 275.
Baxtcr, scrgC<'lllt, his exploit, 469.
Hazn. TOut of, 337, 338.
Beckwith, c'010Ile1, at Barba del
I'llcn;o, 2313; at tlle Coo, 261.
Hereriord, \ViIliam Carr, marshal,
organizes Portuguese army, 171-
87; WeUiligtoll's cOlllidence in
llim, 233.
nlnke, .roacllim, geneml, ill Cata-
lonia, !J ; Ilis attempts to succour
Gcrolla, 40-4, 32, 65-6; his mis-
takes, 65; supersedes Al'ei~,
161; resigns Cntaloniall eOlllmand,
289 j commands in Cadiz, 325 ;
routed at Bnw, 337-8; rmule 11
Regent, fi18.
B1ayney, Lord, his disaster at ~'\Ien­
girola, 335-6.
llolivar, general JuliallO, surrOLl-
clers Gerona, aU.
Bonuet, geuoral, his cUlllpaigu in
the Asturias, 217-20, 271; later
0lleratiolls of, in the Asturin.s,
483-.'5.
llussaco, Wellington at, 3b2; de-
scription of, 359-61, 386-9; battle
of,362-89.
Cabrem, isle of, snifelingil of FrelLch
prisoners at, 323.
Cadiz, held b)' Spaniards, 138 ; po-
sition aud defences of, 145-9 j
attacked by Victor, 318-22; assem-
bly of the Cortes al, 512-20.
Cafl"urelli, geuol"al, commands tllo
, Bearglll\Td of tl1C army of Spain,'
484-7.
Campbell, Kenel'al, gOI'ernor of
Gibraltar, sends troops to Fllell-
girola, 33{;.
Call1phell, Ale."allder, commands
6th UiI'isioll, 430, 441, 453.
Canllwverde, l\larquis of, com-
mands 1.1 division ill Catalolliu, 290 ;
at the atlair of La Hispal, 497-8;
ravages the borders of FrRnce,499j
defeats Macdonald at Cardona, 500.
Carbon, colonel, defends Mequin_
enlla,3Oll.
Cardolla, Macdonald repulsed at,
500.
Caro, Jose, general, Ilis manifesto
ag'dinst the Juuf.u., 7 ; governor of
Valencia, Ol)~ Suchet, 283-4 ;
flies before French advance and i~
deposed,494.
Caro, Juan, general, captures Villa-
frallca, 295; aids in dCpo!!ing his
brother Jose, 49,1.
Casf.u.flos, Xaviur, gCIlCl.I1, saves the
lives of tllo Ccntral Junta, 141 ;
made a member of the first Re-
gencr,141; deposeU by the Co.rtes,
,:ill].
Catalonia., <;ampaigus ill, 14-60,
207~313, 492-504.
Cer\'era, J\!acllOllald's cantonments
at, 496-7.
Cisgar, Gaoriel, adrnirJII. made
Hegeut, 5J B.
Ciudad Rodrigo, fortress, 164, 22:!,
239 j siege of, 240-.53.
Clausel, Bcrtrand, gellcral, his ru-
JIOl't on the rrellch anny at 'l'orrcs
Vedros. 463 j at Salltarem, 47tl.
Coa, river, cornUat of the, 2b7-66.
Coimbra, emcuatioll of, 400-3;
w;k of, 404 j recovered by
·J't-J.nt, 410-11, 479.
Cole, l..owr)', generAl, at BusMeo,
355-7fl j at Torres Vedras, 430-
53 ; pursues }'l'encll to Santarem,
4il-0.
COllcepcioll, Fort, blowlI up by
the BritislL, 2.'57.
Conde, Garcia, leads convoy illto
f1eronft, 42-4.; governor of
Lerida, 302-0; surrenders and
does homage to Joseph, 308.
Copons, Francisco, general, llis
guerrilla warfaro in Weslerll
AllIlalusia, 32fl-34.
Cortel>', prol>OS;11 for sUJlunouing the,
104--5; meeting of tlm, 482, fill.
Cotton, Stapletoll, general, com-
mands British ca\·lI.1rr on retreat.
to Torrcs Vedras, 462-3.
COUpill"Il)', :'oIarquis, commands ill
Catalonia, 2-1-5.
Co", "'illiam, geueral, commands
at Almeida, 188, 267, 273-6.
Craufurd, IWbert, gcueral, COUl-
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mands the Li~hl l)i\'i~ion, 231 ;
confidence of \\'ellington in him,
23"2, US ; earl)" career of, 233-5 ;
hit methods, 2;)G-7; skirmish
....ith Ste. Croix, 251 ; at combat
of Barquilla, 25S; at oombat of
the Coa, 2a7-266 ; at Bussaco,
355, 363-79; n:treatll to Torres
Vedrns, 397, 402; retreAt!! 011
Sobril, 414, 449; punnes the
French, 467-9; hili eXlledition
into the Frellch lines, 471-2; at
:santarem,473-1:I.
I)'AJoma. /#It! Alorna.
On COllta, Bcrnardo, Portuguese
offic~r, mutinies at Almeida, 275;
executed. 277.
Daroca, seiud bv French, 11.
Del l'arque. the' Duke, commands
the 'Anny of the .Left: 70;
'ft'ins bGWe of TamamC8, 'i7-9;
occnpics Salamanca, 81 ; recol'el1l
SalAmanca, 97; defeated at Alhlt.
de Tormes, 100; l!uperseded by
Li.llomana,14l.
D'Kspaiia, CarIOll, geueral, aids the
Por1uguese, 449; deetroys bridge
of Villa Vcllla, 4M; a1 Ahrantes,
467.
Doyle, Charles, colonel, Ilritish
Commissioner ill Catalonia, ac-
tivitr of, 497-9.
l)rouct. Jean llaptiste, Comte d'
Io::rlon, commallds tile !.lth Corp6,
447; at Yalladoiid, 466: ordered
to 1IlIVB.11OO to Almeida, 468.
Dn!le;;me, Philippe, general, in
Barcelona, 61-2; deposed from
go\'emofihip, 290.
D'Urban, Sir Bcnjamin, his memo-
randum on tile Portuguese ami)',
173, 178 (not~) ; notes 011 lluSl;aC(l,
:JS7; At Torres Ved1'llS, 446;
tactical obser\'ations of, 478.
EbU, Jean Baptiste, general, com-
mands artilfery at Santarem,
·H!J-iiO,
Jo:c1Ulvarria, general, defeated by the
io·nmch,220.
Echeverria, ~errillero ehief, l!hot
by Minll, 488.
t;guia, Francis<:o Ramou, general,
marches for La 1\lancha, G9; de-.
posed from command, 73.
tmpeeimulo, the (Juan.)lartin
Dw), seizes Guadalajara, 11fi;
hal'll.'!eCS King ,Joseph, 339; his
incursiolls round Madrid, 511.
Eroles, Darol1 de, command in
Catalonia, 497, 500.
Eslnula, Juliano, colonel, defend!!
Ho;ltalri\:h, 291, 293, 200.
Estmdn NO\'a, the, 161.
Fane, Hon. Hem')', general. com-
mands Portuguese cavalry,:J(H ; at
Line>! ofTorres Vedras, 431; opera-
tiolls of, Oil llOutlJ bank of the
Tagus, 402, 'J07, 470-(;'
Fane, captai", ItN.} 1c.'Uls raitl on
coast of Catalonia, 4!J7-!l.
Fere)', general,at Barba dell'ul!.fCO,
238; at Bus..<Iloo, 379; before tile
lilies of TOffes Yedras, 44.!J, 400.
Flandrin, major, left ill charge of
Coimbra, 407.
Hetcher, Richanl, colonel, t:OIl-
structa Lines of TolTl!.8 Vcdras,
191-2,420.
J.·orj.u, :\Iiguel,geueral, Portugu~
minister of ",ar, 418. .
.'ourn.a!J, Diu, brigadier-general,
bis defence of Moujuich, 2'J, 34 ;
surrl!.nders at Verona, 59.
Foy, l\Iaximiliell, general, nt llus-
AACO, 36!J,374, 377, 385; repor1Jl
on the Une8 of Tones VedrlL~.
440 ; his miuioll to Paris, 455-0.
Freire, i\lanuel, general, command!!
cavalry at Aranjuez, 87; routed
br ::Sebastiani, 90; defeated at
Alcala la Real, 150; comIll311t111
Mun:ian amlY, 325.
Fririon, FI1tIl~is, chief of tile 8tltlf
to MMM'llA, 200; his ~l(h'ice at
UlI9lSCO, 368 ; remark. on official
accouutl of Bussaco, 448.
Fuengirola, disaster at, 355-6.
FUensa.llta, combat at.. 503.
G1.1icia,l Arm}' of. under Del Parque,
70; Mah}' left in command of,
7.5; o~rntions 011 the homers of,
218,2/0,48$.
Gara}', Martin de, Sel::retary of
Stale, his letters to Wellesle)', 67,
Ganlaullc, Clallllc, gencral, left
hellintl to guard MIIS.-.enn'ij balle,
344; ordered to join MlWM'ina,
460 ; bis failure, 400.
Gayau, partisan chief, opposes
Sucbet in Aragoll, 11.
Guan, Ilonore, ~lleral, ;at the
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Sierra Moreua, 130; operations
of, in Amlnlnsia, 330.
Gerona, third siege of, ]9-60.
Giraro, Jean Baptiste, general, at
Ocaila, 93-4; opposes the Serranos,
328; defeats La Romana at Villa
Gareia, 331.
Giron, r'rnncisco, gcneral, ntOeafia,
94-6; at the Sierra i\lorena, 13l.
Grahnm, Thomas, general, com-
mands British troops at Cafu, 320.
Gran3(la, submits to Sebastiani, ][)().
Granollers, combat of, 290.
Guerrilleros, the, 1l5-17, 488-92.
Guctry, colonel, dt'icntcd hy
Cntalans, 290.
Hahert.. Pierre, general, operations
of,in Aragon and Catalonia,284-I:i,
3(4)-1, 503.
Hlllliwcll, B., captain, R.N., burns
French ships at RoAAS, 62.
Herrasti, Andres, .lreneral, defend~
Ciudad Rodrigo, 222,240-9; sur·
renders, 253.
I1eutlelet, general, commauds 2nd
Corps, 97, 119, 213-14; at
Bussaco,309-70,
Hill, Rowlllnd, gCllcmll. rletaclul<1
to Portalegre, 216; "ellington'e
confidence in, 233; crosses the
Tagus, z.w; opposeg Replier,
26.IJ, 279, 332; marclies to join
Wellingtoll, 343-4; at Bussaco,
3M; ill tllcJ..incsofTorres Yedras,
3!l7; removed to south bank of
Tagus, 467-8, 4iJ, 476-8.
Hostalricb, combat of, 57; siege of,
208; surrender of, 297-8.
lbarrola, general, at combat of
Margalef, 304.
Infantado, Duke of, his plot agnill~t
the Junta, 4.
Iranzo, )Iiguel, general. succeeds
O'Dollnell in command in Cata-
lonia, 501.
Jaea, operations round, 11-12.
Joio, Prinf'.e Regent of Portugal,
193-4; Wellington's appeals to,
417-18.
Jones, JoJ\1I, major ilK, assists
in COlllltrnction of l ..ines of Torras
Yedras, 420; his description of
tlLem, 421, 42.'1.
JOIleph Bonaparte, King of Spain,
his plan of campaign, i3-5; llis
difficulties, 116-24, a16; his cam-
paign in Andalusia, 125; sei~es
Scville, 136-43; enters Granada,
151; his quarrels with 8o111t,
316-17; Napoleon's disregard of,
460-1,605 ; his complaints, 60.5~7 ;
threatens to abdicate, 309.
Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste, marshal,
re.sigus command UI 8pain, 74,B1.
.'nnot, Andoche, general, Duke of
Abrantes, in Leon, 221 ; in"est.q
and takes Astorga, 223-6; at
Almeida, 267; with Masseua in
Portugal, 344-61 ; at Bussaco, 367;
at sack of Voimbra, 404; before
Lines of 'I'orres Vedras, 43i-B,
44]-60; retreats, 46,5.
Junta, the Central, its dealings
with Wellington, 1,67 ; its pta:n
of campaign in 1809, 69-73; its
weakues8, ]03; its decrees, 105 ;
flies from ScvilJc and disperses,
]37-8; abdicates,14J.
Kellermanll, Fraucois Christophe,
general, in command in Loou,75,
82; occupies Salamanca, B3;
dcfeate Del Parque at Alba de
'formes, ll9, 100 ; his quarrels II'itll
King .TOMpll, 4&'3, /)()''l.
Lacy, Luiz,gelleral, at Ocana, 92-4;
defeat of, in Sierra Morena, 130-1 ;
bis expedition to .Algeeiras, 328;
his r,lia 011 Moguer, 329-30.
La Carrcrli, r..fartin, genernl, at
Tamames, ii-8; lleaT Ciudnd
Rodrigo, 25:3; at combat of Alba
de Tonnes, 100 ; at Torn>s Veclra~,
432.
Lardi~o:d, Malluel, made a mem-
11er of the Spallisll Hegcllcy,141 ;
Ilia "iews on the Cortes, lilT;
delJOSecl,618.
La Romana, Pc(JroCaro, Marquis of,
his manifesto against the Junta,
6-7, 104, 100 ; joins Sel'ille Juula,
40; commamler of Army of the
Left, 141; opposes ~lortier, 214-
16; aids the Regenc!' ofCadiz, 324-
,.,; defeated at Vii a Garcia, 331 ;
at FUCllte Cantos, 333; joins
Wellingtoll at Lillf$ of Torres
Vellras, 432,
LccclLi, general, ill Calalonia, l!J;
at siCK6 of Gerolla, HI, 27, 49.
l..cite, Francisco, Portuguese gene-
ral, commands at Rims, liG, ]flfl.
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Leit]l, Jamcs, gCUCI'l).!, commands
the troollS nt the ZC1.ere, 247 ; joins
Wellington on tile AIV:l, 344.; at
BtIllSaco, 35S, 362, 374; b;s p.ut
in the battle, 388-9 j at the Lines
of Torres Vct[ras, 430,441, 453 ;
pursues the }<'renclJ, 471, 47li, 4'i'll.
Leou, surprised by colonel Barcclla,
271.
Lcrida, si~e of, 300-8.
Linhares, ftodrigo dn SoIlS3, Conde
de, Prime Minister of Regent of
Portugal, 193,417-18.
Lisbol.l, riots ill, 416; arrests at,
417.
J.i\'crpool, Robert Earl of, his
correspondence with "'ellillgtoll,
16B-0 461-2.
Loho, .lO'iO, general, commands at
Abrantes, IBD, 455.
Loison, general, threatens Astorga,
221; at the combat of the Coo,
258, 262 ; at Bussaco, 379-82; at
the Lines of '1'orrcs VCtlrllS, 449 ;
retreats, 464.
Longa, leader of guerrilleros, 491.
I,ujan, Manuel, Liberal leader in
the Cortes, 51B.
i\Jacdonald, Etiellue, llLarshalJ Duke
of Tarentum, governor of Cat.,,~
Jonia, 299, 311; hig relief of
BarcelollR, 312; joins Suchet, 403,
405; checked at Canlona, 600;
conducts convoys to Barcelona,
493-4,501 ; returns to join Suchet,
001.
Mall}', Nicolas, geueral, commands
in GaJicilL,75, 21R; fails to relieve
.\storga, 22G j his weakness, 485.
Malaga, submits to Sebastiani, HiO.
Manresa, defeat ofSchwartz at, 205.
Marchand, general, defeated br
Del Parque at Tamames, 77, 79;
retires from .salamanca, 97; at
Bu:saco, 382.
i\fargalef, combat of, 304.
i\Iarsllall, RaJII}I, his disastrous
atwmpt to relie\'e Gerona, 3G j
slain, 47-8.
l\Iartiu, G., admiral, destroys
1<'reuch COlLl'Oy, 62.
i\Iascareulllls, JOiIo, Portuguese
traitor, his capture and execution,
271,448.
i\Iassena, Andre, marshal, Prince of
Essling, commands army of Por-
lugal, 199; Ilis plan for attacking
Portugal, 16.1; cllaractcr of,207-8;
at Ciudad Rodrigo, 246, 251 ; his
mendacious report of comhat (If
the Coa, 264-6 ; hesiegesand takes
Almeida, 2G7-75; adl'311ces iuw
Portugal, 341 ; at BllE$co, 365-85;
march('$ un Lis!x)JJ, 300-403; at
sack ofCoimbra, 404 ; vicws Lines
of Ton-cs Vedras, 442-4; llis
difficulties, 4.49-54; dillpatcheco
Foy to Paris, 4<55; Napoleon's
remarks on, 456-8; retreats, 463-
76; halts at Santarem, 477-9.
)[atagorda, fort at Cadill, 319-21.
MeLeod, major, gallant conduct of,
at the Coa, 262.
McquillcnZ6, si~ of, 309-10.
i\Jerino, Gerommo, (f:l Curn,'
leader of guerrilleros in Old
Castile, 490; lights the J....rench at
Almazan, 491.
Merle, general, his attack :ll
llussaco, 370, 38.5.
Milans, Francisco, lender of rnique-
letes,·2!ll,293. .
Milllaull, general, cltarge of, at
Ocaiia, 93; routs Blake's forces at
Ilaza,337-8.
Mina, Francisco £sllO".& y, the dder,
llis stru~glell'ith Suchet iu Aragou,
286; Ius exploits ill Navarre and
ArngOll,4B8-fl.
Mina, Xavier, the younger, 'the
Student; his exploits and capture,
u6, 212, 2U3, 2il6.
Miot de Mclito, Alldre, cOUl'tier of
King JoseplJ, 162, 500.
Monjuich, citadel of Geroll:l.,
as.OfI.lllt on, 31, 33.
Monjuich, citadel of Barcelona,
plots to capture, 24.
Montbrun, Louis--Pierre, gelleral,
discovers Lines of TOlTes Vedras,
437-9,449-60; at Santarem, 479.
Montrnarie, Kcneral, dcfeats the
Valencians near Morella, 493.
i\foore, Sir John, his views on the
defence of Portugal, 169.
Mortier, Edollard,marshal,wounded
at Ocaiia, 00; forces IJaSSeS of
Despeua Perros, ]30, 132; marches
all BadajO".&, 161, 213; reUres w
Seville, 214; defeats La Homana
at f'llente Canto.~, 333.
Murcia, capture of, br Sebastiani,
327; his second ahorth'e expedi-
tion against, 334.
J\lusnier, general, lli~ lI'(lrk in
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Aragon, 11-12; defeats O'Donnell
at combat of Mal'galef, 304.
Nallier, Sir WiUiam, his remarks
on Suchet, 308; 011 llussaco,3ai
(note), 363 (nme).
Napoleon, Emperor, superseodea
St. Cyr and Reille, 17 ; hig plans
for the campaign i.n Spain and
Portugal, 197-2Q1, 227-30; his
divorce alld nlaJ'ri~e, 198-9;
supersedes Augereau, 200; his
orders to Mass€na, 227-9, 247 ;
receives fo'oy'sreport from ;Ulls:>cna,
46(j, 458; statement of bis plans,
40$9; bis quarrels witll King
Joseph, 316, 00.5-6; schemes for
annexation of northern SIl3in,
506-10.
Navarro, GareiaJ gCllcral, dcfeawd
at Falcet, 503-4.
Nev, iI'Iichel, marsllal, Duke of
Elchingen, character of, 200;
threatens Ciudad Hodrigo, 222;
besieges Ciudad Rodrigo, 242-54 ;
advallces 011 Almeida, 257; at
COlllOat of the Coo, 259-66; invests
Almcida, 26i-71; witll !\11l&llinu
in Portugal, :140-01 ; Ilt Bna.'IIlCo,
3.55,365, 3GB; before the J..ines of
'forres Vedras, 437, HO-fiO; re-
treats, 465.
Ocaila, battle of, ~ll-O.
O'Dollllell, Charles, commands
under La Ronmna, 215, 432.
O'Donnell, Henry, officer of the
Ultonia regiment, fails to take
convoy into Gerona, 52 ; .'jurllrises
Soullam'scamp,53,oO; in command
of the Army of Catalonia, 219 ;
l!llrpriSe8 Guetry's troovs, 290;
attacks SouJlam, 289; III Tarra-
gonn., 295; routed at i\largnlef,
303-4; reorganizes his forces,
312-13; opposes Suchet at ;I'ortosa,
493 ; aUIl Macdollald,49.'i; his suc-
cessful northern raid, 497-9;
wouuded at Ut Bispal, 501 ; tribute
to his adivity, 004.
Onlenlln~aJ the Portuguese, charuc-
ter of, 181; called ont, 183;
)'fa.ssena's treatment of, and
Wellington's J;>rotest, 341-2;
blockade Almelda and Ciudad
Itodrigo, 345, 397; at tIle Lines
of 'forres Vellras, 341-4; capture
.\la.ssellll.'S aide..de-camp!', 448;
capture dispatches, 461.
Oreuse, Pedro de Quevedo, Bisholl
of, made a member of the Uegency,
141 ; refuses to take all oatll of
allegiancc to the Cortes, ami
resigns, /)18.
Orleans, Louis-llhilippe, Duke of,
his intrigues at Cadiz, 521.
Oviedo, calltured and recaptured
by Bonnet, 217-18.
l'ack, DCllllis, gCllcrdl, at Hussaco,
:'In,;, 362, 3i!), 382--3; at the Lilies
of 'J'orres Vedl'llS 441,453; pur-
sues retr~ting French, 469; at
Sautarem, 473,475, 4iR
l)alafox, Francisco, Ilia intrigues,
104, 1'11.
l'am\,lolla, general, Portuguese
advlscr of l\IaSS/!u3J 163, 348.
l)arque, Duke Del, JIee Del Parqlle.
l)avetti, 001011el, caJltured by the
Ordenam;a,3-10.
Pelet, Je~m .Jacques, colonel,
.Massena's confidence in, 210.
Pelliclle, fortress of, 188.
"erena, colonel, Ilis acth·ity in
Aragol1, 11 ; at .Lerida, 301.
l'icton, 'nlomas,general, Ilis quarrel
with Graufurd, 266; at Bussaco,
355,362,371,375; hi!! disparage-
ment of Leith, 388-9; at the Lines
of'l'orres Vellras, 430, 439, 440.
I'opham, ::;ir Home, rdids I;oasls of
Asturias and Biscay, 4$.
PorHer, .Jllall Dia:.:, 'the mar-
quesito; his activity, 83; cut.q
llonnet's oommuuications,217,219;
his exploits in Asturias, 485-7.
Portugal, geography of, 153-60;
\Velliuglon's scllelll~ for its
defence, 1(j7-90; it8army, 171-82 ;
Regency of, 193; ill\'asioll of,
by MassCllfl, 341-481; internal
troubles of, during tIle illvo.sion,
416-13.
Regellcy, the Portuguese, 193-u,
415-1i.
UcgCllOYJ Svuuisll, the jirst, llomiu-
atetl by Centr:Ll Junta, 141, 149,
014,617 i deposed hy the Cortes,
.518; tlle second, appointed by the
Cortes, 618.
HeiJIe, fJonore Charles, general, in
Catalonia, superseded, 17; com-
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mantis ill N"varre, 488, Mm; his
coutest. witJl Miua. 4S!).
Renovales, colonel, defeated by
LWAI, 11)..12; his mids 011 tbe
Arturias, 486-7.
lleruitr, Jean Louis Ebenezer,
~lIeral, takes commautl of the
2ntl Corp!, 215; op~ Hill,
269, 279, 3.32; joins llai!8Cua in
Portug7\I,3.&3-:;] ; l\t BUSMCO, 355,
366. 3&.); befo~ Linell of Torres
Vedra3.il37,442,450; retreats,465.
46lJ, 470; at Salltarem, 471, 475.
Itovira, Uoclor lo'.. leader of
miquelctCll, 16, 42, 291-3.
~,,\\'edm, Francisco, Ilultle hello.! of
the Juuta at Se\'ille, 140; member
of the first llegeucr, ]41; deposed
bv Ule Cortes, 528.
Salllte-Croix, general, his oper,,-
tions on honlers of Galicia, 22.3;
eommAnrls Massena'g ,wV1Uw:e,
391-2,435; killed,440.
St. err, LaureDt Cou\-ion, ~ue­
ral, his campaign iu Cata-
loum, 14.-17; super'lOeded, 17; at
Geroua, 30; his \;eWll 011 the
fiicge, 48; bkes oomml1l11l, 50;
gives it Mer to '\lIgereAIl, S3;
criticism of his conduct, 03.
~ancllez, Julian, guerrillero cllief,
aa; in Ciudad Rodrigo, :l41;
l!fiC1llJefi, 248; blockudus t'iudad
Rodrigo, 447; rendel'l'l aid to
Wellin,{Ctoll,4oo,
Sanson, 'l'reuch engineer geueral,
his plans for siege of Gerona, 27.
Sallta-lo"c, Manano, Duke of,
15pallish ellWY at Paris, 500.
Santnrem, geoenl Ebll'! at, "M;
Frendl retreat on, 472 ; skimii...h
At, 473.
&intociltles,Josi, defend3 Astorga,
221,225_6.
Scllwa,rb, general, defealed at
Manre.;a, 295; surprised aud c:3p-
tured at wBispal, 408.
ScbBStinni, Horaee, gellcral, 'lit
eombRt of Ontigolll, all; defeats
I\reizaga, 129-32; subdues Granada
and Malaga, 150; plullders i\lureia,
327; marches against Ulake, 3a4 ;
defeats Lord Blayuey, ~,
Serr.ll:l,gcncral, colllmands IIro"ince
of Loon, 270-1, 483; his nttcmllts
to Clltch PorHer, 486.
Seville, conspiracies in, 4; Central
JWlta al, 4, GB j abantloued by
Central Juula, 139; re\'olutiolls
in, 141 j l!urrenderstoJ06Cph,143.
Sihein, Io'J'Illlcisco, 1teneral, corn·
mantis the TralHIS-Montee, 176-7 ;
captures Puebla de SellabriA, 270;
blockades AJmeida, 447, 485, 487,
Sobral, operatiull8 arowld, 414,~,
440,443.
Soullltm, ,J06Cph, general, his carnl'
surpri!!Cl'1 hy O'Oonllell, J),1 ;
checked by O'Donnell, 200;
defeats O'Dollnell at Vieh, 292;
rejoills J\laedonald, 601.
Soult, Nicholfls, marshal, Duke of
Dallllatiu, sllcuecds Jourtlllu 1Il!l
l:hicf of the fllaff ill Spain, i4, 8t ;
df'fentil i\rei1.l1p at Oealill, 91-6;
his ll!ans forconquest of .o\ndalusill,
121_1); fon:es tile passes, 128-32;
his role ill AndalUSia, alS-lU;
opel'3ti.on& of,~t La RomalJ.ll,
331 ; Napoleon's censure of, 433:
hill !lelfish policy, 458--9, 506.
&lIlt, I)ierre, genenl, lit loines of
Torres Vedras, 437; at Salltarem,
479.
Sou;;a, Jose Antollio, 'thePrincipaI,'
member of l)ol1uguese !{CKeucy,
influonce of big family, 193; his
fluar....lll with Wellington, 41.',-17.
Sousa.Holsteill, Pedro, l)ortuKUC8e
ambass:Jdor, intrigues of, at Cadi",
105, 1)2U.
:;ausa, Rodrigo, ~ee Coude du Lill·
hares.
SteWll1, Willialll, gCllcral, lak..'>:I
British troop" to Cadiz, 148; sue.
ceeded b}' Graham, 320.
Stunt, C:harlell, ambassador lit
Lil;boll, member of l'orluguese
Regellc)·,IW,-o,
Suchet, Loui8-Gabriel, manlhal, hill'
conquest of Aragon, 10-14, 282;
marchell 011 "alencia, 283-4;
besiegell autl captures Lerillll, 300-
9; takes )lClIUillf>-DZa, 300-10;
before Tortosa, 402; puts Caro to
flight, 491 ; his iuaetioll, W2.
Taboadll, ~'rtlllci!!OO Gil, ~nerlll,
caplures J'uebla de Seullbrin, 270.
Talllallles, battle of, WOII hy Del
I'arque, i7-9,
Tcruel, 0lleratio1l8 of Suchel
aroulltl, ]3, 28~,
Torrero, Murioz, Liberal deputy ill
Cartes, 6]8.
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To~ Vedrns, Line! 0(, HlI-2;
Wellington retreats on I 393-413 ;
description of, 419-00.
Tortosa, Suehet before, 493;
O'VouueU attempts to aid, 493;
blockade of, 496.
Traut, Nicbolas, (;olonel, attacks
iUaMCUa'i! artillcr},traill, 3bO, aM;
routed hy French Cll\'alr)'atSardio,
aoo; seizes Coimbra, 410, 411.
Trcmendal, combat of, ll.
Valencia, Jose: Caro's domination
at, 6-7; Suchet's abortive attack
ou, 284; uper..tiOlljj of tilll arm)'
0(,~ Caro, Jose.
Vlliverl1e, combat of, 211,.
Vaughllll, Charles, his remarks 011
the CoI"te$, ,s2a.
Venegas, FraJJciliCO, general, mili-
lary governor of Vadi:r., 14G-7;
vicero~of lUexico, 149.
Verdier;ge.neral, supel"lledes Reille,
18; besieges GeronaJ 19--48;
thro'll1l up his commalld, 49;
criticism of hi! couduct of tlle
siege, 64.
Viell, battle of, 291-:l.
Victor, Claude Perrill, mal"l!hal,
Duke of llelhlllO, O!lCr'dtiOllS of,
IlgainstArcizagaJ 86-7; commands
l!lt Corps ill conquest of- Anda-
lusia, 125-33; recei\'C8 surrender
of Sel'ille, 143; marches 011 Cadiz,
146; besieges it, 31U-22.
Vigodet, Gaspar, general, defeated
ill the Sierr.l Moreua, 132.
Villacampa, general, operations of,
ill Aragon, ll, l3, 282, 283, 286,
310, 339; hllr8S8eS Sachet, 503;
defeated at Ah'entosa and }'neD-
santa, 500-
Villafnllca, French drh'en out of,
""'.VilIagarcia comoot of, 331.
Villatte, oolonel, expedition of,296.
Villa Velhll, bridge of, its impor-
tance, 166, 189; destroyed by
CarlO!! d'Espai'ia, 455.
Vizeu, l\Iassella at, ;)C>l-\J.
\VlI.lIl100, colollcl Ale;(., hill cbarge
at BU!l8aOO, 372--3.
Wellesley, HOD. HeIIrY, lIIinister at
Cadiz,522.
Well~e)', Richard, MlIrquis, his
negotiations with the Central
Junta, 3, 67; becomes Foreign
Seeretarr, 168.
\VellillgtoD, Arthur, Viscount, }lis
dealiugs with the Central Junta,
1,68,72; retreats into PortugalJ
107-11; llis 111311 of defeuce of
]'ortugnl, 167 ; oollccntmtes his
forces Ileal' the frontier, 243;
refu!!e!I to mOl'C forward to Cindad
Itodrigo, 245; criticism of C1'3.U-
Curd, 266; watches Almeida, 274-
9; pre(lares to lIleet Ma.s;;ella,
34.5; at Bu;;sacu, 352-61; wins
battle of BUSlSaCOJ 362-30 ; retreats
on Torres Vedl'll!!, 303-413;
quarrels u;th Principal Sousa.,
"U6-17; disposes troop" at Torres
Vedr.l.!i, 439; Napoleon's remarks
on, -1.57; pun;ues retreating
french, 4G8-;B; stop€ at &n-
tarelll, 47B; his views on thc
Corte&, .~22.
White, Blalloo, Liberal journalist,
llis views, 616 (notl), .51G.
\\ril80lI, John, general,operatiollS
of, Oll the French rear, 47tl,
Xe..., Suchet's flotillas captured
by insurgents at, 503; siege
material for Tort08ll at, 5W.
ZalatneaJ oombat of, 216. .
Za)'llS, J., general, ill the Ocaua
l;aIupaig"Il, 87, 92, 00.
Zcrain, T., gellcrnl, routed b)'
Victor, 133; retires to So,·jUe,
137.
Zcz.ere, ril'er, line of, fortified b)'
Wellington, 100; :\lassCUlI's
operations Oil tIle, ,155.
Ziz.audre, river, fortification along,
ill UIC Liues of T()r1'(~ V(."I!rd~,
423.
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